As far as I understand, your point is that our mental states are ultimately independent of the corresponding verbal expressions. This position fails to take account of the complex social and collective character of our beliefs. They are developed, shaped, and exercised within the networks of our interpersonal interactions. Can we reduce them to simple rituals and behavioural patterns, deprived of the signifying symbolic mechanisms? — Number2018

Correspondence is a mental activity. When you use words, you have a belief about how words are used. But what about when you need to use a screwdriver? Do you need words to use a screwdriver, or just the visual of someone using a screwdriver?

Social environments are just a type of natural environment. Sure, being raised by wolves as opposed to apes can have a drastic impact on how you interpret your environment, but we are actually talking about the various environmental niches that certain species fill in the environment. Different rules are required to accomplish different goals. Apes and wolves have different goals, but also similar goals. They both require food and mates, but different food and different mates. A wolf does not interpret an ape of the opposite sex as a thing to mate with. It interprets it as food, or a trespasser in its territory.

When you use words, you have a belief about how words are used. But what about when you need to use a screwdriver? Do you need words to use a screwdriver, or just the visual of someone using a screwdriver? — Harry Hindu

Any YouTube video about learning how to use a tool has a complement of verbal or finger-alphabet instructions. When one learns how to work with a screwdriver, she necessarily places herself into an already-given organized space where physical motions and bodily dispositions are combined with a set of cognitive operations, believes, and attitudes. There are no mere imitations, mimicking or the manifestation of instinctive tendencies. It is the enactment of the heterogeneous variety of social presuppositions. A learning process presupposes the existence of various institutionalized practices, ordered by the hierarchical system of oral or written instructions, guidelines, programs, etc.

I'm not finished with the article, but I'm just noting that the author is acknowledging that beliefs have propositional content (maybe some other kind is also being allowed and I haven't gotten to it yet).

"For example, if I am sitting in my garden and register some fluttering in the periphery of my vision, then my internal brain states will change to encode the perceptual hypothesis that the sensations were caused by a bird. This minimizes my surprise about the fluttering sensations. On the basis of this hypothesis I will select prior beliefs about the direction of my gaze that will minimize the uncertainty about my hypothesis. These prior beliefs will produce proprioceptive predictions about my oculomotor system and the visual consequences of looking at the bird. Action will fulfill these proprioceptive predictions and cause me to foveate the bird through classical reflex arcs. If my original hypothesis was correct, the visual evidence discovered by my orienting saccade will enable me to confirm the hypothesis with a high degree of conditional certainty. We will pursue this example later using simulations."

The bold section refers to a proposition.

The bold section refers to a proposition. — frank

Perhaps! It reads like a class of propositions with unspecified content to me. Which sensations? What's the character of the perceptual features formed? To me there seems to be a big gap between having sensations caused by a bird's actions, and, say, "I saw the wings of a starling fluttering by". The former class of phenomena underdetermines the latter, the latter is an aggregation and stabilisation of the multiple instances of the former (bird caused sensations leading to bird caused stable perceptual features of the bird as an explanatory hypothesis for those sensations).

Perhaps! It reads like a class of propositions with unspecified content to me. Which sensations? What's the character of the perceptual features formed? — fdrake

I think it's as specific as it needs to be. A person sensed rustling and made a half conscious hypothesis based on previous beliefs.

To me there seems to be a big gap between having sensations caused by a bird's actions, and, say, "I saw the wings of a starling fluttering by". — fdrake

My point was that the author expressed the garden-person's beliefs as a proposition. No quotation marks are needed for that. If octupi evolve toward something more intellectual, it may be that they'll express propositions in light patterns on their skins. We would still express the proposition in words because that's what we do.

The former class of phenomena underdetermines the latter, the latter is an aggregation and stabilisation of the multiple instances of the former (bird caused sensations leading to bird caused stable perceptual features of the bird as an explanatory hypothesis for those sensations). — fdrake

I didn't get the impression the author thinks people actually say things like "the rustling is caused by a bird."

