If it happens more than once, then it's probably your fault.

I edited my last reply that you already responded to, so I wanted to alert you to that so that you'd go back and look at it and laugh really hard because it's like super funny.

I don't see how the thought experiment offers an explanation for the metaphysical composition of consciousness. — Hanover

It doesn't. It only argues that whatever it is, it isn't physical.

I learned it from that movie with the British guy that plays Scotty in the new star trek movies, with the robots. They say it like five hundred times. They deny being robots just for being mechanical, as they insist that they aren't slaves. So, heads up on possible future trigger words like that, don't won't to be inorganicist.

What is the distinction between the physical and non-physical?

Do you think his real name is Scotty or they call him that just because he's Scottish, sort of like they call me Jew?

That's probably why. I could understand if your name was Joey, you could be nick named Jewy,

What is the distinction between the physical and non-physical? — Hanover

Well, that's Hempel's dilemma. I don't know if Chalmers provided a definition of physical and non-physical. A brief skim of the SEP article doesn't seem to offer one. I guess the distinction is taken for granted. Maybe it's as simple as the physical just being those things described by current scientific theory? Maybe the physical is anything which in principle is publicly accessible?

I don't see how the thought experiment offers an explanation for the metaphysical composition of consciousness. — Hanover

It doesn't. It's the same old incredibly stupid idea that conceivability has ontological implications (beyond the fact that something is conceivable).

It doesn't. It's the same old incredibly stupid idea that conceivability has ontological implications (beyond the fact that something is conceivable). — Terrapin Station

According to Chalmers, "Kripke's insight that for phenomenal concepts, there is no gap between reference-fixers and reference (or between primary and secondary intentions)" entails that their logical possibility (conceivability) entails their metaphysical possibility.

Although saying that, he also claims that just their logical possibility alone is sufficient to refute physicalism. If "physically identical but not conscious" isn't a contradiction (and so conceivable) then consciousness isn't physical.

If only any of that made it less stupid. ;-)

I don't remember a "phenomenal concepts" phrase, by the way. What the heck are "phenomenal concepts" supposed to be contra "non-phenomenal concepts"?

I don't remember a "phenomenal concepts" phrase, by the way. What the heck are "phenomenal concepts" supposed to be contra "non-phenomenal concepts"? — Terrapin Station

http://consc.net/papers/knowledge.html

Thanks. So, basically a concept about phenomenal properties. It's not saying something about the ontological status of concepts where some are phenomenal and some are something else.

If "physically identical but not conscious" isn't a contradiction (and so conceivable) then consciousness isn't physical. — Michael

The problem is that the things we are asked to conceive (p-zombies) are only possible if you assume the conclusion - i.e., that consciousness is not physical. When Hanover asked if a distinction had been made between physical and non-physical, the question is crucial to Chalmer's argument. And as you noted, Chalmers seems not to address the issue.

Look at the argument :

If we can conceive of a p-zombie then consciousness isn't physical
We can conceive of a p-zombie
Therefore, consciousness isn't physical — Michael

Now ask yourself : Can the p-zombie be conceived of if you do not already accept that consciousness is different from the physical?

And this goes to my much maligned comparison of coherence and conceivability. If you do not define your terms (consciousness, p-zombie, et. al.) - which is what it means to be coherent - then I fail to see how you can meaningfully think about them (conceive of them).

Throughout this discussion, we have long forgotten the question in the OP : Is consciousness a recognizable attribute or an assumption? What does it mean to be just like a real human but to lack a consciousness, when the presumption of consciousness can only be made through observation of behavior? How can one be said to lack what cannot be shown to exist? To believe that such a creature exists (one just like us but lacking internal, unviewable consciousness) calls into question whether consciousness exists in others at all - which destroys the argument.

Here is the p-zombie argument:

"According to physicalism, everything that exists is either physical or depends on what is physical. So if physicalism is true, a world that is an exact physical duplicate of our world, with nothing else in addition, will be an exact duplicate of our world in all respects. Therefore, if there is a possible world that is an exact physical duplicate of our world but is different in any way, e.g. it has different (or no) psychological properties, physicalism is false. If two physically identical worlds have different properties of consciousness, those properties of consciousness don’t depend on physical properties. So if zombies are possible, physicalism is false and property dualism is true." http://documents.routledge-interactive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A22014/dualism/The%20zombie%20argument.pdf.

My problem is in the bolded area. I just don't follow how this isn't obvious question begging. Aren't we assuming by the antecedent "if two physically identical worlds have different properties of consciousness" that consciousness is not physical? How can the two physical worlds be "identical" if they have differing consciousness unless we've already assumed that consciousness is not physical?

