I guess a verbal flourish can be difficult to translate.

I don't know what to say about that.

:up:

And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. — Phaedo 69c

Socrates is talking about the Bacchants, those who have been initiated into the rites of Bacchus, that is, Dionysus; the god of the grape, wine, and fertility. Wearing masks is also part of the rituals. The Socrates' and Plato's masks are significant in this context.

Here too the irony should not be lost. Socrates' talk of phronesis and moderation are in sharp contrast to the divine madness the rituals were intended to induce. But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites.

But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites. — Fooloso4

Well, if Socrates was not opposed to divine madness, why would he be opposed to the Bacchic rites?

And, anyway, at 72c and 72d he vindicates the doctrine of rebirth and of learning as recollection does he not?

So, the text does seem to have a spiritual message after all, and it isn't only "comedy"?

Thank you @Fooloso4 for https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/538287
You are right the book you mentioned does sound interesting but expensive !!
Here is another : 'Laughter, Humor, and Comedy in Ancient Philosophy'

The introduction by the editors, Pierre Destrée and Franco V. Trivigno, explains the organization of the book in three sections, on the psychology of laughter, the norms that govern humor, and the way philosophers make use of humor in their works. In fact, there is no sharp division among the chapters, and, as is to be expected, a good deal of overlap.

As the editors note (8), the primary type of humor turns out to be abrasive or polemical, and Plato's treatment of humor in relation to phthonos ("envy," "malice") is a theme that runs throughout.

It is also the focus of the opening chapter, by Trivigno, who observes that "Plato's explicit theorizing about laughter and comedy is . . . focused on particular sorts of laughter that are presented as morally harmful" (13). Laughter poses a double danger: it threatens to become uncontrollable and overwhelms one's judgement, appealing as it does to the lower part of the soul. Furthermore, the pleasure it provides is mixed, as Plato argues in the Philebus, since the envious feel pain at the success of others even as they delight in the anticipation of their failure.

In the Laws, however, Plato contemplates dividing "comedy into two kinds, according to whether it is playful [paizein] or not" (935D), the latter being free of animosity.

When Socrates makes fun of his interlocutors, Trivigno suggests, his humor is not hostile but aims at their moral improvement. Whether this counts as playful is perhaps questionable. — Book review by David Konstan

[my bolds]

Again, we see the opposites pain and delight > mixed pleasure.

I guess a verbal flourish can be difficult to translate. — frank

Sure. But he wasn't translating. He was reading Gallop's English translation.

1. How did he misread that?

2. Why was he so quick to read so much into his own misreading?

As I have said before, with the dialogues we need to look not only at what is said but at what is done. — Fooloso4

Indeed. And I have kept that in mind when reading.
It is something I am alert to in real life, including being aware of my own actions and if I follow my own advice. Some things are easier said than done :wink:

BTW, Greeks, like others in the ancient world, were aware that great civilizations preceded them. They liked to think of themselves as descendants of the great elders (and they were, they just didn't know how as we do).

They would have been predisposed to honor old wisdom. We're the opposite. We think of ourselves as the highest point humanity has yet reached. We look with suspicion on our elders, ready to snicker at their folly.

So it probably helps to put ourselves in Plato's shoes in order to understand him.

So it probably helps to put ourselves in Plato's shoes in order to understand him. — frank

Correct. And the crux of the matter is, are they the shoes (1) of a philosopher or (2) of an author of comedy? I think the evidence tends to suggest (1) as the correct answer.

— Phaedo 69c

Socrates is talking about the Bacchants, those who have been initiated into the rites of Bacchus, that is, Dionysus; the god of the grape, wine, and fertility. Wearing masks is also part of the rituals. The Socrates' and Plato's masks are significant in this context.

Here too the irony should not be lost. Socrates' talk of phronesis and moderation are in sharp contrast to the divine madness the rituals were intended to induce. But, as the Phaedrus makes clear, Socrates was not opposed to divine madness. There is here, once again, a play of opposites — Fooloso4

Again, interesting information. I didn't know about the Bacchants.

Good to follow the continuing themes as outlined in the OP:

As we shall see, opposites will play an important part in Socrates’ stories. — Fooloso4

:cool:

The interplay.
The pain and the pleasure.
The chains and release.
Life and death.
Body and spirit.
The tragi-comedy of the human experience...

