The whole question as to whether people really believe what they claim to believe is a good one and it also raises the question of social pressure to believe certain things. Do people hold on to beliefs systems in name for fear of rejection and lack of popularity? If they hold onto the beliefs because they have not explored contradictions in their thinking it does seem that they are self deception. Does that mean that they are afraid to explore further?

Without specifically answering your questions, I would elaborate further that the actual coherence of one's thought is the measure and the projection of one's fundamental beliefs. And the willingness to explore and publicize one's fundamental beliefs is central to theories of social rationality and communicative action (and deliberative democracy) such as of Jurgen Habermas. Credibility, in other words. I think what you are asking is, do most people fear to take responsibility for their own fundamental beliefs? I'd argue yes.

Think about how people seek out information. You don't read Wikipedia in order to engender belief, only to collect bits of information which potentially can figure in belief. If you want to engender belief, you actually read the source books, because only those are in any way an adequate representation of the totality of underlying absolute presuppositions. As Collingwood says, "the only way to find out if a book is worth reading is to read it."

Our culture has become superficial, and superficiality does not lend itself to producing actual beliefs, only "hypothetical" ones.

What is a belief, other than a memory? Nothing. And to believe is to have confidence in what is believed, i.e. the memory. Confidence in one's memory is the assumption of sameness, that the thing recalled is the same as the thing which was remembered. So to believe is to be confident in one's capacity for maintaining sameness.

You can see how self-deception is very relevant when we allow ourselves to conform our memories for various different purposes.

What is a belief, other than a memory? — Metaphysician Undercover

If I believe I am writing this now, how is that a memory? It may become a memory, but only because it was first a belief.

I agree with you completely. Most people seem to just look up information on Wikipedia as if it has all the answers summed up, as if it is the new 'wise' philosopher. That is why I get a bit annoyed when people just create links to it. I use it as a basis for looking at potential for research and for a reference for thinking through ideas.

There is a big difference between information and knowledge and I think that the main difference is the way in which knowledge is a more thorough exploration of ideas, especially in terms of personal belief. Of course, even with people using books it is possible to just use them in a superficial way. However, it is probably less common than with the internet, because so often, including on this forum, people offer a link to someone else's ideas, but with no further elaboration of the meaning and significance of the ideas.

It is easier to hypothesize something as a belief than actually to believe it. — Pantagruel

This statement could be painful but it is the most who is closest to reality. As you said to us one of the powers that can be in us the humans is believe in

something

. This point makes and proves why we are so different from animals or other creatures inside the savage world. The fact that abstract concepts created in our vocabulary as "metaphysics" or "beliefs" shows why we always want to improve our lives the better we want... Probably to reach the best goal everyone aspire = happiness (I just say this because it remembered me so fast when you quoted Aristotle).

What is a belief, other than a memory? Nothing. And to believe is to have confidence in what is believed, i.e. the memory — Metaphysician Undercover

Empiricism? Yes I guess something complex as "belief" has to been taught in us previously. Imagine if it could actually exist people who do not understand this pattern because they never been taught to. Somehow there are people which just live an ordinary life without the pursuit of "bieleve" in something better o understand what is the real meaning of "beliefs".
But in this point I don't refer to religious/atheists persons. I refer to all of those who have the power of believe in something: the next vaccine or reduce the Carbon emissions (for example). Because believe in something like religion or atheism are even more complex that just believe in tangled things.

If I believe I am writing this now, how is that a memory? — Pantagruel

All those words which you are applying in reference to your belief, "I am writing this now", require a memory of meaning. To believe "I am writing this now" is to have confidence in your use of those words, and that requires your memory of how those words ought to be used.

refer to all of those who have the power of believe in something: the next vaccine or reduce the Carbon emissions (for example). — javi2541997

This is a more specialized use of "believe", to say "believe in". It is better represented as having faith in a particular power, or capacity, to overcome obstacles. To simply "believe" is to have faith in one's power of memory, but to "believe in" is to have faith in some capacity to act.

Probably to reach the best goal everyone aspire = happiness — javi2541997

Yes, people don't 'believe' they want to be happy, they just do.