My point here is that if we have World A with conscious beings and World B with p-zombies, yet, from an outside observer they are measurably the exact same, then we either have an epistemic problem (we need better measuring devices) or we have a metaphysical problem (consciousness cannot, in principle, be measured). Since there are two equally valid options, we've proven nothing. Only if we accept as a given (which seems a premise of the p-zombie argument) that consciousness cannot in principle be measured, then of course consciousness is a non-physical entity. That, though, is the case only because we accepted it was as a given - thus the question begging.

What have I missed?

Ooh, beat you to it!

If "physically identical but not conscious" isn't a contradiction (and so conceivable) then consciousness isn't physical. — Michael

"Physically identical but not conscious" is in fact a contradiction unless you define it in a way that it's not. To a physicalist all the world is physical. For two things to be identical, they must be physically identical. So, if you asked a physicalist if a conscious person and his doppelganger p-zombie were identical, he'd say of course they aren't; they can't be. The distinction between the two means the distinction must be physical because that's all there is.

To the point of what I can conceptualize, I cannot conceptualize of two identical entities (a regular person and his corresponding p-zombie) having no physical differences if I assume physicalism. It simply makes no sense to assume physicalism and then to assume non-physicalism at the same time.

Does look like we're saying the same thing independently.

But, the example you gave was 'bread that was molecularly identical to bread' except that it wasn't nourishing. So that example seems to me to violate the law of identity, as it basically amounts to saying 'imagine bread that isn't bread' - which amounts to saying 'imagine an instance of A that is not actually A'. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure "molecular identity" in the sense intended exhausts the concept of logical identity. (Incidentally, are you suggesting that all there is to identity of objects is "molecules"? I'm not sure I've ever heard that sort of claim from you.)

What I said was the bread and the p-bread are "molecule-for-molecule the same". I don't mean it's the very same molecules, but rather exactly the same type of molecules, in exactly the same numbers and arrangements. Two tokens of the same type, type-identical, not token-identical, so far as the molecules are concerned; but there is this one functional difference. A functional difference without a physical difference. Isn't this how some philosophers have characterized the similarity of p-zombies and ordinary humans? I thought that was the whole point of their exercise.

I think it's a frivolous notion.

Whereas bread that was molecularly slightly different, and therefore had different, or no, nutritional value, is a very different kind of idea. But then the point is lost. — Wayfarer

The point would be lost if there were a difference in type-identity of molecular structure. But that's not what I've said about bread and p-bread.

I did leave the possibility open in the case of Yellow-Eyed and Brown-Eyed Cabbage Farmer, but that's another example. The two examples have this in common: In the case of the eyes, I imagine the difference without worrying how it's possible; in the case of the breads, I imagine the difference without worrying how it's possible. That's just how easy it is to "imagine and conceive" in the loose, ordinary sense of these terms. You leave a blank where an imaginary explanation might go.

For that matter, I can imagine a being with a radically different type of inner life - an alien intelligence perhaps - but not one with no inner life, because then, how would they simulate an answer to the question, 'how do you feel about X'? — Wayfarer

Perhaps your standards of imagining are stricter than mine. I just imagine it, like a child, without worrying about the details and implications.

How would the zombie answer questions like "how do you feel..."? To say it has no grounds for answer, is to imply that the only bases in us for such answers are somehow metaphysical, drawn from "pure subjectivity", external to the physical organism and its physically instantiated cognitive system. I see no reason to suppose that is the case in us. For instance, I'm pretty sure you can poke enough holes in a brain to the point where it will lose the capacity to answer such questions, one way or another.

However, if there is something like a phenomenal character to conscious experience, and I'm inclined to say there is, then it seems a zombie, if it's an honest zombie, when asked to report on the phenomenal character of its experience, would report, perhaps after a period of confusion and disillusionment, that it doesn't seem to have any.

How would such a thing be possible? It's the job of the make-believe mad scientists who get paid to cook up such fictions, to fill in those blanks.

The zombie is not sentient. It's "phenomenally blind". Nothing appears to it. It's not appeared to. It's a syntax engine.

There's a favourite quote of mine from Descartes which makes this point brilliantly (not least because he made it in the 1630's) — Wayfarer

The passage strikes me as rather primitive. Descartes seems to be imagining a machine made of pulleys and cables and levers and buttons and gears, running on mechanical principles. He seems not to anticipate the growth in computational complexity kicked off in the past century.

I expect that, given enough time and resources to develop, artificial intelligence will meet and exceed human capacities of speech, creativity, and performance. None of that is sentience.

