(I had posted this in the other thread but now you’ve posted this new one I’ll reply here.)

It seems to me to be empirical, but also a phenomenological account. But empiricism and phenomenology are distinct, so I am not sure how to characterise it. Like you said, it is reductionist....but empirically reductive...? — jancanc

As secular culture is presumptively physicalist, I can’t see any basis, in that context, for ethical codes beyond the utilitarian and/or pragmatist.

The very fact that humans have a sense of ‘what ought to be the case’ can be seen as the basis for a metaphysical argument, in that it posits a sense of a greater good. It is reminiscent of what Christians designate ‘conscience’ which is the faculty that senses moral choices. Conversely, as a lot of what modern culture is derived from evolutionary biology, then ethics (and most else besides) is deemed to have been selected for some purportedly evolutionary advantage (although to me that also seems to converge on utilitarianism).

Have a read of Anything but Human by Richard Polt (a Heidegger scholar).

Consider the fact that human action ranges to the extremes. People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts. Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense. — Richard Polt

Of course there are secular ethical theorists - John Rawls comes to mind - who base their considerations on ‘the just society’. Although again it seeks to ground ethical decisions in interpersonal domain rather than, as Schopenhauer and arguably Kant did, in metaphysics.

(Coincidentally, perhaps, I have just bought a close relative a book for Christmas, called Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, by Iris Murdoch, although I haven’t read much of it myself.)

Altruistic behavior has always interested me. I've always thought that we are a self-interested species that happen to be part of a larger group system.

When taken in a group context, we can see the basis of altruism more easily.

It begins with the family unit. Seemingly altruistic behaviors of our parents. The pain and self-sacrifice they endure for the benefit of their kids. We also learn, in this context, the benefit of obedience, cooperation and the great reward of selflessness.

We carry this understanding when we grow up and join other groups and soon find that the same applies. Obedience, cooperation and selflessness are typically rewarded.

We can see similar things happening with our animal cousins and studies have shown that infants prefer cooperative or selfless behavior over selfish ones.

So, is it still altruism if we directly benefit or if the behavior was developed from habit?

Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, — Wayfarer

I have read quite a bit of this, an interesting read for sure.
You make very good points (and I am tracking down the Polt text).

The very fact that humans have a sense of ‘what ought to be the case’ can be seen as the basis for a metaphysical argument, in that it posits a sense of a greater good — Wayfarer

That is a very pertinent point. Now, "a sense of the greater good", I agree is the basis of the metaphysical argument. Any empirical account of this, in my opinion, falls short of true compassion. Utilitarian and/or Pragmatist approaches, that you interpreted the account to be, can only ever be 'enlightened egoism'..... we act on the basis of another's interests only insofar as we relate, or have reference to those interests, if that makes sense. "I" feel another's pain through my own being....so it is my pain...

but so long as we experience our own emotions in the confines of our own being, i think the concept of "altruism" is illusory. I think Nietzsche outline this, but if i see someone suffering that generates my own suffering inside me which i then want to get rid of by helping 'the other'....but it's fundamentally the suffering in me which i want to dispense with.

However, strictly speaking, it can't be both an empirical and phenomenological account? — jancanc

Can you elaborate on the contrast that you are drawing between an empirical and a phenomenological account? (I am not even going to ask about "metaphysical," because that is such a mushy category.)

If not to alleviate your own suffering, it's possible that you're expressing something formed by habit or training. Or you probably may not share the experience but you anticipate some reward in behaving selflessly. Or maybe the act fulfills a need - as in a wanting parent finds a helpless child.

In any case, selfish or selfless, these are still positive behaviors and something groups must try to promote with their members for sustained success.