Are you saying that even our own speech acts are mapped to interpretation? So, that as I write these words I'm mapping my thoughts through the given speech acts? On the other hand, if I'm reading or listening to someone else's speech act/s it seems truistic that I interpret them, or as you say, the speech act is mapped to "interpretation." — Sam26

I hadn't given much thought to the mechanics of the mapping process; I imagine that it's done by agents utilising background knowledge of norms and commonalities - in Witty speak how a language game is embedded in a form of life, how epistemic notions require a background and so on.

What I meant to imply was that what speech acts express is dual to how they can be interpreted in context. The agent doing them expresses, the agents receiving them interpret. To a large degree, a speech act expresses that which it can be expected to be interpreted as. Just like a picture of a bird can be expected to be seen as a bird.

This seems rather obvious, unless I'm missing some finer point. — Sam26

To be clear on the significance I think it holds; if intentional content is expressed in a speech act, so are the type of mental/agential states that characterise that intentional content (with some transduction/transformation involved). Overstating it a bit to provide an upshot; the "meaning is use" conception of language has the connection between mental states and speech acts as part of use, and thus part of meaning. To mix metaphors, Wittgenstein's beetles are crawling all over words and eating them from the inside, not inside our heads.

To be clear on the significance I think it holds; if intentional content is expressed in a speech act, so are the type of mental/agential states that characterise that intentional content (with some transduction/transformation involved). Overstating it a bit to provide an upshot; the "meaning is use" conception of language has the connection between mental states and speech acts as part of use. To mix metaphors, Wittgenstein's beetles are crawling all over words and eating them from the inside, not inside our heads. — fdrake

I think I agree with the first part of this, but explain your last sentence a bit more.

I think I agree with the first part of this, but explain your last sentence a bit more. — Sam26

There's a lot of philosophy that says that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, because the connection between a mental state and a word can't be constructed in accordance with a public criterion. Instead, the behavioural states associated with the mental states are treated as the sole informers of language use. In W's private language argument context I think this is a reaction against "language of thought" theories from Frege, but the private language argument can be read (sensibly) as support for logical behaviourism. As SEP puts it:

Analytical or logical behaviorism is a theory within philosophy about the meaning or semantics of mental terms or concepts. It says that the very idea of a mental state or condition is the idea of a behavioral disposition or family of behavioral tendencies, evident in how a person behaves in one situation rather than another. When we attribute a belief, for example, to someone, we are not saying that he or she is in a particular internal state or condition. Instead, we are characterizing the person in terms of what he or she might do in particular situations or environmental interactions. Analytical behaviorism may be found in the work of Gilbert Ryle (1900–76) and the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–51) (if perhaps not without controversy in interpretation, in Wittgenstein’s case).

If it turned out that internal states were already expressed in words, that the connection between mental states and speech acts was itself part of the norms of language use, that would go against the logical behaviourist conclusions of the private language argument (when it's read that way). We already took the beetle out of the box, as it were.

There's a lot of philosophy that says that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, because the connection between a mental state and a word can't be constructed in accordance with a public criterion. Instead, the behavioural states associated with the mental states are treated as the use. In historical context I think this is a reaction against "language of thought" theories from Frege, but the private language section can be read (sensibly) as support for logical behaviourism. As SEP puts it: — fdrake

I find it bizarre that anyone would think that mental states play no part in what speech acts express, as if minds don't exist. However, there has to be agreement publicly in terms of the use of words, it can't be about my own private mental state. One's mental state, say one's interpretation for example, is fit within the use of language that's decided publicly. I can't take just any mental phenomena and fit it into an expression as though I decide how a word or expression is used. So, although we have these private mental states, the act of expressing such states is decided publicly, not privately. One's private mental state does not automatically come mapped to some linguistic expression. Language is a public phenomena that we use to express mental phenomena.

I think those who interpret Wittgenstein as a behaviorist based on meaning as use have it wrong.

However, there has to be agreement publicly in terms of the use of words, it can't be about my own private mental state. — Sam26

I think that applies definitionally; a use can't be set up/a word can't be defined with respect to only the presence/absence of a mental state. But it seems to me we can use speech acts to describe mental states and moreover that speech acts routinely express mental content. The philosophical thought experiment that makes the meaning of the word be the thought that motivated it is blocked, but I don't think that blocks language use in general from thematising mental states or expressing intentional content. Mapping the private with the public is part of the public.

EG, if I claimed that my partner makes me feel a special way and I called it "blimblam", and I described it as a composite of homeliness, horniness, care and calm. You'd know how to use the word. It's not my blimblam thoughts and sensations that are doing the work in the setting up the use of the word, it's leveraging the public criteria we share that characterise the use of those sensations and feeling words we both already know.

I think that applies definitionally; a use can't be set up/a word can't be defined with respect to only the presence/absence of a mental state. But it seems to me we can use speech acts to describe mental states. The philosophical thought experiment that makes the meaning of the word be the thought that motivated it is blocked, but I don't think that blocks language use in general from thematising mental states or expressing intentional content. Mapping the private with the public is part of the public. — fdrake

I find no disagreement here. You seem to be arguing against something that I also disagree with.

