Arguments for the soul

Bartricks

I do not believe there is a single good argument for the proposition that our minds are our brains. By all means prove me wrong, but note that this:

Premise: Brain events cause mental events
Conclusion: Therefore mental events are brain events

is a stupid argument. The conclusion doesn't follow (obviously). If you add this premise - If A causes B, then A is B - then the conclusion will follow. But that premise is clearly false.

Perhaps you think that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object, and thus if our brain events cause our mental events this would be evidence that brain and mental events must be events involving the same kind of object. Well, although I think that the claim that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object has nothing to be said for it - it doesn't seem self-evident and how could one ever offer non-question begging evidence in support of it? - even if it is true, it would not entail the conclusion. It would entail, as I have said, that the mental events and the brain events must be events involving the same kind of object. But it would leave open what kind of object that was - that is, it would leave open whether the object in question is material or immaterial. For one could just as well infer from it that the brain is a mental object - that is, that the brain is not physical, but mental - as the opposite.

Yet whenever I have asked for evidence that our minds are our brains, the above is all I have been offered. So, my working hypothesis is that there is no good evidence that our minds are our brains. There's just a widespread assumption that our minds are our brains that reflects nothing more than the widespread assumption of naturalism. But no matter how widespread an assumption, it does not constitute 'evidence' that the assumption is true.

By contrast, when it comes to evidence that our minds are immaterial soul there is an abundance of it. (I do not claim any of these arguments is a proof - reasonable doubts can, I think, be raised about some of their premises - but each one counts for something and together they do, I think, constitute a proof. Think of each one as a witness statement. Witness statements are not completely reliable. But if you've got 10 witness who all say the same thing - that Tim did the crime - then you're one shit detective if you conclude that as each one is less than completely reliable, you have no reliable evidence that Tim did the crime).

Argument 1:

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture or taste, or sound our minds have.
2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
3. Therefore, it is self-evident to our reason that our minds are not sensible objects

Another (2):

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks like (it makes sense for me to wonder what the olive will taste like, but it makes no sense to wonder what it hopes).
2. If minds were sensible objects, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks like.
3. Therefore, our minds are not sensible objects

Another (3):

1. If our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that our minds are not sensible objects
2. Our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably
3. Therefore, our reason implies that our minds are not sensible objects

Another (4):

1. If I am morally responsible, then not everything I do traces to external causes
2. I am morally responsible
3. Therefore, not everything I do traces to external causes
4. If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes
5. Therefore, I am not a sensible object

Another (5):

1. If my reason represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable irrespective of any of my sensible properties, then my reason is implying I am not a sensible object
2. My reason represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable irrespective of any of my sensible properties
3. Therefore, my reason is implying that I am not a sensible object

Another (6):

1. If an object is sensible, it is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible
3. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object

Another (7):

1. In order to be harmed at a time t1, one must exist at that time.
2. The destruction of our sensible bodies harms us at the time at which it occurs
3. Therefore, we exist at the same time as our sensible bodies cease to exist
4. If we exist at the same time as our sensible bodies cease to exist, then we are not our sensible bodies
5. Therefore, we are not our sensible bodies.

Another (8):

1. No existing object has infinite parts
2. if any sensible object exists, it will have infinite parts (for it will be infinitely divisible)
3. Therefore, no sensible object exists
4. My mind exists
5. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object

Another (9):

1. My reason represents it to be possible for my mind to exist apart from any sensible thing
2. If my mind was a sensible thing, then it would not be possible for it to exist apart from any sensible thing
3. Therefore, my reason is representing my mind not to be a sensible object

Another (10):

1. Sensible objects exist as bundles of sensations
2. Sensations cannot exist absent a mind that is bearing the sensations in question
3. Therefore, sensible objects exist as the sensational activity of minds
4. Minds are not sensible activity, but objects engaging in that activity
5. Therefore, minds are not sensible objects.

