Well I can tell you the mode of existence of common objects; that they can be seen, felt, are publicly available to perception and so on. Everyone can agree on the reality and existence of those. The words 'exist' and 'real' are generally used in reference to such things.


'Generally used'? By whom? What you're appealing to here is 'the wisdom of crowds'. You're simply saying 'hey everyone knows this. What are you talking about?'

To which the answer is, I'm talking about 'philosophy' - which consists of questioning 'what everyone thinks they know'. Philosophy is the questioning of normality, of what we all take for granted.

If the world is a common-sense world, and if everything here is as it appears, then what are we asking questions about, and why are we studying philosophy? So far, in our interactions, I haven't really seen any indication of what your view is on this.

But I have an open mind.

I agree pretty much with what you say Cavacava except that I don't think concepts are universals; I think they are particular events and are real as such.

Also I am not on board with the idea that the move is from particular to universal. For me, the two are symbiotic. We cannot perceive anything as something if we do not have a general concept of the thing. For example, we cannot see something as a dog if we do not possess the ability to conceptualize the generality 'dog', I think.
about 11 hours ago ReplyFlag

Well I think "Universal" is the traditional term, the term 'general' is perhaps more appropriate, or (as I saw Aristotle's name mentioned) 'species'. (the term 'Universal" I think more appropriate for math or scientific use)

When you say you think that concepts are particular events, do you mean while they are occurring, if so yes I agree and they flow through our minds incessantly. They are also categorical, enabling us to quickly differentiate particulars by means of particular/species/genus recognition.

I don't disagree with you about the movement of thought being both ways at this point in time, but concepts must start from particular instances within which we see relationships (now almost automatically) develop into concepts or add on as additional information to preexisting concepts. The concepts we derive from perception are inductive fodder for the deductive.

So, our perceptions provide us with information that we sort out and add to our 'database'. Dogs are great, but we learned this concept, and we learned it from all the particular instances of this waggy tailed, wet tongued creature. Language makes rapid concept formation possible.

I think our organism works together well, I think the mental affects the physical and the physical the mental, we are inexorably one, perhaps like the relationship between matter and form as Aristotle would have it.

The following from SEP:

"Aristotle thinks that Plato and other dualists are right to stress the importance of the soul in explanations of living beings. At the same time, he sees their commitment to the separability of the soul from the body as unjustified merely by appeal to formal causation: he will allow that the soul is distinct from the body, and is indeed the actuality of the body, but he sees that these concessions by themselves provide no grounds for supposing that the soul can exist without the body. His hylomorphism, then, embraces neither reductive materialism nor Platonic dualism. Instead, it seeks to steer a middle course between these alternatives by pointing out, implicitly, and rightly, that these are not exhaustive options."

I think the conversation regarding the existence of universals often overlooks a key topic, and that is whether or not properties even exist, as in, is there an ontological structure behind common concrete particulars. Because you can be a nominalist and still accept that there are properties, just that they are concrete particulars (tropes). It's taken for granted that "redness" is something that can be taken as a separate, independent entity from an object. It's taken for granted that "triangularity" is something apart from the triangle itself.

However, I don't see why there is the need to postulate the existence of a shareable entity, or even entities at all. I find it absurd that there are specific "properties" that "make up" something.

Things can be similar because they act similarly. A red object is just a piece of matter that is acting in such a way that it reflects light. A triangular object is simply a piece of matter that is acting in such a way that it looks triangular. Instead of properties being like a metaphorical sticker that is applied to objects or coalesced to bring forth an object, properties are merely the manifestation of matter as it is changed. They are what matter is doing, not what matter is possessing.

I believe I just described Aristotle's hylomorphism, that is, that matter (hyle) assumes forms (morph). His Prime Mover was pure Form, and he also conceived of Pure Matter, which could be interpreted as a predecessor to quantum indeterminacy.

I tend to agree with Wittgenstein that philosophy is about getting clear about how language reflects common understanding and clearing up remaining confusions engendered by our propensity to reify linguistic terms, or use language in inappropriate ways when it "goes on holiday".

This doesn't mean that being and difference are not ineluctable mysteries; but I think these mysteries are better dealt with by an allusive philosophy, more like poetry than science; an evocative philosophy that enlivens our poetic feelings and reverence for life, than by the kinds of systematic attempts to define what is that are exemplified by pre-critical, or for that matter Kantian, and even Hegelian, metaphysics and epistemology.

I pretty much agree with what both of you write here.

This is nonsense; neutrinos ( their effects at least) can be measured, as can time and space; that's how we make sense of these things. The idea that the meaning of any phrase is understood simply by virtue of knowing the definitions of the words (even if it were unproblematically correct) doesn't rule out the possibility that the phrase may be senseless. I haven't argued that 'abstractions exist independently of their manifestations' is meaningless, but I have argued that it is senseless. You apparently haven't picked up on that.

That's doesn't really help. Superman specifies something imaginary. We know we are talking about an object which doesn't exist. But what is an "abstraction?" How exactly is that a suggested thing which might exist (a thing in the world) or not (imaginary)?

In the relevant sense, "abstraction exists" is a meaningless statement because it doesn't specify a notion of what might or might not exist. It is like trying to say "space" or "time" exists. There is no coherent meaning because at no point is a possible state of existence mentioned.

I found a short summary of Aristotle's criticisms of Platonism, which I think accurately sums up the problems I have with the theory and general Realism for that matter.

I don't know whether to classify Aristotle as a Realist or a Nominalist, though.

I also don't agree with everything Aristotle said, especially the part regarding the anthropomorphizing of particulars striving for perfection. We humans can do so, and in fact Aristotle's thoughts on this are strikingly similar to that of Nietzsche's, but ultimately the universe is under the influence of entropy. So there really is no "perfection" here, unless "perfection" means to return to the state of absolute potential substance.

Aristotle was a long time before the medieval debate - which is when the realist v nominalist debate occured. So the answer probably is that he was neither, but that Aristotelean thought, generally, was very much a part of the scholastic philosophy that the nominalists, such as Ockham, were criticizing.

Thanks for your thoughtful reply, I'm sure that the opportunity for further discussion will present itself.

I looked it up, Wayfarer, Aristotle advocated what is known as immanent or moderate realism.

Also, it should be noted that Aristotle thought that the constant striving towards perfection was never-ending.

Right. Well, that's because everything has a telos, a purpose towards which it is striving. That is its 'final cause', its reason for being. (It was that idea which became the source of ridicule insofar as Aristotle's physics posited that stones fell to the earth because it was their telos; such ideas which were basic to Aristotelean physics were really completely torpedoed by Galileo. But there is still much of value in Aristotle's philosophy and metaphysics, in my view.)

According to Lloyd Gerson, who is one of the current top academic experts in Platonism, Aristotle was still a Platonist, albeit a dissenting Platonist. So he believed in the reality of the universals, but he had a more empirical, less ethereal temperament than his teacher.

Wayfarer, your reference to Aristotle reminds me of the parallel, or even isomorphy, that the contrast between his and Plato's understanding of the Forms has with the discussion regarding whether the existence or reality of universals is immanent to (dependent on) or transcendent of (independent of) particulars.

So, you say "he (Aristotle) believed in the reality of universals", which is true, and which I have not been arguing against either. But he did not believe in the independent reality of universals, and disbelief regarding that is the position I have also been arguing for on the grounds that we have no idea what such an "independent reality" could be.

Platonism with respect to mathematics is the view that 'number is real'. That is usually taken to mean that numbers, or numerical systems, are 'discovered', with the contrary view being that they are 'invented'. I think overall the current intellectual fashion vastly favours the latter; the overwhelming reaction seems to be, if numbers are real, where are they? Are they "out there somewhere" as the current saying has it; which I think says something about the way we see the world nowadays.

I think that mathematical systems are discovered in some respects, and invented in others. But in speaking of the natural numbers and the basic operations of arithmetic, I find the 'conventionalist' argument (i.e. that numbers are invented) untenable; I assume that the number 7 is the same for any observer, anywhere in the world, or indeed on any world. The same general observation can be made of logical laws, like the law of the excluded middle.

I found an interesting essay called Frege and the Third Realm by Tyler Burge, which says that Frege seemed to accept the existence of a 'third realm', different from either the realm of physical objects, or of thoughts, per se. Frege believed that number is real in the sense that it is quite independent of thought: 'thought content exists independently of thinking "in the same way", he says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it. Thought contents are true and bear their relations to one another (and presumably to what they are about) independently of anyone's thinking these thought contents - "just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets." '

Furthermore in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic he says that 'the laws of truth are authoritative because of their timelessness: "[the laws of truth] are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which our thought can overflow, but never displace. It is because of this, that they authority for our thought if it would attain to truth."

(Frege on Knowing the Third Realm Tyler Burge, Mind, New Series, Vol 101, issue 404, Oct 1992)

That essay says that Frege doesn't give any attention to the question of 'how the third realm exists'. For him it is simply the case that the basic numbers and functions are real, independently of anyone's say-so, and that they're plainly different from physical objects. They're simply givens, things which by dint of our rational intellect we're able to perceive directly. And that attitude is very Platonist (a point which Burge makes).

