Cats demonstrate purposeful behavior. You're calling this belief.

Whether we want to conflate purposefulness with belief is a decision made at the level of language game, not philosophy. Right?

Cats demonstrate purposeful behavior. You're calling this belief. — frank

Behaviour is not belief, on my view. Belief is correlations drawn between things.

Whether we want to conflate purposefulness with belief is a decision made at the level of language game, not philosophy. Right? — frank

I do not really see much of a difference between the two levels, aside from philosophy being metacognitive and not all language games being so.

Another's belief and our report of it.

"Belief that 'X'" is our report, where X is a statement/proposition. Pointing out that our reports are in propositional/statement form is irrelevant to the content of the creature's belief being reported upon, especially when reporting upon a language less creature's belief.

anything you say from a phenomenological perspective about your experience of colour is only selective and filtered data from your memory of having that experience ... — Isaac

That is incorrect. I can say all sorts of things about my experience which are at a variance or additional to my memory of said experience. It’s called ‘lying’, and people do it often.

...your memory of having that experience which is no more accurate than interpreted data from third parties. — Isaac

This is a tall claim. How would you go about trying to prove it?

the reporting in a discussion of such 'experiences' would still themselves be memories, and so flawed. — Isaac

The assumption here is that memories are ‘flawed’, ie that forgetting is necessarily a problem. But forgetting may be a solution to a problem.

This seems to be the perennial trick of the idealists and woo-merchants. To point out that empirical data has flaws (subjectivity, the necessity of an observer etc) and then for some reason assume this counts as an argument in favour of alternative methods of discussion. Pointing out that one approach is flawed does not count as support for another unless you can show that it is not similarly flawed, and in this case you can't. — Isaac

Once again, all this talk about ‘flaws’ is yours, not mine. To me, the subjectivity of empirical data is not a flaw, it is sui generis. It follows from the definition of ‘empirical’. Empirical is a strength, not a flaw. It means that any subject can check by him or herself whether some things happen. It means that we, subjects, are like St Thomas: we want proof. We subjects can do our own observations, and base our thinking on them, thank you very much. This is not the problem.

The real problem is bias. Bias is a necessary part of any observation, because any observation is made from a certain view point, typically answers some preformed questions, and is interpreted within a certain belief framework that filters out some of the evidence we collect. It follows that confirmation bias happens quite a lot. Instead of basing our thinking on our observations, we very often chose our observations (those we accept as conclusive) based on our thinking. And this means going around in circle.

Another problem is that individual bias stands in the way of productive communication and comparison of observations between subjects.

A key point to understand here is that the road going from subjective empirical observations to generalisable, objective knowledge and back (the road of science) is built by different observers collaborating with one another, checking, replicating the experiment, verifying the math, etc. Therefore, the road from subjective empirical observation to objective knowledge goes through intersubjectivity: several subjects sharing their observations and coming to an agreement about them. Individual bias makes this work both necessary and difficult. Other tools to control individual bias are therefore necessary, such as triangulation or bias analysis in sociology.

You should not mistake me for an idealist. I just want science to work better at the ‘hard problem’ and get better chances at solving it, by recognizing its blind spots and trying to control its biases. One of which is a misplaced fear of subjectivity.

Belief is correlations drawn between things. — creativesoul

This statement would be a reflection on your own folk psychology (specifically mind-reading.)

You attribute beliefs and other mental states as a way of predicting behavior. There's a theory that your brain is actually hard-wired to engage in this kind of predictive activity.

So we have a cat, whose brain is hard-wired to produce hunting behavior, and you, whose brain is hard-wired to project beliefs on the cat to explain it's behavior and thereby make predictions.

Philosophy is best a zone of exploration. It's not as helpful when a philosopher takes the role of declaring. Science threatens to pull the rug.

Yeah, but the thing about hard-wiring is that you can't hardwire everything about a changing environment. We can't even do this with computers. That's why humans, animals and neural networks need to learn things. So a cat is hardwired to hunt, but it has to learn about hunting. And we're hardwired to think of other minds. But we still have to learn about other humans.

That leaves plenty of room for some version of folk-psychology.

Yeah, but the thing about hard-wiring is that you can't hardwire everything about a changing environment. We can't even do this with computers. That's why humans, animals and neural networks need to learn things. So a cat is hardwired to hunt, but it has to learn about hunting. And we're hardwired to think of other minds. But we still have to learn about other humans. — Marchesk

I know. As I wrote that to creative I had this image of me about to lose my grip and fall down into a hermeneutic abyss. And then this huge guy came over and threatened to step on my fingers which were barely hanging on to the edge.

I think it was that guy from the James Bond movie.

Belief is correlations drawn between things.
— creativesoul

This statement would be a reflection on your own folk psychology (specifically mind-reading.) — frank

Could be I suppose. I doubt it though.

All statements are predication
All predication is correlations drawn between different things
Not all correlations drawn between different things is predication

The question is whether or not all correlations drawn between different things is adequate for belief. They are all meaningful to the creature drawing them.

Belief is not a mental state, on my view. I reject the notion. Correlations are drawn between internal and external things. The correlations drawn consist of both, and thus they themselves are neither.

Then how should we think about these correlations? Reductively? Ideally? Emergently?

Or would you say we don't need to pursue that question?

I see we've devolved into irrelevancies. I'll leave you to it since my part in the conversation is having no effect whatsoever on your jeremiad you may as well carry on without interruption.

I see we've devolved into irrelevancies .... your jeremiad ... — Isaac

LOL. Did I hit a nerve?

Belief is correlations drawn between things. — creativesoul

What is there that cannot be characterised as "correlations drawn between things"? And if so many functions have this characteristic, what's the point?

Belief is an attitude towards some possible state of affairs such that one takes that state of affairs to be the case.

That is, it is holding that some statement is true.

All this banter about languageless (it's one word) animals is a furphy. Indeed, what you are doing is pretty much the same as those here who take qualia to be real things - you are taking a piece of language and supposing that because we talk as if it refers to something, there must be something to which it refers. You are reifying belief.

You there? I'd really like to know where this was going. When you have a minute.

Cats demonstrate purposeful behavior. You're calling this belief. — frank

That's pretty much it. We use talk of beliefs in order to explain human behaviour. We can extend this to cats, but the belief is not a thing in the mind of the cat; it's just a pattern of behaviour. That is, the belief is not in the cat, but in the explanation.

Conversations with @Olivier5 are like that. Nothing happens.

Conversations with Olivier5 are like that. Nothing happens. — Banno

I have excellent, fruitful conversations with non-zombies though. It’s only with the zombies that it’s over so fast. They run away from me I guess...

To return to the original issue, an experience is a relation between yourself and the things in your environment (say, the coffee). Experience is a term that applies to humans but not to robots. Not because humans have Cartesian minds (where they have internal experiences), but because humans have different capabilities to robots. A human's practical contact with the world instantiates differently to a robot's. — Andrew M

A robot has a relationship with its environment as well. Humans are part of the environment. To assert that humans are somehow special in this regard, is unwarranted.

The practical contact with the world for both humans and robots is via the physical senses.

Experience is information.

Qualia aversion is a serious condition that often goes undiagnosed. Symptoms include the need for public reassurance and an inability to introspect.

That's pretty much it. We use talk of beliefs in order to explain human behaviour. We can extend this to cats, but the belief is not a thing in the mind of the cat; it's just a pattern of behaviour. That is, the belief is not in the cat, but in the explanation. — Banno

Can an infant have a belief? Can a cat think?

Long story short, I think kicking happens out there in the world, not in people's minds (it's a kind of relation, which is part of the physicist's toolkit). However it doesn't follow that it has an independent existence apart from individuals. Which is why it is abstract, not concrete. — Andrew M

That makes sense. But I think the same thing applies to individuals. An individual is a being (be-ing) in the sense of the term as verb, yet being, like kicking, does not have an independent existence apart from individuals.

So for me an act of kicking is as concrete as the individual doing the kicking and the object being kicked. And kicking in the general sense, is no more abstract than being or existence in the general sense.

What do you think? Posit an example, and we can have a look.

Then how should we think about these correlations? — frank

Evolutionarily seems best to me? I'm attempting to put forth an elemental description of a complex entity in such a way that most reasonable people would at least agree that the description has done it's job and provided a basic outline from which all levels of conscious experience from the simplest through the most complex can be derived and/or sensibly said to have evolved within the confines of.

In order for conscious experience to have been able to have gradually emerged over an evolutionary timeline, it must have been able to have begun at some simple, basic, and/or rudimentary level of complexity, and continue to grow and evolve in it's complexity over sufficient time and repetition into something like exactly what we're doing here and now.

So the question is what could all conscious experience consist of such that it is capable of naturally emerging and evolving over time? I'm not looking to answer all the questions of the origin of humanity or the universe. I'm not looking to solve all the problems of philosophy. I'm focusing specifically upon human thought and belief(world-views) and I'm using the general influence of methodological naturalism accompanied by a strive for adequate simplicity in accounting practices.

Verifiability is always a plus too. Falsifiability... well... we cannot falsify a true statement, so there's that.

What is there that cannot be characterised as "correlations drawn between things"? — Banno

Irrelevant.

We're discussing what I'm arguing/advocating for here:What does it matter if someone can attempt to use that same description as a means to characterize everything as such? I certainly don't. It's the quality of the characterization/criterion/accounting practice/linguistic framework/report/model/conceptual scheme that matters here, not whether or not it is possible to use the same terms differently than I.


To directly answer the question...

On my view, all sorts of things are not characterized as "correlations drawn between different things". Everything that existed in it's entirety prior to becoming part of a meaningful correlation drawn between it and other things by a creature capable of doing so. Simply put:The content of the correlation(the things); the creature drawing the correlations.

The coffee, the tasting, and the resulting bitterness. The creature drawing the correlations between the three is having meaningful conscious experience of tasting bitter coffee.

The fire. The touching. The resulting pain. The creature drawing correlations between the three is having meaningful conscious experience of being burnt by fire.

Exceptions abound with correlations drawn between language use and other things, but that's not an issue given the recursive nature of language. It's to be expected - required even - of a minimalist criterion that is amenable to the evolution of language and meaning. Sometimes we draw correlations between language use and other things. Language use consists of correlations drawn between it and other things. That's not a flaw of the outline. It's a feature to be expected of a model capable of taking proper account of the evolutionary progression of conscious experience, particularly when it comes to the bridge between language-less meaningful conscious experience to conscious experience that is informed thereafter thereby.

Can an infant have a belief? Can a cat think? — Daemon

Sure. To the precise extent that they are capable of drawing correlations between different things. At that level of cognitive ability it's always correlations drawn between directly perceptible external and internal things.

Banno's position, while very very popular, cannot admit either. His recent participation supports that charge... quite clearly so.

It's like defining a cat as an animal with claws.

No it's not.

Qualia aversion is a serious condition that often goes undiagnosed. Symptoms include need for public reassurance and an inability to introspect. — Marchesk

A sure sign that there's no substance to the counter-argument is when a participant focuses upon the author rather than the argument being given.

I was not even talking of qualia. I was just explaining to Isaac that his cherished objectivity stems from subjectivity, rather than being the opposite of subjectivity. Then he goes all emotional and crashes out of the conversation... Go figure.

In order for conscious experience to have been able to have gradually emerged over an evolutionary timeline, it must have been able to have begun at some simple, basic, and/or rudimentary level of complexity, and continue to grow and evolve in it's complexity over sufficient time and repetition into something like exactly what we're doing here and now. — creativesoul

So, would you describe your overall approach as scientific realism?

I was just explaining to Isaac that his cherished objectivity stems from subjectivity, rather than being the opposite of subjectivity — Olivier5

You’re crossing a line there. But then, I think you’re a ‘continental philosopher’.

You’re crossing a line there. But then, I think you’re a ‘continental philosopher’. — Wayfarer

Yes, this idea that human subjectivity is the cradle or bedrock of scientific objectivity — this idea may be to philosophical zombies what garlic is to vampires. And as is well known, us continental philosophers eat a lot of garlic...

I was not even talking of qualia. I was just explaining to Isaac that his cherished objectivity stems from subjectivity, rather than being the opposite of subjectivity. — Olivier5

I don't recall making a claim about objectivity. Could you quote me that post?