I am assuming that, empirically and socially, the actions of a person that are directed by a genuine belief must be measurably different from those of a person promulgating a false belief. Presumably things like long-term consistency, cogency of presentation, tendency to evoke comprehension in others. I am assuming that "the truth will out" in some sense, or more precisely, "the false will out," and reveal its own falsity. It is an hypothesis.

If you are dissimulating, you are intentionally mis-communicating. If you are practicing authenticity, then the possibility of understanding is greatest. That would have significance for coordinated group planning and action, for example. — Pantagruel

Take, for example, Christians and their professed belief in the Ten Commandments, or their professed belief in "love thy neighbor". How would you go about measuring, assessing any of that, based on their words and actions?

What exactly is the point of this though? — Darkneos

To discover the nature of the shared presuppositions that underlie our various analytical inquiries. If we are doing metaphysics, at any rate.

Well, you can be a Christian and go to the same church as your neighbour and so ostensibly ascribe to the same "moral ideology", but behave very differently in the same situation, e.g. donating to a beggar on the street, caring for a sick relative. Which only strengthens the argument that our "animating" beliefs can be different even when our situations are similar. If someone constantly acts in ways that appear to contradict his ostensible ideology that will impact credibility.

I'm not trying to prove this proposition empirically except by way of experiment. If I adopt this as
motivating hypothesis, I assume that my actions will be efficacious in a way that those motivated by an hypothesis of deceit cannot be.

RGC's use of "presupposition". — creativesoul

I like the term '"idden assumption". It's better than "belief" imo because these are not really positive beliefs, that we adhere to consciously and defend. They are more like unconscious ideas that shape our examinations but are not themselves examined. To me a belief is something more explicit and stated.

This presupposes that RGC claims otherwise. He doesn't. Absolute presuppositions are but one part in the field of study.

Read the paper. — creativesoul

This presupposes that logic precedes thought. — creativesoul

This is why I have no inclination toward reading the paper. It appears to inspire all sorts of nonsense like this, which I would simply reject and have no part of. Therefore it would just be a waste of my time.

I like the term 'hidden assumption'. It's better than " elief" imo because these are not really positive beliefs, that we adhere to consciously and defend. They are more like unconscious ideas that shape our examinations but are not themselves examined. — Olivier5

:up:

Yes, but, they can be and are subject to indirect modification, insofar as they govern and determine both scientific and ordinary thinking. As is clear when Collingwood describes the various scenarios in which metaphysical and scientific thinking can be 'out of step' with each other. This misrepresentation of metaphysics (via pseudo-metaphysics, irrationalism, etc) represents a breaking down of the mechanisms around one set of absolute presuppositions in favour of another.

This is why I have no inclination toward reading the paper. It appears to inspire all sorts of nonsense like this, which I would simply reject and have no part of. Therefore it would just be a waste of my time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is why we're so thankful that you deigned to comment on it.

I haven't read Collingwood so can't comment much on this thread. All I want to say is that the term "belief" summons something consciously assumed true, while the "hidden assumption" vocable is more neutral and I believe more precise here. The danger (so to speak) of these assumptions is in their hiding: they cannot be examined untill they are ferreted out.

I agree with the idea that even the most rabid anti-metaphysician is doing some metaphysics. 0 is a number. Bald is an air style.

"belief" summons something consciously assumed true — Olivier5

The primitive hunter in my example may not consciously be aware that "massive objects appear to fall a certain way in the earth's gravity field" but still base his actions upon that principle. For me, it is this "commitment to act in a certain way" which constitutes the fundamental aspect of "true belief". I think that the point at which beliefs begin to be explicitly outlined is the point at which bad faith can begin to be introduced. I would trust what people's actions reveal about their beliefs more than what they report their own beliefs to be.

. I would trust what people's actions reveal about their beliefs more than what they report their own beliefs to be. — Pantagruel

Okay, point well taken. True that. Roger. My mistake.

what is the absolute presupposition they express? You say it is causality; but what could it mean to presuppose causality — Janus

I emphasize “metaphysically speaking”, for none of the following has any affect on Everydayman, who doesn’t know, and cares even less, about any of it. Speculative epistemology is intellectual entertainment, not a solution to existential difficulties.

