In Buddhist texts, the pursuit of gain is discouraged - ‘ no gaining idea’. The Buddha is said to have said ‘I have realised the supreme enlightenment and have gained nothing thereby’. — Wayfarer

Now I think I have heard this before, but it's a fascinating perspective. You can minimize it if you have attained it. But I guess you shouldn't go after it as this is ego driven and possibly vainglorious.

What is gained by living a contemplative life?

I can't quite follow this one, Tim. Can you expand on knowledge of ideas? I have assumed that esoteric means that which cannot be described but is understood as a kind of revealed wisdom. — Tom Storm

Maybe, please allow me to be lazy, for efficiency's sake, if it works. If you think you know anything about arithmetic, list just one piece of such knowledge here. My point being that whatever you list, it will be about ideas. And since an idea is not a thing, there can be no knowledge of it. Of ideas themselves, as, say, listed, there can (of course) be knowledge. But if you know anything about seven, for example, I'd be glad to read. Point?

What is gained by living a contemplative life? — Tom Storm

There are benefits but not necessarily personal gains. The first Buddhist book I read was the very popular book Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind. It stresses 'giving up gaining ideas' while practising zazen. I came to realise that this attitude is what makes it a 'religious' practice, in the sense that it requires devotion, while not seeking to get something from it. This has to do with the dynamics of ego - so long as the self is concerned for itself, then that is self-centered motivation. Practicing for no personal gain is altruistic motivation.

Examples from throughout the history of Western philosophy are given here: https://press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/index.html — Fooloso4

That is highly germane to this topic - thanks for posting it.

:up:

There were no actual sages? — Wayfarer

No actual sages in the sense of having divine knowledge. At least none that Socrates ever met and none that he identified as such. Someone worshiped for possessing divine wisdom does not necessarily possess it.

According to the IEP entry on Hadot:

The Sage was the living embodiment of wisdom, “the highest activity human beings can engage in . . . which is linked intimately to the excellence and virtue of the soul” (WAP 220). Across the schools, Socrates himself was agreed to have been perhaps the only living exemplification of such a figure (his his avowed agnoia notwithstanding).

by ignoring esotericism, we risk cutting ourselves off from a full understanding of Western philosophical thought.
— Melzer

That would never happen. Not in a million years. Everyone is aware of that. — Wayfarer

There are a great many scholars who do in fact either ignore it or deny it.

There are a great many scholars who do in fact either ignore it or deny it. — Fooloso4

Yes, apologies for being sarcastic.

One of my favorite 'underrated' philosophers is Kojeve, and the sage is central to his interpretation of Hegel.

The end of history as it is understood by Kojève is, of course, not the end of historical processes and events. Rather, Kojève believed that history is not merely a chain of events but has a telos, and that this telos can be achieved, and actually is already achieved. According to the Platonic–Hegelian tradition in which Kojève situated his discourse, this telos is wisdom. Kojève understands wisdom as perfect self-transparency, self-knowledge. The Wise Man knows the reasons for all his actions; he can explain them, translate them into rational language. The emergence of the Wise Man, of the Sage, is the telos of history. At the moment at which the Sage emerges history ends. — link

Basically, the theory goes, Hegel was the sage, or roughly the point where a roughly perfected self-consciousness or self-transparency was achieved, where the cat catches its tail, finally. The sage depends upon the work and wars of the past as well as of continuous, evolving conversation of preceding (mere) philosophers...and is in some sense just the one who recognizes that the dialectic has grasped its own nature, puts the last stone of the pile, completing the structure.

Here one can ask: but why is history needed for the Sage to emerge? Indeed, one can assume that it is possible to become a Sage at any moment of history – it is enough to decide to practice introspection, self-reflection, self-analysis, instead of being exclusively interested in the outside world. From the very earliest of times until now we have heard often enough the requirement to initiate metanoia – to turn our attention from dealing with the everyday world towards introspection.

