That's not strong enough to support the contention of platonic realism in the OP. — Banno

I agree. The problem I see with Platonic realism is that if it is not taken to be claiming that there is a separate realm where the Ideas, universals and numbers live, then I can't see what it is claiming other than that (at least some) ideas and generalities have a conceptual or logical existence which is independent of human opinion.

I agree with you; I also believe that science informs us about the nature of the physical world. I believe that because I see no good reason not to believe it, given the effectiveness of science.

It's all a matter of belief, as I see it, since there seems to be no possibility of any context-independent certainty.

The skeptical challenge to the dualist position is: well, you say there is this 'spooky mind-stuff', so where is it? This is where the limitations of the method of objectification need to be made clear. The attributes of the intellect (nous) appear by way of what the mind is able to grasp, in other words, in the operations of reason. They are themselves not an object of scientific analysis, although without the use of reason, scientific analysis could not even start. But as the empiricist instinct is always to proceed in terms of what can be objectively grasped and quantified, then the operations of reason, although assumed by it, are not visible to it. — Wayfarer

We differ here in our perspective, about what is reasonable and unreasonable explanation. Because I admit the hypotheses of panpsychism and pantheism, which are very distinct from dualism in spirit. I also admit dualism, but I always find it the most encumbered with detail of those positions. Not to mention, that it is sometimes linked directly to theism and spirituality, which are nothing bad in principle, but are is extremely loosely implied.

I will argue from the point of panpsychism and pantheism. The brain could be capable of experiencing itself not by sensory perception, but as self-reflection. For the panpsychist position, the constituents of nature might have innate ability to self perceive, which elaborates into collective experience under certain circumstances, and for pantheism , the starting point would be omniscient consciousness that is compartmentalized into epistemically isolated portions (the deity is the ultimately extended mind). In both cases, the qualia is realized by the physical domain. This is not outwards pointing experience, just self-experience, but the state has subsumed both the mental and the physical role, and contentions (forces of interaction) arise natively between the mental parts, not conveyed through transduction from some envelope medium.

For panpsychism, the extent to which a physical process expresses a cognitively viable transaction (producing retention and manipulation of information) determines how much the local awareness coheres and produces collective experience. For pantheism, the global awareness is split from the divine awareness on boundaries that do not belong to the same sentient process. But in both cases, the experience is fragmented and nested in layers. It breaks into vantage points, each one incomplete. Each part can self-reflect, but larger parts subsume smaller ones in a manner, which articulates self-reflection in a qualitatively different way.

The totality is omniscient, but incoherent. It does not entail regard for the constituents. Personality arises as property of self-determination, to whatever extent possible, whose identity becomes specific to each vantage point. It is not aggregated. The awareness of constituents is limited in quantity and quality from the point of view of the aggregates, even if they are not coherent enough to understand that. And the aggregates behave in ways whose motivations might be unrelatable in terms of focus and character to the vantage points below it. For illustration, the blood cells spilled during shaving become subject to destruction that their natural programming objects to, but the individual (with the clumsy hand) cannot understand that significance - instead he sees a potential for a scar. For both pantheism and panpsychism, dullness of the structure results in less self-awareness. This time, not because it is not cohesive after splitting on information processing boundary, but because it is not articulate. It does not secrete as much collective experience, or allocate as much supreme awareness. While those structures may be still aware, it is a poor, inexpressive awareness.

Back to your question, matter experiences itself, but partly in fragments and only partly collectively. That is why, it cannot be aware of itself in detail at the aggregate level, even though it is aware of itself at the individual level. Those conditions that are experienced by our constituents on their own are lost to us, as to the person that we identify as. But the interactions between constituents allow communication (metaphorically), such that a vantage point can receive second hand image of its own state, by virtue of being compelled by the surrounding forces to representation of (parts of) its recent configuration, but possibly through expression that varies based on the manner in which the information was acquired. Hence, we are capable of receiving our state image from surrounding material constituents, which provides the detail of our self-experience that we would otherwise be lacking, but in a manner that realizes itself differently then if we were truly able to self-reflect in full detail.