There you go. 10 arguments for the immateriality of the mind. No one of them is a proof by itself. But each one counts for something, as they all have plausible premises - that is, premises that enjoy some support from our reason. And there are 10 of them! And there's no countervailing evidence. I think they put the matter beyond a reasonable doubt. After all, only one needs to work. Imagine that there is only a 1/6 chance that any given one of those arguments is sound. Okay - do the maths. What's the chance that at least one of them is sound? I'm no mathmetician, but I believe it is 84%. That makes the proposition far more reasonably believed than not, and may even be enough to put it beyond a reasonable doubt. And like I say, that's if each one is far more likely unsound than sound. But I do not think that is actually the case. I think each one is about 50% likely to be sound. What are the odds that at least one is sound? 99.9%. Now that really is beyond a reasonable doubt.

180 Proof

the immateriality of the mind. — Bartricks

Assuming it does, explain how an "immaterial mind" interacts with (its) material body.

counterpunch

Odd, how you poke holes in the material explanation, but offer no alternative! What then? A ghost in the machine? Prove it!

khaled

the claim that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object has nothing to be said for it - it doesn't seem self-evident and how could one ever offer non-question begging evidence in support of it? — Bartricks

Mental things causing physical changes is telekinesis. Seems dubious.

2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has — Bartricks

No. What does light taste like? What is its texture?

2. If minds were sensible objects, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks — Bartricks

Overgeneralization. It could just be the case that it makes sense to wonder what some sensible objects (such as minds, according to the position you're arguing against) think like, while others (such as olives) not. In which case the conclusion doesn't follow.

If our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that our minds are not sensible objects — Bartricks

Where did this come from?

If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes — Bartricks

Not necessarily.

If an object is sensible, it is divisible — Bartricks

Not necessarily.

2. The destruction of our sensible bodies harms us at the time at which it occurs — Bartricks

Not necessarily. Depends on the way you die.

2. if any sensible object exists, it will have infinite parts — Bartricks

wtf?

My reason represents it to be possible for my mind to exist apart from any sensible thing — Bartricks

Really? What would a mind that has no body feel like? Doesn't seem possible to me.

Sensible objects exist as bundles of sensations — Bartricks

Ontologically no. We only know of them through bundles of sensations. To assume sensible objects ARE nothing more than bundles of sensations is just idealism.

the proposition that our minds are our brains. — Bartricks

I don't think it's so much a proposition as a "call to redefine" each mental state with its associated brain state. Which makes many of your arguments that rely on language use bad (that we can't ask how much our mind weighs for example)

Bartricks

↪180 Proof

see op

Bartricks

↪counterpunch

see op

Bartricks

↪khaled

Address the arguments

khaled

↪Bartricks

I've pointed out a bad premise in each. That's known as addressing generally.

But yea.... replying to you was a mistake as usual if you can't even see that.

Just say the dunning kruger line then move on. Write something interesting next time. :yawn:

bongo fury

↪Bartricks

You have as a premise that we each have a "mind" (or "mental events"). Can you imagine a rational animal being like a robot in lacking a such a gift?

javi2541997

Another (6):

1. If an object is sensible, it is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible
3. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object — Bartricks

I would change “divisible” for tangible. All sensible objects are tangibles because we can use it or modified for our own desire respecting the laws of physics. Our mind is not tangible because is full of abstract criteria but it gives us the most powerful thing: awareness.
Can be awareness divisible as you stated? To be honest yes. Because we apply here cogito ergo sum rule. Since we are literally aware of our own mind we exist but imagine those who never had this thought. I guess we can apply here the divisible/tangible criteria because it will reflect us how aware we are about our mind.

Another (8):

1. No existing object has infinite parts
2. if any sensible object exists, it will have infinite parts (for it will be infinitely divisible)
3. Therefore, no sensible object exists
4. My mind exists
5. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object — Bartricks

I don’t understand so much this one. Infinite is so relative in our vocabulary. I guess any objects do not have infinite parts because literally we don’t know what extent or integrated is infinite in our reality. Sometimes we use infinite just as trying to describe something we don’t know yet.
Therefore, if my mind has limits admitting there are “infinite” variables then my mind is so sensible to their changes.

Another (9):

1. My reason represents it to be possible for my mind to exist apart from any sensible thing
2. If my mind was a sensible thing, then it would not be possible for it to exist apart from any sensible thing
3. Therefore, my reason is representing my mind not to be a sensible object — Bartricks

I guess you mixed reason and mind. Reason provides us enter to the sensible/tangible world. When work the reason we can make the ideas of mind true. For example, building a pyramid was firstly an idea in someone’s mind. Later on, the architect put the reason to work and then build it. So this is literally sensible criteria.