However, Kojève, following Hegel, does not believe that such a shift is possible under ordinary circumstances, that it can be effectuated by a simple decision to switch one’s attention from the contemplation of the world to self-contemplation. Such a voluntary decision would be possible only if ‘the subject’ were ontologically different from the world and opposed to the world, as Plato or Descartes believed it to be. But Kojève develops his discourse in the postmetaphysical, post-religious age. He wants to be radically atheistic; and that means for him that under ‘normal conditions’ man is a part of the world and human consciousness is completely captured by the world. — link

https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/romantic-bureaucracy-2

It's a spectacular theory (which I find true at the level of various fragments.) Some thinkers have questioned whether Kojeve was being ironic or playful with his theory(he's suspected of being a spy, joked about being a god.) You can find a portrait of him and his scene here:
https://books.openedition.org/editionsbnf/387?lang=en

Perhaps the core of Hegel’s philosophy is the idea that human history is the history of thought as it attempts to understand itself and its relation to its world. History is the history of reason, as it grapples with its own nature and its relation to that with which it is confronted (other beings, nature, the eternal).
...
With the beginnings of Socratic philosophy, however, division and separation is introduced into thought – customary answers to questions of truth, morality, and reality are brought under suspicion. A questioning ‘I’ emerges, one that experiences itself as distinct and apart from other beings, from customary rules, and from a natural world that becomes an ‘object’ for it. This introduces into experience a set of ‘dualisms’ – between subject and object, man and nature, desire and duty, the human and the divine, the individual and the collectivity.
...
Kojève follows Marx’s ‘inverted Hegelianism’ by understanding the labor of historical development in broadly ‘materialist’ terms. The making of history is no longer simply a case of reason at work in the world, but of man’s activity as a being who collectively produces his own being. This occurs through the labor of appropriating and transforming his material world in order to satisfy his own needs. Whereas Hegel’s idealism gives priority to the forms of consciousness that produce the world as experienced, Kojève follows Marx in tying consciousness to the labor of material production and the satisfaction of human desires thereby. While Hegel recuperates human consciousness into a theological totality (Geist or ‘Absolute Spirit’), Kojève secularises human history, seeing it as solely the product of man’s self-production. Whereas Hegelian reconciliation is ultimately the reconciliation of man with God (totality or the Absolute), for Kojève the division of man from himself is transcended in humanist terms. If Hegel sees the end of history as the final moment of reconciliation with God or Spirit, Kojève (Like Feurbach and Marx) sees it as the transcendence of an illusion, in which God (man’s alienated essence, Wesen) is reclaimed by man. Whereas the Hegelian totality provides a prior set of ontological relations between man and world waiting to be apprehended by a maturing consciousness, Kojève sees human action as the transformative process that produces those ontological relations. While Hegel arguably presents a ‘panlogistic’ relation between man and nature, unifying the two in the Absolute, Kojève sees a fundamental disjunction between the two domains, providing the conditions for human self-production through man’s negating and transforming activities. — link

https://iep.utm.edu/kojeve/#H5

As you can see, Kojeve envisioned an atheist sage. One could argue that we're still chasing the end of history, which is a Heaven down here on earth.:

For Kojève, historical reconciliation will culminate in the equal recognition of all individuals. This recognition will remove the rationale for war and struggle, and so will usher-in peace. In this way, history, politically speaking, culminates in a universal (global) order which is without classes or distinctions – in Hegelian terms, there are no longer any ‘masters’ and ‘slaves’, only free human beings who mutually recognise and affirm each others’ freedom. This political moment takes the form of law, which confers universal recognition upon all individuals, thereby satisfying the particular individual’s desire to be affirmed as an equal amongst others. — IEP

The lectures themselves are found here: https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/25851/files/2016/02/KOJEVE-introduction-to-the-reading-of-hegel-zg6tm7.pdf

No actual sages in the sense of having divine knowledge. — Fooloso4

I don’t regard ‘divine knowledge’ as interchangeable with higher knowledge. Not all wisdom teachings are necessarily theistic. I suspect that it’s the reflexive association of ‘higher’ with ‘divine’ that is often at the basis of the rejection of the idea of ‘higher truth’.

