Google definition of "freedom": the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants. Freedom is precisely how it's been defined but the actual situation on the ground may vary. Read the fine print :joke:
On a more serious note, one has to draw a distinction between what we mean by freedom and to what degree we possess it. These two are entirely different things. One - the meaning of freedom - represents our conception, expectation, and perhaps even our hope and the other - the freedom we possess - is reality's constraining, modifying, limiting effect on us.
Of course you might say that the facts as they stand matter - we have to mind the consequences of how we act, speak, and think - and that tells an entirely different story of human "freedom" than that supposed in the definition of freedom. True but notice a simple fact. Would you call this situation, having to walk on eggshells as it were, always mindful of the consequences of our acts, speech, and thoughts, freedom? No, right? I rest my case. — TheMadFool
Let us call this parameter two.
Therefore, applying the above two parameters, I postulate the following:
Mark realizes that, due to pollution, over harvesting, habitat destruction, over population, and the lack of meaningful change to rectify these problems, the earth will no longer be able to sustain life, human or otherwise, within the next three hundred years. Mark, being an exceedingly talented geneticist, has the ability to create a virus which will eliminate 75% of the human population over the next hundred years. There is no suffering to speak of, simply a massive reduction in the ability to reproduce and the resulting population decline. This action will result in the betterment of future generations as well as restoring global balance and harmony.
Duty suggests that Mark release his virus, despite his personal feelings on the issue. He is aware of both outcomes, elimination of everyone (no action on his part) or elimination of 75% of humanity (action on his part). Good will (ensuring that life goes on) informs Mark's Duty to Act, which is supported by reason (Continuation of life over the cessation of life), and therefore, the act that Ought to be done.
And there is a rationalized justification for an act that most would consider genocidal. Lovely frame work. Thanks Kant. — Book273
I quibble on the word "epistemology." If you mean methods by which we know, I agree, — tim wood
I suggest we are always lost and never not lost, anything else is mere illusion propped up by a seeming regularity: we think we know, and for a while win some of our bets, but our knowledge is spurious. — tim wood
Our duty then to be informed and self-informed as best we can be, reason being our best and only true navigational aid. And it seems to me Kant finds morality in reason, at least as much as with reason. — tim wood
And this is precisely what the mariner does, not just in storm but always. He reads his moment, the vibration of the wind in his lines, the colour of the sky, and what experience tells him. His decision then at that moment being always and forever correct, notwithstanding what comes over the horizon at him. — tim wood
["[Antony's argument] that we can bypass ['the distinction between the rational and emotional, or (Hume's) moral sense/innate moral judgment'] and still have a personal moral decision bound to reasonable action"] would be highly dependent on our culture, associations, and the books we read. Social animals have what some call a pre-morality. They are wired for group behavior.... we are not born with [cultural/thinking] language, nor are we born knowing the concepts essential to moral thinking and we aren't born knowing the high order thinking skills. Any "personal moral decision bound to reasonable action" is dependant on what we learn and because our circumstances are different, our sense of morality can be different.
This is where the higher-order thinking skills come in. That is the learned ability to reason through our choices and make decisions. ...Morality based on how we feel instead of how we think, leads to power struggles not a high standard of morality. — Athena
Unless you knew people of my grandmother's generation, I don't really care what you think. — Athena
I have no idea why some people appear to worship Nietzsche. — Athena
This is not quick judgment... — Athena
This may be tangential, but I'll defend. If I am away from my home beyond my willingness or desire to be away, possibly beyond or against my control, I may well feel anxiety. After all, home is where my roots are and where I am grounded - the places and things by which I know my place, and lacking, do not know.it might be a little cynical to say we are "always lost" — Antony Nickles
Only one task left: how is wanting being free? — tim wood
Your distinction between freedom and the freedom we possess is interesting, but when I open the present of your thought, the box is empty. It is a word game without substance because if we do not understand cause and effect and "the limits of our freedom[/u], things can go very wrong, so I don't think separating cause and effect thinking from our understanding of freedom is a good idea. Yes, I do say "the facts as they stand matter". :kiss: — Athena
But what is wrong with it? Simply the heightened risk of being killed or catastrophically injured in an otherwise minor accident of the sort motorcycles are subject to, at a cost the victim cannot himself bear. That is, he, usually a he, hurts everyone, and some greatly. — tim wood
8) In order to act morally, one must be free to act.
9) Duty is the obligation to act in accordance with morality.
10) Realization of purpose under morality is the highest aim of mankind.