I once did an amazing pirouette in the woods because I was running and caught a glimpse of the pattern of a venomous snake. I was only vaguely aware of this during my feat. I went back to see, and I wouldn't have been surprised if it would have just been a pattern in the leaves. It was a snake, but not the venomous one I was trying to avoid. So yes, I think it's apparent that prior beliefs can shape our actions in a time frame that doesn't allow articulation.

I think it's as specific as it needs to be. — frank

I think the author expressed that the sensations were caused by the bird. I don't think the author expressed which sensations were caused by the bird, or anything about the nature of the sensations. Other than that they were caused by the bird.

It's like the difference between "I saw a bird" and "I saw a bird with black wings".

My point was that the author expressed the garden-person's beliefs as a proposition. — frank

So I agree that they expressed that the sensations were caused by a bird as a proposition, I don't believe that implies that the sensations which were caused by the bird were expressed as a proposition.

I didn't get the impression the author thinks people actually say things like "the rustling is caused by a bird." — frank

I didn't either.

So yes, I think it's apparent that prior beliefs can shape our actions in a time frame that doesn't allow articulation. — frank

:up:

Maybe this comes down to a modality thing; if you see a proposition as an eternal abstract object, whatever sensations were caused by the bird are easy to construe as one. If you see a proposition as associated with a real (set of) statements or language items, that the time frame blocks (simultaneous) articulation in a statement is more troubling; as there's no statement to to bear the proposition at the time.

I think the author expressed that the sensations were caused by the bird. I don't think the author expressed which sensations were caused by the bird, or anything about the nature of the sensations. Other than that they were caused by the bird.

It's like the difference between "I saw a bird" and "I saw a bird with black wings". — fdrake

This was the passage:

For example, if I am sitting in my garden and register some fluttering in the periphery of my vision, then my internal brain states will change to encode the perceptual hypothesis that the sensations were caused by a bird. — frank

The author doesn't know what caused the fluttering. There's supposed to be some brain states associated with a perceptual hypothesis.

Maybe this comes down to a modality thing; if you see a proposition as an eternal abstract object, whatever sensations were caused by the bird are easy to construe as one — fdrake

The sensations are easy to construe as an eternal abstract object? That's weird.

If you see a proposition as associated with a real (set of) statements or language items, that the time frame blocks (simultaneous) articulation in a statement is more troubling; as there's no statement to to bear the proposition at the time. — fdrake

Why do you need a statement to express the proposition at the time?

Because, the only obvious reading of "(referring) subject" is to have it mean "word or phrase that refers". — bongo fury

Fair enough. I should have used the word "existing" instead of "referring" (or, even better, omitted the qualifier altogether).

subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with.
— Andrew M

So subjects are nouns? Looks like objects and subjects are synonyms, unless you're saying that objects can't be discussed, described, or dealt with. — Harry Hindu

Depending on the context, they can be interchangeable. Alice (the subject) is kicking the ball (the object). Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). In the first, it is Alice that is being described. In the second, it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form).

Depending on the context, they can be interchangeable. Alice (the subject) is kicking the ball (the object). Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). In the first, it is Alice that is being described. In the second, it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form). — Andrew M

It seems to me that both sentences are describing both things, because both sentences say the same thing, just from different views.

I think at this point creativesoul and Banno are saying the exact same thing with different words. They don't really seem to disagree. When Banno said "All beliefs have propositional content" Creativeoul (and I suspect most people) heard "All beliefs are statements in our minds" so Creativesoul tries to dismantle that. But it's more like "All beliefs can be put into a statement". Seems defnitional to me, not much you can disagree with there. Like "Bachelors are not married".

Why do you need a statement to express the proposition at the time? — frank

I guess I don't really know how to think about a proposition if it's not associated with a statement, or a class of statements, that sets out a state of affairs. How do you think about it?

The sensations are easy to construe as an eternal abstract object? That's weird. — frank

Sorry, ambiguous "it", I meant seeing the proposition as an eternal abstract object.