How self-assured does that claim need to be for you to abandon communication? If someone came up to you and said "Hi, I'm a Buddhist Oshō" would that be sufficient claim to exalted epistemic status for you to just walk away? Or do they have to actually say "...and I know things you don't"? — Isaac

It's very simple: Such people don't engage in dialogue to begin with. They just preach. It's one-way communication. They declare their exalted status and move on.

Such people don't engage in dialogue to begin with. They just preach. It's one-way communication. They declare their exalted status and move on. — baker

Good answer.

In none of those cultures had the fact-value dichotomy, which became apparent in Hume, appeared. In those other cultures, sound judgement, or sagacity, did not only concern those matters which could be measured. It's the development of that outlook, in which facts and values became separated, that I think is the historical issue at hand. — Wayfarer

I see a parallel in the way art has been perceived in European culture: over time, there emerged a clear distinction between folk art (or popular art) and high art (academic art, art proper). There is the sense that folk art (or popular art) is what people do when they don't have the education, the skill, the talent, and the socio-economic status to do proper art. With that, folk art (or popular art) is also devalued, discredited, as "not actually art".
(This distinction doesn't seem to be so sharp in American culture, though.)

The phenomenon of sages is in comparison to "proper wise men" like folk art (or popular art) is to high art (academic art, art proper).

I can categorically say that I don't think Jung had a single interesting thing to say. — Isaac

Heh. If one is familiar with European culture at the time, Jung's and Freud's work are nothing special, they're just part of the "spirit of the time". It's when someone's work or persona is taken out of the context of their time that they can seem special.

It's like if you were to place a member of the aristocracy at a party where everyone else is a commoner, the aristoract would stand out by their behavior, clothes, etc. But if that same aristocrat would be at a party with oter aristocrats, they'd blend in, be nothing special.

I don't know Mahler well, but his name makes me think of Bukowksi, who loved to drink and smoke and write to Mahler on the radio. — j0e

This is so peculiar. By European standards, Mahler is high art, and Bukowski is popular art. Not comparable at all. The same person cannot appreciate both (unless they are confused).

As you suggest, altering our ways of seeing can be done in a million ways. The trick may be in which options not to choose. There's almost nothing that doesn't have this capacity - owing a dog alters your way of seeing. Having a child. Going to war. — Tom Storm

I agree with this, but I was referring more to radically altered states of consciousness. You might think of them as egoless states.

Nice story about the man who lost a leg. Perhaps his ego had been housed in his leg. :wink:

Seriously though, I do believe personal loss may lead to improvements of the personality.

I met a man 20 years ago who was the most optimistic, buoyant and kind person I have ever met. He'd lost a leg 10 years earlier in a bike accident. I asked him how he remained so positive. He said loosing his leg was the best thing that ever happened to him. Before then he had been morose and a heavy drinker. Losing his leg made him confront some difficult truths about the preciousness of life and, because he didn't die in the accident, the misfortune functioned as an aphrodisiac for living. I would not recommend that people who are morose and depressed go out and loose a leg. But that might be the lesson. — Tom Storm

I find such lessons are useless unless one has experienced such a traumatic situation oneself, and then "grew from it."

You can see this phenomenon in some popular spiritual teachers, who, basically, experienced a psychotic breakdown, and then "emerged wise" from it. I have no doubt that posttraumatic growth is possible. But look at what such spiritual teachers teach and look at their personal history: it's clear that they didn't arrive at their level of attainment by following the advice and doing the practices that they advise their followers to do. No. That psychotic breakdown was what made the difference for them.

What is gained by living a contemplative life? — Tom Storm

Presumably, by living it the right way, one attains true happiness, the complete cessation of suffering.

There are benefits but not necessarily personal gains. The first Buddhist book I read was the very popular book Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind. It stresses 'giving up gaining ideas' while practising zazen. I came to realise that this attitude is what makes it a 'religious' practice, in the sense that it requires devotion, while not seeking to get something from it. This has to do with the dynamics of ego - so long as the self is concerned for itself, then that is self-centered motivation. Practicing for no personal gain is altruistic motivation. — Wayfarer

This is one of the major points where the different Buddhist schools differ.
In the Theravada Forest Tradition, you can find teachers who teach that there very much are things to be gained, goals to attain. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, for example; Ajahn Chah's tradition not so much.
Also, altruistic motivation is just one factor; in Theravada, a minor one, in Mahayana, the major one.