My brain experiences itself, but not the specialized regions and biological redundancies. It conceives a foggy image of its complete configuration that only figures the high level detail. This includes the information processing aspects, which are captured as collective qualia. And while this qualia does not realize the image of its micro-states, the content that is absorbed as the collective self-awareness uses the sensory organs and material surroundings as additional loopback through which to refine its self-reflection. Piggybacking on devices, such as a recording of fMRI made earlier, played on a monitor, it receives neurological image of its recent state. It still does not have full perception of its constituents, which presently are capturing this image, but since the sensory image now traces physical interaction pathways that constitute information transaction, those are experienced at the collective level in sufficient detail to articulate mental experience and reflection.

Earlier I proposed monistic intersubjectve idealism. Particularly, a form of what I would call unconstrained pantheism, where the creation is fictional. It could shed and gain parts, and the story and rules can change. Merely the epistemic completion suggests that it will be explored with consistency, until the principal content has been extracted. The point here is that the universe is not guided by law, but by motivation to explore it. It doesn't have to be coherent, just provide useful experience for supreme vantage point.

Edit - This is work of pure fiction. Not a strongly supported conjecture.

the blind spot of science. — Wayfarer

Damn. I could write several posts on the errors in the first paragraph alone.

But I don't think such direct criticism will be useful here. Instead, I might try to describe back to you the picture I have of your view, and see where it differs from my own.

You mention a natural division between objective and subjective, but reject this as a construction. You then posit a realist objection. So you think along lines such that objective explanations are somehow subjective explanations; that primacy must be given to individual experience and so forth.

I think the subject-object distinction causes more confusion than clarity. It's just an overburdening of the simple grammatical distinction between first and third person. What can be said in the first person can be said in the third person salva veritate. "The construction of a world devoid of any subject" is a misunderstanding of what saying something in the third person consists in. Saying something in the third person does not remove the individuals involved so much as translate them. It's not a voice form nowhere, but a voice from anywhere.

You write very well, but for those of us who have limited capacities for reflecting and processing it might help to break apart and separate very lengthy paragraphs, and/or do a bit more summarizing or condensing. You do have interesting insights. Did you say you worked in the health sector? An MD? Nurse? Just curious.

You write very well, but for those of us who have limited capacities for reflecting and processing it might help to break apart and separate very lengthy paragraphs, and/or do a bit more summarizing or condensing. — jgill

Thanks. I start with the notion of a concise response, and end up with a lot of words. There are usually no paragraphs in what I write. A monolithic chunk of text with a few empty lines, to throw off the reader. I'll try to rectify the last post, at least mechanically.

I don't like to belabor myself, but it doesn't come easily. Even after several edits, I usually remain verbose. I sometimes end up summarizing in a finishing paragraph. The problem is, in very long posts, I become spent and may give up. Sorry. The truth is, as I have said before, the forum format, for which I am very grateful also, is mostly for exchange of sketch ideas. But when the perspectives differ, suggestive communication is insufficient, and both parties either have to make things concrete or give up.

You do have interesting insights. Did you say you worked in the health sector? An MD? Nurse? Just curious. — jgill

Well, I haven't. Nothing as noble. My occupation is in the technological sector (software developer).

Earlier I proposed monistic intersubjectve idealism. Particularly, a form of what I would call unconstrained pantheism, where the creation is fictional. It could shed and gain parts, and the story and rules can change. Merely the epistemic completion suggests that it will be explored with consistency, until the principal content has been extracted. The point here is that the universe is not guided by law, but by motivation to explore it. It doesn't have to be coherent, just provide useful experience for supreme vantage point. — simeonz

Agree with @jgill - your posts are very hard to parse. I think it’s worth the effort, but the longer your posts become, the less inclined I am to keep trying.

If you read my posts fairly, you will actually realise I’m quite a conventional philosopher. In fact most of what I say, I hope, could be contained within the bounds of Aristotelianism, albeit with a somewhat porous border with Buddhism. What makes me a minority report in the context of this forum is that I don’t subscribe to philosophical or scientific materialism. But I try and validate the points I’m making against sources. Now I understand you might have a very different perspective, but I think it would help you a lot to map what you’re saying against some of the literature. Preferably, popular sources, rather than peer-reviewed science journals. Use them to illustrate the point - where you agree with them, and where you disagree. I’m sure you have many such sources. One of the things I really get from this forum is finding out about what others are reading.

