But how could we possibly know that we "share common understandings"? — Banno

Through language, mathematics, conventions of all kinds, we share common understandings. If I ask you a question, ask you for something, give you something, we will generally have enough in common to understand each other. But if you and I were from completely different cultures or epochs then our conceptions may be so remote that we could barely communicate. You would not understand what I mean, or vice versa, even if the individual words were translated, because of the conceptual underpinnings, the intentions behind the words.

I got initiated into this line of thinking by reading Berger & Luckmann's Social Construction of Reality way back. At the time I was indignant - like you are now! 'Who put the stars in the sky?' I thundered (not meaning 'God' but meaning that 'the stars were in the sky before society was there to construct anything'.)

But after some time, I came around to their point of view, because i came to see that 'reality' is something other than simply 'nature' or 'the universe'. Why? Because we constantly impute things to it. We have our mental map which contains such imputations, judgements, order, hierarchy, which is validated by the culture we live in, which has an often-implicit sense of what is real. That is the sense in which reality is constructed rather than being simply 'the given'.

It goes back to Kantianism and its descendants. Phenomenology, initiated by Husserl, was indebted to Kant in that respect. Kant's 'copernican revolution' was precisely that 'things conform to thoughts' rather than vice versa. Whereas dogmatic realism asserts an objective domain existing independently of anything we think or do, as the constant underlying background; it takes that as 'the real' upon which our thoughts are 'constructed'. And constructivism tends to invert that. It takes a kind of perceptual shift - like a gestalt shift - to see it.

Because the objective aspect generically is not dependent upon being shared. If the existence of the Earth depended upon being shared, you would expect intersubjectivity/sharing to be a factor in things like equations of motion and it just isn't. Li — fdrake

Math is also not dependent on being shared. Would you call it objective?

:up:

What about the case of the amputee who feels pain in his missing arm? And people can also lie, or exaggerate. — Olivier5

Sure. I don't see the relevance. You claim was:

Why, then you do not mention the fact that each individual observer is necessarily subjective and therefore fallible. — Olivier5

My point is that when you feel a pain, there is no place for doubt.

Now if you feel a pain in an amputated arm, you still feel a pain. That's not fallible.

And if someone claims to have a pain, when they do not, it is the claim that is false, not the pain - or lack thereof.

So, it seems to me that it would be an error to suppose that a claim is fallible because it is subjective.

What is it that is not shared?
— Banno

One’s subjective experience. My pain is not your pain. — Luke

Again, talk to the example of Newton's cradle - what is not shared there?

Thanks for the testimonial. My bit after the bit you quote is of import:

If there is a private subjective world, then by definition you cannot see into mine, nor I into yours. and it would not be possible to confirm any commonality. — Banno

If there is a private subjective world, then by definition you cannot see into mine, nor I into yours. and it would not be possible to confirm any commonality. — Banno

Misinterprets subjectivity as solipsism.

No.

Edit: I'm not keen on explaining Kant's errors again here. He wasn't to know that he was setting philosophy off after wild geese.

Care to respond to this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/500452 ?

The supposition is that we each have our own private sensations, which we then translate into a description of the way the cradle moves, put into words and find that we agree on the words used... is that the idea? — Banno

No. I tried to explain the rationale behind constructivism which was condescendingly dismissed as ‘a testimonial’, so I’ve done my bit.

One’s subjective experience. My pain is not your pain.
— Luke

Again, talk to the example of Newton's cradle - what is not shared there? — Banno

Like pain, one’s perceptions are not shared - you have yours and I have mine.

Cheers.

Like pain, one’s perceptions are not shared - you have yours and I have mine. — Luke

So... what is it about the Newton's cradle that is not shared?

You asked what is not shared. I’ve answered the question.

If there is a private subjective world, then by definition you cannot see into mine, nor I into yours. and it would not be possible to confirm any commonalit — Banno

It's assumed. You make this assumption regularly, that you know how others feel or what they think.

It's assumed. — frank

What's assumed- Commonality? Or a private subjective world?

My 2 cents for now.

Guy yells in pain when his hammer misses and hits his finger instead.
Other guy notices, recognizes, points, and grunts "Hammer", "Pain".
When the grunts, the words, grow common, they're used for hammers and pains.
I'd think most have experienced the unpleasantry of pain, some by hammers.
That doesn't mean anyone has another's pain, and apparently that isn't required either.
At least hammers can be shared.
I guess, once word use stabilizes across, nuances may be discovered, and shared meanings eventually become auto-assumed.
Something similar could be said of the audio itself, saying and hearing words and phrases, plus writing and reading.
Language is social; it seems natural language can give lots of insight into others' personal experiences.

The pain is subjective (existentially mind-dependent and process-like).
The hammer is objective (existentially mind-independent and object-like).

I’ve answered the question. — Luke

...one’s perceptions are not shared — Luke

...all indications are that we do see the same thing; and if we do not, we can talk about that, too; indeed, that is pivotal to progress.