Fair enough. I should have used the word "existing" instead of "referring" — Andrew M

Cool. The opposite sense of subject to Strawson's sense, but fine if you are careful not to mix in that other usage without notice, or without noticing. Ah, but you see no such requirement.

(or even better, omitted the qualifier altogether). — Andrew M

Hence no need, apparently, to point out that Harry's usage is at least partly the opposite one:

subject:
1. A person or thing that is being discussed, described, or dealt with.
— Andrew M
So subjects are nouns? — Harry Hindu

You instead immediately resume the confused (Aristotelian?) insinuation of some benign parallelism between the two, which the philosopher has just clarified, if only we followed the clear logic.

Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). [...] it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form). — Andrew M

The philosopher has no robes.

Being able to ride a bike involves being able to to do whatever it is one has to do to ride and remain upright. I believe I can do whatever it takes ...

I believe whatever.

"All beliefs are statements in our minds" so Creativesoul tries to dismantle that. But it's more like "All beliefs can be put into a statement". — khaled

This is the difference between them. "I believe that the ground will not swallow me up when i step through the front door." is a belief that can be expressed as a proposition (as can be seen), but not a statement that anyone has in mind except when doing philosophy. I have it in mind that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the skirting board hole, but there are no statements in the cat's mind, but a nameless anticipation.

In order to express a belief as a statement, one needs to believe that the words exist and have meaning.
How does one arrive at the belief that "'mummy' means something", at that beginning age when one does not yet believe that 'means something' means anything? The first word is necessarily a complex of beliefs in communication that cannot yet be stated. Language developed as a set of beliefs and practices that did not start with the expression of those linguistic beliefs.

I guess I don't really know how to think about a proposition if it's not associated with a statement, or a class of statements, that sets out a state of affairs. How do you think about it? — fdrake

I think that when I reflect on my interaction with the world, I frame it as a conversation. As I probe my environment, it's like I'm asking questions. True propositions are the world's answers. False propositions could be mistakes I made in discerning the world's voice, or they could be wrong hypotheses, or attempts to deceive. Like Heidegger, I think this reflective state lives alongside a more fused state.

I asked Nagase this same question once. He said something like "I don't feel the need to address that.".

Merry Christmas!

I think that when I reflect on my interaction with the world, I frame it as a conversation — frank

I do that too. I noticed that I frame my interaction with the world as something like a conversation while reflecting, but that I retroject the narrative beats (as it were). Like they're conjured by the reflecting state as a summary. I think of the narrative beats as a retrojected framing device that inspires us to act as if the story we've just told ourselves is true. I've had plenty of experiences where I've had to revise the narrative - they're panicky, like missing a step on the stairs or hurting someone unexpectedly.

Like Heidegger, I think this reflective state lives alongside a more fused state. — frank

That makes sense. Heidegger (as Dreyfus reads him) has a related distinction. Stuff like propositions; in the form of subject-predicate expressions; are tacked on after most of what we do, and it's very inviting to mistake the moves we've made in conceptualising the world as properties of the world - even conceptualising it in a manner that it somehow always fits into declarative statements.

I do that too. I noticed that I frame my interaction with the world as something like a conversation while reflecting, but that I retroject the narrative beats (as it were). Like they're conjured by the reflecting state as a summary. I think of the narrative beats as a retrojected framing device that inspires us to act as if the story we've just told ourselves is true. I've had plenty of experiences where I've had to revise the narrative - they're panicky, like missing a step on the stairs or hurting someone unexpectedly. — fdrake

Exactly! We're drawn to conclude that propositions are abstract objects by the logic of communication. If I agree with you, it doesn't make sense to say that I'm agreeing with either the sounds you made or the sentence you uttered.

It's to the proposition you expressed that I agree or disagree. The marks of the proposition's origin in a constructed narrative appear in the fact that I have to reference your point of view in order to understand you.