So there’s at least an implicit distinction between the Buddhas, and in later Buddhism, the Bodhisattvas, and the ‘uneducated worldling’ (the ordinary people.) Although again an uneducated worldling could by joining the order or practicing the principles, become enlightened - there is a canonical case of a bandit-murderer who used to wear a necklace of the fingers of his victims who converted (bearing in mind, these texts are from ancient history.)

Is that a hierarchy? I don’t know, but I think it can be said there is a ‘dimension of value’ or an axis along which the sense of there being higher and lower understanding can be identified, with the ‘higher’ being more amenable to detachment, disinterestedness, and the other virtues associated with the Buddhist path. — Wayfarer

The most essential hierarchy in Buddhism is that of the three types of buddhas/buddhahood:
1. the sammāsambuddha
2. the arahant
3. paccekabuddha

There can be only one sammāsambuddha per time period (in our time period, this is said to be the Buddha who started out as Prince Siddhattha); this is the most exalted position and one cannot choose to become that type of buddha or attain that kind of enlightenment.
One also cannot choose to become a paccekabuddha, as that status is available only to those who live in a time when the Dhamma dispensation of the previous sammāsambuddha has died out.
The most that a person can attain who is living in a time when the Dhamma dispensation of a sammāsambuddha is still alive, is arahantship. An arahant's knowledge is like a handful of leaves, in comparison to the sammāsambuddha's, whose knowledge is like the whole forest.

The practical implication of this hierarchy is that, if you accept it, you "know your place" and adjust your expectations as to what is possible and attainable for you.

I pretty much agree with you. Joe, and I have been arguing as much on here for quite a while. I think such "certain direct knowledge" consists merely. must consist merely, in a feeling of certainty.

Such certainty, since it is neither tautologically true nor empirically verifiable cannot be anything other than mere faith, even though it may be accompanied by a feeling of absolute (well. subjective, really even if felt to be absolute) certitude. — Janus

What I find relevant is that people can be enthralled by others' claims of exalted knowledge.
Why is that?

Does one feel captivated by "sages" out of one's deep sense of inadequacy, low self-esteem?
Or is there more to it?

Which is why I have generally defaulted to: show me the difference it makes? Show me a life transformed. The people I have met who were all about the contemplative life, searching for mystical insights were often in pretty poor shape. Jealousy, anxiety, substance use, vanity - were prevalent. The elitism inherent in the lives of many spiritually attuned folk is interesting too. People trying to demonstrate how much closer they were to understanding Taoism or Zen, or better at mediation, or more in touch with 'genuine' Gnosis - looking down on ordinary people who were wallowing in ignorant materialism, etc, etc.

Are the sages any different? And how would we know? — Tom Storm

I remember hearing from a Catholic source that the Catholic saints are actually people who were usually saintly for a relatively short time in their lives (even for as little as just a few hours), and not, as the title "saint" suggests, 24/7. Perhaps this puts things into perspective a bit.

The trouble for me is that it's as if your are putting car mechanics and sages in the same bin. Actually I like the idea myself, but I don't think a certain kind defender of esoteric knowledge (Wayf, for instance) has mere skill in mind but something more exalted. — j0e

If a particular type of knowledge cannot be attained through deliberate effort, then what use is it, and what use is it to pursue it?

A knowledge that cannot be attained through deliberate effort is a happy accident, a freak of nature. It's something one might watch in awe, but that's it.

If people are given freedom, they'll use it create chains and bind themselves in tribes.

It's not clear that this is the order in which things happen.

This is so peculiar. By European standards, Mahler is high art, and Bukowski is popular art. Not comparable at all. The same person cannot appreciate both (unless they are confused). — baker

To me there's a class aspect and a quality aspect to the high-art / pop-art distinction. I consider Bukowksi a first-rate novelist and so 'high art' in terms of quality. I expect him to eventually be in a Norton anthology of American literature (along with John Fante and Henry Miller).