And any slightly different interpretations of what is said can be ironed out, as well; or ignored, if they make no difference.

It seems to me that one cannot say what it is that is not shared; and hence that it is irrelevant to the discussion. — Banno

...all indications are that we do see the same thing; and if we do not, we can talk about that, too; indeed, that is pivotal to progress.

And any slightly different interpretations of what is said can be ironed out, as well; or ignored, if they make no difference. — Banno

I don’t deny that we can see the same thing or that we can discuss disagreements, but still I cannot perceive your perceptions or feel your pain. That’s what is not shared. “If they make no difference” to what?

What's assumed- Commonality? Or a private subjective world? — Banno

I think most normal people assume both.

You demonstrate that you assume you can know what people think by asking questions.

You don't act like you can read minds, so you seem to assume their thoughts are hidden somehow.

What is it that is subjective in our observations of the cradle? — Banno

When I see that clip of Newton's Cradle, my first thought is "that looks fake". The accelerations and decelerations are not right, so the whole thing looks "off" to me, it's jerky, not smooth, fluid, as I think it ought to be.

If you think that there is nothing which is not public, then without a doubt you will be deceived.

So, it seems to me that it would be an error to suppose that a claim is fallible because it is subjective. — Banno

And it seems to me you are trying to confuse yourself. While an observer is always fallible -- that is to say that he may get some observations seriously wrong, either because of some bias or because he's lying -- a claim cannot logically speaking be said to be fallible: it's just true, not true, or somewhere in the middle.

Oh, I don't know. It seemed you were pretty clear:

Why, then you do not mention the fact that each individual observer is necessarily subjective and therefore fallible. — Olivier5

I always try to be clear. An observer is subjective, hence fallible. A claim is not an observer. A claim can just be true or not.

You understand the difference between the concept of observer and the concept of claim, don't you? You are just playing stupid now.

That's the thing with human beings: you can't always trust what they say. Sometimes they even lie to themselves.

I always try to be clear. — Olivier5

Good. What 's with the comments about claims? I don't see the import to you.

PerhapsIm too tired to follow your line of thought, but you've several times said

An observer is subjective, hence fallible. — Olivier5

despite my providing examples in which observers cannot be fallible. Meh. Leave it for tomorrow, maybe.

Or perhaps you might comment on 's post.

despite my providing examples in which observers cannot be fallible. — Banno

If you provided any evidence that human beings are infallible, I must have missed it. An observer can lie, try to deceive, or he can be inaccurate or careless in his observations. Such things are known to happen, believe it or not. Which is why intersubjectivity is so important in the quest for objectivity: it allows some filtering out of individual subjective biases.

If you provided any evidence that human beings are infallible, I must have missed it. — Olivier5

Here you go...

that pain in your toe, for example. You cannot be wrong about that; it's one of the few places were certainty is certain... — Banno

See?

Physics by poll vote... — Banno

Intersubjectivity, at least in the sense I'm talking about, is not about majoritarian or even unanimous agreement on people's opinions, but rather about assembling a model that takes into complete and equal consideration all experiences.

When it comes to physics, or any physical sciences, that would mean that you don't just poll people on what they believe is true, but you do look for a theory that affirms all of everyone's observations.

I'll spare this thread the ethical analogue of that.

but you do look for a theory that affirms all of everyone's observations. — Pfhorrest

We've already been through this. Literally any theory at all can be made to match everyone's observations by the addition of another 'coupling' theory.

"The earth is flat".

"But the images from space show a round earth".

"OK then, the earth is flat, and the space photos are faked".

"So you can't hold the theory that the earth is flat, and the space photos aren't faked".

"No, but that wasn't the theory in question".

"OK, let's make it the theory in question - The earth is flat and the images from space aren't faked - that doesn't match all observations".

"Well, now that's the theory in question, sure it can - The earth is flat, the images from space are not faked, and a forcefield changes the apparent shape of the earth when looked at from a distance"

"Alright, but you can't hold the theory that..."

...and so on, ad infinitum.

that pain in your toe, for example. You cannot be wrong about that; it's one of the few places were certainty is certain...
— Banno — Banno

One of the few places, maybe, but 1) human beings can still misrepresent their pain, they can lie about it (or did you believe Trump really had bone spurs?); and 2) outside of these few places, human beings remain fallible observers. Therefore it is good practice to try and compare observations made by several people, whenever possible, in order to firm up our collective knowledge of stuff. That's the idea encapsulated in "intersubjectivity".

I think Rousseau has the germ of a good point here - objectivity as the view not from nowhere, but from anywhere. — Banno

Or a view from everywhere.

The thing about objectivity is that it does not include information about location relative to the body. A view does. So objectivity really isn't a view, rather it is an explanation that leaves out the irrelevant information about location relative to a specific body.