There is here, once again, a play of opposites. — Fooloso4

Of course there is. That is Plato's obvious method. But his play of opposites suggests that another reason for using humor may have been to provide a counterweight to the seriousness of the subject matter.

After all, spirit is light and joy. Humor is uplifting, while a somber mood may be depressing. And the purpose of philosophy is to elevate the spirit. Combining humor with metaphysical teachings does not seem to be a contradiction.

Correct. And the crux of the matter is, are they the shoes (1) of a philosopher or (2) of an author of comedy? — Apollodorus

Playwrights were big celebrities back then. I don't know, probably best to just drop it, huh? There's more important stuff in the world. :grin:

Playwrights were big celebrities back then. I don't know, probably best to just drop it, huh? There's more important stuff in the world — frank

lol I think you might be right there. But maybe we should wait for the final verdict before we give up completely?

I didn't know about the Bacchants. — Amity

I should add, in case it is not obvious, that wine and fertility are about bodily pleasures. And yet, Socrates throughout the dialogue has railed against the pleasures of the body. Here too, the context is "being mastered by pleasure" and the "exchange pleasures for pleasures", but he refers to the rites of the Bacchants "Riddles" and "mysteries" indeed!

Socrates is quite clear it is not rites that purify:

Exchanged for one another without wisdom such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth, whereas, in truth, moderation and courage and justice are a purging away of all such things, and phronesis itself is a kind of cleansing or purification. (69c)

There is, however, one more piece of the puzzle:

There are indeed, as those concerned with the mysteries say, many who carry the thyrsus but the Bacchants are few. These latter are, in my opinion, no other than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way.(69d)

The thyrsus is the wand, but not all who carry the wand and participate in the rites understand them. They have, as it were, the props and go through the motions, but do not practice philosophy in the right way. And, if any confusion still remains, once again, practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice".

practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice". — Fooloso4

I think that was already obvious. But practising moderation and courage and justice must be considered in the context of Socrates' belief in rebirth, etc. as discussed at 72a - 72d.

Socrates now summarizes Cebes’ argument but makes a significant change without Cebes’ noticing. Did he forget his own argument? Cebes said that every soul wears out many bodies, but Socrates says:

... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d)

As if to emphasize this change, Socrates says:

I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.

And Cebes said:

There is nothing that I want to add or subtract at the moment. That is what I say.(95d-e)

After Cebes says this:

Socrates paused for a long time, deep in thought. (95e)

Then says:

"This is no unimportant problem that you raise, Cebes, for it requires a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction. I will, if you wish, give you an account of my experience in these matters. (96a)

One might think that what will follow is a discussion of natural science.

Listen then, and I will, Cebes, he said. When I was a young man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it splendid to know the causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it is. (96a)

But he did not find the answers he sought.

One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best. (97b-d)

Socrates accepted Mind as the cause, but instead of inquiring about what Mind is, or how it arranged things, he sought an explanation for why it is best that things be the way they are. He did not find such an explanation in Anaxagoras or anywhere else. He thus launched his “second sailing” to find the cause. (99d).

After this, he said, when I had wearied of looking into beings, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material. A similar thought crossed my mind, and I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true. (99d-100a)

Those familiar with the Republic will recall the story of the ascent from the cave where it was necessary to first look at images of things (beings) before being able to look at things themselves, and then finally looking at images of the sun before looking at the sun itself.

With his “second sailing” Socrates looks to what seems best in a double sense. First, he wants to understand how it is best that things are arranged by Mind as they are, and second, having failed to understand things as they are, that is, to attain truth and knowledge, he seeks what seems to be the best argument.

I am going to try to show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they
exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and to find the soul to be immortal.
Take it that I grant you this, said Cebes, and hasten to your conclusion. (100b-c)

Cebes does not really seem interested in the forms and agrees without question in order to get to the point that concerns him, the immortality of the soul.

Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause?—I do.

I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. (100c-e)

Socrates does not attempt to describe the precise relationship of beautiful things to Beauty itself. One would think it important to do so if it is to be accepted as philosophically sound. He settles instead for the “safest answer”. The image of sailing brings to mind, or rather, as we may recall, a “recollection” of the image of the raft sailing through life in the midst of danger.

