Does that mean that if you believe determinism you then necessarily believe the universe contains zero randomness? — Michael Gagnon

Yes, and the opposite view isn't that no things are determined. The opposite view is simply that not everything is determined.

It's similar to idealism versus realism in that idealism only obtains when one believes that everything (is at least only known) to be an "idea," or mental in nature. It's not that realists believe that nothing is only just an idea. The realist view is simply that not everything is an idea.

So in a nutshell:

If you believe that there are a mixture of determined and undetermined events, you're not a determinist. You're only a determinist if you believe that every event is determined.

And if you believe that there is a mixture of real and ideal existents, then you're not an idealist. You're only an idealist if you believe that everything is an ideal existent (or that we can't know anything other than ideal existents).

You are not a determinist by that definition. Because of the current understanding of quantum mechanics, the hard determinist position seems very hard to affirm. The best you can do is say that we may be mistaken about our conception of quantum mechanics, given how relatively new and weird it is, but this simply leaves possibility of determinism open.

To make clear though, believing determinism simply means indeterminism is true; it does imply you believe in the compatibility of free will with this indeterminist state or some libertarian conception of free will.

Does that mean that if you believe determinism you then necessarily believe the universe contains zero randomness? — Michael Gagnon

Lottery winners are chosen randomly. A computerized random number generator uses the quartz crystal clock. In these cases "random" means a choice was made without any plan or scheme for choosing. The knowledge required to predict the choice is not available. I don't assume that because I can't predict the outcome that it has no cause.

Because of the current understanding of quantum mechanics, the hard determinist position seems very hard to affirm. The best you can do is say that we may be mistaken about our conception of quantum mechanics, given how relatively new and weird it is, but this simply leaves possibility of determinism open. — Chany

Correct me if I'm wrong, but aren't nearly all interpretations of quantum mechanics deterministic? Courting controversy as usual, one could argue that all interpretations are deterministic. The Copenhagen interpretation being a theory about what can be said about Reality, rather than a theory of Reality, thus it is at least agnostic when it comes to determinism.

Actually, I'm going to take that back. Von Neumann's interpretation was genuinely stochastic, but I'm not sure it has many adherents left.

Lottery winners are chosen randomly. A computerized random number generator uses the quartz crystal clock. In these cases "random" means a choice was made without any plan or scheme for choosing. The knowledge required to predict the choice is not available. I don't assume that because I can't predict the outcome that it has no cause. — Mongrel

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that the knowledge required to predict the outcome is not employed?

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that the knowledge required to predict the outcome is not employed? — tom

I really do not think that the knowledge required to make such predictions even exists, so it's rather nonsense to talk about applying that non-existent knowledge. A more appropriate question would be to ask whether it is possible to obtain the knowledge required to make such predictions.

I know that we can make probability assignments to quantum events and that there is definitely room to argue quantum events are deterministic, though we lack the ability to properly see the causal relationships. I agree that it is agnostic towards determinism and that it does not truly confirm or deny it. It is just hard to affirm determinism is true when there is something that can possibly defeat it.

However, I admit this may be my personal interpretation brought out by dealing with free will libertarians trying to argue quantum mechanics allows them wiggle room to insert the power to do otherwise. The rest of the world might believe quantum mechanics is obviously deterministic, it is just the case that we cannot clearly show determinism.

You are not a determinist by that definition. Because of the current understanding of quantum mechanics, the hard determinist position seems very hard to affirm. The best you can do is say that we may be mistaken about our conception of quantum mechanics, given how relatively new and weird it is, but this simply leaves possibility of determinism open.

To make clear though, believing determinism simply means indeterminism is true; it does imply you believe in the compatibility of free will with this indeterminist state or some libertarian conception of free will. — Chany

I've always found this a rather odd things to claim for two reasons. First of all, there's a distinction to be made between ontological and epistomological determinism. QM is proof of epistomological indeterminism only, not ontological. Ontological determinism is, for instance, an intuition with which we can interpret QM results, which will lead to Bohmian mechanics - e.g. the necessity for hidden variables.

Second, free will is something that implies the exercise of reason, which in turn discerns between options that will be caused by the decision. The very act of choosing presupposes determinism because it assumes specific consequences will follow the choice made. It would be rather weird if we would have free will because of the existence of ontological indeterminism - an ontological hiccup in my thinking would then be the source of my free will. In that sense it wouldn't be free will but an accident of probability.

I really do not think that the knowledge required to make such predictions even exists, so it's rather nonsense to talk about applying that non-existent knowledge. A more appropriate question would be to ask whether it is possible to obtain the knowledge required to make such predictions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pseudo-random number generators are just algorithms. Given the seed(s) and the algorithm, you will know the outcome. In fact, pseudo-random number generators are characterized by the frequency with which they repeat - the lower the frequency, the better the generator.

Pseudo-random number generators are just algorithms. Given the seed(s) and the algorithm, you will know the outcome. In fact, pseudo-random number generators are characterized by the frequency with which they repeat - the lower the frequency, the better the generator. — tom

I don't know much about such seeds and algorithms, but you haven't convinced me that it is possible to know what the number will be prior to the computer acting to determine the number. Perhaps you could give a brief explanation of how you would proceed to determine that number, and how you would be sure that computer would follow your procedure to come up with the same number as you.

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that the knowledge required to predict the outcome is not employed? — tom

It's not unknowable. Likely unknown, though.

I agree with what you are saying. I would say that lacking proper epistemilogical proof does create a gap in which to deny ontological determinism. A relatively weak gap, but a gap none the less. However, I have had a friend try to argue for free will libertarianism down this line of thought and have read a philosopher (Robert Kane, I believe) who has argued this very notion.