NOS4A2

↪Bartricks

I do not believe there is a single good argument for the proposition that our minds are our brains.

I think you’re right on this. I believe the same but perhaps for different reasons, for what is the brain without the myriad systems that support it? All of it is so interconnected that it even makes the concept of “organ” seem inadequate. So instead of postulating a soul I would merely extend the concept of “mind” to throughout the entire body, or better yet, eliminate the notion of mind altogether since it essentially the same thing as the body.

180 Proof

↪180 Proof see op — Bartricks

Nothing but strawmen & sophistry, so the question remains:

Assuming it does, explain how an "immaterial mind" interacts with (its) material body. — 180 Proof

:sweat:

Bartricks

↪khaled

Mental things causing physical changes is telekinesis. Seems dubious. — khaled

Doesn't address what I said.

2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
— Bartricks

No. What does light taste like? What is its texture? — khaled

Those questions make sense when asked of light particles. Note, that doesn't mean that a sensible object has all the sensible properties (I have not said that if a sensible object has one sensible property, it has all others). But if I tell you that there is a sensible thing that has a certain smell, then it makes sense to wonder what it might look or feel like etc. But it does not make sense to wonder what one's mind smells like etc. But by all means just contradict me, just note that unless I am correct then it is inexplicable why there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview. Try again.

Overgeneralization. It could just be the case that it makes sense to wonder what some sensible objects (such as minds, according to the position you're arguing against) think like, while others (such as olives) not. In which case the conclusion doesn't follow. — khaled

No, you'd genuinely consider me insane if I wondered what a lump of cheese thinks like. Likewise with a lump of ham. Yet that's what a brain is. Try again.

If our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that our minds are not sensible objects
— Bartricks

Where did this come from? — khaled

What do you mean? I assume you're asking why that premise is true, you are just using entirely the wrong words to do it.

Imagine you have been invited to a party. You've heard rumours that 'Megan' is there. You are allergic to dogs. So you phone the host and you ask the following: "Is Megan there? And are there any dogs there?" The host replies that Megan is indeed there, but she's unsure if there are any dogs at the party. Do you have grounds to conclude that Megan is not a dog? Surely. It is, of course, possible that Megan is a dog, for it is possible that though the host knows Megan is at the party, the host does not know whether Megan is a dog. But though that possibility exists, it is more reasonable to assume that as you are speaking to the host and the host is sure Megan is there but not sure any dogs are there, that Megan is not a dog. And that's what you'd actually conclude, right? Well, the host is Reason and Reason has told you that your mind definitely exists, but has also told you that she's not sure whether any sensible objects really exist. Draw the same conclusion. Or don't and be rationally perverse.

If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes
— Bartricks

Not necessarily. — khaled

Explain.

If an object is sensible, it is divisible
— Bartricks

Not necessarily. — khaled

Er, you think there can be extended things that are not divisible.....okaaay. Brilliant refutation. Plato and Descartes take note.

2. The destruction of our sensible bodies harms us at the time at which it occurs
— Bartricks

Not necessarily. Depends on the way you die. — khaled

Doesn't need always to be harmful. It is sufficient that it is ever harmful. Now, are you claiming that it is 'never' harmful to have one's sensible body destroyed?

2. if any sensible object exists, it will have infinite parts
— Bartricks

wtf? — khaled

Due to it being divisible. No matter how small an extended object, it will be divisible. Thus it will have infinite parts. As nothing has infinite parts, they do not exist, or at least they do not exist as 'extended' things (which is all that needs to be shown in order to demonstrate that minds are immaterial).

My reason represents it to be possible for my mind to exist apart from any sensible thing
— Bartricks

Really? What would a mind that has no body feel like? Doesn't seem possible to me. — khaled

Stop up your ears, close your eyes, make sure not to be eating or smelling anything, and now render your body numb. Are you still aware of your self? Of course you are and you don't need actually to do any of those things to realize that you would still be aware of your self.