We’re clearly on a different wavelength in some respects, but I think your posts and ideas have a lot of potential, hopefully the back-and-forth of this medium will help you sharpen that up a bit.

Agree with jgill - your posts are very hard to parse. I think it’s worth the effort, but the longer your posts become, the less inclined I am to keep trying. — Wayfarer

I make the effort to the extent, which my ability and energy afford me. I admit that it is not as good as it could be.

Now I understand you might have a very different perspective, but I think it would help you a lot to map what you’re saying against some of the literature. Preferably, popular sources, rather than peer-reviewed science journals. Use them to illustrate the point - where you agree with them, and where you disagree. I’m sure you have many such sources. One of the things I really get from this forum is finding out about what others are reading. — Wayfarer

I have my philosophy textbook, wikipedia, random articles, Stanford E. P., and this forum. My commitment is rather shallow in this regard. I am authentically curious, but the articulation frequently strikes me much more conjectural and personal then evidential. I usually read hypotheses as a sketch, and gradually piece them together, rather then focus in depth. ( Edit: In principle, the starting points for my ideas are Leibniz and Spinoza, but theirs are theistically or spiritually inclined, whereas mine are rather void in that regard and are predominantly phenomenological.)

But I confess that I am illiterate, by the forum's standards. I always try to emphasize how unremarkable my purview of philosophy is, but it doesn't get across. Maybe because I express myself with overconfidence. For abiogenesis, I could provide some articles, which might be interesting to you, but they are not official sources either. They are found as random reads off the internet as well.

We’re clearly on a different wavelength in some respects, but I think your posts and ideas have a lot of potential, hopefully the back-and-forth of this medium will help you sharpen that up a bit. — Wayfarer

If you would like to elaborate, do you perceive the differences between us as rooted in the technical or the ethical side of things. Is it a matter of innate persuasion, which I have also stated that science is, or experiential conviction? That is, do you consider my proposals too vague, which would be a fair point, or unsound, or ethically inadmissible.

But I confess that I am illiterate. — simeonz

This is obviously not true. Your posts are sometimes a bit awkwardly written but you’re by no means illiterate. You ought to ask yourself why you say that. Your posts are quite sophisticated (although could use editing.)

I you would like to elaborate, do you perceive the differences between us as rooted in the technical or the ethical side of things. — simeonz

I have an intuition that ‘philosophy requires no apparatus’. What I mean by that is that the fundamental questions of philosophy remain the same, no matter what our period of history or scientific discoveries. The figure of Socrates is fundamental in that regard. He had access to no specialised knowledge and obviously none of the instruments and theories which characterise the modern world. Nevertheless his quest for an authentic state of being is still the archetype for the philosophical endeavour, in my opinion. 'Man, know thyself' is the most general, yet most important, command in philosophy. It is notoriously difficult.

I do find your proposals a little vague, but that’s OK, as exploring these ideas is why we have forums. As to my objections to scientific naturalism generally, they are not aimed at you in particular. I understand that scientific naturalism is the predominant attitude in today’s world, so I'm swimming against the tide in that respect.

In some ways my philosophy is motivated by religious ideas, but I have to qualify that by saying that I have a broad view of what religion means. The classical Christian view is that Christianity is the only religion, and that other religious conceptions, although admirable in some ways, are all ultimately flawed and doomed. Whereas I tend towards a pluralist view. Philosopher John Hick says of the relation of different religions:

