• Bartricks
    6k
    Crudely, contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. Each one is very stupid. I mean, just obviously false. But they're approximately equally stupid, which means that there is a lot of debate over who has the most stupid view. But, like I say, they're all stupid. The naturalists and expressivists will agree that non-naturalism is bonkers. The naturalists and non-naturalists will agree that expressivism is bonkers. And the non-naturalists and the expressivists will agree that naturalism is bonkers. So my view that all three views are bonkers is very well supported by contemporary metaethicists!

    I will now explain why each one is painfully obviously false, starting with naturalism. The naturalist believes that the moral properties of rightness and wrongness and goodness and badness can be identified with objective natural properties. I say 'objective' because no contemporary metaethicist would defend individual subjectivism about morality (because it's really, really stupid).

    This view is stupid because it amounts to the view that the lifeless natural world can issue directives to us. That's literally mad. If I thought the door wants me to close it, I'm a nutter, right? Well, nothing changes if instead of thinking a door wants me to close it, I think certain complex bundles of natural features want me to act in certain ways. So naturalism is literally insane. The objective natural world doesn't want us to do anything or be anything. Thus, as morality is about what we ought to do and what we ought to be, morality cannot be identified with any objective natural features of the world.

    The non-naturalist would heartily agree with what I've just said. But to 'overcome' this problem - the problem of accommodating the normativity of morality - they posit non-natural properties. Now, exactly what one of those is is something non-naturalists are wont to spill a lot of ink arguing about. If you suggest that they are positing platonic forms, they normally insist they're not, but typically won't tell you exactly what they're on about, as they don't really know. It's just they try and turn not really having a clue what they're on about into a virtue. Anyway, whatever a non-natural property is, the simple fact is it is going to be every bit as insane to think that one of them can issue a prescription as it was to think that a natural property could. So, where the naturalist says "morality is a piece of cheese", the non-naturalist says "don't be silly, cheese can't issue directives - morality is an abstract monolith". But an abstract monolith is no more in the prescribing business than cheese is. The debate between naturalists and non-naturalists is, then, a bit like a debate between two lunatics, one of whom thinks he is Napoleon nd the other of whom disagrees and insists he is not Napoleon, but Jesus.

    Naturalists and non-naturalists are typically united in their utter bewilderment, bordering on contempt, for expressivist views. And the feeling is mutual. The expressivists think that naturalists and non-naturalists are making a category error in thinking of morality as an aspect of reality that needs to be accommodated by our ontology. They insist that morality is an activity - it is something we 'do', not something we 'perceive'. Our way of talking about morality simply misleads us into thinking we're describing, when in fact we're expressing.

    Naturalists and non-naturalists find this bewildering because it is just so obviously false. As false as insisting that something that is obviously an activity - such as walking - is in fact an exercise in description. It is noteworthy - though no-one seems to have noticed it - that most expressivists find the naturalists and non-naturalists constant appeal to moral intuitions puzzling. They often admit that they do not know what a moral intuition is. Well, that explains it. Just as there are people who have sight but are colour blind, there are also those who possess reason, but are not prey to moral intuitions. If you are not prey to moral intuitions, then you simply do not perceive the moral aspect to reality. And it stands to reason that you will then give an expressivist interpretation of morality. I mean, it is stupid and self-indulgent - for clearly the bulk of moral philosophers do get moral intuitions and so do get the impression of an external moral aspect to morality, for the bulk of moral philosophers are not expressivists and think the view is patently obviously false right from the get go - but it is understandable why one would think morality is just a name for an activity rather than a feature of reality if one gets no impression of that feature. Just as, if one has never walked or seen walking, one might think that when people talk about 'walking' and 'going for a walk' they might be talking, slightly eccentrically admittedly, about a place, not an activity. Note too that those who do not perceive morality may nevertheless come to be fascinated by what others are talking about, precisely because they do not know. And thus we can predict that a disproportionate number of moral philosophers may in fact be unable to perceive morality (and thus may also be disposed to be expressivists). Just as, for instance, a lot of psychologists seem to be mad, so too many metaethicists are morally blind.