Sensible objects exist as bundles of sensations
— Bartricks

Ontologically no. We only know of them through bundles of sensations. To assume sensible objects ARE nothing more than bundles of sensations is just idealism. — khaled

Question begging. What I am aware of when I am aware of, say, a table is just a bundle of sensations. The table itself, if I am to gain any awareness of it via my sensations, must resemble them in some or other respect. Yet sensations can only resemble sensations; thus what I know through my sensations are sensations. And sensations exist as the experiential activity of minds. Now, don't tell me that this is a well-known argument for Idealism, for I am well aware of that. The point, though, is that the argument has a high degree of plausibility and if it goes through it establishes that our minds are immaterial.

I stress too that only one of the arguments needs to go through. Just one. And you do not undermine my case if - and I do not think you have done this - you raise reasonable doubts about the premises of each and every one. For even if each argument is only 50% likely to be sound, the set of 10 such arguments will render the proposition that the mind is a soul 99.9% likely to be true.

Bartricks

↪bongo fury

You have as a premise that we each have a "mind" (or "mental events"). Can you imagine a rational animal being like a robot in lacking a such a gift? — bongo fury

My arguments have the premises they have. Are you disputing one? Which one and why?

Note too that minds and mental events are not at all the same. A mind is a thing, an object. A mental event is a happening involving a mind. For an analogy: my body walks, but walking and my body are not the same. Likewise, my mind thinks, but my mind and thinking are not the same. Thinking is an activity of mind - so, when a mind thinks those thoughts are mental events - but the mind itself is not the thinking, rather it is 'doing' the thinking.

And your question is also confused. What 'gift' are you talking about? And what do you mean by a 'rational' animal? Do you mean an animal that is aware of reasons to do and believe things? I assume so. But a state of awareness is a kind of mental state. So a 'rational' animal must have a mind, else how can it be in the mental state constitutive of being aware of reasons? So no, I can no more imagine a rational animal lacking a mind than I can imagine a bachelor having a wife.

InPitzotl

Arguments 1, 2, 3, and 9 can equally apply to the Linux kernel.

(JIC you're having a problem with argument 2: It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a sensible object process-schedules like).

Bartricks

↪javi2541997

Another (6):

1. If an object is sensible, it is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible
3. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object
— Bartricks

I would change “divisible” for tangible. — javi2541997

But then you would not be addressing my argument.

Strictly speaking, premise 1 is false if sensible objects are understood subjectively. That is, if a sensible object is really a bundle of sensations - as Berkeley argued (convincingly, in my view). For though sensations can be divided into different kinds, sensations themselves can't be 'divided', for they are not 'things' at all, but mental activities. But of course, understood that way sensible objects are only 'objects' in an inverted commas sense and there would be no doubt that our minds are immaterial.

But if sensible objects are conceived of as extended things, then they are always going to be divisible. For any sensible object, so conceived, takes up some space. And any region of space admits of infinite divisions.

So the argument is sound, I think.

Bartricks

↪InPitzotl

No they couldn't.

InPitzotl

No they couldn't. — Bartricks

Argument 1:

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture or taste, or sound the Linux kernel has.
2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
3. Therefore, it is self-evident to our reason that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object

Argument 2:

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what a the Linux kernel process-schedules like (it makes sense for me to wonder what the olive will taste like, but it makes no sense to wonder what it schedules).
2. If the Linux kernel were a sensible object, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object process-schedules like.
3. Therefore, the Linux kernel is not a sensible object.

Argument 3:

1. If our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object
2. Our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably
3. Therefore, our reason implies that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object

Argument 9:

1. My reason represents it to be possible for the Linux kernel to exist apart from any sensible thing
2. If the Linux kernel were a sensible thing, then it would not be possible for it to exist apart from any sensible thing
3. Therefore, my reason is representing the Linux kernel not to be a sensible object

I'm not sure why this is even difficult. But, there it is. Given I have made the same argument about the Linux kernel, then by demonstration it can be made. Any real objections to this then?

Bartricks

↪InPitzotl

Argument 1:

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture or taste, or sound the Linux kernel has.
2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
3. Therefore, it is self-evident to our reason that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object — InPitzotl

The reason these arguments do not apply, is that the question at issue is what kind of an object the mind is, not whether it is an object or not.

As I understand it, the Linux kernal is a 'system', not an object (it will involve sensible objects, but isn't itself one anymore than, say, a 'friendship' is an object).