All those words which you are applying in reference to your belief, "I am writing this now", require a memory of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

This would be a vicious circularity. You can't believe something unless you already believed something. Clearly we do begin to believe, which is not an 'historical fact'.

the great danger and prevalence of self-deception — Pantagruel

There is a big difference between information and knowledge and I think that the main difference is the way in which knowledge is a more thorough exploration of ideas, especially in terms of personal belief. — Jack Cummins

For me, belief or lack of belief has never been self-deception so much as involuntary ignorance. I knew absolutely nothing about history when I was a child and didn't care in the least until I played a video game with encyclopedia-styled entries on historical topics. This factual content made an impression on my knowledge without really impacting me on an intellectual level, though I picked up some subtle strategies of behavior from the structure of the game. With time to reflect and read as an adult, it dawned on me that history, the analysis of precedent, is key for effective interpretation of the world, and I became absorbed in picking up as much comprehension of the previous two hundred years and its main antecedents as possible while integrating it with my philosophical background.

So from personal experience, it seems that three stages exist: carelessness about knowledge, dabbling accumulation of fact such that a general picture of reality takes shape semiconsciously, and active synthesis for the sake of optimizing one's grasp of truth. The procession from one stage to the next is like a phase change in matter, encountering inertial resistance at the beginning to exponentially progress, finally reaching a place where escape velocity is achieved and everything simply makes intuitive sense. The real challenge is in the phase changes, its almost like a shift in cultural awareness or perhaps even personality that is very difficult to actualize without a conducive environment and some well-crafted conditioning. I think my cultural milieu was designed to make me thoughtlessly ignorant, and I overcame that during a few periods of my life by way of gaining more independence to pursue personal interests and simply think in a self-directed way than is typical.

Natural curiosity+adequate resources+lack of environmental inhibitors=intellectual growth. Resources have become more than sufficient in modern society, and curiosity is a given, but some severe environmental inhibitions are in place, and dealing with that is where the real challenge presents itself.

This would be a vicious circularity. You can't believe something unless you already believed something. Clearly we do begin to believe, which is not an 'historical fact'. — Pantagruel

There is no circle, because I do not equate belief with memory as if they are the same thing. Belief is derived from memory which is prior to belief, as required for it, such that a belief is a particular type of memory. To believe is to have an attitude of confidence toward your memory. Then a belief is the memory subjected to that attitude of confidence.

This is a more specialized use of "believe", to say "believe in". It is better represented as having faith in a particular power, or capacity, to overcome obstacles. To simply "believe" is to have faith in one's power of memory, but to "believe in" is to have faith in some capacity to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is so interesting how you classified these complex concepts in two groups. I never thought the act of "believe" can lead us into another conception: "believe in" as you said. I guess this is just an a example of the classic question of "which one went first the egg or the gen?"
Having faith in something we can do comes when we are ready to pursue it. So I think firstly comes the act of "believe" in general terms and then "believe in..." specific terms.
So, probably, the epitome could be: being a believer in beliefs than can bring the power of act inside the world/society I live in.

To believe is to have an attitude of confidence toward your memory. Then a belief is the memory subjected to that attitude of confidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, the belief is the "attitude of confidence" that is what we are discussing. It is not the memory, and it doesn't have to be "about" memory. Belief is always a living, current, fundamental commitment.

So, probably, the epitome could be: being a believer in beliefs than can bring the power of act inside the world/society I live in. — javi2541997

Exactly. There is a correspondence between the quality of belief and the quality of the presentation (enactment) of the belief. That would be the fundamental (or to use Collingwood's term, absolute) presupposition.

I use it as a basis for looking at potential for research and for a reference for thinking through ideas. — Jack Cummins

Yes, it is more of a tool for finding a source than an actual source, at least in any non-trivial sense.

So from personal experience, it seems that three stages exist: carelessness about knowledge, dabbling accumulation of fact such that a general picture of reality takes shape semiconsciously, and active synthesis for the sake of optimizing one's grasp of truth. The procession from one stage to the next is like a phase change in matter, — Enrique

I like this characterization, especially the analogy of the "phase change"....

