A proposition is a state of affairs. — frank

Propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions, including thought- and utterance-tokens, which presumably are not sharable, and concrete events or facts, which presumably cannot be false. These consequences fit well with contemporary usage. — SEP

SEP makes a distinction between propositions and concrete events, I'm using proposition in the sense of what the statements "snow is white" and schnee ist weiß" have in common in terms of truth/falsity; they express the proposition that snow is white. Roughly - sharable truth value bearing aspect of a statement. Snow being white can't be true or false in the way "snow is white" can be true or false, since it's not a statement.

Possibly due to memory processing. — frank

Don't you think it's because of human-style language? Allows us to think in the abstract, frame hypotheses, think about the past and the future, etc etc.

Propositions, per the most common AP meaning, are expressed by uttered sentences. They aren't "aspects of statements."

Per Russell, they're states of affairs which either obtain or don't.

Don't you think it's because of human-style language? Allows us to think in the abstract, frame hypotheses, think about the past and the future, etc etc. — Daemon

It may be that language and our ability to think abstractly go hand in hand?

It may be that language and our ability to think abstractly go hand in hand? — frank

There's evidence that crows can count. So for example, if two hunters are behind a blind, and one leaves, the crows are aware that one is still back there. They also apparently can keep track of individual humans and how they've behaved.

There's evidence that crows can count. So for example, if two hunters are behind a blind, and one leaves, the crows are aware that one is still back there. They also apparently can keep track of individual humans and how they've behaved — Marchesk

They also wash their mushrooms before they eat them.

An octopus knows it's seeing itself in a mirror. Even cats don't do that.

So what exactly is abstract thought?

So what exactly is abstract thought? — frank

Remembering we're inside the cave of sensory shadows?

Yep. Nice that we agree. Thanks for expounding our view.

Don't you think "beliefs only apply to statements" goes against my belief that snow is white? Which is an attitude I have towards snow. Not just towards the statement.

This is the more promising approach.

So the first is the phenomenal character of the experience. Now if that is the taste of the coffee, then it is clear that it is something we can talk about, at great length, so it is not ineffable, and it is shared.

And pretty uncontroversial.

If that i all that qualia are, I have no problem with them. However I would still avoid using the term because of its ambiguity.

Yeah but the problem is you cannot tell me about the phenomenal character of sonar, even if you go to great lengths researching the science on it. You cannot even tell me if there is any, although it seems reasonable to suspect animals have phenomenal experiences.

You cannot even tell me how it is that our own brains produce red or bitterness. The best you can do is try and talk of some public model we tell ourselves to come up with redness or bitterness, which sounds absurd.

Don't you think "beliefs only apply to statements" goes against my belief that snow is white? Which is an attitude I have towards snow. Not just towards the statement. — fdrake

Fdrake believes that "snow is white" is true.

"snow is white" is true IFF snow is white.

Hence,

Fdrake believes that snow is white.

It amounts to the same thing.

Side note: I use statement rather than proposition because I adopt the common usage of statement for utterances with a particular grammar, and proposition for a subclass of statements that are either true or false. Hence "the present king of France is bald" is a statement but not a proposition. Beliefs apply to statements, because Fred might believe that the present king of France is bald.

I don't think snow is white. I think the Cyrenaics are right at least about this. We are whitened upon seeing the light reflect off the snow.

I don't know where that falls in Banno's Ramsey sentences. I guess my skepticism is rooted in a philosophical argument against color realism, even though most people would say the snow is factually white (upon seeing the pure snow), and not just that they believe it.

Yeah but the problem is you cannot tell me about the phenomenal character of sonar, even if you go to great lengths researching the science on it. You cannot even tell me if there is any, although it seems reasonable to suspect animals have phenomenal experiences. — Marchesk

OK, we can work with that.

First, does a submarine experience the phenomenal character of sonar? I guess we might agree that it doesn't.

And does a bat experience the same phenomenal character of sonar as a dolphin? If there is such a thing as the phenomenal character of sonar, then the answer should be "yes". IF the experience differs between bats and dolphins, between bats and bats, between dolphins and dolphins, then on what basis do we call it a somehow unified "phenomenal character of sonar"?

Delve a bit deeper and consider what it would take to answer this question. I submit that there can be no answer, because there can be no grounds for making such a comparison. And if no answer can be formulated, has a question been asked? I suspect this is question without a sense.

And finally, and I think most tellingly, we can talk about the experience of sonar. We can talk about the distance at which a dolphin can recognise a mackerel, or at which a bat can track a moth. This would be a conversation that parallels our discussion of the characteristics of coffee.