It's here that propositions finally become unglued from their temporal, linguistic genesis. The point of view you had when you spoke is in stasis. I join you in a position outside the world, on an eternal xyz axis.

That makes sense. Heidegger (as Dreyfus reads him) has a related distinction. Stuff like propositions; in the form of subject-predicate expressions; are tacked on after most of what we do. — fdrake

Oh. Maybe it was Dreyfus then, and not Heidegger?

Exactly! We're drawn to conclude that propositions are abstract objects by the logic of communication. If I agree with you, it doesn't make sense to say that I'm agreeing with either the sounds you made or the sentence you uttered. — frank

The article I linked to you in the previous post explores the issue. Whether you are agreeing with what you've heard is quite different from hearing a proposition being expressed. The latter might be involved in the former in some cases, but it might not. Dreyfus construes the degree of involvement as the degree to which conceptualisation is required in understanding an act - even a speech act. Though (and the paper I linked argues) that the distinction isn't sharp and the two types of understanding it references should be understood reciprocally.

I agree we're drawn to conclude that propositions are both abstract objects and play a central coordinating role in the connection between practices that involve language and the world. The relevant aspect of it to me is whether being drawn to conclude in that way is an inappropriate framing brought on by ingrained habits of reflection; inappropriate because it misses the relevant phenomena (expression, the connection of intentional states to statements etc).

For Heidegger, the majority of what goes into expression, understanding, interpretation is termed "pre-predicative", that is a style of content distinct from the content of declarative sentences. That is signalled by eg. we can struggle to put things in words which are palpable, urgent and intimately understood. There is a certain compression involved, assertions are just one way of making sense. This is not to say that "there are things which cannot be said", but it is to say "understanding and crafting assertions requires a broader but distinct capacity of understanding the world than the understanding that we're putting into assertions". If someone restricts intentional state content to declarative sentences' propositional content (eg, making beliefs only target propositional content or propositions) it removes both the character of that content and the means of its interpretation.

Since you seem to like visual imagery, the kind of picture here is more similar to; assertions and the like attract meanings which they then engender, "putting things in words" - especially conceptually - is a kind of filter for content. The filter is sharp and distorts what is put in it, pliable square pegs in sharp round square-ish holes. Mistaking the properties of the filter for the properties of what's put in (expression) and what comes out (interpretation) - the dyad of expression and interpretation - is an easy error to make, as the practice of putting things into the filter -especially conceptually- is an ingrained habit. We reflect and see roundish lumps that've been put through the filter, if you realise the shape of the filter you might see that they were pliable square pegs all along.

Since you seem to like visual imagery, the kind of picture here is more similar to; assertions and the like attract meanings which they they then engender, "putting things in words" - especially conceptually - is a kind of filter for content. The filter is sharp and distorts what is put in it, pliable square pegs in sharp round square-ish holes. Mistaking the properties of the filter for the properties of what's put in (expression) and what comes out (interpretation) - the dyad of expression and interpretation - is an easy error to make, as the practice of putting things into the filter -especially conceptually- is an ingrained habit. We reflect and see roundish lumps that've been put through the filter, if you realise the shape of the filter you might see that they were pliable square pegs all along. — fdrake

I'm answering your post backward. This last paragraph, taken alone, seems to be launching existentialism of a kind I can definitely embrace because I'm somewhat aspy and its very familiar. I rely on memorized soundbites to get through life, but when I'm tired, I can become almost completely nonverbal. It makes for awesome relationships. I also frequently have dreams that don't have rational components. I reach for metaphors and the content of the dream slips through the words like sand through my fingers. I totally get why Nietzsche suggested that the idea of truth takes hold when we've forgotten that we're talking in metaphors all the time.

If someone restricts intentional state content to declarative sentences' propositional content (eg, making beliefs only target propositional content or propositions) it removes both the character of that content and the means of its interpretation. — fdrake

I agree. Art conveys truth that can't be squashed into propositions. Stephen King said that to stay faithful to childhood memories, our stories of those times have to be mixed with fiction (the english word "truth" is rooted in germanic wording that means fidelity.)