    Anyway, there you go: those are the three main kinds of metaethical theory that metaethicists dispute the truth of. And they're all extremely silly. Which, like I say, is actually something most metaethicts would agree about, for each one has approximately the same number of defenders, and their defenders agree that the alternatives are silly. Discuss. Or just say something totally unrelated to the OP, as per usual.
  • 180 Proof
    13.9k
    Stoooopid OP ... and in too many ways to bother enumerating. Good job, lil D-K. :up:

    (Time to take your meds now.)
  • SteveMinjares
    89
    Crudely, contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. Each one is very stupid. I mean, just obviously false. But they're approximately equally stupid, which means that there is a lot of debate over who has the most stupid view. But, like I say, they're all stupid. The naturalists and expressivists will agree that non-naturalism is bonkers. The naturalists and non-naturalists will agree that expressivism is bonkers. And the non-naturalists and the expressivists will agree that naturalism is bonkers. So my view that all three views are bonkers is very well supported by contemporary metaethicists!Bartricks

    May sound cliche but...

    “There is no such thing as stupid just the unasked question.”

    So maybe the road to enlightenment needs a dash of madness.

    Maybe the concept we should be thinking of is “Consider the possibility” not to validate or believe. Take it as just a “Maybe”

    Because there ethics may prove useful in the future and cannot be validated because that instant of time has not arrived yet to test the theory.

    In other words your talking in what-if scenarios and if the scenario does not exist yet how do you test your ethics to validate it to be truly righteous and acceptable.

    Ethics is not universal so the code you create to define it constantly needs to be tested by circumstance to validate it to be righteous.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    May sound cliche but...

    “There is no such thing as stupid just the unasked question.”
    SteveMinjares

    No, there is clearly such a thing as stupid (though it is not a thing, but a property of a thing). For instance, see anything posted by 180Proof. Or, indeed, the claim that there is no such thing as stupid.

    Ethics is not universal so the code you create to define it constantly needs to be tested by circumstance to validate it to be righteous.SteveMinjares

    It is universal. And metaethical theories are not theories about the content of morality, but about what morality itself is.
  • Banno
    23.1k
    Hmm. , yep.

    For those tempted to comment on this OP, there is a clear, erudite summation of metaethics, in the SEP article.

    Have a read of that first.

    A more historical approach can be found at the IEP, but is not as up to date.
  • jgill
    3.5k
    Have a read of that first.Banno

    Is it worth the effort? :roll:
  • Banno
    23.1k
    Well, I did say "for those tempted to comment..."

    The OP is deliberately abrasive, and quite misguided. A look at the articles I cite will quickly show this. But if you are not interested in metaethics, let it be. Metaethics is certainly not where I would start a course on ethics.
  • Banno
    23.1k
    Ethics is not universal...SteveMinjares

    ...and you are now doing metaethics.

    Metaethics is the examination, not of moral codes, but of the thought and language used to express them. It's not about what we ought do in specific situations, but about the nature of such ethical statements: are they universal? are they just expressions of sentiment? are they statements of fact?
  • Bartricks
    6k
    and quite misguidedBanno

    Oh, and you know your stuff do you? Based on your deep understanding of contemporary metaethics, you think what I wrote was misguided? Okaaaay.
  • 180 Proof
    13.9k
    For instance, see anything posted by 180Proof.Bartricks
    Only thing better than my posts for you, lil D-K, would be the meds you're not taking. :smirk:
  • SteveMinjares
    89
    It is universal. And metaethical theories are not theories about the content of morality, but about what morality itself is.Bartricks

    Ok than indulge me in this hypothetical scenario

    Thou shall not kill....

    Scenario A: Robber kills a store clerk

    Scenario B: Clerk kills a the Robber

    Scenario C: Clerk accidentally kills a by standard while defending the store.

    Ethics dictate killing is wrong but the scenario presents different motives. Does Ethics discriminate by motive of the individual or what society deems as acceptable?

    Is Ethics intention is to justify punishment or to improve quality of life to community and individual?

    The only moral standard that should be considered as Universal is Compassion, Love, Mercy and Forgiveness.

    Anything outside those attributes is just seeking justification to condemn.
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    Ethical naturalism is right about a natural ontology, but it wrongly assumes ethical propositions are descriptive cognitive propositions like non-ethical propositions are.