Metaphysically speaking, humans presupposes causes, which we question and answer for ourselves in propositions; we absolutely presuppose causality, which we never talk about because without causality, there wouldn’t even be any cause questions to ask. We reason to instances of cause; we grant causality, which is the point of departure for reason to come up with causes.

Much like...when we go to the store for a thing, we presuppose the thing to be there, because of experience (milk, eggs, butter) or it’s just the kind of store that has that thing (granite, lawnmowers, Chinese silk), but before all that we always absolutely presuppose the reality of the thing, because if we’ve presupposed it being in the store, we must have absolutely granted that the thing exists.

Furthermore, after granting its existence, we still presuppose the possibility of the particular thing being in the store we’re going to (because it is impossible to know it’s actually there), then it must be the case that we’ve already absolutely granted the general notion of possibility itself, because without it, whether the thing was in the store or not would never have become a question, a concern or a satisfaction/disappointment, for us. This is the possibility in relation to space, because we’ve already granted the possibility of the thing in relation to time, from the mere fact it exists.
—————-

Once the concept of causality is formed, then the idea that it either obtains or does not obtain logically follows. — Janus

This is part of RGC’s thesis, in that once the concept of causality is formed, whether or not it either obtains or does not obtain, is a nonsense implication. Once it forms, it has obtained, hence the logic of it is irrelevant. Which is not quite the right way to express it, but the point remains. The reason for this is given in Kant, but not so much in Collingwood, so I’ll refrain from it.

Don’t mean to speak for you, but perhaps your sentence would have been better stated as...once the concept of a cause is formed, whether it obtains or does not obtain, logically follows (that is to say, whether or not the necessarily conjoined effect follows from it).
————-

then the term "absolute presupposition" understood as being beyond truth aptitude, seems itself simply wrong, because causality is being proposed, even if not explicitly. — Janus

Agreed, it is confusing, and seemingly self-refuting. Collingwood covers this confusion by stipulating that absolute presuppositions are not “propounded”, which we take to mean not proposed. Thus, if the conception of causality is not proposed, it is immediately removing from susceptibility to truth aptitude, and, rather, it is tacitly understood a priori, antecedent to our conscious construction of empirical propositions.

Remember....all our conceptions arise from something. It is easy to see conceptions of objects arise from sensibility, but it is not so easy to see from whence abstract concepts arise. It is irrefutable that we have them, re: time, beauty, justice, etc., but they cannot arise from sensibility, so....wherefrom?

I’ll leave you with....(gulp)......spontaneity.

Which is why we're so thankful that you deigned to comment on it. — Pantagruel

Your very welcome, the gratitude is much appreciated.

Philosophy is a quest for knowledge. The true quest for knowledge starts from a lack of knowledge. That's why Socrates professed to not knowing. The "presupposition" is a bias which interferes with the true quest for knowledge, because it's an assumption of already knowing certain things. So the philosopher must do everything possible to rid oneself of such presuppositions in order to enjoy a true philosophy.

To insist that one must start from a presupposition of some sort is simply counterproductive, an attempt to justify not making the effort to free oneself from the influence of bias, and do everything possible to approach with an open mind. And to argue that the assumption that one has rid oneself of such biases, is itself a presupposition, is a failure, because we all know that we cannot completely rid ourselves of them, so we do not presuppose such perfection.

The point to a good philosophy is to make any such presuppositions (biases) as irrelevant as possible, having as minimal as possible influence on the philosophy. So any philosophy which sees presuppositions as playing a significant role in philosophy is simply a misguided philosophy.

Philosophy is a quest for knowledge. The true quest for knowledge starts from a lack of knowledge. That's why Socrates professed to not knowing. The "presupposition" is a bias which interferes with the true quest for knowledge, because it's an assumption of already knowing certain things — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a misconstrual of the sense of these presuppositions. These presuppositions are accumulated with respect to a complete context of being in the world, underlying practical as well as theoretical activities. They are more like transcendental conditions, if anything. Nothing in this thread ever purports to rise to the discussion of knowledge. This is more basic than knowledge, it is belief.