Whether you are agreeing with what you've heard is quite different from hearing a proposition being expressed. — fdrake

This sentence has tripped me up. I don't know what you mean.

I have it in mind that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the skirting board hole, but there are no statements in the cat's mind, but a nameless anticipation. — unenlightened

An artificial neural network can have the nameless anticipation (surge in action potentials). Oughtn't we reserve "belief" for the anticipations of a more restricted class of machines?

I suggest: those very much future machines skilled not merely in the chasing of mice, but in the chasing of the imaginary trajectories of the pointings of mouse-words and mouse-pictures. A skill which is ascribable literally to humans from infancy. Only anthropomorphically to cats and present-day robots.

That's too restrictive for people who are sure cats literally have beliefs, of course. They must exclude robots some other way. If at all.

The first word is necessarily a complex of beliefs [nameless anticipations] in communication [in the narrower sense of the chasing of trajectories in games of symbol-pointing] that cannot yet be stated. Language developed as a set of beliefs and practices that did not start with the expression of those linguistic [and non-linguistic] beliefs [anticipations]. — bongo fury

An artificial neural network can have the nameless anticipation (surge in action potentials). Oughtn't we reserve "belief" for the anticipations of a more restricted class of machines? — bongo fury

The thought police are a bit premature here. the legislation has not been passed, and the ten commandments do not specify. No we ought not.

If at all. — bongo fury

:smile:

Smart phones, though?

When Banno said "All beliefs have propositional content" Creativeoul (and I suspect most people) heard "All beliefs are statements in our minds" so Creativesoul tries to dismantle that. — khaled

This could not be much farther from truth.

Beliefs have no spatiotemporal location, because it would need to cover the entire area between internal and external content. I have not claimed that beliefs are in the mind.

That's been Banno's imaginary opponent.

It seems to me that both sentences are describing both things, because both sentences say the same thing, just from different views. — Harry Hindu

Yes that seems right, since one logically follows from the other. That is:

(1) Alice is kicking the ball
(2) Alice kicking the ball is equivalent to the ball being kicked by Alice
(3) Therefore the ball is being kicked by Alice

Fair enough. I should have used the word "existing" instead of "referring"
— Andrew M

Cool. The opposite sense of subject to Strawson's sense, but fine if you are careful not to mix in that other usage without notice, or without noticing. Ah, but you see no such requirement.

(or even better, omitted the qualifier altogether).
— Andrew M — bongo fury

I think I see how you're reading my sentences now. I used the qualifier to distinguish between an existing and non-existing subject (e.g., the present president of France versus the present King of France, say). But given the context, it wasn't necessary to qualify it, since the subsequent sentence dealt with the non-existing subject case.

Whereas you seem to see the qualifier as distinguishing between claims about the world and claims about words (e.g., snow versus "snow"). If the qualifier is removed, you see my sentence as ambiguous. Is that correct?

You instead immediately resume the confused (Aristotelian?) insinuation of some benign parallelism between the two, which the philosopher has just clarified, if only we followed the clear logic. — bongo fury

There is a parallelism between words and the world, as well as important differences between the two. Which we discussed a while back, as you may recall.

Or the ball (the subject) is being kicked by Alice (the object). [...] it is the ball that is being described (i.e., in subject-predicate form).
— Andrew M

The philosopher has no robes. — bongo fury

I don't see a problem with what I wrote. Feel free to be more specific.

Beliefs have no spatiotemporal location, because it would need to cover the entire area between internal and external content. I have not claimed that beliefs are in the mind. — creativesoul

?
I didn’t say you did. I said you try to dismantle that.

I guess I don't really know how to think about a proposition if it's not associated with a statement, or a class of statements, that sets out a state of affairs. How do you think about it? — fdrake

Start off with the basics. When you have a thought of red, is the thought a color or a word? But then words can be colored scribbles. So is red a color with no shape or a colored scribble?

