I may not be understanding what your saying, but there are books on logic, the fallacies, *how* to think, as opposed to *what* to think. Is that what you are getting at? I read Irving M. Copi's Introduction to Logic back in Community College forty years ago. I'm sure there is stuff like that around.

No, I'm talking about a book on the essence of the mind considered in itself, that is, a book on the logical relationships between the essential components of the mind considered in itself.

I see. I can't help. Best to you.

Thank you James. Isn't it funny how man, in being so evolved (in his own mind), knows nothing of the essential structure of his own mind?

That's not only me with my own mind, that's me with this computer I'm using and the car I drive. I do hope there are people out there who are on top of it. And if so, I bet they have written the book you are looking for. But it's way out of my wheelhouse. I might be interested in giving it a look if you find something written for a lay person.

I'm looking for books on the logical form and process of thought and its relationship to the logical form of the mind considered in itself, but cannot seem to find any. I'm not looking for books on the relationship between thought and neural or physical processes. Is there even such a thing? — TheGreatArcanum

Phenomenology may be a topic of interest to you.

Start at the beginning: Critique of Pure Reason. Make no mistake......whatever is said today, about what you’re asking, is grounded in one way or another, pro or con, by that complete metaphysical treatise on the human cognitive system.

As an added bonus, you get a real test of your comprehension abilities.

Have fun!!!

Phenomenology may be a topic of interest to you. — Pop

I have read some of Husserl and Heidegger’s writings, but haven’t found much that is useful in them, especially Heidegger. His philosophy is pretty much useless to me, as I’m not looking to base my philosophy in empirical facts, but in a priori truths.

Start at the beginning: Critique of Pure Reason. Make no mistake......whatever is said today, about what you’re asking, is grounded in one way or another, pro or con, by that complete metaphysical treatise on the human cognitive system.

As an added bonus, you get a real test of your comprehension abilities.

Have fun!!! — Mww

I’ve read most of the Critique of Pure Reason, and several commentaries on it, as well as several commentaries on Hegel’s writings, but very little of his actual writing. I wouldn’t say that I’m an expert on either of their philosophies, and that is fine, because I do not wish to be. My goal is to create my own system of philosophy, so I’ve taken bits and pieces from both of their philosophies to construct my own philosophical system using an original analytic method which allows me to infer, from particular to universal, with absolute certainty.

Specifically, I’m looking for my information on the immateriality of subjectivity because I find both Kants philosophy to be primitive in this sense.

allows me to infer, from particular to universal, with absolute certainty. — TheGreatArcanum

Oh. Ok.

Good luck with that.

I’m not looking to base my philosophy in empirical facts, but in a priori truths. — TheGreatArcanum

Good luck with that. :smile:

My goal is to create my own system of philosophy, so I’ve taken bits and pieces from both of their philosophies to construct my own philosophical system using an original analytic method which allows me to infer, from particular to universal, with absolute certainty. — TheGreatArcanum

I would be interested in an example?

Try Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation.. His premise is basically the title of the four-volume work.

Oh. Ok.

Good luck with that. — Mww

Thank you. But it’s actually already finished (with the exception of the final touches). I’ve been working on it for almost five years now and plan to release the first edition within a year. I have a very good feeling about it and think that it is going to be well received by many.

I would be interested in an example? — Pop

If I give an example, I will have to divulge the secret to my method (to a bunch of philosophers) prior to publishing it (which I’m not willing to do). I can assure you, however, that it is so simple, and so apparent, that it has been in front out very eyes (so to speak) for thousands of years, and for this very reason, no one has discovered it. How is that for irony?

Try Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation.. His premise is basically the title of the four-volume work. — schopenhauer1

I’ve read this book too, and I really, really love it, to be quite honest. Schopenhauer, in my opinion, has the best prose of all the philosopher’s, with the exception of Nietzsche (of course). I do agree with him that the world is ultimately a representation (a collection of ideas), but disagree with him that those ideas are ultimately “my ideas.” I also disagree with him on the essence of willing, which, by its very nature, is teleological and this not a “blind and incessant willing,” but “a purposeful, future-oriented willing.”