That's laughable considering how you have approached me in this thread. — Janus

My apologies then. No offense meant. seems to be explaining the notion fairly well... if by that I mean in line with RGC.

The "presupposition" is a bias which interferes with the true quest for knowledge, because it's an assumption of already knowing certain things... — Metaphysician Undercover

Knowledge must be true. Presuppositions need not be. Assumptions are sometimes different than presuppositions. Again, this is clearly laid out in the book. The link to the download was given earlier...

Thanks

@MU You miss, continue to miss, and insist on missing the entire point of what absolute presuppositions (APs), a phrase used as a term of art and well-defined by the man who developed it, are. As such, with respect to this discussion, you are an absolute and annoying fool (AAF). But in even this there is a substantial hint as to the nature of APs, which goes to understanding their function and their meaning and significance within that function.

Are you an AAF? Two possible answers. 1) You are altogether an AAF, meaning that in any and every sense and application you are AAFish, and that is that. Or 2) in this discussion you are an AAF, being agnostic as to any other AAFishness that may or may not pertain. And this APs. It is their functioning where, when, and how they're functioning at their function that defines them as APs. You continue to define them as they are not here defined, which in sum means that the train of your thought left the station and you weren't on board, but you continue to think that you are.

This is why I have no inclination toward reading the paper. It appears to inspire all sorts of nonsense like this, which I would simply reject and have no part of. Therefore it would just be a waste of my time. — Metaphysician Undercover

The obvious question is "Then why are you participating in this discussion?" If you don't like the rules of this particular game, don't play.

I haven't read Collingwood so can't comment much on this thread. All I want to say is that the term "belief" summons something consciously assumed true, while the "hidden assumption" vocable is more neutral and I believe more precise here. — Olivier5

Since you haven't read the paper, it doesn't make sense for you to jump in and decide we should be using different words than we are. It's disruptive and inconsiderate.

This is why I have no inclination toward reading the paper. It appears to inspire all sorts of nonsense like this, which I would simply reject and have no part of. Therefore it would just be a waste of my time. — Metaphysician Undercover

"This is not a genuine argument: it is a sophistical excuse for refusing to read a book.... The only way to find out whether a book is worth reading is to read it." (EM, p.19)

If only, MU, you arose to the level of "sophistical."

I’ll leave you with....(gulp)......spontaneity. — Mww

I think maybe convention, consensus, is the primary reason, although I think spontaneity is part of it too.

if by that I mean in line with RGC. — creativesoul

Yeah.....(chuckles to self).....I’m trying really hard to stay in the proper lane.

I guess I’d first have to ask what you mean convention, consensus, to be the primary reasons for. Spontaneity and those are very far apart, so just wondering what they might have in common.

I guess I’d first have to ask what you mean convention, consensus, to be the primary reasons for. Spontaneity and those are very far apart, so just wondering what they might have in common. — Mww

Why do we assume the presuppositions that, often unconsciously, underlie our understanding of the world. Some thoughts. I'm brainstorming - just throwing out ideas:

• Intuition - I think what you call "spontaneity?"
• Consistency with our overall understanding of reality. Yes, this is circular.
• Convention - I say "There is no objective reality." Everyone says, "What are you, an idiot?"
• Experience
• Whim
• Bias
• Self-examination
• What else?

Convention and spontaneity may be really different, but they can both contribute. How much of what you call "spontaneity" is just internalized convention? Harder than this question is "What are the APs underlying our beliefs." @tim woods and I have been talking about opening another thread to discuss that.

Whenever anybody states a thought in words, there are a great many more thoughts in his mind than are expressed in his statement. Among these there are some which stand in a peculiar relation to the thought he has stated: they are not merely its context, they are its presuppositions.

The priority affirmed in the word presupposition is logical priority. It is not a priority in time.

Only by a kind of analysis, when I reflect upon it, do I come to see that this was a presupposition was making, however little I was aware of it at the time.

