Ok. Relational in the sense of inviting description by means of many-place predicates (transitive verbs etc), or in the sense of being true relative to a point of view?

That's funny, Salinas himself refers to it as a "heightened state of empathy". — Janus

Yes - and is at pains to differentiate empathy from synesthesia, describing how the synesthesia supports his empathy. They are not the same.

it is possible that some people might be psychic (which would be the only way that one could truly feel another's pain) — Janus

Ah, the true Scotsman returns. Edit: You claim Salinus does not truly feel the other's pain; again, this is to no more than simply reassert your assumption,in the face of the contradictory evidence.

Salinas makes no claim to psychic ability.

In any case, this is a strawman, since I have nowhere said that pain is necessarily private, — Janus

Well, yes you have: you have said that it is not possible to feel someone else's pain. That is, it is necessary that one cannot feel the pain of anther. The strawman accusation comes too easily.

...the evidence points to it being so, certainly in the majority of cases. — Janus

The evidence is before you. It is possible for someone to feel another's pain. Majority or minority, doesn't matter. The possibility exists, and hence I the notion that pain is necessarily private collapses.

Is there a reason you did not respond to my latest post? Oh well, never mind.

No two things are exactly alike, ever. Pain's not unique in this respect. No two phones are exactly alike either, but we still refer to them as 'the same' phone - "Oh look, you've got the same phone as me". We seem to be constructing this arbitrary wall around feelings when their intrinsic differences between people are no more than the particular scratches on your phone that are not on mine. If we share the same make and model we happily say we have 'the same' phone. — Isaac

This confusion seems to me easily resolved by maintaining the distinction between types and tokens. Here is a Wikipedia summary for those unfamiliar or havng trouble with this concept:

The type–token distinction is the difference between naming a class (type) of objects and naming the individual instances (tokens) of that class...

The sentence "they drive the same car" is ambiguous. Do they drive the same type of car (the same model) or the same instance of a car type (a single vehicle)? Clarity requires us to distinguish words that represent abstract types from words that represent objects that embody or exemplify types. The type–token distinction separates types (abstract descriptive concepts) from tokens (objects that instantiate concepts).

For example: "bicycle" represents a type: the concept of a bicycle; whereas "my bicycle" represents a token of that type: an object that instantiates that type. — Wikipedia

In this case, we have the types "pain" and "phone" and the tokens "my pain", "my phone", "your pain" and "your phone".

You obtained the token of your phone somehow - you possibly bought it - and now you are in possession of it. You can lose possession of it, sell it or give it away. It's possible for anyone else to perceive your phone and use it while it remains intact. This is no different for any other phone. But pain and other subjective phenomena are different and unique in this respect. While everyone can partake in the same type of experience - of pain - tokens of that type of experience are intrinsically private.

We must firstly recall the distinction between having pain and expressing pain. Having pain is your experience of the feeling that hurts; whereas expressing pain is your physical reaction to the feeling that hurts, such as screaming, wincing or saying "ouch".

Although your physical reactions to pain are obviously public, in that other people can hear you scream, see you wince and understand the word "ouch", your experiences of having pain (your tokens of having pain) are not accessible to anybody else. Nobody else can experience your tokens of pain in any way, except via your expressions of pain. But your expressions of pain are not the feeling that hurts. Other people undoubtedly have their own tokens of pain, which we perceive via their expression, but when it comes to the feeling that hurts, you can only ever experience your own tokens.

This has nothing to do with context and it is not the same for a phone. If you'll let me, I can experience/perceive and use any phone that you happen to possess. I can have your phone (e.g. if I buy it from you), but I can't have your tokens of pain.

Yes - and is at pains to differentiate empathy from synesthesia, describing how the synesthesia supports his empathy. They are not the same. — Banno

This is hilarious; where have I said that synesthesia is empathy or the same as empathy?