On the second point, and at the risk of derailing towards a free will debate, determinism in decision making creates problems for incompatibilists. Free will libertarians and hard determinists would be looking for the ability to do otherwise (i.e. a way to avoid complete determinism in our actions) and the gap allows this to happen without the need to appeal to some sort of dualism.

I would say that lacking proper epistemilogical proof does create a gap in which to deny ontological determinism. — Chany

Sure. I would conclude we really don't know and accept that I act as if the world is determined in good faith (so far, it hasn't let me down).

On the second point, and at the risk of derailing towards a free will debate, determinism in decision making creates problems for incompatibilists. Free will libertarians and hard determinists would be looking for the ability to do otherwise (i.e. a way to avoid complete determinism in our actions) and the gap allows this to happen without the need to appeal to some sort of dualism. — Chany

I wonder if we would really start acting differently if this question would be answered one way or the other. I doubt it and in the end don't think we'll change if we discover we don't have free will. I already believe the latter and I'm not exactly apathetic because of it. In the end the question isn't that relevant.

It's not unknowable. Likely unknown, though. — Mongrel

Unknown by choice.

That is, if you believe in choice.

Not necessarily.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#StaDetPhyThe

Having a choice does not declare an outcome. I might choose to try to cross a street but another free willer may choose to strike me with an auto before I have completed my goal. Hence we have choice, in a Bergsonian sense, in that we create virtual action in our minds prior to acting upon them. Outcomes are always up to the confluences of all of the choices as they are put into action.

In regards to quantum interpretations, I believe the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation is the only one that is casual though Bohm stated that his equations clearly leave open the possibility of choice, hence the probabilistic aspect of Quantum theory. As for myself, I use holographic theory, not quantum theory as a launching point for my views.

The universe is likely completely mathematical, and I believe 100% deterministic. Not to say we don't have the ultimate playground of the delusion of free-will. Science enables us to understand more of the sub-atomic actions and reactions causing every 'random' event or even lottery pick, as time goes on. Just as we continue to understand the inner workings of the most complex machine in the universe, the human brain, so we will understand better the infinitely complex closed system we live within.

In regards to quantum interpretations, I believe the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation is the only one that is casual though Bohm stated that his equations clearly leave open the possibility of choice, hence the probabilistic aspect of Quantum theory. As for myself, I use holographic theory, not quantum theory as a launching point for my views. — Rich

What is the difference between holographic theory and quantum theory?

I would say that holography is a science of its own which creates three dimensional photographs with the use of light waves. Using this model, one can extend this representation into a theory of how the universe might work. Whether it's A quantum interpretation or holographic perspective, ultimately both are referring to the same thing - wave interference and entanglement. The holographic view presents a more concrete picture of what may be happening.

You said the you "use holographic theory". How do you use it?

It's not unknowable. Likely unknown, though — Mongrel

I don't understand (hard) determinism because of the question of unknowability. If determinism were true we would have no way of verifying it. We can't conceive of knowing the entire state of the universe at time t1 and at time t2 in order to do the verification - well, I can't - and those are the things we would need to know. So people's belief in determinism always flummoxes me. When I first got obsessed with philosophising it was a problem that drew me, but now I know it's got me beat - I'm just feeling garrulous tonight :)

I don't understand (hard) determinism because of the question of unknowability. If determinism were true we would have no way of verifying it. — mcdoodle

But if our known fundamental laws were deterministic, and they had been tested to destruction, then might we be advised to take what they say about reality seriously?

And by the way, our known laws are deterministic.

As a conceptual device.

I disagree that it is relevant. It has a lot to do with personal responsibility, so if we cannot find a legitimate way to give responsibility in a sound manner, we are left with a couple issues, like what we should do about punishment.

Given that almost all knowledge in inductive in nature, we cannot prove most things absolutely false. We can, however, look at how the universe and our decision making process functions and gather evidence. If we have a bunch of good reasons for believing determinism to be true and no good reasons to believe determinism false, then we can justifiably believe determinism to be true.

There are lots of problems with determinism.

John Earman's Primer on Determinism (1986) remains the richest storehouse of information on the truth or falsity of determinism in various physical theories, from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics and general relativity. (See also his recent update on the subject, “Aspects of Determinism in Modern Physics” (2007)).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#StaDetPhyThe

Given that almost all knowledge in inductive in nature, we cannot prove most things absolutely false. — Chany

I just spit my herbal tea all over my laptop!

If we have a bunch of good reasons for believing determinism to be true and no good reasons to believe determinism false, then we can justifiably believe determinism to be true. — Chany

There are no good reasons, induction is a myth, falsification is all we can achieve (Duhem-Quine thesis admitted), and justification is impossible, which is OK because it is irrelevant.

That said, the ONLY stochastic theory of nature that has ever been proposed is quantum mechanics in its mid-20th century state-vector-collapse conception. Everything else is, including modern interpretations of QM, deterministic (though adherents of Consistent Histories might disagree).

Quantum mechanics is, by definition, probabilistic not deterministic.
Interpretations of QM are deterministic not the formal framework itself.

Mathematically, quantum mechanics can be regarded as a non-classical probability calculus resting upon a non-classical propositional logic. More specifically, in quantum mechanics each probability-bearing proposition of the form “the value of physical quantity A lies in the range B” is represented by a projection operator on a Hilbert space H. These form a non-Boolean—in particular, non-distributive—orthocomplemented lattice. Quantum-mechanical states correspond exactly to probability measures (suitably defined) on this lattice.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/

For some reason,Tom does not seem to believe that quantum mechanics is probabilistic.

shrugs
what can you do