My arguments have the premises they have. Are you disputing one? Which one — Bartricks

The idea that we each have a mind, except in a manner of speaking about our physical constitution and behaviour.

and why? — Bartricks

Partly because I suspect that arguments like yours would show that this idea leads easily to the fantasies (as they seem to me) of immaterial souls and the like. So I would see your argument, if it works, as a reductio.

I doubt (as also no doubt will you) that I am qualified to offer the kind of stress test of your argument that you seek. I thought I would try instead to see if there was any chance of making you doubt the premise, getting you to appreciate the possibility that animals might evolve without acquiring any non-physical aspect or component, but then also in certain cases be able and inclined to think the opposite.

I thought one reason you might entertain such a scenario could be that mechanical robots are (or soon will be) a clear case of rational-but-mindless-if-not-in-a-manner-of-speaking. So the scenario would merely be that of the evolution of a kind of animal with similar functionality to a machine. And evolution has proved adept at producing biological machinery of almost limitless complexity, so the scenario wouldn't seem implausible.

But you say you take "rational" as already implying possession of a mind (in more than a manner of speaking). And I expect you will feel the same way about "think". So for you (or other dualists) I would probably need to sketch the scenario in terms like "computational" and "compute": an animal able and inclined to compute statements implying that it had a mind (in more than a manner of speaking).

The idea that we each have a mind, except in a manner of speaking about our physical constitution and behaviour. — bongo fury

So you're a bot?

An animal.

Partly because I suspect that arguments like yours would show that this idea leads easily to the fantasies (as they seem to me) of immaterial souls and the like. So I would see your argument, if it works, as a reductio. — bongo fury

Ah, I see. So because you already know how things are with reality and my arguments contradict your understanding, my arguments must be faulty.

It seems you think you're God. But you also think you don't have a mind. Hmm. Methinks you're confused.

I doubt (as also no doubt will you) that I am qualified to offer the kind of stress test of your argument that you seek. I thought I would try instead to see if there was any chance of getting you to appreciate the possibility that animals might evolve without acquiring any non-physical aspect or component, but then also in certain cases be able and inclined to think the opposite. — bongo fury

How do you doubt something without a mind? Do you think doubts can exist all by themselves, just drifting around like clouds?

Why are you mentioning animals? And yes, if there actually are any extended sensible objects then I accept entirely the possibility that a sensible body might evolve without there being any soul inside it. I mean, you're one by your own admission.

But you think you don't have any mental states, right? Or rather, you've typed that (you can't think it, for thoughts are mental states. So if you're correct and you don't have any mental states, then you're just a typist without a mind....which is a bot).

Ah, I see. So because you already know how things are with reality and my arguments contradict your understanding, my arguments must be faulty. — Bartricks

No, I said I suspect your argument is valid.

It seems you think you're God. — Bartricks

It's about beliefs facing the tribunal of experience as a corpus. That's why I might be just as inclined to judge premises from the conclusion of a valid argument as the other way round.

How do you doubt something without a mind? — Bartricks

But don't forget I have a mind in a manner of speaking about my physical constitution and behaviour.

And yes, if there actually are any extended sensible objects then I accept entirely the possibility that a sensible body might evolve without there being any soul inside it. — Bartricks

Cool... an animal body able to compute statements implying it had a mind in more than a manner of speaking?

a typist without a mind....which is a bot — Bartricks

Yes, good definition of a bot: a typist without a mind in a manner of speaking.

Incidentally, I think the appropriate manner of speaking (which disqualifies any present-day bot) is to imply skill in the social game of agreeing (or disagreeing) about which words and pictures are being pointed at which objects out in the world.

the immateriality of the mind.
— Bartricks
Assuming it does, explain how an "immaterial mind" interacts with (its) material body. — 180 Proof

I'd like a clear answer to this, too.