Do you think that distinction could be breaking down? What's Banksy sellling for these days?

A new day, a new record price for a Banksy artwork it seems. Game Changer became the most expensive Banksy painting ever sold at auction when it achieved £16.8million at Christie’s London on 23 March 2021, on the one-year anniversary of the UK’s first lockdown, with proceeds going to benefit the NHS. — link

https://www.myartbroker.com/artist/banksy/top-ten-prices-paid-for-banksy-art/

I think Banksy's stuff is cute and clever at times but gimmicky overall. Yet rich people want it. Why?

To me there's a class aspect and a quality aspect to the high-art / pop-art distinction. I consider Bukowksi a first-rate novelist and so 'high art' in terms of quality. I expect him to eventually be in a Norton anthology of American literature (along with John Fante and Henry Miller).

Do you think that distinction could be breaking down? — j0e

I suppose so. The mixing of the high and the profane has been going on for quite some time, actually.

I think Banksy's stuff is cute and clever at times but not so great. But rich people want it. Are they slumming?

I think the people who buy such works do so because they see a lucrative investment in it, not because of the art.
Also, many rich people are actually the nouveau riche, social climbers who have money but lack class. I wouldn't value art by how much it sells.

If a particular type of knowledge cannot be attained through deliberate effort, then what use is it, and what use is it to pursue it? — baker

I'm trying to isolate the difference between working hard to obtain some manual skill or traditional education program and working hard to obtain a mystical 'something' that insiders call 'knowledge.' Granted that subcultures can create their own lingo that only they understand as participants in lifestyle , what are outsiders to make of their claims?

I think we agree that someone would just have to enter the community earnestly to (possibly) find out.

If people are given freedom, they'll use it create chains and bind themselves in tribes.
It's not clear that this is the order in which things happen. — baker

Would you agree that we in affluent, (relatively) free societies tend to have more leisure time and less interference in spiritual/intellectual matters than throughout much of human history? Certainly there are still norms, still taboos. We use our freedom to create subcultures, mock people on Facebook, etc. But for the most part it's non-violent. Witches are drowned. They are just convinced to drown themselves.

What I find relevant is that people can be enthralled by others' claims of exalted knowledge.
Why is that?

Does one feel captivated by "sages" out of one's deep sense of inadequacy, low self-esteem?
Or is there more to it? — baker

Interesting question! Many people seem to be drawn to those who show a complete confidence in their understanding of things and people. If I unfailingly believe I can directly and infallibly understand everything that is going on with myself and others, with humankind's situation in the world, with life and death itself, then I will manifest a charismatic certainty that will be extremely attractive to those who are drawn to individuals who project an impression of supreme self-confidence. Of course such people will becomes laughing-stock if they are also manifestly stupid. A recent American politician springs to mind as an exemplar of this phenomenon.

I think the people who buy such works do so because they see a lucrative investment in it, not because of the art.
Also, many rich people are actually the nouveau riche, social climbers who have money but lack class. I wouldn't value art by how much it sells. — baker

I don't value art that way either, and class is an interesting concept, not strictly identified with wealth. I speculate that 'being philosophical' (being 'rational' and 'scientific') is an indicator of class. Rationality (as an ideal self-image) is perhaps a kind of epistemological veganism, turning its nose up at greasy peasant superstition.

Don't you think that someone must like the art for its price to go up?

I'm trying to isolate the difference between working hard to obtain some manual skill or traditional education program and working hard to obtain a mystical 'something' that insiders call 'knowledge.' Granted that subcultures can create their own lingo that only they understand as participants in lifestyle , what are outsiders to make of their claims? — j0e

Nothing. "Don't stick your nose into things that are none of your business" should be the motto.

This is where the guild theme becomes useful again: If you're a member of the guild of, say, candle makers, out of professional deference, you're not going to indulge in assumptions about those in the guild of horseback saddle makers. (Ideally, you wouldn't even have the time to do so, being busy with your own craft and all that.)


Sorry, have to go for the day.

Nothing. "Don't stick your nose into things that are none of your business" should be the motto. — baker

Right! And that would be a good look from the outside, a selective group that guards its secrets.