I also disagree with him on the essence of willing, which, by its very nature, is teleological and this not a “blind and incessant willing,” but “a purposeful, future-oriented willing.” — TheGreatArcanum

My biggest question of his metaphysics right now is how is it that Will can have many "wills"? Why is it also that there is representation in the first place, if all is ultimately Will? I guess I never really got how the "objectification" of the representational reality really manifested or coincided as a "flip side" of Will. I can describe it, but I guess I don't understand how it fits together.

My biggest question of his metaphysics right now is how is it that Will can have many "wills"? Why is it also that there is representation in the first place, if all is ultimately Will? I guess I never really got how the "objectification" of the representational reality really manifested or coincided as a "flip side" of Will. I can describe it, but I guess I don't understand how it fits together. — schopenhauer1

Yes. I have had a problem with this question as well. The problem is that if there is only one Will, or rather, one Absolute Subject willing from many sub-centers, how is that I am ignorant and forgetful and not omniscient? If I were identical to the one Subject which wills all wills, wouldn’t I necessarily be omniscient? Would forgetfulness even be possible? Where would my memories go? How could I lose them?

The Will is an essential aspect of subjectivity, but not the only essential aspect (this is the catch), so there can be no “Will-in-Itself” apart from the other essential aspect of the Mind-In-Itself. In Willing, the subject brings an abstract concept from memory into the understanding which is simultaneously stored as in object of memory once again, albeit, in a different configuration (if it is a novel thought and not a mere representation of an old one).

I think that I have found a way to fit it all together. If you like Schopenhauer and his conception of an Absolute Will, I think that you will enjoy my philosophy immensely because I am a pure idealist in the sense that I that that the world is a representation, and no representation can exist apart from willing in the absolute sense.

Well if you want something in line with Kant (and Schopenhauer- to a certain extent), you might want to look into the works of Jakob Friedrich Fries and Leonard Nelson. You can check some essays on https://www.friesian.com/ if this particular line of thinking is your cup of tea.

The problem is that if there is only one Will, or rather, one Absolute Subject willing from many sub-centers, how is that I am ignorant and forgetful and not omniscient? If I were identical to the one subject which wills all wills, wouldn’t I necessarily be omniscient? Would forgetfulness even be possible? Where would my memories go? How could I lose them? — TheGreatArcanum

Well, being creative here, perhaps if Will is not limited by space/time, perhaps what we think are separated entities of "wills" and objects (the flipside of Will?), is just maya or illusory. That is to say, the principle of sufficient reason, with its seeming causes of space/time, logical necessity, goal-seeking, and such is really frothy illusory foam that is really atemporal/non-spatial Will. However, even me just saying that, makes me think it begs the question as to why then is there this illusion? Why the frothy foam of reality as Representation- that is to say, as objects and individual, seemingly non-connected wills?

Well, being creative here, perhaps if Will is not limited by space/time, perhaps what we think are separated entities of "wills" and objects (the flipside of Will?), is just maya or illusory. That is to say, the principle of sufficient reason, with its seeming causes of space/time, logical necessity, goal-seeking, and such is really frothy illusory foam that is really atemporal/non-spatial Will. However, even me just saying that, makes me think it begs the question as to why then is there this illusion then? Why the frothy foam of reality as Representation- that is to say, as objects and individual, seemingly non-connected wills? — schopenhauer1

According to my understanding, willing is a duration-less process unless it is intended by the subject that the object of willing should remain present in awareness for an extended period of time. In other words, when I will to think a particular concept or image, that that concept is represented simultaneously with my will to represent it, but that if I will to think a proposition as opposed to a single concept, it takes time for that proposition to be thought inside the mind (unless it is an object of intuition, in which case, an entire proposition can be represented simultaneously in my understanding and is not present in my mind as a result of my subjective will, but as the result of a transcendent will).

Ultimately, I contend that there are thoughts which are heard in the mind that are spatial and thus temporal, and thoughts (in the form of intuitions) that are not heard, but known immediately and thus transcendent of space and time (in the relative sense).

Much more can be said of these relations.

I guess "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" by John Locke could fit what are you looking for.

I'm looking for books on the logical form and process of thought and its relationship to the logical form of the mind considered in itself, but cannot seem to find any. — TheGreatArcanum

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

Bolds added.

I'm not quite sure what you're asking for since the rules of formal reasoning are systematically violated by human participants in trials quite regularly meaning there will likely be no recent literature on the subject. I also understand there is also no such thing as any kind of recognized causal link between the neurological and the psychological, hence the mind-body problem.

What do you want? Frege?

thinking is a universalising activity...This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

Nice! I have not added this truth to my collection yet. Thank you. Is this part from De Anima, as well, or is only the bold writing from De Anima?

the rules of formal reasoning are systematically violated by human participants in trials quite regularly — Zophie

I'm not sure what this means, can you please explain?

I also understand there is also no such thing as any kind of recognized causal link between the neurological and the psychological, hence the mind-body problem. — Zophie

I agree.

What do you want? Frege? — Zophie

I'm not sure. I'm not that familiar with Frege. I'm not sure why people think it's necessary to understand the nuances of language and propositions to understand the essence of the mind?

By "the rules of formal reasoning are systematically violated by human participants in trials quite regularly" I mean that psychological studies have found, and will probably continue to find, people engaging in thought processes do not use any known formal method for their reasoning as dictated by the cannons of deductive logic.

Frege thought there were real things called "The True" and "The False" in which his concept of logic (based on arithmetic) constitutes what is or is supposed to be how humans do or should reason. Supposedly he is the precursor of modern logic as it's commonly understood.

I'm also not sure "why people think it's necessary to understand the nuances of language and propositions to understand the essence of the mind", but I think it may have something to do with the way that nothing can be expressed in a non-language.

By "the rules of formal reasoning are systematically violated by human participants in trials quite regularly" I mean that psychological studies have found, and will probably continue to find, people engaging in thought processes do not use any known formal method for their reasoning as dictated by the cannons of deductive logic. — Zophie

This is inconsequential. Just because people don't think using any known formal logical method doesn't mean that they cannot think using a formal logical method or that the mind considered in itself is transcendent of logic.

Frege thought there were real things called "The True" and "The False" in which his concept of logic (based on arithmetic) constitutes what is or is supposed to be how humans do or should reason. Supposedly he is the precursor of modern logic as it's commonly understood. — Zophie

I believe that the foundations of logic lie in the concepts of contingency and necessity, concepts that originate in the logical structure of the mind itself.

I'm also not sure "why people think it's necessary to understand the nuances of language and propositions to understand the essence of the mind", but I think it may have something to do with the way that nothing can be expressed in a non-language. — Zophie

thought doesn't necessitate words, only symbols which can be purely imaginary. Indeed, if we reduce language to symbols, then thought necessitates language, but if we reduce thought to words, then thought doesn't necessitate language.

Right, but nobody is telepathic. Yet.

Right, but nobody is telepathic. Yet. — Zophie

assumption.

Demonstrable inference.

Imagine nothing. Do not give the nothing a name. That seems to be the base unit of your mental analysis. And whatever it is, it's incommunicable. Yet it has a function. How is this coherent?

Imagine nothing. Do not give the nothing a name. That seems to be the base unit of your mental analysis. And whatever it is, it's incommunicable. Yet it has a function. How is this coherent? — Zophie

one cannot "imagine nothing" without imagining empty space. the base state of our minds is prior to and transcendent of intentionality. your experiment necessitates intentionality so it cannot be a description of the base state of the mind.

when the mind is in a passive state of potentiality (i.e. when the mind is silent), which is the base state of the mind, the object of knowledge (or awareness as it is often called) is not nothing (it is not an object-less awareness), but the totality of the subject's potentiality, or rather, the conceptual representation of the subject as a whole. It is definitely not incommunicable.

The nothing you're talking about isn't an example of nothing, it's an example of empty space. So let's use that as our token. The base state of the mind, as opposed to the ordinary mind, with all its non-named empty spaces in a passive state of silent mental potentiality holding the object of knowledge aka awareness that is also not a nothing but a totality of potentiality, in all its approximate splendor, only further serves to demonstrate that what you're talking about is implausible enough to communicable in regular language, let alone mentalese.

Basically what you're doing is pointing to your head and talking about the rich inner mental world that you can never describe. Why bother?