The following is from my very first forum post: "we all concur on what a number is, and mathematics is lawful; in other words, we can't just make up our own laws of numbers. But numbers don't 'exist' in the same sense that objects of perception do; there is no object called 'seven'. You might point at the numeral, 7, but that is just a symbol. What we concur on is a number of objects, but the number cannot be said to exist independent of its apprehension, at least, not in the same way objects apparently do. In what realm or sphere do numbers exist? 'Where' are numbers? Surely in the intellectual realm, of which perception is an irreducible part. So numbers are not 'objective' in the same way that 'things' are. The key point is that number is real, but can only be apprehended by an intelligence capable of counting; that is the sense in which it is real but not physical.

I think this is related to the platonic distinction between 'intelligible objects' and 'objects of perception'. Objects of perception - ordinary things - only exist, in the Platonic view, because they conform to, and are instances of, laws (so there's your 'instantiation'). So in the Platonist understanding, particular things are simply ephemeral instances of the eternal forms, but in themselves, they have no actual being (i.e. their being is contingent or dependent). Their actual being is conferred by the fact that they conform to laws (their logoi). So 'existence' in this sense, and I think this is the sense it was intended by the Platonic and neo-Platonic schools, is illusory. Earthly objects of perception exist, but only in a transitory and imperfect way. They are 'mortal' - perishable, never perfect, and always transient. Whereas the archetypal forms are apprehended by Nous: they provide the ideal for all existing things by creating the pattern, the ratio, whereby things are formed. They are real, above and beyond the existence of wordly things; but they don't actually exist. They don't need to exist; things do the hard work of existence. That is the sense in which they're 'transcendental' - they're beyond the perishable realm of the world, in the 'ideal realm' only perceptible through noesis.

Now you're right in saying that this is where Aristotle differed with his teacher; he was of a much more empirical temperament. But I hope the above has helped to sharpen the question of what the argument actually is about. (And for a good contemporary presentation of the Aristotelean view, have a look at Aristotle was Right about Mathematics After All by James Franklin, which is an Aristotelean-realist view.)

Start by asking what it means for a universal to be real before you ask whether or not they are real. — Michael

For universals to be real, they must have a mind-independent existence. That's what realism essentially means. X is real if it does not depend in some way on our perceiving or conceiving it. Dreams are obviously mind-dependent, as are hallucinations. After that, it gets controversial.

Are particulars real? If that particular tree does not depend on me or anyone else perceiving or thinking about it, then it is. But what about the term "tree"? Does that denote an abstraction which only lives in human thought and language? Then it's not real. It has no existence independent of us.

The challenge for the realist qua universals is to show how they could be mind-independent. Do they live in the particulars as Aristotle thought? Do they have their own "realm"? If so, how do our minds come to know about them? And so on.

This is nonsense; neutrinos ( their effects at least) can be measured, as can time and space; that's how we make sense of these things. — John

Problem is, those are universals. You're abstracting over the entire cosmos to derive "space", and over all rate of change to denote "time", and the "building blocks" of "matter" to discuss "neutrinos".

The big problem nominalism has is how we can understand the world without using universals. You can say that space, matter, time, energy, laws, atoms, etc are just names for particulars, but that's not how they are used in science. Time isn't just a bunch of events, rather it's a dimension (another universal) related to space, influenced by gravity (again a universal), and driven by thermodynamics and how things were in the Big Bang.

You could probably say that our entire understanding is based on universals. It is our ability to abstract which allows us to reason, draw inferences, and conceptualize. That doesn't resolve the issue of whether and how universals are real, but it does demonstrate that they are indispensable to thought.

Another way to frame the universal debate is to ask how God would view the universe if nominalism is the case. Because then it's just particulars, and our naming schemes would be misleading from the omniscient perspective. You might say that even though naming and categorizing things is very useful to us, it deludes us into thinking there is something more to the endless particulars we call the universe (the universal of all particulars).

We have the gall to say things like "the speed of light prohibits anything with mass accelerating to C". God would find are notions of laws amusing, I would guess. And our equations quaint. If God is a nominalist.

X is real if it does not depend in some way on our perceiving or conceiving it. — Marchesk

So my experiences and my ideas aren't real?

Dreams are obviously mind-dependent, as are hallucinations.

But dreams and hallucinations are real things. They really happen.

Yeah, but it's important to use words precisely in these kind of discussions, or mass confusion results. Realism in philosophy denotes mind-independence. Maybe they should have come up with a more technical term, since obviously dreams and hallucinations do occur. But then what isn't real under that usage? Unicorns happen in our minds as well. And culture. But nobody says they are real.

I imagined a pink unicorn, and that did happen (hypothetically speaking), but it wasn't real. That's the proper use.