It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account. (85c-d)

According to Simmias' image, if we cannot gain knowledge, the raft will be out of our control and tossed about, unless there is a more stable carrier, some divine account. Is Socrates’ safe account just such an account? What is the cost of passage?

Socrates “assumes” the existence of the Beautiful itself and a Good itself, and so on. He does not try to prove them and does not say how they actually relate to things.

Recollect also the following: Socrates said he persuades himself that what he says seems to be true, (91a) which is very different from attempting to say what seems to be true. Is he trying to persuade himself that the forms seem to be true? Has he been successful? However we may answer this, one thing should be obvious: if the myth of recollection was true, none of this would be necessary. He would have simply recollected what he knew from being dead, the existence of Beauty itself, Justice Itself, the Good itself, and all the rest.

Socrates ends with a very odd bit of advice:

Then would you not avoid saying that when one is added to one it is the addition and when it is divided it is the division that is the cause of two? And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness, and you would dismiss these additions and divisions and other such subtleties, and leave them to those wiser than yourself to answer. But you, afraid, as they say, of your own shadow and your inexperience, would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another. (101c-d)

When one is added to one it is not the addition of one to one that makes two but it is two by sharing in Twoness. Socrates tells him that he should “loudly exclaim” this. Yelling has seemed to take the place of persuasion by reason.

And when you must give an account of your hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable, but you will not jumble the two as the debaters do by discussing both the beginning and what emerges out of it, if you wish to discover any truth … but if you are a philosopher I think you will do as I say.”
What you say is very true, said Simmias and Cebes together. (101d-102a)

Compare this to the description of dialectic the Republic:


"Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole. When it has grasped this, argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too." (511b)

In the Republic hypothesis is used to get free of hypothesis, back to the beginning of the whole. Here, however, Cebes and Simmias are told to go from hypothesis to hypothesis, but they do not free themselves from hypothesis. They are told not to discuss the beginning, but, of course, they can’t because they have not arrived at the beginning. They have not arrived at the forms. At best they have arrived at what seems to them best. The philosopher, if Cebes and Simmias are philosophers, does not have knowledge of the whole either through dialectic or recollection.

if the myth of recollection was true, none of this would be necessary. He would have simply recollected what he knew from being dead, the existence of Beauty itself, Justice Itself, the Good itself, and all the rest. — Fooloso4

I think you are missing some important points, e.g.:

1. Full recollection of past knowledge is not automatic. it needs training by means of philosophy, etc. and may require more than one lifetime to develop fully.

2. What you recollect in this life depends on what you knew in your past life or lives. If you were not a fully enlightened soul in your past life then you wouldn't have experienced Beauty Itself, Justice Itself, the Good Itself, and all the rest, and you couldn't recollect all that in this life.

I should add, in case it is not obvious, that wine and fertility are about bodily pleasures. And yet, Socrates throughout the dialogue has railed against the pleasures of the body. Here too, the context is "being mastered by pleasure" and the "exchange pleasures for pleasures", but he refers to the rites of the Bacchants "Riddles" and "mysteries" indeed! — Fooloso4

Thanks for further explanation.
Sometimes things need spelling out, even if they might seem obvious to others.

Even when things seem more clear or obvious as we discuss the dialogue, repetition does no harm.
Indeed, I think there are instances of such in the text. To reinforce or to replay the arguments all the better for analysis and assessment of any conclusions.
This helps to consolidate any short term 'Aha, got it!' or 'OK...but not quite there yet' into the long term memory. All the better for later recall. No rebirth required.

Memory recall or retrieval is remembering the information or events that were previously encoded and stored in the brain. Retrieval is the third step in the processing of memory, with first being the encoding of memory and second, being the storage of the memory. Retrieval of the encoded and stored memory is very important because otherwise there is no point in storing information.

I repeat the themes in my posts because it helps keep them in mind as I go.
For example: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/538325

Those familiar with the Republic will recall the story of the ascent from the cave where it was necessary to first look at images of things (beings) before being able to look at things themselves, and then finally looking at images of the sun before looking at the sun itself. — Fooloso4

Yes. I recall that, even if I am not overly familiar with it. Thanks for the memory :cool:
I had thought of it fleetingly in the previous discussion re chains and release. Freedom from the painful fetters - the pain gradually being eased as Socrates rubs his legs. It is a process.
Just like the pain and pleasure of reading a difficult text...