But anyway, I take it you accept that the Linux kernal argument is sound? So, it does establish or provides prima facie evidence that it is not a sensible object, yes?

And so presumably you accept that it does the same where the mind is concerned - it establishes or provides prima facie evidence that the mind is not a sensible object too, yes?

As the question is not 'is the mind an object or something else?' but 'what kind of an object is the mind?' then this would establish that the mind is an immaterial object.

It wouldn't do that where the Linux kernal is concerned, but that's because it's a system involving sensible things, rather than a sensible thing itself.

Someone who thinks that the mind is a system is making a category error of the same kind someone who thought the Linux kernal is a sensible object is also making a category error.

Everything I have said above applies to what you've said about argument 2. You presumably accept the argument is sound, as when we put in Linux kernal it delivers the correct verdict. It is just that, once again, the question at issue is not 'is the mind a thing or a system' but 'what kind of a thing is the mind'. But again, you accept, I take it, that the argument is sound in respect of the mind, yes?

Bartricks

↪InPitzotl

Argument 3:

1. If our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object
2. Our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably
3. Therefore, our reason implies that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object — InPitzotl

Premise 2 in that argument is clearly false. It is true when you substitute 'our minds' for Linux kernal.

But anyway, it is not clear to me what your point is given that the Linux kernal is indeed not a sensible object. (In this case you have arrived at a correct conclusion by unsound means).

Bartricks

↪InPitzotl

Argument 9:

1. My reason represents it to be possible for the Linux kernel to exist apart from any sensible thing
2. If the Linux kernel were a sensible thing, then it would not be possible for it to exist apart from any sensible thing
3. Therefore, my reason is representing the Linux kernel not to be a sensible object — InPitzotl

Again, this argument is clearly unsound in a way that it would not be if 'mind' were used instead. Premise 1 is obviously false.

I'm not sure why this is even difficult. But, there it is. Given I have made the same argument about the Linux kernel, then by demonstration it can be made. Any real objections to this then? — InPitzotl

Yes. First, the question is not 'is the mind an object or something else?' but 'what kind of an object is the mind - material or immaterial?'

Confusing systems with things is a category error, akin to confusing friendship with a thing. (You could put 'friendship' in the premises of the first argument and get the same result). So you're using the arguments to establish something quite different from what I am using them to establish.

Second, what point are you trying to make? Do you think that the Linux kernal 'is' a sensible object and thus that there must be something fallacious about those arguments? Or do you think that it is not a sensible object and thus you accept the arguments go through? Or do you think that the relevant arguments leave open whether the mind is an object or a system? It is entirely unclear to me what you're trying to show....

InPitzotl

As I understand it, the Linux kernal is a 'system', not an object (it will involve sensible objects, but isn't itself one anymore than, say, a 'friendship' is an object). — Bartricks

You could call it a system if you like, but I wouldn't call it one. The kernel is an abstraction; it's kind of an abstract object. In principle people with minds can "operate" the Linux kernel; abstractly, we could evaluate potential runs of the Linux kernel through a sort of mathematical framework, but in practice that's quite difficult to do, and the purpose of the thing is more in lines with running it on physical machines that implement the abstraction of computers.

But anyway, I take it you accept that the Linux kernal argument is sound? So, it does establish or provides prima facie evidence that it is not a sensible object, yes? — Bartricks

Sure. It's sound. But it also demonstrates something is a bit off with what is being argued. The fact that I can imagine the Linux kernel running on a completely abstract machine with no physicality doesn't really seem like it has any bite to it. It doesn't demonstrate, for example, that there can actually be such a running Linux kernel somewhere, nor does it demonstrate that a machine running the Linux kernel has another kind of "substance" in it.

Premise 2 in that argument is clearly false. It is true when you substitute 'our minds' for Linux kernal. — Bartricks

"Mind" and "Linux kernel" are two abstract objects-of-thought with referents, neither of which I can hold in my mind at a moment but both of which I can reason with. I see no reason to hold one premise without the other.

Again, this argument is clearly unsound in a way that it would not be if 'mind' were used instead. Premise 1 is obviously false. — Bartricks

You cannot imagine an abstract computer?

Confusing systems with things is a category error, akin to confusing friendship with a thing. — Bartricks

Perhaps confusing abstractions with substances is a category error.