Exactly. There is a correspondence between the quality of belief and the quality of the presentation (enactment) of the belief. That would be the fundamental (or to use Collingwood's term, absolute) presupposition. — Pantagruel

True! You have described it even better than my statement: the importance of quality in the belief.
I guess in this point it will depend a lot of person themselves. Each one will qualify the belief as they consider appropriately. So this could be clearly subjective. For example: we all know that clearly climate change is a big problem. How much of the population will really consider it? Well I guess the one who gives quality to this belief.

Everyone (except a few) believe in climate change.
Someone believes in the quality of this belief and then wants to make a difference.

But here again we end up in the starting point as I said previously: happiness.

Yes, people don't 'believe' they want to be happy, they just do. — Pantagruel

Everyone (except a few) believe in climate change.
Someone believes in the quality of this belief and then wants to make a difference. — javi2541997

It makes sense. People who really believe can be committed in a way that people who do not really believe cannot.

Having faith in something we can do comes when we are ready to pursue it. So I think firstly comes the act of "believe" in general terms and then "believe in..." specific terms. — javi2541997

I wouldn't be so quick to judge priority in this manner. Since we are essentially active beings, continually engaged in activities, I would think that it is quite likely that we "believe in" a particular capacity prior to formalizing a belief. So for example, if I have a walking trail which I regularly walk, and there's a water course, a stream or ditch which I must jump across, I gain confidence in my capacity to jump across, prior to gaining the belief that I can jump across. We see this clearly in the scientific method, where certain theories or hypotheses provide us with the capacity to predict, then after obtaining faith in this capacity (believing in it), we proceed toward the belief the hypothesis provides some sort of truth.

Right, the belief is the "attitude of confidence" that is what we are discussing. It is not the memory, and it doesn't have to be "about" memory. Belief is always a living, current, fundamental commitment. — Pantagruel

I don't think that's quite right. A "belief" is a thing, the word used in this way is a noun. That thing is a memory which has been subjected to the process of believing. Believing is an activity and it is produced by the attitude of confidence. The belief is the result of this activity. So the belief is the memory which has been subjected to that process, of believing. It is not the attitude of confidence, nor is it the process (believing) which is produced by that attitude, it is the result of that process.

Belief is always a living, current, fundamental commitment. — Pantagruel

What you refer to here is the act of believing, which is distinct from, and ought not be called "belief".

we proceed toward the belief the hypothesis provides some sort of truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

So I guess you want to explain that we can only have the belief hypothesis when some methods and objectives are actually true. Yes. It depends a lot the feith in something that previously has to be true because it is quite difficult believing in something false.
So the premise can change here a little bit. First something (we call it "x") is true is our perspective. Secondly, we believe in the truest of x. Then, we believe in the capacity of make x understandable, studied, developed, compared, etc...

That thing is a memory — Metaphysician Undercover

This is speculation. A belief is instantiated in the act of believing To the point, since we are measuring actual believing as a kind of commitment which further manifests the belief in some kind of action.

What you refer to here is the act of believing, which is distinct from, and ought not be called "belief". — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree. That's the essence of the whole post. It is in criticism of the whole process of "hypothetical beliefs," which is what you are espousing. Beliefs are much more robust than their empirical "filler". Specifically, with respect to "absolute presuppositions" which are the topic.

And an absolute presupposition is one which is actually believed as such. — Pantagruel

Ah, no. R.G. Collingwood's (RGC) ideas on metaphysics are simple and powerful. It is a shame to misunderstand them and get them wrong. At the same time they also have that quality of newness that makes any idea first encountered seem a little strange until got used to. And it is a challenge to capture them in short summary.

As to metaphysics, RGC analyzes that and finds that as the science of pure being it is just the science of nothing at all, because there is nothing at all that it can be the science of. The idea being that for any science there must be predicates aplenty to "scientize" about. But with pure being, beyond being itself, there can be no predicates. (Is it green? Heavy? Eats grass? Furry? No, no, nope, and no, and so forth.)