That's why I posted in that long quote from Feser. Basically, he is arguing that expressions like 'the laws of motion' or the rules of Euclidean geometry are concepts, as distinct from imaginings, in part because they are determinate - they stipulate precise outcomes. They're not reducible to imaginings, either - you can't imagine the outcome of a calculation, you need to actually perform the calculation, i.e. exercise reason. Although that is somewhat tangential to the main point. — Wayfarer

It seems to me that conceptions and linguistic utterances can be "indeterminate" and imprecise in one way or another. We can use our conceptual capacities to refine our ideas and expressions -- whether we use words, or pictures, or gestures, or any other tokens for the purpose. I'm not sure there is a standard of clarity, definiteness, precision required before we count something as a "concept". There are formal rules of math and logic, there are norms of syntax, and so on. And there's such a thing as sorting things out, or getting your point across, well enough to suit your present purpose.

Perhaps this is tangential. It might be brought home, if someone would clear up for us what sort of "conceiving" is at issue when we attempt to conceive p-zombies, and what relevance such exercises might have for our understanding of consciousness or anything else.

Oh yes I most certainly do, but there is some entertainment to be had in saying why. But I am still at a loss why so much ink is spilled over the question. — Wayfarer

It seems we're on the same page here, too.

I expect that, given enough time and resources to develop, artificial intelligence will meet and exceed human capacities of speech, creativity, and performance. None of that is sentience. — Cabbage Farmer

Creativity and sentience may be the same thing or mutually necessary. One difference between a p-zombie and a human is that the p-zombie would not be able to create knowledge - i.e it would be stuck in its programming, just as animals are.

What I'm suggesting is that p-zombies cannot possess a GENERAL intelligence, because they cannot create knowledge of themselves.

Wayfarer: In any case, if the responder has no inner life, then the response 'I feel good about it', is actually a falsehood, obviously, because they don't feel anything.

I don't understand the relevance of this. — Michael

It's relevant, because the whole notion of 'p zombie' is a thing that looks like a human but has no inner life - therefore doesn't feel . If you say to such a thing 'how do you feel?' then the answer can't be based on a real state, as there is no such state. So what is the response based on? On what basis does it answer?

What I said was the bread and the p-bread are "molecule-for-molecule the same". I don't mean it's the very same molecules, but rather exactly the same type of molecules, in exactly the same numbers and arrangements. — Cabbage Farmer

'The same' means 'the same type'.

The passage strikes me as rather primitive. Descartes seems to be imagining a machine made of pulleys and cables and levers and buttons and gears, running on mechanical principles — Cabbage Farmer

Not at all. Notice the last passage:

Thus one would discover that they [machines, p-zombies] did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.

Granted, 'disposition of their organs' is a rather archaic way of putting it, but the principle stands. It's similar to a point made by Leibniz (which is not co-incidental).

I'm not sure there is a standard of clarity, definiteness, precision required before we count something as a "concept". There are formal rules of math and logic, there are norms of syntax, and so on — Cabbage Farmer

Non-rational creatures can't form concepts, they're essential to the operations of reason.

When Hanover asked if a distinction had been made between physical and non-physical, the question is crucial to Chalmer's argument. — Real Gone Cat

Well, it's crucial to both Chalmers' and the physicalist's argument. You could argue that if neither defines the term "physical" then both arguments are vacuous. If the physicalist has defined the term "physical" then take that to be Chalmers' definition.

The problem is that the things we are asked to conceive (p-zombies) are only possible if you assume the conclusion - i.e., that consciousness is not physical.

...

Look at the argument:

If we can conceive of a p-zombie then consciousness isn't physical
We can conceive of a p-zombie
Therefore, consciousness isn't physical
— Michael

Now ask yourself : Can the p-zombie be conceived of if you do not already accept that consciousness is different from the physical?

How is it different to any other syllogism? Consider:

If Socrates is a man then Socrates is mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal

Does the second premise assume the conclusion? If not then how does this syllogism differ from the p-zombie syllogism?

And this goes to my much maligned comparison of coherence and conceivability. If you do not define your terms (consciousness, p-zombie, et. al.) - which is what it means to be coherent - then I fail to see how you can meaningfully think about them (conceive of them).

A p-zombie is defined as something biologically and behaviourally identical to us but which isn't conscious.

Asking to define consciousness seems like a problematic question. Imagine if we were pre-historic people considering the nature of stars. Do we have to define "star"? Given that we don't know what stars are, what kind of definition can we give? At best "those lights in the sky", if that counts as a definition. So really when it comes to consciousness it's just a case of each of us individually understanding what we personally are referring to by the term and assuming that others are referring to the same sort of thing.

"Physically identical but not conscious" is in fact a contradiction unless you define it in a way that it's not. — Hanover

"Contradiction" was probably the wrong word on my part, given that this isn't just a semantic issue. We can't simply define consciousness a certain way and expect to have addressed the problem of consciousness.