...they are descriptions of different manifestations of the Ultimate; and as such they do not conflict with one another. They each arise from some immensely powerful moment or period of religious experience, notably the Buddha’s experience of enlightenment under the Bo tree at Bodh Gaya, Jesus’ sense of the presence of the heavenly Father, Muhammad’s experience of hearing the words that became the Qur’an, and also the experiences of Vedic sages, of Hebrew prophets, of Taoist sages. But these experiences are always formed in the terms available to that individual or community at that time and are then further elaborated within the resulting new religious movements. This process of elaboration is one of philosophical or theological construction. Christian experience of the presence of God, for example, at least in the early days and again since the 13th-14th century rediscovery of the centrality of the divine love, is the sense of a greater, much more momentously important, much more profoundly loving, personal presence than that of one’s fellow humans. But that this higher presence is eternal, is omnipotent, is omniscient, is the creator of the universe, is infinite in goodness and love is not, because it cannot be, given in the experience itself. 1

(Another philosopher of religion whose work I have found very useful in this 'universalist' sense is Karen Armstrong.)

More specifically, the particular genre or milieu that this OP is motivated by is Christian Platonism, which is one of the three main schools of traditional philosophy that have motivated me (the others being Vedanta and Mahāyāna). The cultural issue in the West is that the rejection of religion, which was caused by the way religion was framed in Western culture, culminates in a 'culture of unbelief', as it were. There is a deep and generally unstated prohibition - a taboo, in fact - on certain ways of thinking that has become deeply embedded in Western thought since the Enlightenment. Calling attention to that is my theatre of operations.

If I may take a rain check for a while. I need a few days to compose my thoughts.

On a different note, I didn't actually mean illiterate, as in functionally illiterate. When I use words, I sometimes misuse them by intending some non-default meaning, even without qualification, assuming reinterpretation from context. I meant a person rather uneducated, namely for the topic of philosophy.
Ironically, this does imply that my command of English needs some polish. And, so does my command of my native language.

You mention a natural division between objective and subjective, but reject this as a construction. You then posit a realist objection. So you think along lines such that objective explanations are somehow subjective explanations; that primacy must be given to individual experience and so forth.

I think the subject-object distinction causes more confusion than clarity. It's just an overburdening of the simple grammatical distinction between first and third person. What can be said in the first person can be said in the third person salva veritate. "The construction of a world devoid of any subject" is a misunderstanding of what saying something in the third person consists in. Saying something in the third person does not remove the individuals involved so much as translate them. It's not a voice form nowhere, but a voice from anywhere. — Banno

I think that the majority of posters on this forum would naturally assume that the mind is the product of the evolved brain. This is the issue I'm wanting to home in on. This means that, before h. sapiens evolved, there were no intelligent minds in the universe (leaving aside any similar types of intelligent species, or more advanced types of species, that we don't know about.) It is, I think, taken as a truism, that in the absence of a divine intelligence or higher intelligence, which I will likewise presume is the majority view, that the Universe is in an important sense mindless - not the product of a mind, and not the theatre of any mind, save the minds of evolved species, such as ourselves, but that our mind, the human mind, is a product of that essentially mindless process.

That is the sense in which I think common-sense realism pictures the mind as a product of, and therefore dependent on, the brain, and the evolutionary processes that gave rise to it. It seems obviously true. So when I venture an idealist/constructivist opinion, the objection is - and we've seen it again in this thread - 'hang on, surely the Universe existed before humanity evolved to see it.' It is taken as an affront to common sense to see it any other way (I've had this very reaction from your good self in times past.)

My response is to acknowledge that this timeline is empirically true, and that I concur with the evidence in respect of the timeline of human evolution. But I also point out - and this is the crucial point - that 'before' is itself a human construct. The mind furnishes the sequential order within which 'before' and 'since' exist. In itself the Universe has no sense of 'before' or 'since' or anything of the kind. (This, I take to be the meaning of Kant's insistence that space and time are 'intuitions' rather than objective realities. See the passage from Magee's book on Schopenhauer in this post which I've posted a number of times previously).

The other line of argument starts from the scientific realisation that there's a strong sense in which 'mind creates world'. I think the modern version of this idea starts with Eddington and Jean's idealism which emerged around WWII. It's continued to develop, almost in an underground way. They're the dots I'm wanting to join, so I'm reading up on that area.

I don't share the popular infatuation with the evolving mind. It doesn't seem to me to impact on the sort of conceptual work that is the province of philosophy.