Reading Aristotle closely, he found and developed a different idea derived from what he found Aristotle to have been doing. This - these - were about presuppositions, both relative and absolute (as he defined those terms). And nowhere in these ideas is anything about belief or believing.

Readers of and posters to this thread, then, will need to realize that comments about belief as such have just about zero to do with RGC and his ideas on metaphysics, and are instead, as applied to him, mistakes about his thinking.

As to presuppositions themselves, I shall try to get their sense into just a few sentences. Science, says RGC, is organized thinking about a determinate subject matter. And there are certainly other kinds of thinking - wishful, fanciful, nonsensical, artistic, poetic, & etc. - but none directly the topic, and in terms of scientific thinking itself, most of the others stand generally as nonsense (to the science).

That the first claim, although not explicitly made by RGC: that scientific thinking exists. And it involves the asking of questions. Not necessarily aloud, explicitly, or in a laboratory, and at first not even necessarily clearly. At the same time there is also thinking, although again not necessarily at first clear or explicit, but which at some point is fairly presentable as a proposition.

RGC's first example is of a shipboard experience he had.
"I write these words sitting on the deck of a ship. I lift my eyes and see a piece of string - a line, I must call it at sea - stretched more of less horizontally above me. I find myself thinking, 'that is a clothesline,' meaning that it was put there to hang washing on. When I decide it was put there for that purpose I am presupposing that it was put there for some purpose. Only if that presupposition is made does the question arise, what purpose? If that presupposition were not made, if for example I had thought the line came there by accident, that question would not have arisen, and the situation in which I think 'that is a clothesline would not have occurred." (An Essay on Metaphysics, 2014, p. 21.)

A bit later (p. 38) he breaks down the well-known, "Have you left off beating your wife yet?" finding and laying out four of the most relevant presuppositions that lead to questions.
"1. have you a wife?
2. Were you ever in the habit of beating her?
3. Do you intend to mange in the future without doing so?
4. Have you begun carrying out that intention?"

And (p.51), "It might seem that there are three schools of thought in physics, Newtonian, Kantian, and Einsteinian, let us all them, which stand committed respectively to the three following metaphysical propositions:
1. Some events have causes.
2. All events have causes.
3. No events have causes."

RGC then points out that while seeming contradictory, each of these stands as a foundational and structural part of the science that presupposes it, and as such, the question as to the truth of any one of them is a nonsense question because their value as presuppositions lies in their "efficacy" and not in their being thought true.

Some presuppositions are relative. That is, "[O]ne which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition and relatively to another as its answer" (p.29). While "[A}n absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer" (p.31).

It takes but a little practice to become aware in one's own day-to-day of lots of presuppositions that we make. Absolute presuppositions, being for the most part buried under numerous relative presuppositions, are harder to ferret out. And when found often seem absurdly obvious, which makes sense because they are absolute presuppositions of our own thinking.

RGC then develops the idea of metaphysics-as-science as the historical science of identifying the presuppositions made at different times by different groups of people, including us now. He identifies it as such arguing that is what he finds even Aristotle and Kant doing in their own thinking, at least in part, and without being entirely aware that was what they were doing, not having to hand an explicit theory of presuppositions.

RGC's book An Essay on Metahysics, here, https://www.amazon.com/Essay-Metaphysics-R-G-Collingwood/dp/1614276153/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=an+essay+on+metaphysics&qid=1614872591&s=books&sr=1-1.

Two others of his books, The idea of Nature and The Idea of History, both worth the read.

Ah, no. R.G. Collingwood's (RGC) ideas on metaphysics are simple and powerful. It is a shame to misunderstand them and get them wrong. — tim wood

Yes, you've recapitulated RGC's arguments. None of which contradicts my interpretation. He says quite clearly, the logical efficacy of a supposition does not derive from its truth, but only on its being supposed, i.e. believed. And absolute presuppositions are fundamental, that is, they are pre-supposed.

So, this is black letter from the "Essay on Metaphysics" and its what I meant and said. I certainly extended it further, built upon Collingwood's framework. That was also made clear.