To a physicalist all the world is physical. For two things to be identical, they must be physically identical. So, if you asked a physicalist if a conscious person and his doppelganger p-zombie were identical, he'd say of course they aren't; they can't be. The distinction between the two means the distinction must be physical because that's all there is.

I don't think people are that straightforward. We might believe that consciousness is a physical thing but then when asked to consider the p-zombie, Mary's room, or inverted spectrum hypotheses find ourselves agreeing that it's possible, and so change our minds about consciousness being a physical thing.

To the point of what I can conceptualize, I cannot conceptualize of two identical entities (a regular person and his corresponding p-zombie) having no physical differences if I assume physicalism. It simply makes no sense to assume physicalism and then to assume non-physicalism at the same time.

I don't think people just assume physicalism. Rather it's a conclusion from one reasoning or another (else why do they believe it in the first place?). And it isn't nonsensical to suggest that the p-zombie argument is more convincing than whatever arguments conclude in favour of physicalism.

It's relevant, because the whole notion of 'p zombie' is a thing that looks like a human but has no inner life - therefore doesn't feel . If you say to such a thing 'how do you feel?' then the answer can't be based on a real state, as there is no such state. So what is the response based on? On what basis does it answer? — Wayfarer

I don't know what you mean by a response being based on something. If we accept that speech is physical behaviour and that all physical behaviour is caused by prior physical behaviour then the question-answer scenario is simply a matter of physical stimulation and reaction, in accordance to the natural laws of cause and effect.

If we accept that speech is physical behaviour and that all physical behaviour is caused by prior physical behaviour then the question-answer scenario is simply a matter of physical stimulation and reaction. — Michael

But speech ISN'T physical behaviour. It conveys meaning and intention, neither of which are physical. So again, ask a zombie a question, and how can it respond? Without any inner life, reason, or anything else that is constitutive of a human being, what could it say?

But speech ISN'T physical behaviour. It conveys meaning and intention, neither of which are physical. So again, ask a zombie a question, and how can it respond? Without any inner life, reason, or anything else that is constitutive of a human being, what could it say? — Wayfarer

By speech I just mean the measurable vocalisations; i.e. mechanical waves of pressure and displacement caused by air exiting the mouth and manipulated by the larynx, mouth, and tongue. Is an inner life required for this physical event to occur?

Well, it's crucial to both Chalmers' and the physicalist's argument. — Michael

The physicalist's argument is not up for consideration. We are only trying to establish whether Chalmers' argument is valid. (This reminds me of how Trump supporters respond to his critics - when his numerous flaws are pointed out, the next sentence out of their mouths contains the name "Hillary Clinton". Its deflection.) But back to the important point ...

How is it different to any other syllogism? — Michael

Because Chalmers conditional is of the form "A implies A". The p-zombie is only conceivable if you already accept that consciousness is not physical. Otherwise, two "physically identical worlds (with) different properties of consciousness" would be a contradiction. So, in this case, the second premise does assume the conclusion.

But here you're up against the distinction between sound and meaning. A zombie could produce many kinds of apparently-vocal noises, it could recite the Gettysburg Address - but how does it answer a question? What does it say? It won't do to say 'look, it's making noises, it must be able to speak.' A speech act requires cognitive faculties, in addition to the physical organs; which is why a person whose larynx has been removed because of surgery, can still express themselves through writing, which a chimp (for instance) cannot.

Because Chalmers conditional is of the form "A implies A". The p-zombie is only conceivable if you already accept that consciousness is not physical. Otherwise, two "physically identical worlds (with) different properties of consciousness" would be a contradiction. So, in this case, the second premise does assume the conclusion. — Real Gone Cat

Both arguments are in the form:

If A then B
A
Therefore B.

So I fail to see how the p-zombie syllogism differs from the Socrates syllogism.

The physicalist's argument is not up for consideration.

But their definition of "physical" is up for consideration, given that Chalmers' argument is a response to their claim that consciousness is physical. Chalmers is (I assume) using whatever definition the physicalist is using.

But here you're up against the distinction between sound and meaning. A zombie could produce many kinds of apparently-vocal noises, it could recite the Gettysburg Address - but how does it answer a question? What does it say? It won't do to say 'look, it's making noises, it must be able to speak.' — Wayfarer

I really don't understand your question. You accept that a p-zombie could recite the Gettysburg Address. Then you should accept that a p-zombie could recite the phrase "I feel good about X". All that is required is that the appropriate sounds are produced in response to the appropriate stimulation.

A speech act requires cognitive faculties, in addition to the physical organs; which is why a person whose larynx has been removed because of surgery, can still express themselves through writing, which a chimp (for instance) cannot.

If by "cognitive faculties" you mean "brain activity", sure. The lungs, mouth, and tongue are indeed causally influenced by signals sent from the central nervous system.