In itself the Universe has no sense of 'before' or 'since' or anything of the kind. — Wayfarer

Well, that's not right. We can be pretty sure that there is no frame of reference in which this conversation takes place before the Earth was formed, for example. Or if you want an example without any sentient beings, there is no frame of reference in which the sun becomes a red dwarf before it forms. Also, the entropy of the universe is higher now than it was a few billion years ago.

Kant's notions of space and time are dated.

Further I don't see what this has to do with the OP, with Platonic Realism & Scientific Method.

I think the dots you want to join are too estranged.

More work to be done, indeed, but something is emerging.

BTW I’ve just discovered an exceptional science writer by the name of Timothy Ferris, who’s book The Mind’s Sky explores just these kinds of things.

Bertrand Russell said that 'physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little; it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover. — Wayfarer

Mathematics is just another language and is therefore invented and arbitrary. It uses scribbles to represent some state if affairs, just like other languages. You can even translate the scribbles into English or some other language. What you can say with mathematics you can say in English.

Scientific method relies on the ability to capture just those attributes of objects in such a way as to be able to make quantitative predictions about them. This is characteristic of Galilean science, in particular, which distinguished those characteristics of bodies that can be made subject to rigourous quantification. These are designated the 'primary attributes' of objects, and distinguished, by both Galileo and Locke, from their 'secondary attributes', which are held to be in the mind of the observer. They are also, and not coincidentally, the very characteristics which were the primary attributes of the objects studied by physics, in the first place. — Wayfarer

Words are like numbers in that they allow you to make quantitative predictions, too. Words represent how we view the world as quantified objects. The mind is a measuring device.

My response is to acknowledge that this timeline is empirically true, and that I concur with the evidence in respect of the timeline of human evolution. But I also point out - and this is the crucial point - that 'before' is itself a human construct. The mind furnishes the sequential order within which 'before' and 'since' exist. In itself the Universe has no sense of 'before' or 'since' or anything of the kind. — Wayfarer

This is well said, and I will extend this to point out that the whole concept of "the Universe" is just a human construct as well. So it makes no sense to argue from the premise that "the Universe existed before humanity evolved to see it". This is because, as "the Universe", is simply how we see things (as per Kant, phenomena). Therefore it assumes that our conception of "the Universe" correctly represents what existed before humanity, and this requires that temporal extrapolation which is doubtful.

This proposition, that "the Universe existed before humanity evolved to see it" is only justified if our conception of "the Universe" truly correlates with what existed before humanity, otherwise it's similar to the often quoted expression "have you stopped beating your wife", where you start by assuming something unjustified, likely a falsity, and say something about it. It's nonsensical.

Therefore, as philosophical skeptics, we ought to call into question, all the mathematical constructs, and the premises employed by the theories of physics, to determine their justification to assess our conception of "the Universe". And this is why platonic realism needs to be rejected. Platonic realism leads to the idea that mathematics provides us with eternal unchanging truths, and this supports the idea that "the Universe", as we conceive of it is a true conception, based in the eternal truths of mathematics. Then when the relationship between what is theorized about "the Universe" through mathematics, and what is actually observed empirically, becomes completely disjointed, (as in quantum mechanics wave/particle duality), platonic realism pushes us into this notion that mathematics (which is really a human construct), is the underlying fabric of the Universe which existed before humanity evolved to see it. This is because the underlying fabric or "substance" of the new conception of "the Universe" is no longer consistent with empirical observation. Therefore if "the Universe" is to represent something real, the mathematics must be real, because that's all that's there, mathematics with nothing empirically observable.

This is well said — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks. I don't agree with your rejection of platonic realism, however. As far as I know, Plato never placed dianoia - mathematical and discursive knowledge - at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge. It was higher than mere opinion, but didn't provide the same degree of certainty as noesis.

Have you heard of Sabine Hossenfelder's book Lost in Math? She too agrees that mathematicism in physics, if we can call it that, is leading physics drastically astray, but that has nothing really to do with Platonism, as such. It is the consequence of speculative mathematics extended beyond the possibility of empirical validation.