This is where the guild theme becomes useful again: If you're a member of the guild of, say, candle makers, out of professional deference, you're not going to indulge in assumptions about those in the guild of horseback saddle makers. (Ideally, you wouldn't even have the time to do so, being busy with your own craft and all that.) — baker

I agree, but consider the original context, in which an ambivalent saddle-maker can't resist trying to win the respect of the candle-makers.

I suppose the issue is just the boundary between philosophy and religion and the strange games that are played on that boundary.

Sorry, have to go for the day. — baker

See ya next time!

Incidentally - this thread started with a quote from Edward Conze, in an essay called Buddhist Philosophy and its European Parallels. The quoted passage was Conze's brief summary of 'the perennial philosophy'. A few paragraphs down in the same essay, he writes about the 'sciential' philosophy of Western society:

In the West, a large number of philosophers discarded the basic presuppositions of the "perennial philosophy," and developed by contrast what for want of a better term we may call a "sciential" philosophy.* That has the following features:

[1] Natural science, particularly that dealing with inorganic matter, has a cognitive value, tells us about the actual structure of the universe, and provides the other branches of knowledge with an ideal standard in that they are the more "scientific" the more they are capable of mathematical formulation and the more they rely on repeatable and publicly verified observations.

[2] Man is the highest of beings known to science, and his power and convenience should be promoted at all costs.

[3] Spiritual and magical forces cannot influence events, and life after death may be disregarded, because it is unproven by scientific methods.

[4] In consequence, "life" means "man's" life in this world, and the task is to ameliorate this life by a social "technique" in harmony with the "welfare" or "will" of "the people."

Buddhists must view all these tenets with the utmost distaste.

"Sciential" philosophy is an ideology which corresponds to a technological civilization. It arises in its purity only to the extent that its social substratum has freed itself from all pre-industrial influences, and in the end it must lead to the elimination of even the last traces of what could properly be called "philosophy" in the original sense of "love of wisdom." For centuries, it existed only blended with elements from the traditional "perennial" philosophy.

As philosophies, both the "perennial" and the "sciential" systems possess some degree of intellectuality, and up to a point they both use reasoning. But considered in their purity, as ideal types, they differ in that the first is motivated by man's spiritual needs, and aims at his salvation from the world and its ways, whereas the second is motivated by his utilitarian needs, aims at his conquest of the world, and is therefore greatly concerned with the natural and social sciences. Between the two extremes there are, of course, numerous intermediary stages.

* At the time this essay was published, 1963, the term 'scientism' had not yet come into vogue (despite having been coined by Hayek in 1942), but I think it is what Conze is getting at with the term 'sciential'.

For those interested, the remainder of the essay is here

And finally, a snippet from the .pdf which @Fooloso4posted above. The associated book also looks exceedingly interesting. The OP asked:

Should we call what the sage has special access to knowledge? Is there a performative contradiction in reasoning in defense of something inherently 'irrationalist' in the sense of declaring itself indecipherable except by the chosen few? — j0e

It certainly seemed clear to ancient philosophers that special qualifications were required to receive instruction in higher philosophy. Presumably the book goes into this in more detail. But I have to say, that based on the comments to date, there seems little awareness of the 'esoteric/exoteric' distinction in the history of philosophy.

If I unfailingly believe I can directly and infallibly understand everything that is going on with myself and others, with humankind's situation in the world, with life and death itself, then I will manifest a charismatic certainty that will be extremely attractive to those who are drawn to individuals who project an impression of supreme self-confidence. — Janus

Evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers argues essentially this in his theory of self-deception. We have evolved to subconsciously pickup certain microcues emitted by those we are interacting with. These microcues gives us an intuitive sense when someone is trying to manipulate us. Trivers' theory of self-deception asserts that people deceive themselves in order to eliminate these microcues, in order to deceive others in turn.

This is a relevant quote that came to mind. In a book review of Teilhard de Chardin's 'The Phenomenon of Man', Peter Medawar wrote:

Its author can be excused of dishonesty only on the grounds that before deceiving others he has taken great pains to deceive himself.