I do own all three of those books you kindly recommend.

I don't think that's quite right. A "belief" is a thing, the word used in this way is a noun. That thing is a memory which has been subjected to the process of believing. Believing is an activity and it is produced by the attitude of confidence. The belief is the result of this activity. So the belief is the memory which has been subjected to that process, of believing. It is not the attitude of confidence, nor is it the process (believing) which is produced by that attitude, it is the result of that process. — Metaphysician Undercover

What about people who hold irrational beliefs - say paranoid psychotic delusions - that couldn't possibly derive from some type of memory process (because such belief content lies outside of previous experience)?

He says quite clearly, the logical efficacy of a supposition does not derive from its truth, but only on its being supposed, i.e. believed. — Pantagruel

In other places he wrote about religion, so RGC was perfectly capable of writing about believing and beliefs. But it is hard to find in RGC's Essay... any form of "believe." A few, but not in your sense or use of the word. And it would seem he took care to distinguish presuppositions from belief; he certainly did not use the word when easily he could have.

Your "i.e., believed" then is yours and not RGC's. Yours a reading-into as opposed to a reading-out-of, and as such a misrepresentation - and a major misreading - of his thinking. Confusing - conflating - belief and presupposition in RGC's thinking simply a mistake.

A "belief" is a thing, the word used in this way is a noun. That thing is a memory which has been subjected to the process of believing. Believing is an activity and it is produced by the attitude of confidence. The belief is the result of this activity. So the belief is the memory which has been subjected to that process, of believing. It is not the attitude of confidence, nor is it the process (believing) which is produced by that attitude, it is the result of that process. — Metaphysician Undercover

Gibberish.

Your "i.e., believed" then is yours and not RGC's. Yours a reading-into as opposed to a reading-out-of, and as such a misrepresentation - and a major misreading - of his thinking. Confusing - conflating - belief and presupposition in RGC's thinking simply a mistake. — tim wood

You speak with such authority.

Here is an excerpt from the Journal "Graduate Studies at Texas Tech University," from "An Emendation of RGC's Doctrine of Absolute Presuppositions" which is completely consistent with my presentation.


My central thesis is that Collingwood's absolute presuppositions are basically beliefs that function in a certain way, and that what he calls metaphysics is actually the study of belief systems....Subsequently I shall offer numerous comments concerning the status of principia within a belief system, but at the moment, it is necessary to say something about the nature of belief in general. A belief is basically a habitual way of acting, not the actions themselves; belief is a habit such that, given a particular situation, one will act in a certain way. Collingwood used phrases suggestive of this doctrine in enough instances to lead one to suspect that he might have been
willing to concur with it had it come explicitly to his attention. For example, in discussing a change from one Absolute Presupposition to another, he stated that "it is the most radical change a man can undergo, and entails the abandonment of all his most firmly established habits and standards for thought and action. "

https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/bitstream/handle/2346/72442/ttu_icasal_000191.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

So, sorry Tim, but you are not quite the authority that you present or believe yourself to be.

So, sorry Tim, but you are not quite the authority that you present or believe yourself to be. — Pantagruel

I am no authority at all, that is why I quoted RGC himself - it's not easy to reproduce his thought with his nuance in different words. And nothing wrong with riffing on another's thoughts, but much wrong with misrepresenting them. Yours (or your reference's) an interpretive departure, eisegesis v. exegesis. And the idea that "absolute presuppositions are basically beliefs that function in a certain way," is as close to being dead wrong while still breathing as you can get. Your man essentially defines belief as an habituated way; I find that at best misleading and inadequate.

In any case, if you're on about beliefs, why adduce Collingwood? And if you're about Collingwood, why not start with him instead of some academic exercise? And note he himself titles his piece an "Emendation." By which title he suggests improvement or correction - which is at least to say not the thing itself! And it is my opinion that it seems that your reference is lost on what a belief is or what the word means, unless he is redefining it as a term of his own art - but why would anyone do that?

So it would seem to devolve to what "belief" is. But that is not really a Collingwood question.