The aspect of platonism I focus on is the simple argument that 'number is real but incorporeal' and that recognising this shows the deficiencies of materialism, and also something fundamental about the nature of reason. How to think about the question is also important. I think there's huge confusion about the notion of platonic 'entities' and 'objects' and the nature of their existence. Most of that confusion comes from reification, which is treating numbers as actual objects when they're not 'objects' at all except for metaphorically.

As Aristotle said, we're 'creatures of reason' (iusually 'the rational animal') - so we live in 'the space of reasons' as naturally as fish live in the sea. I'm interested in exploring that idea.

What you can say with mathematics you can say in English. — Harry Hindu

Yeah makes wonder why phycisists went to all the trouble of devising new form of mathematics and symbolic forms to express concepts that literally could not be described in English. You should join the Physics Forum and let them all know, it would probably save them heaps of time and effort.

The problem I see with Platonic realism is that if it is not taken to be claiming that there is a separate realm where the Ideas, universals and numbers live, then I can't see what it is claiming other than that (at least some) ideas and generalities have a conceptual or logical existence which is independent of human opinion. — Janus

The strongest case for realism is that we can't do science without some kind of abstract entities, whether they're mathematical or other kind of operators quantifying over particulars. I recently listened to a Sean Carol podcast with a philosopher arguing for a kind of mathematical realism who makes that point. An even stronger case which he defended is that arithmetic is strongly related to consistency, and you can't do away with it unless you're willing to ditch giving consistent accounts of the world.

Now maybe that must means our cognition requires us to have some sort of consistent abstraction to make sense of the world. But that raises the question of why the world would be that creatures would find it advantageous to evolve such a cognition, if there are no real abstract entities whatsoever.

Of course Carol himself thinks that the world does have a mathematical structure to it described by the wavefunction, but that's a separate matter.

What you can say with mathematics you can say in English. — Harry Hindu

So then give us the English account of QM without any math.

Thanks. I don't agree with your rejection of platonic realism, however. As far as I know, Plato never placed dianoia - mathematical and discursive knowledge - at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge. It was higher than mere opinion, but didn't provide the same degree of certainty as noesis. — Wayfarer

What Plato placed at the top of the hierarchy is the study or knowledge of ideas and forms. But I do not think that "certainty" is the proper descriptive term for the higher levels of knowledge. Aristotle followed a similar division, and named the highest as intuition. You can see that there might be something amiss with describing this as certainty. The higher forms of knowledge lead us to higher levels of correctness, or good in Plato's world, but this is not really based in certainty.

Modern epistemology places too much emphasis on certainty, but certainty is just a form of certitude, which is an attitude. And this attitude is more properly associated with the lower levels of knowledge like opinion. We become certain of our opinions, but the true knowledge seeker always keeps an open mind.

Have you heard of Sabine Hossenfelder's book Lost in Math? She too agrees that mathematicism in physics, if we can call it that, is leading physics drastically astray, but that has nothing really to do with Platonism, as such. It is the consequence of speculative mathematics extended beyond the possibility of empirical validation. — Wayfarer

I haven't heard of that book, maybe I'll check it out when I get a chance. I believe the problem referred to is related to Platonism, because a misunderstood Platonic perspective is what validates the separation of logic (such as speculative mathematics) from empirical validation. When Forms are allowed completely separate existence, then a coherent logical structure need not be grounded in empirical fact. So we might construct an elaborate and very eloquent logical structure, which is even very useful for the purpose (good) that it serves, without having any real substance. That in itself is not bad, but amateur philosophers, and many common people will come to believe that it is saying something real and true about the universe, when in reality the whole structure is just designed to make predictions based on statistics, or something like that, and it's not saying anything real or true about the universe.