I like the quotes and the topic. I think it's understood that Pythagoras was a cult leader of some kind, and that Plato might have had a secret doctrine. I find it very hard to believe that the Epicureans did, given what I've read of and about Epicurus, and I couldn't find any confirmation of it. Clement was a theologian, which may speak against his reliability on this matter, but he's fascinating:

Clement suggests that at first, humans mistakenly believed the Sun, the Moon, and other heavenly bodies to be deities. The next developmental stage was the worship of the products of agriculture, from which he contends the cults of Demeter and Dionysus arose.[22] Humans then paid reverence to revenge and deified human feelings of love and fear, among others. In the following stage, the poets Hesiod and Homer attempt to enumerate the deities; Hesiod's Theogony giving the number of twelve. Finally, humans reached a stage when they proclaimed others, such as Asclepius and Heracles, as deities.[22] Discussing idolatry, Clement contends that the objects of primitive religion were unshaped wood and stone, and idols thus arose when such natural items were carved.[23] Following Plato, Clement is critical of all forms of visual art, suggesting that artworks are but illusions and "deadly toys".[23]

Clement criticizes Greek paganism in the Protrepticus on the basis that its deities are both false and poor moral examples. He attacks the mystery religions for their ritualism and mysticism.[23] In particular, the worshippers of Dionysus are ridiculed by him for their family-based rituals (such as the use of children's toys in ceremony).[24] He suggests at some points that the pagan deities are based on humans, but at other times he suggests that they are misanthropic demons, and he cites several classical sources in support of this second hypothesis.[25] Clement, like many pre-Nicene church fathers, writes favourably about Euhemerus and other rationalist philosophers, on the grounds that they at least saw the flaws in paganism. However, his greatest praise is reserved for Plato, whose apophatic views of God prefigure Christianity.

Clement argues for the equality of sexes, on the grounds that salvation is extended to all humans equally.[36] Unusually, he suggests that Christ is neither female nor male, and that God the Father has both female and male aspects: the eucharist is described as milk from the breast (Christ) of the Father.[37][38] Clement is supportive of women playing an active role in the leadership of the church and he provides a list of women he considers inspirational, which includes both Biblical and Classical Greek figures. It has been suggested that Clement's progressive views on gender as set out in the Paedagogus were influenced by Gnosticism,[37] however, later in the work, he argues against the Gnostics that faith, not esoteric knowledge [γνῶσις], is required for salvation. According to Clement, it is through faith in Christ that one is enlightened and comes to know God.[39] — wiki

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clement_of_Alexandria

There's a not much of gap it seems between apophatic theology and atheism.

Strauss talks of 'parables and images,' which seems compatible with a literary interpretation of esoteric claims. Derrida writes of the metaphoricity that haunts the rational philosophy which dreams of being purely literal. A great theme, familiar through flies in bottles and disposable ladders, say. We might discuss in what sense a parable conceals. I think the Apocalypse of St. John has real world referents that couldn't be published (Nero, etc.). But we might also talk about the stimulating ambiguity of parables.

That last quote is about Pythagoras again.

Early-Pythagorean sects were closed societies and new Pythagoreans were chosen based on merit and discipline. Ancient sources record that early-Pythagoreans underwent a five year initiation period of listening to the teachings (akousmata) in silence. Initiates could through a test become members of the inner circle. — Wiki

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pythagoreanism

It's clear that philosophy has some of its roots in 'irrationalism' by current standards, but it's not clear what to make of this. A reactionary position would be that we've lost our way. Not 'back to Kant' but back to Pythagoras! :starstruck:

Perhaps analogy is the core of cognition, so that the issue is mythos opposed to logos but rather open discussion versus initiates sitting five years in silence. Is the issue control?

Trivers' theory of self-deception asserts that people deceive themselves in order to eliminate these microcues, in order to deceive others in turn.

This is a relevant quote that came to mind. In a book review of Teilhard de Chardin's 'The Phenomenon of Man', Peter Medawar wrote:

Its author can be excused of dishonesty only on the grounds that before deceiving others he has taken great pains to deceive himself. — emancipate

:fire: