Not something essentially different, and hence (though this isn't Elgin's point) not an excuse to impute symbolic thinking (or an alleged cousin of it) anthropomorphically. — bongo fury

I think smoke being a sign of fire, and the like, are different than, for example a letter symbolizing a sound or a sound symbolizing an object. I would agree they are related of course, you might say symbolizing evolves out of signifying. I haven't read Elgin though.

I am not sure I am exactly in line with Peirce on this (it's a long time since I've read him), but the way I see it is that signs are material correlations (the habit of association forms when one phenomenon is repeatedly found to be proximally occurrent with another), Ikons are imagistic correlations (the ikon or pictograph looks like what it represents) and symbols are conventional (the association has been established by traditional or social usage). This seems to make good sense to me, but I'd be happy to have this view corrected or improved upon.

...the world as a metalanguage...
— fdrake

To be clear, the metalanguage is on the left, and contains the truth predicate. The object language is on the right. So the object language is the world. — Banno

I take it you mean the object language considered as a whole domain of symbols plus its own semantic world of denoted objects comprises the semantic world of the metalanguage? (Nothing like "the world as a metalanguage", but fine. Thank goodness, indeed.)

But that wouldn't excuse blurring the distinction between syntactic and semantic layers of the object language.

It doesn't matter that it's natural language, where the layers aren't as clear cut as for Tarski. There's still no need to confuse use vs mention, logical or grammatical subject vs subject-matter, state of affairs or disquotation as in statement vs state of affairs or disquotation as in event (or whatever).

It doesn't matter that it's natural language, where the layers aren't as clear cut as for Tarski. There's still no need to confuse use vs mention, logical or grammatical subject vs subject-matter, state of affairs or disquotation as in statement vs state of affairs or disquotation as in event. — bongo fury

So... you think I am jumbling use and mention?

I want to be clear about this. "The cup is on the table" can be dealt with in two ways. We can talk about it, saying things like "The cup is on the table" contains six words, or "The cup is on the table" is true; or we can use it to show that the cup is on the table.

That's not an ambiguity.

One can use a screw driver to drive a screw, or one can put it away into the toolbox. That does not make the use of a screwdriver ambiguous.

Edit:

When you push on the pragmatics, you end up with something like a formal semantics of statements alone to justify the belief claim. — fdrake

Is this what you had in mind?

Use is deploying a word, phrase, sentence, group or groups of sentences to refer, command, entreat, explain or whatever else we do with words, phrases, sentences or groups of sentences. — Janus

Sure. I was responding to Bongo Fury's comment that confusion of use and mention had reached pandemic status. I was asking for his view of it to set alongside Banno's (which is kind of unique, I think).

I take it you mean the object language considered as a whole domain of symbols plus its own semantic world of denoted objects comprises the semantic world of the metalanguage? — bongo fury

I mean that the world is all that is the case.

Look at that and reassure me that you can see that it is about what can be stated.

So... you think I am jumbling use and mention? — Banno

I do.

The sentence on the right is being used, not mentioned.
— Banno
Used as in setting out a state of affairs.
— Banno
What is on the RHS is a state of affairs
— Banno — bongo fury

I want to be clear about this. "The cup is on the table" can be dealt with in two ways. We can talk about it, saying things like "The cup is on the table" contains six words, or "The cup is on the table" is true; or we can use it to show that the cup is on the table.

That's not an ambiguity.

One can use a screw driver to drive a screw, or one can put it away into the toolbox. That does not make the use of a screwdriver ambiguous. — Banno

??

I cannot see your point.


Use your words. Show me the ambiguity.

I'd like you to fill this out. — Banno

I shall try to contrast what I've been thinking to what you've been thinking, but I'd like you to answer a couple of questions first. I need you to spell out how you think this works before I try and make the contrast.

So the object language is the world. — Banno

The missing piece may be that the world is, in Davidson's words, always and already interpreted. The illocution of making statements involves representing the world in words - that's what the game is. — Banno

When you say "the object language is the world", what does that mean? Does it entail that the world is a language because it is an object language, or are you making a different claim? If you are making a different claim, what metaphysics justifies treating the world as a language?

Moreover, I'll grant that the world is "always already interpreted", but I don't see why that should make the content of that tacit interpretation propositional or even just language-like. Can you spell that out for me? Heidegger's emphatically against the claim that tacit interpretation works primarily by how it comes to be embedded in declarative sentences. Even though he sides with the claim that language ("discourse") plays a central role in giving the world its interactive texture (of institutions, intentions, rituals, signposts, jokes etc) and that texture is "always already there".

For Heidegger, propositionality; called the predicative "as structure" - conceived of as the adequation of thought and being through sententially expressed judgements - is retrojected onto pragmatic activity. It arises during conceptual/intellectual judgements regarding activities. It's like Witty's seeing-as applied to statable judgements - a seeing that (such and such) is the case. This is contrasted to the pre-predicative "as structure"; the pragmatic, procedural and existential components of interpretation - more of a seeing-how and the how of seeing-as. He has language "discourse" interweaving+coordinating both of those "as-structures" without exhausting all of their aspects, notably only the first has statements (judgements) playing a central role.

(substantial edits)

The missing piece may be that the world is, in Davidson's words, always and already interpreted. The illocution of making statements involves representing the world in words - that's what the game is. — Banno

There's a great sci-fi movie called Arrival in which the protagonist gains the alien's worldview as she learns their language. She subsequently has the ability to travel forward in her her own timeline like the aliens can.

On the one hand, this plot expresses your point that what we know of the world is bound by language and vice versa.

But it also conflicts in the idea that the world (in total) is expressable in language. It's logically possible that there are aspects of the world that we can't point to with language because we don't have the concepts (yet).

So you could narrow down your assessment of the RHS to 'the world as we know it presently'.

You can't say it's the world in total unless you can rule out the plot of Arrival and say our worldview is presently complete. And don't bring up Davidson's translation thing. I'm not saying these supposed hidden parts of the world are necessarily untranslatable. Just that our languages don't necessarily cover every aspect of the world in total.

To support your point you might present an aspect of the world that is not covered by our language.

You show us, a new riff or artwork or film and say "see, that's new", and then we talk about it. Language grows.

Nothing in that counts against statements representing the world. Pointing out that words present the world, that the world is what is the case, is not claiming that there are things we do not know.

Solaris(1972) was better.

I was responding to Bongo Fury's comment that confusion of use and mention had reached pandemic status. I was asking for his view of it to set alongside Banno's (which is kind of unique, I think). — frank

Yep. Well, maybe not unique but characteristic. Mention of use incites, in many, insurrection against pointing (naming, denoting, describing) as the presumed basis of meaning. So they probably hope the use-mention distinction is at least half-way not about pointing. They must be frequently disappointed, in that case.

"The cup is on the table" can be dealt with in two ways. We can talk about it, saying things like "The cup is on the table" contains six words, or "The cup is on the table" is true; or we can use it to show that the cup is on the table.

That's not an ambiguity. — Banno

Not if it's the choice between mention and use, no. But it isn't quite that. The first half is about mention and is fine. Use of (other) words to mention or point at a sentence. But what is pointing at what when we

use it [the sentence] to show that the cup is on the table. — Banno

?

Nothing so low class as pointing seems to be implied. Much better, we are invited (roughly every other sentence) to see the cup situation as somehow one with the sentence. Distinguishing between picked-out and picker-outer would obviously spoil that mystical game.

To support your point you might present an aspect of the world that is not covered by our language. — Banno

All I need is the movie to demonstrate that it's conceivable that there are aspects of the world that can't be pointed to by a sentence of English.

If you use Tarski, all you can say is that used sentences point to things in the world as we know it.

Pointing out that words present the world, that the world is what is the case, is not claiming that there are things we do not know. — Banno

Yea, I can tell you didn't see the movie. Imagine that there's an aspect of the world that we can't presently conceive.

Solaris(1972) was better. — Banno

I've always really wanted to like Tarkovsky's Solaris, but meh. He was trying to too hard to imitate Kubrick.

So they probably hope the use-mention distinction is at least half-way not about pointing. — bongo fury

Then what do they think use is doing, if not pointing?

All this stuff about language use...

The debate is about the content of all belief.

Some belief is prior to language.

:roll:

What do you mean when you claim that the world and/or states of affairs are 'shaped' like statements or propositions?

Surely that's not to be taken at face value.

Trees and mice and mice running around trees are not shaped like statements or propositions(using these terms synonymously). And... some statements are false. Someone else raised this point earlier, as have I on more than one occasion. The world is not the sort of thing capable of being true/false either, so... I'm a bit confused regarding exactly what you're trying to say here.

By the way, just so you know better, I'm not using "correlations" as you're using "propositions"... not even close.

I'm not saying these supposed hidden parts of the world are necessarily untranslatable... — frank

I would say exactly that. The unknown(hidden parts of the world) is most certainly untranslatable, for it is utterly meaningless, and all translation is of that which is already meaningful.

There is such a thing as language-less belief.

It is the simplest of all the different kinds that I'm convinced exist, and we talk about; where "kinds" are determined by the content of the correlations being drawn.

Here's the point:No language-less belief uses or mentions language. Period. The use/mention distinction is totally irrelevant with regard to what language-less belief consists of - the content - of language-less belief. Honestly, the only sensible use I find is that use is not always about language use, and mention has it as the focal point.

Language-less creatures are capable of neither using nor mentioning language.

Statements and propositions are both existentially dependent upon language use. While language-less belief is prior to language, it can still be about language use and/or products thereof. Some language-less belief is about language use and/or directly perceptible stuff that is itself existentially dependent upon language use. Some language-less belief is about cups, shelves, and cupboards. Language-less belief that is about cups, shelves, and cupboards can be so, can have such content, because those terms pick out directly perceptible things, and some language-less creatures are capable of drawing correlations between directly perceptible things.

A creature cannot have belief about "red cups full of Maxwell House coffee" unless it can say that. However, some of us may DO need to be reminded that while a cat can most certainly chase a mouse, and that mouse can most certainly run behind a red cup full of Maxwell House coffee(for the sake of argument, we'll pretend it's a big cup and a small mouse), the mouse most certainly does not hide behind a statement, a proposition, a use, a mention, language, or "red cups full of Maxwell House coffee".

Enough.

Thanks for your efforts. That's an excellent reply.

This might take a while.

The "claim" is nothing but the commonplace that when what we say is true, it sets out how things are. I have difficulty in seeing how you might maintain that the world is interpreted and yet treat this interpretation as tacit; especially if that tacit interpretation is thought of as not being capable of interpretation in propositional form.

The notion of a level of interpretation that is not linguistic is counterintuitive. I gather the notion is that the world is already divided into cups and tables before these are spoken of; (the before here being a logical, not a temporal, priority? I understand time plays an odd role in Heidegger's metaphysics...)

The question you ask - how one moves from the tacit to the explicit presentation, "...retrojected onto pragmatic activity", is psychological, rather than logical. The logic of propositions does not have a place for the tacit; how could it, given that logic is in essence about grammar?

This is what we are addressing:

When you push on the pragmatics, you end up with something like a formal semantics of statements alone to justify the belief claim. — fdrake

I gather the issue is, at what stage do we conclude that some given statement is true - what is it that justifies a belief? That's fraught; it requires psychology rather than logic...

I don't see why that should make the content of that tacit interpretation propositional or even just language-like. — fdrake

Well, if it is not propositional, what is it? What other form could it have? And even if there is some alternative form, that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form. If it were not, then we would have no grounds for referring to it as "content".

That is, the tacitly understood relations of individuals to each other must themselves be interpretable in propositional form.

I've no idea what to make of that.

I think smoke being a sign of fire, and the like, are different than, for example a letter symbolizing a sound or a sound symbolizing an object. I would agree they are related of course, you might say symbolizing evolves out of signifying — Janus

I would agree that smoke being a sign of fire is different than marks symbolizing, referencing, picking out, etc., other things.

What's interesting to me though, is exactly how much they are alike.

They both require a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. They both require something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between them.

...that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form. — Banno

I would agree that language-less belief is capable of being talked about and our talking about it has propositional form. All our interpretations come in exactly such a form.

All I need is the movie to demonstrate that it's conceivable that there are aspects of the world that can't be pointed to by a sentence of English. — frank

If this were so, we would have no way to claim these were "aspects of the world"; as if you could show something and yet not be able to point to it.

By the way, just so you know better, I'm not using "correlations" as you're using "propositions"... not even close. — creativesoul

If your correlations cannot be put into the form of a proposition, then what are they?

You would not be able to say.

I would agree that language-less belief is capable of being talked about and our talking about it has propositional form. — creativesoul

Then what are we arguing about?

I would agree that language-less belief is capable of being talked about and our talking about it has propositional form.
— creativesoul

Then what are we arguing about? — Banno

About what follows from that...

Well, if it is not propositional, what is it? What other form could it have? And even if there is some alternative form, that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form. If it were not, then we would have no grounds for referring to it as "content". — Banno

Correlational form, if we must talk like that. Both require a plurality of things, but propositional form requires that some of those things are meaningful marks or sounds(language use).

...that form must be capable of interpretation in propositional form... — Banno

Well, much of our talk uses propositional form because that's just a matter of how our naming and descriptive practices work. It quite simply does not follow that everything we talk about(name and describe) has propositional form.

Mt. Everest certainly does not. Nor does a chair. Nor does a correlation drawn between one's own instinctual involuntary urge, drive, and/or desire(if we must) to chase a rodent and the rodent's whereabouts.

Our reports of chairs, mountains, and mice most certainly do.

If your correlations cannot be put into the form of a proposition, then what are they? — Banno

What kind of question is that? As if everything can be put into the form of a proposition, aside from correlations drawn between different things?

Mice, trees, chairs, and mountains cannot be put into the form of a proposition.

Well, I suppose a creative butcher-type material reconstruction could amount to parts and pieces of mice, trees, and mountains being arranged into the shape of names and/or descriptions themselves, but that's not what we're after here.

The point is that mice, trees, chairs, and mountains can become meaningful to a creature capable of drawing correlations between those things and others. Part of the content of the language-less belief in question here is a mouse. Another part is a tree. Another part is the desire to catch the mouse. All language-less belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief. Trees, mice, and spatial relations are part of the content of that particular language-less belief. Tress, mice, and spatial relations are not propositional in form, nor are they in any way shape or form existentially dependent upon language use at all. All propositions are. Thus, not all belief content is propositional.

I would agree that smoke being a sign of fire is different than marks symbolizing, referencing, picking out, etc., other things.

What's interesting to me though, is exactly how much they are alike.

They both require a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. They both require something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between them. — creativesoul

Yes, I agree that signs and symbols occur only in the context of sentient/ sapient beings. And I also agree that the things that become signs and symbols, are not merely signs and symbols. Smoke is smoke before, or irrespective of whether, it is a sign of fire. And sounds or inscribed marks are sounds and inscribed marks regardless of whether they are also signs or symbols.

So, it looks like we agree.