So, people learn through repetition; the repetition builds paths in our brain. Once people have been down the same path a few times, they find the place quicker next time round.

That is why I am struggling and others might find it all too obvious and have a quicker pace.

The thyrsus is the wand, but not all who carry the wand and participate in the rites understand them. They have, as it were, the props and go through the motions, but do not practice philosophy in the right way. And, if any confusion still remains, once again, practicing philosophy in the right way means,
"in truth, moderation and courage and justice". — Fooloso4

Understood. But got a long way to go...thanks for being a guide along the way :sparkle:
Even if you are not an Absolutely Perfect Sage :wink:

That is why I am struggling and others might find it all too obvious and have a quicker pace. — Amity

The problem may be that others are only too quick to proclaim what is all too obvious and not pace themselves slowly enough to attend to the details that can turn the obvious into something quite different.

So, people learn through repetition; the repetition builds paths in our brain. Once people have been down the same path a few times, they find the place quicker next time round. — Amity

Consider the following from my last post. Socrates says:

I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.(95d)/quote]

As I pointed out:

Socrates now summarizes Cebes’ argument but makes a significant change without Cebes’ noticing. Did he forget his own argument? Cebes said that every soul wears out many bodies, but Socrates says:

... the soul in its very entering into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease (95d) — Fooloso4

Also consider what Socrates says about incantations. Sometimes we come to believe something is true just through repetition.

The problem may be that others are only too quick to proclaim what is all too obvious and not pace themselves slowly enough to attend to the details that can turn the obvious into something quite different. — Fooloso4

Have you considered that "others" possibly includes yourself?

The OP says “The question arises as to whether this [Phaedo] is a comedy or a tragedy”.

IMO the discussion so far has failed to show that Phaedo is a “comedy”.

If anything, it is a tragedy (τραγῳδία tragodia) in the traditional sense of drama invoking an accompanying catharsis, or a "pain [that] awakens pleasure", for the audience, with a very clear spiritual message.

In your own words, "Plato did write and he is a very capable storyteller, capable of the greatest music. His dialogues are akin to the work of the poets’ plays".

The fact is Plato is far greater than a "very capable storyteller" or "poet", as stressed time and again by later Platonists. So, the real question is for what reason you choose to deny this.

The OP says “The question arises as to whether this [Phaedo] is a comedy or a tragedy”. — Apollodorus

There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. There's no story arc.

There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. There's no story arc. — frank

"Drama" in the sense of "play". Obviously, not a conventional one. But it does contain elements of tragedy and comedy and has a spiritual message to convey. So, maybe something like the mystery plays of antiquity only more complex and sophisticated?

But it does contain elements of tragedy and comedy and has a spiritual message to convey. So, maybe something like the mystery plays of antiquity only more complex and sophisticated? — Apollodorus

If that's what it becomes for you, fine. The dialogue format was popular at the time. It's just the format Plato used.

I don't see a spiritual message. I see the expression of ideas that will course through philosophy for the next 2400 years.

To each his own?

I don't see a spiritual message. I see the expression of ideas that will course through philosophy for the next 2400 years. — frank

You don't have to see anything. The dialogues can be interpreted on many different levels, such as literal, allegorical, etc.

Platonism, by which I mean the philosophical and mystical tradition that regards itself as closely following Plato, does see a spiritual message in the dialogues, though.

But, as you say, "to each his own".

Platonism, by which I mean the philosophical and mystical tradition that regards itself as closely following Plato, does see a spiritual message in the dialogues, though. — Apollodorus

Of course. Have you read any books about Meister Eckhart?

I am enjoying this discussion so much. All the different points of view which lead to more intriguing questions. More food for thought:

Plato was not willing to go as far as Socrates did. He preferred to address the public at large through his written dialogues rather than conducting dialogues in the agora.

He did not write abstruse philosophical treatises but engaging philosophical dialogues meant to appeal to a less philosophically inclined audience. The dialogues are, most of the time, prefaced by a sort of mise en scène in which the reader learns who the participants to the dialogue are, when, where and how they presently met, and what made them start their dialogue.