Adding the word "phenomenal" moves us onto the third of the definitions of qualia, and out into the fringes of functional language use. Here the term starts to lose any coherence.

Fdrake believes that "snow is white" is true.

"snow is white" is true IFF snow is white.

Hence,

Fdrake believes that snow is white.

It amounts to the same thing. — Banno

I have two different approaches to get you to see the problem, then.

First:

What you wrote actually an invalid argument form:
(1) x believes that p
(2) p iff q
(3: Conclusion) x believes that q

Countermodel:

A student is taking a course on abstract algebra. They've covered groups, they've yet to cover semigroups. They don't know at all what they are, yet.

(1) The student believes that x is a group.
(2) x is a group iff x is a semigroup with an identity and inverses.
(3) The student does not believe that x is a semigroup with identity and inverses.

They don't believe that x is a group because they do not yet believe that x is a group iff x is a semigroup with an identity and inverses. Belief doesn't distribute over implication. You're going to have to spell out what lets you move from one to the other and why, what about the function of the t-sentence restores the validity of the argument?

Would you also hold that your own belief is not a thing in your own mind, but only a pattern of behaviour? — Daemon

It has to be both.

Personally I try to stay away from it. (ontology I mean, not matter, as staying away from matter would be difficult) — Olivier5

How do you know that staying away from matter is difficult if you don't know what matter is? :confused:

The deductive invalidity of the argument seems irrelevant in this case, because there is a logical entailment from "snow is white" being true to snow being white. Thus it would be a logical contradiction to believe that "snow is white" is true while believing that snow is not white, or not believing that snow is white.

Couldn't you have found a more obscure example? I think you need to put more effort in.

Sure, substitution salva veritate. Fdrke might not believe "Schnee ist weiß" despite believing "snow is white". Nevertheless, Fdrake's belief is a propositional attitude: Fdrake believes that snow is white.

None of your counterexamples have weight.

How do you know that staying away from matter is difficult if you don't know what matter is? :confused: — Janus

Because I’m evidently made of matter. If you know what matter is, kindly share.

Because I’m evidently made of matter. If you know what matter is, kindly share. — Olivier5

How do you know you're made of matter if you don't know what matter is?

So what exactly is abstract thought? — frank


Remembering we're inside the cave of sensory shadows? — Marchesk

Do crows do that?

Sure, substitution salva veritate. Fdrke might not believe "Schnee ist weiß" despite believing "snow is white". Nevertheless, Fdrake's belief is a propositional attitude: Fdrake believes that snow is white. — Banno

The student believes x is a group.
The student believes x is a semigroup with identity and inverses.

The first is true, the second is false. By substituting in the second for the first, you're changing the truth value of the belief statement, you're just not changing the truth value of the statement which is believed. It is not substitution which preserves truth value for the belief statements, then.

Thus it would be a logical contradiction to believe that "snow is white" is true while believing that snow is not white, or not believing that snow is white. — Janus

I can believe that snow appears white, but not that it is actually white. So it can be true on the ordinary language use as long as it means ?appears to humans that way" and not is the actual state of affairs, even though most people naively think it is.

How do you know you're made of matter if you don't know what matter is? — Janus

That’s what they taught me in school.

Do crows do that? — frank

Ravens do that in some of Poe's poems, I think.

How do you know your made of matter if you don't know what matter is? — Janus

Or if you think matter is ordinary stuff all the way down as opposed to fields and particles. Meaning yo have the wrong model of matter.

What I find interesting in this view — which must have many precedents — is that the Platonic world of ideas is not ‘out there’ and objective; rather it is grounded in human subjectivity, and built by our intersubjective dialogue and intellectual efforts generation after generation. — Olivier5

Consider that not everything in the intersubjective world was created by humans; a good deal of it is discovered - principles such as non-contradiction, natural numbers, all of the other 'furniture of reason'. In classical philosophy, this is the sense by which h. sapiens is able to transcend the contingent - by discovery of eternal principles and laws discerned by reason (nous). (Of course that is all now regarded as archaic, but still worth a mention.)

Yep. And each belief statement has a statement within the scope of the belief.

I can believe that snow appears white, but not that it is actually white. — Marchesk

Sure something might be able to appear white under extraordinary conditions while not appearing white under ordinary conditions. We would then not say that it is white.

But in any case that is irrelevant to the point. The point is that you cannot believe that 'x is P' is true, without believing that x is P without contradicting yourself.