The aspect of platonism I focus on is the simple argument that 'number is real but incorporeal' and that recognising this shows the deficiencies of materialism, and also something fundamental about the nature of reason. How to think about the question is also important. I think there's huge confusion about the notion of platonic 'entities' and 'objects' and the nature of their existence. Most of that confusion comes from reification, which is treating numbers as actual objects when they're not 'objects' at all except for metaphorically. — Wayfarer

Recognizing the reality of the incorporeal is a very important step. The way I see it is that if anyone has any formal training in the discipline of philosophy, this recognition cannot be avoided. There are many self-professed philosophers who will not make the effort to properly train themselves, and will simply deny the reality of the incorporeal. For whatever reason, I don't know, they tend to deny the reality of what they have not educated themselves about. Perhaps it is simplicity sake, monism provides a nice simple approach to reality, and whatever aspects of reality it cannot explain, they can be ignored as unimportant to those materialistically minded people. But unless a person is ready to take on the task of informing oneself about the immaterial, having a personal reason to do so, some sort of interest, it seems unlikely that the deficiencies of materialism will ever become evident to such a person. It's like morality, unless a person has the attitude, the desire to be morally responsible, the person will never see the benefits of morality.

But I do not think that "certainty" is the proper descriptive term for the higher levels of knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, you’re right.

Never read a layman's book on QM?

If math was the only language that could be used to explain QM then what need would there be for an interpretation?

You can say your numbers in English, you can say the function symbols in English, so I don't see the problem you guys are having here. The numbers and symbols represent something. What do they represent - more math?

Quantum physics could never have been discovered without maths. Interpretation of the meaning of QM is another matter, but without the mathematics there would be nothing requiring interpretation.

Math would have never been discovered without language.

So are you saying that the mathematical symbols don't refer to anything that isn't just more math? What does the math say about reality?

So are you saying that the mathematical symbols don't refer to anything that isn't just more math? — Harry Hindu

That's what mathematicians claim, so I would think there is some truth to it. If there is anything more than math, being referred to, this is dependent on application.

Math would have never been discovered without language. — Harry Hindu

And prime numbers would have never been discovered without math.

Never read a layman's book on QM? — Harry Hindu

They typically describe the history of some important experiments and physicists leading to the development of QM along with the various interpretations and the authors opinion. But they also include a few equations, with a note that QM is describing a world of the microphysical we don't experience.

I'll revise my question. Can you replace the equations in QM with English making no reference to mathematical concepts?

Absolutely not. ‘All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use them of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.’ ~ Werner Heisenberg.

I should add that the difficulties of interpretation that are presented by quantum mechanics, is that while the mathematics are clear cut, the implications are bewildering - such as non-locality, super-position, the wave-particle duality and so on. The early pioneers of quantum physics leaned towards realism and believed that they would track down the ultimate constituents of reality, but instead opened a Pandora’s box. The maths still makes incredibly accurate predictions - the famous aphorism of ‘measuring the distance from New York to Los Angeles to within a fraction of the width of a human hair.’ But nevertheless, the same scientist who mastered that mathematics, Richard Feynman, also said ‘I think it’s safe to say that no-one understands quantum mechanics’.

I’m aware there’s a lot of bogus philosophy written on the basis of dodgy interpretations of physics, but even the mainstream, commonly-accepted interpretations are pretty far out.

That's what mathematicians claim, so I would think there is some truth to it. If there is anything more than math, being referred to, this is dependent on application. — Metaphysician Undercover

So when you look at reality you see numbers and mathematical function symbols, not objects and their processes? F=ma refers to a state of affairs that isn't just more math.

And prime numbers would have never been discovered without math. — Marchesk

So you agree that language is necessary for math?

They typically describe the history of some important experiments and physicists leading to the development of QM along with the various interpretations and the authors opinion. But they also include a few equations, with a note that QM is describing a world of the microphysical we don't experience.

I'll revise my question. Can you replace the equations in QM with English making no reference to mathematical concepts? — Marchesk

Sure, because the mathematical concepts refer to states of affairs that isn't just more math. What is a mathematical concept, if not words in a language? Are you saying that it's mathematical concepts all the way down? Are you an idealist? The universe isn't made of numbers and function symbols. It is composed of objects and their processes. The scribbles on paper refer to those objects and their processes. Are electrons numbers or objects or processes? Are tables and chairs composed of numbers or electrons?