    Ethical non-naturalism is right to reject that whole bag, but it’s wrong to identify the problem as the “natural” part.

    Ethical non-cognitivism (of which expressivism is the usual species) is right to see that both of those have a common flaw, but wrongly identifies that flaw as cognitivism.

    The correct solution is non-descriptivism, which can still be cognitivist in its moral semantics, and naturalist in its ontology, while dodging the problems of all three of the above.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    You're talking about the content of morality, not its nature. That is, you're engaging in a matter that is the concern of normative inquiry, not metaethical inquiry.

    Ethics dictateSteveMinjares

    Focus on this: the fact that ethics is about dictates, among other things.

    Naturalism is the view that the objective natural world can dictate to us. Which is insane.

    Non-naturalism is the view that non-natural Platonic Forms can dictate to us. Which is equally insane.

    Agree?
  • Bartricks
    6k
    The correct solution is non-descriptivism, which can still be cognitivist in its moral semantics, and naturalist in its ontology, while dodging the problems of all three of the above.Pfhorrest

    On such a view, who or what is the source of the prescriptions? It is not clear to me, as it stands, exactly what the view is.
  • Cartesian trigger-puppets
    221


    I say 'objective' because no contemporary metaethicist would defend individual subjectivism about morality (because it's really, really stupid).Bartricks

    What are your objections to individual moral subjectivisim?

    contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism.Bartricks

    Naturalism and non-naturalism are the two main theories of moral realism, whereas the latter refers to a branch of non-descriptivism. I would break it down a bit differently I think. First, since we are discussing meta-ethics, let's start by posing a meta-ethical question. Let's consider a question that raises some of the issues dividing realism from anti-realism.

    "Are moral statements truth-apt?"

    If no, then we have established that you are a non-cognitivist.

    If yes, then you are a cognitivist.

    To press further, if no. "Are there at least some moral statements which are true?"

    If no, then we have established that you are an error theorist.

    If yes, I'm still unsure. "Are there any moral statements that are objectively true?"

    If yes, then its official, your some type of realist and we can probe deeper by changing our focus a bit to include your now ontological, or more broadly, your now metaphysical beliefs of morality. Down this path we are likely going to be tasked in keeping up with three modalities: metaphysical, semantical and epistemological frameworks will intersect with one another.

    If no, then your definitely an anti-realist but there is still more to uncover here.

    Perhaps you view that we can make moral judgements that contain truth value, but that the truth value of any moral statement is dependent upon the subject to which it is indexed next to. If so, then you rely on a figurative theory of truth, nonetheless it remains between correspondence theory, deflationism, or some otherwise modified theories of truth.

    If you do believe that moral truth is fundamentally dependent upon our attitudes but that moral terms can be defined by non-moral terms, thus dismissing the fact/value distinction, then I suppose you would have to either be in the camp of synthetic or analytic naturalism.

    If you hold that both moral and non-moral terms co-refer, or share the same definition, do they then name the same property?

    If no, then you are either a non-reductive analytic naturalist or a non-reductive synthetic naturalist.

    If yes, then you are either a reductive analytic naturalist or a reductive synthetic naturalist.

    If you hold that moral terms cannot be defined or have a reference fixing relation described by non-moral terms, but that they may still refer to properties that are nearly identical with, or constituentive of ones, that are naming non-moral terms, then your at least not a non-naturalist.

    Non-naturalism contains some spooky duelist metaphysical beliefs that are, for sure, quite strange.

    Back to the line of questioning.

    Can we say anything meaningful regarding the metaphysical nature of these non-natural properties?

    If yes, you are likely a robust realist.

    If no, you either have a queitist take (an acceptance of things as they are without attempts to resist or change them), or some other variant adherent to moral sense theory, but only if you hold that moral knowledge cannot be a priori, otherwise, if you do hold to such a view, your probably working within some form of intuitionalist framework.

    This is why people dismiss meta-ethics.
  • Banno
    23.1k

    Ev'rybody's talking about
    Bagism, Shagism, Dragism, Madism, Ragism, Tagism
    This-ism, that-ism, is-m, is-m, is-m

    Neat summation.
  • khaled
    3.5k
    If anything talking with Bartricks has massively boosted my self control. I still can't help but respond to him sometimes, but my tolerance for self assured idiocy has gone up massively. Problem is he seems to just keep one upping himself and I can't help but respond sometimes. It's almost like he's adapting the difficulty.