11) It follows, then, that moral actions are the only actions of moral worth, that they fall under duty, and that to act in accordance with them requires freedom, and that to the extent that freedom is diminished, the individual is not free. — tim wood
But the purpose here is to draw attention to people who claim as a matter of right under freedom to do what they want; and to the harm they do, potentially to be sure, but too often as a matter of fact. — tim wood
agree that "higher-order thinking skills" embetters us and our society, not only with knowledge of the criteria of our morals, but also our understanding of our obligation to ourselves (and others) to the ethical consideration of a moral moment. I would only say that the idea of "dependent" and "different" does not affect the human condition between (any) morals and when they leave us turned upon ourselves without further guidance. Our "culture" and our "circumstances" and even our "morals" can be different, but the responsibility (among other things) that we have is universal, as you say, "to reason through our choices and make decisions", though I wouldn't call this a "learned ability" so much as a human obligation (categorically, as it were), say, our moral duty.
I would only else say that we are not born with moral/cultural/language, we are born into them. They are there before us and apart from us. We do not (always) "learn" these (as rules, laws), as much as we pick them up in going along and becoming a part of society (an unconscious social contract by osmosis as it were); they are wrapped up in what our society cares about and the way things count in the world (this is Wittgenstein's Grammar and Criteria)--they are not "knowledge" and we don't "agree" on them. But, yes, we can renounce them, be ignorant of them, contradict them, but also, become conscious of them, reform them, extend them (into new contexts), etc. We do not need nor have a "higher standard". It is not a dichotomy between feeling and knowledge--we/the world already have ordinary criteria for morals, etc. The criteria may be forgotten, or unexamined, but that does not mean we don't live by them (are left to our "feelings") or can't explain them if asked (by Socrates, Austin, etc.). — Antony Nickles
I agree that "higher-order thinking skills" embetters us and our society, not only with knowledge of the criteria of our morals, but also our understanding of our obligation to ourselves (and others) to the ethical consideration of a moral moment. I would only say that the idea of "dependent" and "different" does not affect the human condition between (any) morals and when they leave us turned upon ourselves without further guidance. Our "culture" and our "circumstances" and even our "morals" can be different, but the responsibility (among other things) that we have is universal, as you say, "to reason through our choices and make decisions", though I wouldn't call this a "learned ability" so much as a human obligation (categorically, as it were), say, our moral duty.
I would only else say that we are not born with moral/cultural/language, we are born into them. They are there before us and apart from us. We do not (always) "learn" these (as rules, laws), as much as we pick them up in going along and becoming a part of society (an unconscious social contract by osmosis as it were); they are wrapped up in what our society cares about and the way things count in the world (this is Wittgenstein's Grammar and Criteria)--they are not "knowledge" and we don't "agree" on them. But, yes, we can renounce them, be ignorant of them, contradict them, but also, become conscious of them, reform them, extend them (into new contexts), etc. We do not need nor have a "higher standard". It is not a dichotomy between feeling and knowledge--we/the world already have ordinary criteria for morals, etc. The criteria may be forgotten, or unexamined, but that does not mean we don't live by them (are left to our "feelings") or can't explain them if asked (by Socrates, Austin, etc.). — Antony Nickles
Well, I deeply apologize; I got an email that I thought was you replying to my post, but it was, instead, you replying to someone else's (a little new to this). I thought it was strange, but I made some poor assumptions, and I'm sorry that I offended you. If it helps, my mother lived through the war in England, and my grandmother the century before last. — Antony Nickles
Again, my sincere apologies. As a token of peace, I offer that you might (if you can forgive him for basically being a Nazi) find Heidegger's essay “The Question Concerning Technology” interesting. He has a very dark view of the influence of technology, roughly, "enframing" (narrowing) our view of humanity and nature as only a means (echoing Marx).
But the purpose here is to draw attention to people who claim as a matter of right under freedom to do what they want; and to the harm they do, potentially to be sure, but too often as a matter of fact.
— tim wood
The problem is, I think, that you’re using two meanings of freedom. Is, in your opinion, the freedom to do what you want related to Kant’s idea? It seems to me this second freedom is so meaningless that there’s no way to use it in the context of your OP. — Brett
suggested reading Heidegger's essay “The Question Concerning Technology”.Antony Nickles
Actually my story has no one killing anyone, simply reducing the ability to procreate. No suffering for anyone existing. Indeed even the knowledge of the reduction would not be a factor as the change would take place over a number of generations.
My story was not to disparage the teaching of Kant, but to point out that the perspective and values of the individual determine the interpretation and application of Kant's framework. — Book273
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