Statements are sounds and colored scribbles. So to say that you don't know how to think of red apples without sounds and colored scribbles doesn't seem consistent, when you think of words as words, but not apples as apples?

Words are just different types of sensory impressions. You see apples on tables like you see words on screens. You don't need statements to distinguish between words and apples or to have the belief that words and apples are different things. The distinction is obvious in the mind. You only need statements to communicate beliefs, not to actually have beliefs.

I agree. Art conveys truth that can't be squashed into propositions. — frank

I agree with you there. I wanna push back on the idea (if you were suggesting it) that it's exclusive to art though. In terms of the expression of semantic content and engendering intentional content of interpretation, I believe artistic expression uses capacities everyday expressive practices do already. There's one of those where do you draw the line problems between art and non-artistic expressive practice.

I'm answering your post backward. This last paragraph, taken alone, seems to be launching existentialism of a kind I can definitely embrace because I'm somewhat aspy and its very familiar. I rely on memorized soundbites to get through life, but when I'm tired, I can become almost completely nonverbal. It makes for awesome relationships. I also frequently have dreams that don't have rational components. I reach for metaphors and the content of the dream slips through the words like sand through my fingers. I totally get why Nietzsche suggested that the idea of truth takes hold when we've forgotten that we're talking in metaphors all the time. — frank

Dancing's a good example of a nonverbal expressive practice with its own kind of grammar, being attuned to a partner's rhythms I'd guess is a less contextually constrained version of the same thing. With a partner, you don't just have to learn the moves for a specific dance, you have to learn what dance you're doing. That tapestry of cues, interpretations and what is articulated by people's actions is the subject of a more phenomenological and pragmatic take on language and expression. Expecting to be able to fit such things into declarative sentences and being mystified when everything of substance is left out from such an account is the trauma that first silenced Wittgenstein ("whereof we cannot speak...", "“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.” from Tractatus) then attuned him to the essential saturation of language use with all that silenced him:

102. The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background—hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium): for I understand the propositional sign, I use it to say something.

103. The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe.—Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off.

105. When we believe that we must find that order, must find the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called "propositions", "words", "signs". The proposition and the word that logic deals with are supposed to be something pure and clear-cut. And we rack our brains over the nature of the real sign.—It is perhaps the idea of the sign? or the idea at the present moment? — Philosophical Investigations

There's a real tension in any account that places speech acts; which are paradigmatic examples of expressers of intentional content ; at the locus of control of expression, but cashes out the kind of content they express in terms of more circumscribed analyses of declarative sentences and their truth conditions. Only the pliability that comes with all expressions allows their square pegs to be deformed into the round holes of declarative sentence content.

Luckily, once the glasses have been taken off (and not replaced with a monocle), all that allegedly mystical stuff in expressive practices can be used to thematise itself. That's an embarking point for a phenomenological and pragmatic investigation of expression.

This sentence has tripped me up. I don't know what you mean. — frank

I was gesturing towards something like: propositions are part of an interpretive device we use when analysing sentences and relating them to truth, to say that we hear them construes hearing as the kind of capacity that is characterised by the analysing the truth or falsity of sentences.

I don't see a problem with what I wrote. Feel free to be more specific. — Andrew M

Again?

You presume to lecture people on failure of reference. You cite Strawson, who uses "subject" explicitly and unambiguously in just one of its two notoriously opposite uses ("snow", not snow). But notions about Aristotle (or whatever) induce you to systematically equivocate between the two. So you are actually confused, here:

So, just to be clear, do you at last see why

(referring) subject
— Andrew M

would have to be a typo?
— bongo fury

I don't. Feel free to say why you think so. — Andrew M

And then you go straight from (half) acknowledging the error to encouraging the same confusion in Harry.

That is my specific problem with your pre-modern schtick.

There is a parallelism between words and the world, as well as important differences between the two. — Andrew M

Good luck with that schtick! But it is confused.