No, I said I suspect your argument is valid. — bongo fury

But you think they're unsound, though. And yet your only basis for doing so is that they lead to a conclusion that you judge to involve a fantasy of an immaterial soul. But whether it is a fantasy to think we have an immaterial soul is precisely the issue, and my arguments appear to demonstrate that it is not. Of course, if one just decides - as you seem to have - that our minds are not souls, then they will be powerless to move you. But then you're the fantasist, as you're deciding how things are with reality and then closing your mind to evidence to the contrary. I don't understand that attitude at all.

But don't forget I have a mind in a manner of speaking about my physical constitution and behaviour. — bongo fury

What do you mean? Do you mean you do have a mind or that you don't? I mean, you are thinking things, right? And thoughts are mental states. So you have a mind. A mind is just whatever is doing that thinking and desiring and so on.

To be capable of understanding the answer you'd first have to be recognize why that's a confused question to ask.

SO... go on.

Of course, if one just decides - as you seem to have - that our minds are not souls, — Bartricks

No, the premise I'm deciding to explicitly deny is that we have things called minds, except in a manner of speaking about our physical constitution and behaviour.

But then you're the fantasist, as you're deciding how things are with reality and then closing your mind to evidence to the contrary. — Bartricks

To be fair, I think I'm maintaining a reasonably coherent worldview and finding I can consistently deny what seems to you an undeniable axiom.

But don't forget I have a mind in a manner of speaking about my physical constitution and behaviour.
— bongo fury

What do you mean? Do you mean you do have a mind or that you don't? — Bartricks

I added this, above:

Incidentally, I think the appropriate manner of speaking (which disqualifies any present-day bot) is to imply skill in the social game of agreeing (or disagreeing) about which words and pictures are being pointed at which objects out in the world. — bongo fury

And thoughts are mental states. — Bartricks

Again, only in a manner of speaking:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/433444

To be capable of understanding the answer you'd first have to be recognize why that's a confused question to ask. — Bartricks

What's confused about it? I somehow decide to raise my arm, then I act of my volition to raise it. Then, the arm moves. The arm is definitely material. If the decision and will are mind, and the mind is immaterial, then the immaterial would be affecting the material.

I started reading the drivel you wrote and determined it is not worth responding to. I think anyone reading can see which of us is making more sense. Happy trolling!

A couple of things:

The Gut-Brain bilateral communication Axis is accepted by science. The idea that the "brain" controls everything is antiquated, and I'm surprised people still believe that everything is happening in the brain. It's happening everywhere.

There is no such thing as materiality. Everything is quantum energy waves. Again, another myth that was destroyed 100 years still lives in the domain of philosophical discussion.

no, I have no idea what your position is. If you are denying there are minds then there's really nothing I can do for you as you're not responsive to reason and seem profoundly conceptually confused

Dunning and Kruger. You have no expertise in philosophy. If you did, you'd know it wasn't drivel.

Yes, of course - if the mind is immaterial and the body material, then we have abundant evidence that objects of different kinds can and do causally interact.

But he's not asking for evidence of interaction, he's asking 'how' it can happen, which is quite different.

Now that question is confused in this context for several reasons. First, you do not need to be able to explain 'how' something is happening in order to have evidence that it is happening. Second, it is not clear what's wanted in terms of an answer. Those who ask the question will never be satisfied with anything one says, for what they really want is a purely material explanation of interaction between the material and immaterial. Third, as I explained earlier, even if no such interaction can take place, this doesn't provide evidence that the mind is material

@Bartricks

Still waiting for your answer to

:point: :lol:

But he's not asking for evidence of interaction, he's asking 'how' it can happen, which is quite different. — Bartricks

Sure, but we're facing a claim that the mind is immaterial. And we know of multiple kinds of interactions between the physical and the mind... it's not just that I can lift my arm; I can also see things based on the light entering my eyes; not to mention the modulation of mental states by drugs. It's enough in the face of a claim of immateriality to ask what it even means to claim that the mind is immaterial in the first place.

I do not know what you mean.

I have explained why the question is misguided in this context. Those who ask it demonstrate by their asking of it that they simply do not understand the dialectic and are therefore below the level of intelligence needed for fruitful debate.