Bartricks

↪InPitzotl

You could call it a system if you like, but I wouldn't call it one. The kernel is an abstraction; it's kind of an abstract object. — InPitzotl

Does it have effects? If it does, it's not an abstract object. It's not an object at all, but a system. But anyway, I am unclear what your point is. I have used an argument to show that minds are not sensible objects. You have used the same argument to show that something else is not a sensible object. What's your point, exactly? That minds 'are' sensible objects after all? Clearly, that wouldn't follow. That minds are systems?

No, that's a category error. Likewise if you propose that minds are abstract objects (whatever one of those may be). Our minds are concrete objects: they are causally effective. The question is what kind of object they are: material or immaterial. And the arguments I am presenting all imply that minds are immaterial objects. I don't yet see any basis for doubting the soundness of any of the arguments and pointing out that the self-same arguments can be used to establish that other things are not sensible objects - such as systems and so on - is not to cast any doubt on their probative force.

InPitzotl

Does it have effects? If it does, it's not an abstract object. — Bartricks

I have no idea what you mean by object then. An olive has effects.

Bartricks

↪InPitzotl

You cannot imagine an abstract computer? — InPitzotl

No, I have literally no idea how to do that.

I can imagine thinking without there being any sensible objects. And my reason tells me that if I am thinking then I, a thinker, exist. So the combination of being able to conceive of myself thinking in the absence of the existence of a sensible world and the fact my reason assures me that if I am thinking then I, a mind, exist, is what tells me that it is possible for my mind to exist absent all sensible existences.

This doesn't begin to apply to an abstract computer, as I have no idea what one of those is.

Bartricks

↪InPitzotl

Does it have effects? If it does, it's not an abstract object.
— Bartricks
I have no idea what you mean by object then. An olive has effects. — InPitzotl

Er, yes. Olives aren't abstract objects. It is part of the definition of an abstract object that it does not have effects.

So, if the Linux thingy has effects, it is not an abstract object. It does, yes? (Not that I actually know what we're talking about here). So it is not an abstract object.

I suggest it is not an object at all, but a system - a network of relationships between things.

But this is all beside the point. The point is that you haven't raised any doubt about the soundness of any of the arguments I have employed (by your own admission!).

You can't show an argument to be unsound by showing that it is sound!

InPitzotl

No, I have literally no idea how to do that. — Bartricks

Can you imagine an abstract Game of Life, as in Conway's Game of Life?

Er, yes. Olives aren't abstract objects. It is part of the definition of an abstract object that it does not have effects. — Bartricks

I think we have different conceptions of abstract objects then.

I suggest it is not an object at all, but a system - a network of relationships between things. — Bartricks

Can you name an abstract object? Is a number an abstract object?

ETA: 1 is prior to 2; 2 is prior to 3; 3 succeeds 2, 2 succeeds 1. So are numbers systems? Is there an example of an abstract object?

Bartricks

↪InPitzotl

Can you imagine an abstract Game of Life, as in Conway's Game of Life? — InPitzotl

No. I do not know what you're talking about. You're parachuting this word 'abstract' in - what do you mean? I can imagine an olive. Can I imagine an 'abstract' olive? Nope - no idea what that is.

Now a 'game' is not a thing, but an activity. I can imagine activities, though when I do so it is by means of imagining things engaged in the activities. But an 'abstract' activity? I don't know what you mean....

I think we have different conceptions of abstract objects then. — InPitzotl

I'd say.

But this is thread is not about abstract objects. It is about the mind, which no-one thinks is an abstract object. It is about whether the mind is a material object or an immaterial one.

I have presented 10 arguments - 10! - in support of the view that they are immaterial objects. Do you doubt the soundness of any of them?

khaled

↪Bartricks

Note, that doesn't mean that a sensible object has all the sensible properties — Bartricks

Thus it is possible that consciousness is a sensible object without smell or taste or texture or color.

unless I am correct then it is inexplicable why there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview — Bartricks

There is a sizable population that believes there is no such problem.... heck I would say the majority don’t think it’s a problem

No, you'd genuinely consider me insane if I wondered what a lump of cheese thinks like — Bartricks

Correct. Because the lump of cheese happens to be one of the sensible things that it makes no sense to ask what they’re feeling. While minds are one of the sensible things for which the question makes sense. In the same way that it makes sense to ask what a mushroom tastes like but not what light particles taste like, even though both are sensible. You just couldn’t understand the argument.