    If he is a troll he deserves an Oscar. If he isn't I'm deeply concerned. Here is someone that thinks rape victims deserved it.
  • Wayfarer
    20.6k
    Crudely....Bartricks

    An appropriate start to a thread by 'Bartricks'.
  • Banno
    23.1k
    ...perhaps he has been sent by the Lord to test us...
  • baker
    5.6k
    The idea that one can fight evil, and yet remain pure, untouched by it is extremely appealing.

    legoo.jpg
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    On such a view, who or what is the source of the prescriptions?Bartricks

    The person uttering the moral proposition is the one making a prescription.

    There then remains the further question of when and why to assent to such prescriptions, just as there's the question of when and why to assent to descriptive propositions. But that's not moral semantics anymore, but rather moral epistemology; i.e. it's not about what do moral claims mean to say, but when and why are they right to say so, when and why they are true.

    But FWIW my answer to both epistemological questions (about descriptions and prescriptions) is criticoliberal phenomenalist universalism, which on the descriptive side amounts to critical empirical realism (the reason not to believe something is because it dissatisfies an observation, and everyone's observations count), and on the prescriptive side amounts to liberal hedonic altruism (the reason not to intend something is because it dissatisfies an appetite, and everyone's appetites count).

    It is not clear to me, as it stands, exactly what the view is.Bartricks

    I wrote a big thread about my own version of this view a while back:
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8749/meta-ethics-and-philosophy-of-language

    And in the time since I came up with that view on my own I have discovered that someone else (professional) had already come up with something almost identical to it:
    http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/factual/papers/HorganNondescriptive.html
  • Cartesian trigger-puppets
    221


    Neat summation.Banno

    Thanks.

    Is it even possible to divorce the esotericism from philosophical discourse? I would much rather use common language that is broadly accessible but then terms and phrases seem to expand into essays or treatises. I just make mouth sounds and hope for the best most of the time.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    What are your objections to individual moral subjectivisim?Cartesian trigger-puppets

    If individual subjectivism is true, then if I tell myself to do X, then necessarily it would be right for me to X (for by hypothesis the rightness of Xing 'is' my instruction to myself to do it). Yet it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X (anymore than if I tell myself that 2 + 2 = 5, then it will = 5). Thus individual subjectivism is false. Moral norms and values appear to have an external source.

    contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism.
    — Bartricks

    Naturalism and non-naturalism are the two main theories of moral realism, whereas the latter refers to a branch of non-descriptivism.
    Cartesian trigger-puppets

    That's not correct. Naturalism and non-naturalism are are not theories about what actually exists. Moral realism is, for a moral realist is someone who believes that at least some moral propositions are true, and thus that their truth-makers exist. There are moral realists who are naturalists, and moral realists who are non-naturalists.

    Consider: if I say milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring, I am not thereby asserting that there are milkshakes. The view that milkshakes are made of milk and flavouring is not, then, a form of milkshake realism. It is a view about what it takes for a milkshake to exist, but it is not a view about what exists. That's the same with naturalism and non-naturalism.

    As for the rest of what you say, well, it's not a response to the OP, but just you telling me all you know about metaethics. Why?

    For instance, what I said about naturalism - namely that it is bat-shit crazy because it essentially involves thinking objective features of the natural world can direct us to do things - applies as much to synthetic reductionism as to analytic reductionism. So what was the point in making that distinction?

    They're bat-shit crazy, yes?
  • Bartricks
    6k
    perhaps he has been sent by the Lord to test us...Banno

    Yes. You've failed.
  • Bartricks
    6k
    The person uttering the moral proposition is the one making a prescription.Pfhorrest

    If you're view is that saying "Xing is wrong" is just a strange way of saying "don't do X", then you're an expressivist. And the view is clearly false. If Xing is wrong, it is not wrong 'because' I don't want others to do it, is it?

    it's not about what do moral claims mean to say, but when and why are they right to say so, when and why they are true.Pfhorrest

    That doesn't make sense. They don't have truth-makers if they're prescriptions. "Do X!" can't be true or false.