Do you understand, for instance, that even if there is no way to answer it that will satisfy the asker (and there invariably isn't because they mean by an 'explanation' a purely materialist one) that isn't evidence it doesn't occur? And do you understand that even if no such interaction can take place, this doesn't imply the mind is material?

Philosophers demonstrated there's no such thing as materiality thousands of years ago.
Scientists aren't investigating the matter at all. Saying 'there's no material world, coz it's all waves' is as confused as saying 'there's no materiality, as everything is made of tiny bananas, not tiny apples'.
And saying the mind is everywhere is to assert a confused materialist view of the mind.

The question here is whether the mind is material or immaterial. This is not a question investigated by science. Philosophy isn't backward science. And science isn't sophisticated science.

'there's no materiality, as everything is made of tiny bananas, not tiny apples'. — Bartricks

There is no such thing as materiality, other than in philosophical discussions, which is perpetuated by ba very poor educational system that is too lazy to change its textbooks fire 100 years. Professors just keep repeating the same thing that have learned, whether or not it is archaic. Mind/body duality is an artificial issue created by a misunderstanding of the nature of life.

Do you understand, for instance, that even if there is no way to answer it that will satisfy the asker (and there invariably isn't because they mean by an 'explanation' a purely materialist one) that isn't evidence it doesn't occur? — Bartricks

Well it's consistent with this:

By all means prove me wrong, — Bartricks

...but I think my problem here goes a bit deeper. You're entirely correct... not having an explanation for how the immaterial interacts with the material isn't proof that the mind isn't material. But if you're going to advance the burden "prove I'm wrong" on the material theory of mind, you should be held to the same standard in your proofs of its immateriality. By that light, we have this:

Argument 1: That our minds have no color, smell, texture, or taste is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
Argument 2: That our minds have particular properties of thought is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
Argument 3: That our minds are indubitable is evidence that our minds are immaterial.
Argument 9: That our minds can be imagined without bodies is evidence that our minds are immaterial.

...versus this:

Argument A: That our minds react to physical entities through our senses is evidence that our minds are material.
Argument B: That our minds can cause physical actions to occur is evidence that our minds are material.
Argument C: That chemical interactions with the brain appear to modulate mental states is evidence that our minds are material

...then the second set looks a bit better than the former set, unless we build some straw version of materialism where the Linux kernel, not having a weight, taste, or color, is immaterial (or any of other variants applied to args 2, 3, 4).

The reason you need an explanation for how the immaterial mind interacts with the material is because the entire first set seems to be too easily dismissed. All of your arguments have the same issues; no materialist would have a problem with the mind not having a taste, for example, so it's hard to see these arguments as anything but a straw man. But we all agree that you shouldn't drive under the influence of sleeping pills, for some reason.

It's not that a lack of explanation here somehow proves you're wrong. It's that there's a lack of things seriously suggesting you're right. If a belief in the material mind requires valid justification, shouldn't a belief in the immaterial mind as well?

No, it's the other way around. It is ignorant scientists thinking that they're doing philosophy and then others in the public reading their ignorant works and thinking that science has supplanted philosophy.

You, for instance, seem entirely ignorant of the fact that materialism was refuted by philosophers thousands of years ago.

They should teach philosophy in schools and that might go some way towards remedying things.

Do you understand, for instance, that even if there is no way to answer it that will satisfy the asker (and there invariably isn't because they mean by an 'explanation' a purely materialist one) that isn't evidence it doesn't occur?
— Bartricks
Well it's consistent with this:
By all means prove me wrong,
— Bartricks — InPitzotl

No it isn't. Obviously. What did I just say? I just said that 'even if' two objects of different kinds are incapable of causal interaction, that does 'not' show that the mind is material.

'There's a tree outside my window'. Is that evidence that the mind is material? Er, no, obviously. (Typical response of someone on this kind of thread - but what's a window?)

'Two objects of different kinds can't causally interact'. Is that evidence that the mind is material? No.

You're entirely correct... not having an explanation for how the immaterial interacts with the material isn't proof that the mind isn't material. — InPitzotl

That's not what I said. I said not having an explanation of how something is occurring is not evidence it is not occurring.