Well, yes you have: you have said that it is not possible to feel someone else's pain. That is, it is necessary that one cannot feel the pain of anther. The strawman accusation comes too easily. — Banno

I don't believe I have said that. If I have I misspoke. If you claim I said it, then please provide the textual evidence and then we can talk. I do say it would be impossible to feel the pain of another unless one were psychic, and I'm not surprised you trotted out your oft-repeated accusation that the "no true Scotsman" fallacy has been committed. Instead of "truly" I should have said "in the strong sense" which is what I meant.

The evidence is before you. — Banno

No evidence is before me that anyone has ever, in the strong sense, felt another's pain. There is anecdotal evidence that at least one person, Salinas, experiences what he calls "heightened states of empathy", but that is not what at all I have been arguing against, so the "strawman" call stands.

Ok. Relational in the sense of inviting description by means of many-place predicates (transitive verbs etc), or in the sense of being true relative to a point of view? — bongo fury

Probably both; but I haven't given a great deal of thought to that question.

Deleted

Why those quotes? They don't say anything relevant. — Banno

Oh, I dunno. If one chooses between yours consisting of 4:36 minutes of anecdotal hogwash, and mine consisting of peer-reviewed publications, I guess you’d be right.

Of particular note, at 1:08, “...my brain automatically tries to recreate the sensory experience of other people as if I am them and they are me...”, which SERIOUSLY begs the question.....what difference does it make to say, “as if......”?

Gimme a break.

This is hilarious — Janus

Glad you are amused. SO we agree that synesthesis is different to empathy.

. I do say it would be impossible to feel the pain of another unless one were psychic, and I'm not surprised you trotted out your oft-repeated accusation that the "no true Scotsman" fallacy has been committed. Instead of "truly" I should have said "in the strong sense" which is what I meant. — Janus

"...it would be impossible to feel the pain of another unless one were psychic" - that it is necessarily impossible to feel the pain of another unless one were psychic. You are making a modal assertion. In the face of that we have Salinas's evidence that it is possible to feel the pain of another: that it is not necessarily not impossible to feel the pain of another unless one were psychic This is the negation of your assertion. You get this, of course - the logic is elementary.

You now introduce "in the strong sense". Needs exposition. Remember the contention is nto that Salinas indeed feels another's pain, but that it is possible.

mine consisting of peer-reviewed publications, I guess you’d be right. — Mww

SO... you have a preference for irrelevancies that are well-documented. FIne.

Gimme a break. — Mww

You don't have to be here. Take a break of you like. In between posts I am watering the veggies and cooking breakfast.

So let's say pain isn't private. You and I can experience the same pain. That means pain is something transcending both of us. Wow.

All the type-token distinction seems to do is to change the words being used.

Is Salinas experiencing the same token as the patient? Or is it a pain of the same type.

The case has to be made that necessarily, Salinas cannot have the same token pain as the patient.

Can you make that case?

I don't think there is anything mystical here, as the word transcendent might imply. It just seems that Salinas can feel a pain in his foot, and in his patient. The exact physiological differences would be interesting.

cooking breakfast. — Banno

HA!!! We just finished dinner, which on this fine Saturday night, consists of.....breakfast.

Isn’t relevancy a judgement? Or do you just wish to disregard the part where the authors all but reduced the experiments to “episodic memory”?

I wanted to ask you.....the “bottom of page 84” is a footnote, so what was that article supposed to tell me?

You now introduce "in the strong sense". Needs exposition. Remember the contention is nto that Salinas indeed feels another's pain, but that it is possible. — Banno

I didn't introduce it; it was there implicitly from the beginning. I made it explicit only because you seemed to be failing to understand what I was actually saying. I have said over and over that I am arguing against the idea that people feel the pain of the other just as the other feels it.

The case has to be made that necessarily, Salinas cannot have the same token pain as the patient.

Can you make that case? — Banno

The only way Salinas could have the same token pain as the patient would be if he were psychic (and even then I'm not sure it would count as such). Forget pain for a moment: say I'm repeating some sentence or other to myself. That is a private act; if I don't make it public by telling how could you know what the sentence I am repeating is unless you were psychic? Even then I might be lying, so you really have no way of knowing unless you are psychic (but then how could you even be sure that you are truly psychic if I don't confirm that you knew what sentence I was repeating to myself)?