    So your view sounds confused to me. But maybe I have not understood it yet.
  • Isaac
    10.3k
    it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do XBartricks

    So what is true is just that which seems to you to be true, but what is right cannot be that which seems to you to be right?

    You're saying that if I think to myself "I ought to do X", I should assume that because I thought it, it cannot be what is morally right. But if I think to myself "What is morally right seems to be something external to me" I should, on this occasion take that thought to be the absolute truth of the matter?

    How do you distinguish between thoughts which are 'self-evident' and thoughts which originate from you alone? How is my thinking "I'd like to do X" not evidence that Reason dictates I ought to do X? Do your thoughts go around with little labels on them telling you if they've come from reason or just from you?
  • Bartricks
    6k
    So what is true is just that which seems to your to be true, but what is right cannot be that which seems to you to be right?Isaac

    Er, no. I didn't say any of that.

    If something appears to be the case, that is prima facie evidence that it is the case. That doesn't mean it 'is' the case, just that it is evidence that it is the case. So, what's true is not just that which seems to me to be true.

    And what seems to me to be right can be - and normally will be - that which is right.

    Our exchange thus far:

    "If it appears to be square, that's default evidence that it is square. It appears to be square. That's default good evidence it is square"

    You: "So if it appears to be square to you, then it is square. But what appears to be circular can't be circular?"

    "Er, no."

    "And you're saying that if I think to myself "it is square", I should assume that because I thought it, it cannot be square. But if I think to myself "What is square seems to be something external to me" I should, on this occasion take that thought to be the absolute truth of the matter?"

    "Er, no".

    What I suggest you do, Isaac, is learn to read. Then learn to think. Then read what I say. And then don't try and translate what I say into Isaacian, because Isaacian turns sense into nonsense.
  • SteveMinjares
    89
    Naturalism is the view that the objective natural world can dictate to us. Which is insane.

    Non-naturalism is the view that non-natural Platonic Forms can dictate to us. Which is equally insane.

    Agree?
    Bartricks

    Is hard to say, is something I need to contemplate about.

    I can only express my view of ethics as adaptive to circumstance. Each instance is unique and can’t be categorized.

    To me ethics is defined by intention. That is why Laws which at one time were good but later become corrupt due to cultural evolution.

    How cultural and social evolution play a role in how we define ethics.

    While writing this it occurs to me that ethics may be a form of survival instinct. Since we as a species need to be in social settings to defend against predators or aggressive adversaries.

    So those who conform to status quo of society will be protected and deemed worthy of society protection.

    Example

    If I follow current society ethic code I will be accepted in there group, Protected and care for.

    If I go against the pack by causing waves or jeopardizing the groups welfare whether it is intentional or not. I will cause a undesirable effect.

    Ethics can also be a evolutionary trait in a sense of getting rid of bad behavior like getting rid of defective genes in the DNA pool.

    Only the well behaved will survive.
  • Isaac
    10.3k
    Er, no. I didn't say any of that.

    If something appears to be the case, that is prima facie evidence that it is the case. That doesn't mean it 'is' the case, just that it is evidence that it is the case. So, what's true is not just that which seems to me to be true.
    Bartricks

    What you said was

    If individual subjectivism is true, then if I tell myself to do X, then necessarily it would be right for me to X (for by hypothesis the rightness of Xing 'is' my instruction to myself to do it). Yet it is as clear to my reason as that 2 + 2 = 4 that if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X (anymore than if I tell myself that 2 + 2 = 5, then it will = 5). Thus individual subjectivism is false.Bartricks

    Where, in that statement, is the additional information confirming that what is clear to you "if I tell myself to do X, that does 'not' entail that it is right for me to do X" is, in fact true such that "individual subjectivism is false."? You literally wrote in the form " it is ... clear to my reason... Thus ... is false" without any caveats about 'evidence' or further analysis being required.

    Or did you mean to say "individual subjectivism seems to have evidence showing it to be false but cannot be determined to be until we've investigated further"?
bold
italic
underline
strike
code
quote
ulist
image
url
mention
reveal
youtube
tweet
Add a Comment

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.