It's a distinct point. I don't know how this computer is working. Is that evidence it is not working. No.

So, 'if' I don't know how the mind and body interact, that is not evidence that they do not interact.

Here's a completely different point: if immaterial things can't interact with material things, that's not evidence that the mind is material. This argument, in other words, is obviously invalid:

1. Material things can't causally interact with immaterial things
2. Therefore, the mind is material

you should be held to the same standard in your proofs of its immateriality. — InPitzotl

Yes, I provided 10 arguments. Each argument has premises that are far more plausible than their negations. If you think otherwise, show me wrong. If each argument is only 50% likely to be sound, the proposition is shown to be 99.9% likely to be true. That's a proof, yes? If someone constructs a case for the truth of a proposition that establishes its likelihood as 99.9%, then they have proved the proposition according to the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' meaning of proof.

...then the second set looks a bit better than the former set, unless we build some straw version of materialism where the Linux kernel, not having a weight, taste, or color, is immaterial. — InPitzotl

Er, no. The second set are all question begging. Look: do any of my arguments have a premise that asserts the immateriality of the mind? No. They all 'conclude' that it is immaterial.

Now, construct arguments that 'conclude' the mind is material and then let's look at the premises you need to get there.

You, for instance, seem entirely ignorant of the fact that materialism was refuted by philosophers thousands of years ago. — Bartricks

Philosophers don't refute. They present ideas based upon observations.

Arguments don't refute or prove. They simply restate the premise.

Ah, another Dunning and Kruger moment, methinks. You don't have any expertise in philosophy, clearly.

Well, no, because consciousness is not an object at all, but a state. It's typical of your sloppiness that you treat consciousness and minds as equivalent, which is as silly as confusing thoughts with thinkers. — Bartricks

I meant mind. Stop nitpicking.

it must have at least one (else in what possible sense is it 'sensible'?) — Bartricks

What sensible property do electrons have? Or photons of light? Or quantum wave functions?

There is a sizable population that believes there is no such problem.... heck I would say the majority don’t think it’s a problem
— khaled

Okaay. You might want to get in touch with the world's philosophy departments and point this out then. — Bartricks

A sizeable population of the people IN the philosophy departments would agree that there is no such problem. Dennett for one.

Psst, whether lumps of ham are minds is what is in dispute. — Bartricks

False. Whether minds are lumps of something sensible is what is in dispute. We can both agree lumps of ham don't have minds.

My point still stands:

2. If minds were sensible objects, then it would make sense to wonder what a sensible object thinks
— Bartricks

Overgeneralization. It could just be the case that it makes sense to wonder what some sensible objects (such as minds, according to the position you're arguing against) think, while others (such as olives) not. In which case the conclusion doesn't follow. — khaled

It makes sense to wonder how heavy a piece of paper is, but not how heavy light is. Even though both are sensible objects. In the same way, minds can be sensible, and also be such that it makes sense to wonder what they think, but not what rocks think.

No it doesn't. The claim that if something comes into being it has a prior cause is not equivalent to causal determinism. — Bartricks

But that wasn't the claim being made. The claim being made was:

4. If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes — Bartricks

And I responded: Not necessarily. A quantum wave function can do something that does NOT trace to external causes, because it was random. Sensible objects can cause things without tracing to external causes.

And besides, even if your claim was that if something comes into being it has prior cause, what's your proof for that? My reply would again be: Not necessarily. Example: Big bang.

But a reasonably intelligent person, upon asking "Is Megan at the party? And are there any dogs at the party?" and receiving the answer "Megan is certainly here, but I am not sure if there are any dogs here" would conclude that Megan was not a dog. — Bartricks

And that reasonably intelligent person would be wrong. He does not have sufficient evidence. As you said yourself:

Surely. It is, of course, possible that Megan is a dog, for it is possible that though the host knows Megan is at the party, the host does not know whether Megan is a dog. — Bartricks

Which has to be the case. If you follow the analogy, here you want to know "Is the mind a material thing?". You ask the host (reason) "Hey, is the mind present". The host replies "Yes". You ask him "Are material objects present". He replies "Maybe".