I find no disagreement here. You seem to be arguing against something that I also disagree with. — Sam26

:up:

Fair enough then. I wasn't sure if I was arguing against a position you actually held.

Fair enough then. I wasn't sure if I was arguing against a position you actually held. — fdrake

:ok:

I'd presumed a common ground of realism; that we agreed there were things in the world about which one could make true statements; — Banno

Seems fair enough.

... in a word, that there are facts; — Banno

What are facts, though? Presumably, not single objects. Larger space-time regions, of various (e.g. mouse-running-behind-tree) kinds?

Or platonic abstractions, like "states of affairs"? Do you allow such things on your watch? If so, why bother restricting "propositions" to statements?

To believe that the mouse ran behind the tree is exactly to believe that "the mouse ran behind the tree" is true; — Banno

Yes, but isn't it also roughly to be able to recognise the fact (the kind of event), and respond accordingly?

I'll not enter into this discussion until after the debate - if then.

Hey Sam!!!

Good to 'see' you. Hope this finds you well.

:smile:

There's a lot of philosophy that says that mental states play no part in what speech acts express... — fdrake

And it leads to ignoring that Smith was talking about himself.

Cool.

What are facts, though...

What are facts, though? — bongo fury

True statements made about things in the world, that evidently are capable - somehow - of existing in their entirety, of being believed to be true, and of being true, without ever once being uttered/made/heard.

Existing without existing?

You got me?

Read my final post in the debate. That's the best I could do given what Banno offered. Those were his words, not mine...

:ok:

Ah, I get you. Although "existing in their entirety" isn't a phrase I associate with Banno... :lol:

True.

It is a phrase that ought be associated with the position he argues for/from.

In order for the belief of a language-less creature to be an attitude towards a proposition/statement, then either i.)propositions/statements must - in some way, shape, or form - be able to exist in their entirety prior to language in such a way that a language-less creature could be even able to develop an attitude towards them, or ii.)language-less creatures have no belief.

Neither is true.

You got there in the end, well done! — Kenosha Kid

I was already there in my first reply to unenlightened. It just took you a while to realize it.

All Creative had to do was to provide an example of a belief that has no propositional content; that is, a belief that cannot be put into the form "Fred believes that P", for some Fred. That's all the claim that beliefs have propositional content amounts to; It says nothing about cats and small children, let alone claiming that they cannot have beliefs. — Banno

"That cannot be put into propositional form"...

What does that have to do with the content of what's being talked about?

It does not follow from the fact that our accounting practices are propositional in content that everything we take an account of is as well.

Yes. It's probably just different senses of the term. To believe can specify an attitude toward a proposition, or an explanation for the behavior of a volitional being, or something in the way she moves.

Chalmers has a whole thing about how to determine if a conflict just comes down to wording.

Because a belief can be put into linguistic form (a proposition or statement) it doesn't then follow that the content of belief is necessarily linguistic. We observe all kinds of beliefs apart from the use of language. It would be as if we observe someone building a home, handling hammers and nails, picking up lumber, wiring the home, plumbing the home, and digging the foundation, and thinking to ourselves that they have no beliefs about the things they're handling, or the things they're doing. The very acts they're performing show the beliefs they have. It doesn't matter if the belief isn't stated. Moreover, what if a carpenter said he didn't believe in hammers and nails, and yet we see him/her handling hammers and nails almost everyday? Would you say his/her statement overrides the acts that show the opposite. No, you would say that the person is lying or being funny because the actions of the person tell a completely different story, one that contradicts his/her statements. In fact, we often put more stock in one's actions as a picture of what people believe, quite apart from what they say.

Because a belief can be put into linguistic form (a proposition or statement) it doesn't then follow that the content of belief is necessarily linguistic. — Sam26

Once again, I note a failure here to understand what a proposition is. I think it's localized to this forum, unless somebody knows a source for this alternate meaning?

No, it has nothing to do with understanding a proposition, it has to do with understanding what the content of a belief is.

No, it has nothing to do with understanding a proposition, it has to do with understanding what the content of a belief is. — Sam26

Right. The carpenter's behavior shows that he knows how to use a hammer. Why do you want to interpret the scene in terms of belief? Wouldn't Witti advise that we focus on using language to be informative? Therefore, in what circumstances would we talk about the beliefs of the carpenter? What would we actually say about his beliefs?

I think following that line of thought will avoid language on holiday, right?

Yes, it also shows that he has knowledge of how to use a hammer, his actions demonstrate the skill (there is knowledge as a belief, and knowledge as a skill). What Wittgenstein would advise, I don't know. Consider what Witt said in OC 284, "...we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not."

Consider what Witt said in OC 284, "...we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not." — Sam26

Do you understand that this view is not in conflict with framing belief as an attitude toward a proposition?

Sure, but that's not an argument against the position that I and others are taking.