If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes
— Bartricks

Not necessarily.
— khaled

Explain. — Bartricks

This assumes determinism. Which is not necessarily the case. And QM makes it unfavorable

Do you have grounds to conclude that Megan is not a dog? — Bartricks

No.

for it is possible that though the host knows Megan is at the party, the host does not know whether Megan is a dog. — Bartricks

This is the case. Or else you're just question begging. When asking whether or not the mind is physical or immaterial, that means you don’t know (that the host doesn’t know whether or not Megan is a dog).

Er, you think there can be extended things that are not divisible — Bartricks

An electron for one. Yes.

Now, are you claiming that it is 'never' harmful to have one's sensible body destroyed? — Bartricks

I could claim that nothing is harmful at t1 (moment of death, which is premise 2).

Due to it being divisible — Bartricks

But not every sensible object is divisible. Nor is there reason to think they are from armchair musings.

Stop up your ears, close your eyes, make sure not to be eating or smelling anything, and now render your body numb. Are you still aware of your self? Of course you are — Bartricks

Because my brain is still churning away. Try to stop that. Then come back and report what happened to “you”.

The point, though, is that the argument has a high degree of plausibility and if it goes through it establishes that our minds are immaterial. — Bartricks

You can’t assume idealism, then argue that minds are immaterial. That would not be convincing to anyone who’s not an idealist.

For even if each argument is only 50% likely to be sound — Bartricks

I would give them a 1-3% chance.

InPitzotl

You're parachuting this word 'abstract' in - what do you mean? — Bartricks

But this is thread is not about abstract objects. — Bartricks

It is about whether the mind is a material object or an immaterial one. — Bartricks

Stop the presses. Back up. We have three kinds of objects that have been described:

abstract objects
material objects
immaterial objects

Per the above, the mind counts as an object. Material objects, like olives, have effects. Minds have effects. By extension of your arguing that minds are immaterial objects, immaterial objects have effects. But by proxy:

It is part of the definition of an abstract object that it does not have effects. — Bartricks

I now completely reject your definition of an abstract object as special pleading. (You wouldn't accept an argument that the mind cannot be an immaterial object, because it is not an object because it has effects, I would imagine?)

There's a real problem here having to do with what you're arguing. And if you're genuinely concerned with category errors, you should be interested in exploring it. You have proposed a dichotomy... material objects versus immaterial objects. But all you're arguing is that the mind isn't what you classify as a sensible object.

How would you argue against the notion that a mind, whereas it can be imagined without having a body, can nevertheless not exist without a body?

I have presented 10 arguments - 10! - in support of the view that they are immaterial objects. Do you doubt the soundness of any of them? — Bartricks

Yes, but I'm only dealing with these four.

ETA:

Now a 'game' is not a thing, but an activity. I can imagine activities, though when I do so it is by means of imagining things engaged in the activities. — Bartricks

In Conway's Game of Life, the activity is performed on a grid. Each square in the grid is either "alive" or "dead"; those being just states. Those things are abstract; alive has no meaning except metaphorically. There are rules for how the game evolves, but there aren't any players that interact with it... it's just the rules. A live cell with exactly 2 or 3 neighbors is alive in the next step; a dead cell with exactly 3 neighbors is alive in the next step. Those "things", living and dead cells on a grid, are abstractions.

I frankly don't care if you call these "things" abstract objects or not, but your system of attaching arbitrary words to concepts is just a meaningless labeling exercise... the concepts are still there. It most definitely does not make sense to talk about what a living cell in GOL tastes like, or how much it weighs. But likewise, it's kind of meaningless to say that just because a living cell in GOL is not a sensible object, it must be an immaterial one.

Bartricks

↪khaled

Note, that doesn't mean that a sensible object has all the sensible properties
— Bartricks

Thus it is possible that consciousness is a sensible object without smell or taste or texture or color. — khaled

Well, no, because consciousness is not an object at all, but a state. It's typical of your sloppiness that you treat consciousness and minds as equivalent, which is as silly as confusing thoughts with thinkers.