The participants are historical and fictional characters. Whether historical or fictional, they meet in historical or plausible settings, and the prefatory mises en scène contain only some incidental anachronisms.

Plato wanted his dialogues to look like genuine, spontaneous dialogues accurately preserved. How much of these stories and dialogues is fictional? It is hard to tell, but he surely invented a great deal of them. References to traditional myths and mythical characters occur throughout the dialogues.

However, starting with the Protagoras and Gorgias, which are usually regarded as the last of his early writings, Plato begins to season his dialogues with self-contained, fantastical narratives that we usually label his ‘myths’. His myths are meant, among other things, to make philosophy more accessible. — SEP article: Plato's Myths

For Plato we should live according to what reason is able to deduce from what we regard as reliable evidence. This is what real philosophers, like Socrates, do. But the non-philosophers are reluctant to ground their lives on logic and arguments. They have to be persuaded. One means of persuasion is myth. Myth inculcates beliefs. It is efficient in making the less philosophically inclined, as well as children (cf. Republic 377a ff.), believe noble things....


Myth can embody in its narrative an abstract philosophical doctrine. In the Phaedo, Plato develops the so-called theory of recollection (72e–78b). The theory is there expounded in rather abstract terms. The eschatological myth of the Phaedo depicts the fate of souls in the other world, but it does not “dramatize” the theory of recollection. — As above

33 - LAST JUDGMENTS: PLATO, POETRY AND MYTH
Peter Adamson

Plato criticized both the epic poetry of Homer and Hesiod, and the tragic and comic poets. Yet he invented myths of his own. So what was his attitude towards literature and myth? Peter tackles this question in a final episode on Plato.

Audio Player - c. 20mins.
https://historyofphilosophy.net/plato-myth
The History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps - King's College London.

Excellent, easy to listen to - knowledgeable with light touches of humour. Er.
I think the bit about Phaedo is roughly 12min in. But the whole thing including the background to the music at start is enjoyable :cool:

From an interview with Stanley Rosen, an influential scholar who has written extensively on Plato:

ROSEN: Well, firstly, the approach to the Platonic dialogues has changed over the course of history. For example, in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously. And they read very complicated views into what would look to, say, the members of the contemporary analytical tradition like extremely trivial and secondary stylistic characteristics. Secondly, there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer. And we now know, of course, that Heidegger in his lectures on the Sophist took the details of the dialogue very seriously. So, that has to be said in order for us to understand that the apparent heterodoxy or eccentricity of Leo Strauss’ approach to the Platonic dialogues is such a heterodoxy only with respect to the kind of positivist and analytical approach to Plato ... Final point, within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue as though they discovered this. More directly, the Strauss approach is characterized by a fine attention to the dramatic structure, the personae, all the details in the dialogues because they were plays, and also by very close analyses. https://college.holycross.edu/diotima/n1v2/rosen.htm

Rosen demonstrates the approach in Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image.

A few more points from the interview that are worth considering:

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.

For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third.

First of all, there is no unanimity in the tradition of reading Plato. I told you that what passed for orthodoxy is no longer orthodox. The same analysts who made fun of Leo Strauss and me and his other students, today are copying us, but with no acknowledgment. They are copying the Straussian methods, but not as well. Leo Strauss is a much more careful reader and a more imaginative reader, and I certainly am as well. You get these inferior, inferior versions of the same methods they criticized ten years ago. This thesis of a long, orthodox tradition, that’s nonsense. It doesn’t exist. Even if it did, it would show nothing.

The degree to which tidbits might be buried in what looks like offhand comments is very different issue to that of the dialogue's status as a play.

The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him. — Fooloso4

That happens to be correct. But works of this type were not meant to be studied on your own because in that case you could reach any kind of conclusion that might be diametrically opposed to the author's own outlook. These texts were normally read under the guidance of a qualified teacher.

In any case, precisely because the dialogues are intended to stimulate the reader to think for himself, it doesn't seem proper to tell him from the start to stick to a materialist interpretation of the text. Let the reader decide for himself.

Of course. Have you read any books about Meister Eckhart? — frank

Yes, I have. I think Eckhart's teachings come very close to the mysticism within the Platonic tradition.