The case has to be made that necessarily, Salinas cannot have the same token pain as the patient.

Can you make that case? — Banno

It's actually common sense that Salinas isn't experiencing the same token. You'd have the burden if you want to say otherwise. Extreme assertions require extreme proof.

I don't think there is anything mystical here, as the word transcendent might imply. — Banno

If there's one pain and two of us, that's transcendent. Sounds mystical.

HA!!! We just finished dinner, which on this fine Saturday night, consists of.....breakfast. — Mww

Yeah, I live a half-day in your future.

The first link will not open for me. The quote you cite does not support the contention that Synesthesia can be reduced to “episodic memory”. Perhaps if you provide the context?

The second citation just says that brains have lots of cells. No mention of synesthesia.

...implicitly... — Janus

Of course.

...just as the other feels it. — Janus

Hm. I don't see that this helps you. Perhaps Salinas felt the pain just as his patient did. You need something much stronger.

It's actually common sense that Salinas isn't experiencing the same token. — frank

That's not an argument. It's clear that this conflicts with your preconceptions, nothing more.

Sounds mystical. — frank

That's about you.

That's not an argument. It's clear that this conflicts with your preconceptions, nothing more. — Banno

It conflicts with common sense. That means you have the burden. Chalmers said so.

I notice you are not interacting with the discussion.

Sorry.

Perhaps Salinas felt the pain just as his patient did. — Banno

The same type or the same token? Didn't Salinas and the patient each experience their own tokens of pain? Were there two tokens here (one each) or only one?

Token.

Why?

Just to be clear, the contention is not that Salinus does feel another's pain; it is that he might; that it is possible. It is enough to show that it is possible for another person to feel your pain. — Banno

Was that it? Was that all you’re arguing? Then I’d agree. Though I’d add that we have no way of telling if this is what is happening or not. Even if they are both exposed to a same stimuli (the same slap for example)

The only way to know for sure is if you have 2 physically identical people in physically identical scenarios.

Different tokens though? No. Identical tokens? Possible. 2 instances of the same thing.

What?

I can't understand your one word responses.

If you're saying that there was only one token in this scenario and that Salinas and his patient shared the same token of pain despite having separate bodies, brains and minds, then why do you believe that? Why would they each not have had their own tokens of pain?

Was that it? Was that all you’re arguing? Then I’d agree. — khaled

Did you see the end of the argument:

Just to be clear, the contention is not that Salinus does feel another's pain; it is that he might; that it is possible. It is enough to show that it is possible for another person to feel your pain.

If it is possible, then the notion that pain is necessarily private collapses. — Banno

DO you agree with that. too? If so,

I think we are on the same page - I'd express this as that the private experience is irrelevant; it's that the language has a use that gives the utterances meaning. — Banno

...and we are back to post 5, after an interesting journey.

I can't understand your one word responses. — Luke

Nor I, yours.

why do you believe that? — Luke

I think it possible. That's all that is required.

I said the same thing to Isaac. It’s not necessarily, metaphysically, and transcendentally private. Just practically so. I don’t think it’s really an important distinction.

I think we are on the same page - I'd express this as that the private experience is irrelevant; it's that the language has a use that gives the utterances meaning.
— Banno

...and we are back to post 5, after an interesting journey. — Banno

Sure but you say things like “the private experience doesn’t exist”. Which I would never agree to. “The private experience is irrelevant”? As I said, yes to anyone but sci-fi and fantasy writers. Remember those scenes in predator where we get the POV of the predators? Those wouldn’t make sense without private experiences.

But still:

Same token though? No. Identical tokens? Possible. 2 instances of the same thing. — khaled

Like 2 identical legos. But I can’t conceive of 2 people having 1 instance of pain shared between them. Unless they are sewn together like Frankenstein.