Although I have not assumed that a sensible object must have all the sensible properties, it must have at least one (else in what possible sense is it 'sensible'?). And our reason represents minds to have none of them. That is prima facie evidence that our minds are not sensible objects. Try again.

There is a sizable population that believes there is no such problem.... heck I would say the majority don’t think it’s a problem — khaled

Okaay. You might want to get in touch with the world's philosophy departments and point this out then.

No, you'd genuinely consider me insane if I wondered what a lump of cheese thinks like
— Bartricks

Correct. Because the lump of cheese happens to be one of the sensible things that it makes no sense to ask what they’re feeling. While minds are one of the sensible things for which the question makes sense. In the same way that it makes sense to ask what a mushroom tastes like but not what light particles taste like, even though both are sensible. You just couldn’t understand the argument. — khaled

Flagrantly question begging. But that's what you do, isn't it? Note too, it is not 'minds' that it makes no sense to ask the 'what is it thinking?' question (jeez!). It is lumps of ham. Psst, whether lumps of ham are minds is what is in dispute....so if you just assume that a lump of ham is a mind, then you've done what those of us with philosophical expertise call 'begging the question'. As for understanding arguments - er, you're just providing us with more evidence, were any needed, of the Dunning and Kruger effect.

This assumes determinism. Which is not necessarily the case. And QM makes it unfavorable — khaled

No it doesn't. The claim that if something comes into being it has a prior cause is not equivalent to causal determinism. My argument is consistent with both determinism and indeterminism and so assumes the truth of neither.

This is the case. Or else you're just question begging. When asking whether or not the mind is physical or immaterial, that means you don’t know (that the host doesn’t know whether or not Megan is a dog). — khaled

Well, I shouldn't have said that 'you' would conclude that Megan was not a dog, for your reasoning skills are so poor that for all I know you might conclude that Megan is the capital of France. But a reasonably intelligent person, upon asking "Is Megan at the party? And are there any dogs at the party?" and receiving the answer "Megan is certainly here, but I am not sure if there are any dogs here" would conclude that Megan was not a dog. Note too that the 'host' is Reason, not 'you'. That you confuse the two is, of course, no surprise as you're no doubt one of these people who thinks that reality is their plaything and all they need to do is assert something and it will be so. Also, maybe learn what 'question begging' means before throwing the term around (presumably you're operating on the principle that if you make the accusation enough, it will eventually be accurate).

An electron for one. Yes. — khaled

Electrons are divisible. Your confusing 'currently unable to divide it' with it being metaphysically impossible to divide it. So, for example, atoms were divisible in Roman times, even though Romans couldn't divide them. (I've often wondered who the 'remove from packaging' advice was for on foodstuffs.....I wonder no more).

I could claim that nothing is harmful at t1 (moment of death, which is premise 2). — khaled

Yes, you could couldn't you. You could bark at the screen too, or smear your dinner all over it. But none of these things would raise a reasonable doubt about the argument's soundness.

But not every sensible object is divisible. Nor is there reason to think they are from armchair musings. — khaled

Yes they are, and yes there is. But nice try! So, go find an armchair and sit in it (remember: your face should face 'out' and not into the back of the chair and your legs should drape over the front lip and not be folded beneath you). And now muse on this: every extended object has a top and a bottom. There has to be some space between the top and the bottom, else the top will be the bottom and vice versa. And that space can be divided. See? Or you could just read what I originally said and realize that any region of space is infinitely divisible and thus any object that occupies some space will be as well, and as any extended object occupies some space, any extended object is infinitely divisible.

Because my brain is still churning away. Try to stop that. Then come back and report what happened to “you”. — khaled

That's question begging. Note too that I am imagining no sensible object exists - so I am imagining that my brain does not exist. So, I can conceive of myself existing, and my brain not.

You can’t assume idealism, then argue that minds are immaterial. That would not be convincing to anyone who’s not an idealist. — khaled

I didn't 'assume' idealism, I argued for it.

I would give them a 1-3% chance. — khaled

Yes, but you're not an expert and I am and furthermore you clearly haven't understood any of them. I'd give them an average of about 60-70% each. Perhaps that's too high - but like I say, at even half that they'd still put the matter close to beyond a reasonable doubt.

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