And that's exactly why you can't just say "X is(n't) real". You have to say "X is(n't) a real Y". A mirage isn't a real oasis but it is a real mirage. So the question "are universals real?" should be the question "are universals real Ys?" So what's Y? You offer "mind-independent thing" as an example? But isn't that that the definition of a particular? So you're asking "are universals real particulars?" Obviously the answer is "no". But then of those who say that universals are real, how many are saying that they're real particulars?

You offer "mind-independent thing" as an example? But isn't that that the definition of a particular? So you're asking "are universals real particulars?" — Michael

I'm not asking that. I'm asking whether they are something we cooked up as part of our making sense of the world, or whether they exist somehow independent of us. And if universals are something we cooked up, then the world isn't how we think it is. It's just a bunch of particulars. Which means our scientific understanding is wrong, however useful it may be to us. As is our everyday talk with all it's universals.

You have to say "X is(n't) a real Y". — Michael

"Particulars aren't real." You can certainly make that move. It's called idealism. So what is the Y for particulars if realism is the case? Themselves? Then that is the same for universals.

And if universals are something we cooked up, then the world isn't how we think it is. It's just a bunch of particulars. Which means our scientific understanding is wrong, however useful it may be to us. — Marchesky

I don't see how that follows.

"Particulars aren't real." You can certainly make that move. It's called idealism. So what is the Y for particulars if realism is the case? Themselves? Then that is the same for universals.

I'm not making that move, and that's not what it means to be an idealist.

I'm asking whether they are something we cooked up as part of our making sense of the world, or whether they exist somehow independent of us.

If you asking "are universals real?" is you asking "do universals exist independently of us?" then you're asking "are universals mind-independent things?". And what does it mean to be a particular? Is it to be a mind-independent thing? Then you're asking "are universals particulars?"

I don't see how that follows. — Michael

Because all of our scientific concepts make heavy use of universals. Matter, spacetime, atoms, etc are all universals. So is DNA, species, evolution, brain, mind, information, computation, etc.

I'm not making that move, and that's not what it means to be an idealist. — Michael

To be is to be perceived, which makes things mind-dependent, yes? I brought that up because one can deny that particulars are real, and therefore, what is the Y for particulars?

If you're asking "are universals real?" is you asking "do universals exist independently of us?" then you're asking "are universals mind-independent things?". — Michael

But I didn't ask if universals are "things". I stated that they are real if they exist independent of us.

And what is a particular? Is it a mind-independent thing? — Michael

Materialists would say yes. But "particular" is a concept we utilize to denote unique objects. Maybe it's a universal as well?

Then you're asking "are universals particulars?" — Michael

And now we're close to abusing language. But it is an interesting angle to argue. I could argue for "particular" being universal and you could argue that realism amounts to universals being particulars. I'm not sure where that gets us. Is this a Wittgenstein approach to dissolve the issue?

Because all our scientific concepts make heavy use of universals. Matter, spacetime, atoms, etc are all universals. So is DNA, species, evolution, brain, mind, etc. — Marchesk

Aren't universals said to be abstract? Science doesn't say that matter, space-time, atoms, and so on are abstract. Science says that they're concrete things (i.e. particulars).

To be is to be perceived, which makes things mind-dependent, yes? I brought that up because one can deny that particulars are real, and therefore, what is the Y for particulars?

Maybe one can deny that they're real, but I'm not, and neither does the idealist (prima facie). But as I said before, if one wants to deny that they're real then one needs to deny that they're a real Y (whatever that Y is).

But I didn't ask if universals are "things". I stated that they are real if they exist independent of us.

What's the difference between asking if they exist independent of us and asking if they're things which exist independent of us?

And now we're close to abusing language.

Which shows that the approach taken to deny the reality of universals stems from an abuse of language. They argue that a universal must be a mind-independent thing to be real but also that to be a particular is to be a mind-independent thing, and so they're saying that a universal must be a particular to be real. But of course that makes no sense.

Aren't universals said to be abstract? Science doesn't say that matter, space-time, atoms, and so on are abstract. Science says that they're concrete things (i.e. particulars). — Michael

But the concepts "matter", "spacetime", "atoms", etc are abstractions over particular instances. Take time, for example. It is an abstraction from various events. We notice a commonality, and so we say there is this time dimension in which stuff happens. And there is an order to it. The past flows into the present which flows into the future. Of course that's everyday talk based on how we experience stuff happening.. The physical notion of time is a bit different. But it is an abstraction.

As is General Relativity, for that matter, with it's talk of gravity curving spacetime across the universe. Of course it's also mathematical equations backed up by experiments which can be put in such and such terms, but math itself is an abstraction, and so are all scientific equations.

But as I said before, if one wants to deny that they're real then one needs to deny that they're a real Y (whatever that Y is). — Michael

Okay, so what is the Y for particulars? Particulars are a real ____?