Given that you were asking the question in the first place we have to assume that your reason doesn't present the answer (or else you wouldn't be asking the question). So your reason (the host) doesn't know whether or not the mind is a material thing, despite knowing that it is present and that material things may be present. So you don't have enough evidence to conclude from that that the mind is not material.

I would suggest you stop wasting half a paragraph attacking me when you don't understand what I'm saying. It just makes you look like an idiot.

I could claim that nothing is harmful at t1 (moment of death, which is premise 2).
— khaled

Yes, you could couldn't you. — Bartricks

Yes I could. And with as much evidence and credibility as you use for your argument: None.

: every extended object has a top and a bottom — Bartricks

We were talking about sensible objects. Not extended objects. So there ends your line of reasoning. To say "extended object" is to already assume it's divisible.

Your confusing 'currently unable to divide it' with it being metaphysically impossible to divide it. — Bartricks

No, I'm saying there could be things that are metaphysically impossible to divide. An electron is a good candidate.

So, I can conceive of myself existing, and my brain not. — Bartricks

Describe to me what you're imagining then. No wonder you specifically can imagine being without a brain!

No it isn't. Obviously. What did I just say? — Bartricks

Well I read this:

Do you understand, for instance, that even if there is no way to answer it that will satisfy the asker (and there invariably isn't because they mean by an 'explanation' a purely materialist one) that isn't evidence it doesn't occur? — Bartricks

I just said that 'even if' two objects of different kinds are incapable of causal interaction, that does 'not' show that the mind is material. — Bartricks

But "material" has to mean something, and it has to mean something sensible, else all statements you make about what is and what isn't material are either meaningless or irrelevant. Let's phrase it this way... suppose I invoke Laplace's "I had no need for that hypothesis" idiom here. Well, all of the interactions between the mind and the physical are consistent with the mind being a function of what a brain is doing. Yes, that doesn't mean the mind isn't immaterial, but the bigger question here is, what is the need for that hypothesis?

That's not what I said. I said not having an explanation of how something is occurring is not evidence it is not occurring. — Bartricks

I don't see what you're correcting here.

It's a distinct point. I don't know how this computer is working. Is that evidence it is not working. No.
So, 'if' I don't know how the mind and body interact, that is not evidence that they do not interact. — Bartricks

The computer scenario isn't analogous; nobody is arguing minds don't work, and nobody is arguing the mind and body doesn't interact. You're claiming the mind is immaterial. But we know the mind interacts physically in multiple ways. So if it's immaterial, that immaterial thing is interacting in quite a lot of ways similar to how a material thing interacts with the physical. It's a fair question, then, what it even means to presume said mind is immaterial. Again, what is the need for that hypothesis?

Yes, I provided 10 arguments. Each argument has premises that are far more plausible than their negations. — Bartricks

You've mentioned this multiple times, as if it's making a point, but I'm not convinced that this should be all that surprising. Suppose I had a giant hat; I passed it to everyone in this forum, and I asked them to write one argument either for the mind being material, or for it being immaterial, and slip it into the hat. Once I've collected the arguments, I draw 10 arguments from the hat. What do you suppose the probability is that all 10 of those arguments would be for the mind being immaterial? I would gather that probability would be incredibly low.

Now contrast that with what you keep claiming you accomplished. In this case, you yourself are writing all 10 arguments. Then we draw those only-10 arguments out of that hat. So what is the probability that out of those 10 arguments, all of them would both (a) be for the mind being immaterial, (b) be convincing to you? I would gather the probability of that happening would be somewhere near 100%.

Now, I note that you stand by all ten of your arguments. But I've specifically chosen to talk about four of them; the four I have chosen have a single thing in common. They can all be applied to absurdly argue that the Linux kernel is immaterialistic. But I note you're standing by all ten of your arguments as being more believable than not, and those four I've shown lead to this absurdity are certainly parts of that set of 10. So I think that suffices to show there's a problem here somewhere.