I don't know if it is merely a language problem. We don't have the technology of course, but it still outlines a problem hypothetically, doesn't it? If we are nothing more than our physical body or its arrangement then there is no soul and thus if one were to make 2 of me then I should be both. But since that is impossible there has to be something else a pointer or whatever else extra you can get? It's not merely about continuity alone. It's about what constitutes the self in its entirety. So this problem is close to but not the same as the ship of Theseus.The broken teleporter is a nice redux of the ship Theseus paradox which concerns continuity of identity. It is essentially a language problem as far as I can see. In everyday scenarios, we don't need to worry about discontinuities of form alongside continuities of physical constitution or vice versa: my physical constitution gradually changes but I remain me albeit with a time-dependent physical constitution. — Kenosha Kid
The linguistic issue is that, based on our experience with language, we have one word to describe two things that we can easily differentiate. One simply has to choose more careful language if this becomes a real problem. For what it's worth, the "identical parts" idea of identity seems like a non-starter, since when I say "I", I am referring to a continuous thing that does not have static components. The "original you" or the "original Theseus" does not have any relevance in that case. — Kenosha Kid
I think the original argument can be put easier with clones. — DoppyTheElv
More importantly, these thought experiments are (in)famously controversial; they are the opposite of an argument. If anything, their controversy suggests that there may not be objectively right or wrong answers to the questions that they pose. — SophistiCat
Where can I read up on the idea that they are controversial? Do you mean controversial in that it's a bad thought experiment? Or controversial in the sense of they are being discussed? — DoppyTheElv
The teletransporting / copy-beam thought experiment shows that it is unclear what the objective solution is, not that there is none.
Both the beaming and my thought experiment show the same thing: physics has an explanatory gap with personal identity => physicalism is incomplete. — SolarWind
Well, your thought experiment shows only that if you assume dualism at the outset, then dualism is what you will conclude. Same with identity thought experiments: they need not pose problems for physicalism unless you have already assumed that they do. — SophistiCat
You simply compare the set {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} with the set {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}, where the star indicates which life you would live in the corresponding world.
It is possible that the persons are materially identical in pairs, i.e. A* =(material) A, B =(material) B, ... , Y =(material) Y, Z =(material) Z*. So {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} =(material) {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}, but of course also {A*,B,C,...,X,Y,Z} <>(total) {A,B,C,...,X,Y,Z*}. — SolarWind
I just mean that there is a diversity of opinion when it comes to exotic imaginary scenarios involving personal identity. Our intuitions don't seem to deliver a uniform verdict. Some have strong (and divergent) opinions, others are uncertain. — SophistiCat
Well, your thought experiment shows only that if you assume dualism at the outset, then dualism is what you will conclude. Same with identity thought experiments: they need not pose problems for physicalism unless you have already assumed that they do. — SophistiCat
Both biological and psychological suffer from duplication problems though! — DoppyTheElv
I'm not sure you proved anything on the first go around.ask whether the existence of an immaterial instance can be regarded with my consideration now as proved. — SolarWind
To get this scenario to make sense, it's necessary to presume that identity is, rather than constructed and generated by a physical construct, somehow fundamental and separate from physical constructs. And that presumption is basically just a presumption of dualism. — InPitzotl
And the proof that sqrt(2) is irrational continues by exploring what it means for sqrt(2) to be rational.The proof that sqrt(2) is irrational starts with assuming it is rational. — SolarWind
But then I present that difference, and you ignore it to lecture me on sqrt(2). There's a reason I say I'm not the same person as you. That reason through a monist account when applied to Z in WZ suggests I'm not the same person as Z either. So what's the problem?I don't put anything into my proof except that it is conceivable to be a different person in a different (imagined) world. Then simply asking what the difference is between WA and WZ. — SolarWind
There's a reason I say I'm not the same person as you. — InPitzotl
Then simply asking what the difference is between WA and WZ. There I still wait for a conclusive answer. — SolarWind
This isn't about lack of imagination. I can imagine sqrt(2) being rational as well, as I do when proving it's irrational.So I can imagine to have been born e.g. in India. — SolarWind
For me to be that person has to mean something, else the entire exercise is pointless. "Same-person" is a kind of relation. I am the same-person as the guy who initially replied to you. I am not the same-person as you. For me to be this someone else, I need to be the same-person as that someone else.It's not about the triviality of you not being me or anyone else, it's about whether you COULD be someone else in a hypothetical world. — SolarWind
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