Here lies the difference between the desultory and casual thinking of our unscientific consciousness and the orderly and systematic thinking we call science. In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots and tangles; we fish up a thought out of our minds like an anchor of its own cable, hanging upside down and draped in seaweed with shellfish sticking to it, and dump the whole thing on deck quite pleased with ourselves for having got it up at all.

Thinking scientifically means disentangling all this mess, and reducing a knot of thought in which everything sticks together anyhow to a system or series of thoughts in which thinking the thoughts is at the same time thinking the connexions between them.



Prop. 1. Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question.

A question is logically prior to its own answer. When thinking is scientifically ordered, this logical priority is accompanied by a temporal priority; one formulates the question first, and only when it is formulated begins trying to answer it. This is a special kind of temporal priority, in which the event or activity that is prior does not stop when that which is posterior begins.

Def. I. Let that which is stated [i.e. that which can be true or false) be called a proposition, and let stating it be called propounding it.

Prop. 2. Every question involves a presupposition.

Def. 2. To say that a question does not arise is the ordinary English way of saying that it involves a presupposition which is not in fact being made.

Def. 3. The fact that something causes a certain question to arise I call the ‘logical efficacy' of that thing.

Def. 4. To assume is to suppose by an act of free choice.

Prop. 3. The logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend upon the truth of what is supposed, or even on its being thought true, but only on its being supposed.

Prop. 4. A presupposition is either relative or absolute.

In this context the word ‘presupposition’ refers not to the act of presupposing but to that which is presupposed.

Def. 5. By a relative presupposition I mean one which stands relatively to one question as its
presupposition and relatively to another question as its answer.

Def. 6. An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer.

The above has been copied and pasted from the essay up to page 31. I think that the above part could use some considered discussion as a means to grasp what RGC is saying.

It seems to me that key to his position is Prop. 2.

How presuppositions relate to inquiry. While I immediately recoiled at Prop. 1., I have since been content to not pursue that objection for it seems rather inconsequential to the rest. Well, I've edited this now as a result of having read further. Prop. 1. seems to be key to his position as well. He returns to it shortly...

... Do you have any issue with delving into the above for the purpose of better understanding what RGC is doing here?

I'd be lying if I said I understood what the confusion is about, but maybe if there is some more focused discussion I'll clue in.

To the intention of the OP, I found another essay on this subject by Paul Trainor; the conclusion fairly sums up what I think are the most interesting features of Absolute Presuppositions consistent with Collingwood's work:

Perhaps one of the most valuable suggestions found in Collingwood is that the kinds of persons we are, the kinds of values we embody and express, may in some elusive but nonetheless real sense, serve to test our metaphysical beliefs. They may not enable us to judge other peoples, peoples who have and do regulate their lives by other sets of absolute presuppositions, but Collingwood's work surely suggests that if we are to truly know ourselves, if we are to truly create ourselves, then the values we embody and express may serve to indirectly validate or invalidate our metaphysical beliefs.

https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/uram.7.4.270

Cool. Perhaps another thread is best for getting into the paper itself as a means for better understanding RGC. For myself, at least, I couldn't possibly have a clue whether or not another author's take on Collingwood is accurate, for I have not yet understood the paper myself. So, as a means for even being the least bit knowledgable about what others say about RGC, I find myself with the imperative of first having understood him myself.



Interested in a reading group, or another thread?

I guess I’d first have to ask what you mean convention, consensus, to be the primary reasons for.
— Mww

Why do we assume the presuppositions that, often unconsciously, underlie our understanding of the world. — T Clark

Ahhhhh....Ok, gotcha. Reasons for assuming presuppositions. All those are sufficient reasons for assuming presuppositions, experience being my personal favorite, probably. At least the most obvious. Only nit worth picking is, intuitions are not representative of “spontaneity” as I used it.

No worries. My apologies also; I've been a bit irritable due to life circumstances.

Convention - I say "There is no objective reality." Everyone says, "What are you, an idiot?" — T Clark

Of course around here it is usually - "I say there is an objective reality." Everyone says, "What are you an idiot?"

I think people accept their presuppositions because they fit emotional needs. But that doesn't mean they are necessarily wrong.

The other reason is the considered absence of a viable alternative. Which may fit with what you have called Experience.