Nope, he doesn’t think that. — Mww

OK, he thinks "the ground of it, the beginnings, the source, the construction of it" are between his ears.

But has he an argument for this? Or is it just obvious?

Ahhh....so if we can’t talk about some things we can’t talk about anything?

Besides, there can be talk about.....has been for millennia.....the subjective, the private, the ineffable, just not at the same time as its use by the one talking. Hell....every time the first person personal pronoun is used in an objective expression, a subjective condition is rendered by the expression.
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But has he an argument for this? Or is it just obvious? — Banno

Yep, and, should be, assuming you think about stuff the same way I do. If you don’t think, or if you think in a different way, I got nothing.

.so if we can’t talk about some things we can’t talk about anything? — Mww

Again, I can see how you dug that hole for yourself. If everything begins with what is between your ears, and what is between your ears is ineffable, then it might seem that the ineffability carries on to everything...

But the problem there is your own, not mine. I don't agree that everything begins with what is between your ears. And you have yet to provide a suitable argument.

Sure, there has been talk about the ineffable; extended philosophical discussion on a par with the noise the fly makes inside the fly trap.

Drop the notion that the stuff between your ears has primacy. The stuff you might describe as "out there" is just as valid. Minds do not come into existence by themselves, but by interacting with the world.

This I tell you brother, you can't have one without the other.

The poverty of Kant is the supposition that there is stuff we have to have before we can do the things.

We make the stuff by doing the things.

Drop meaning, look to use.

One can hold an apple in one's hands prior to language use, just as one can have a pain in one's hand prior to language use. Language use is not part of the content of a language less creature's belief(conscious experience). It is most certainly a part of our accounting practices thereof.

So, it becomes clear that there is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between our reports of an experience(Jack's notwithstanding) and the experience being reported upon, particularly when we're discussing how to best take an account of language less creatures' belief. That distinction between another's belief and our account must be drawn in terms of content, particularly regarding the content of language less pre-theoretical conscious experience, linguistically informed pre-theoretical conscious experience, and linguistically informed theoretical conscious experience.

There are always apples and pains in all such experiences. There is not always the ability for the creature having the experience to report upon it's experience, nor need there be.

The interesting, relevant to the topic, portion is what sorts of beliefs(conscious experiences) are existentially dependent upon language use, and are thus neither private nor ineffable. There are also a broad category of 'properties' and experiences that are quite simply not immediately apprehensible without prior language use. The coffee tasting comparisons between then and now come immediately to mind. Such experiences are not private for they are existentially dependent upon language use, and language use is not. Remove language use, and you remove the capability to compare past and present. Remove the capability to compare past and present and there is no such experience as a change in one's preference, even if it actually happened. A change in one's own personal preferences would not even be possible to experience as such, for that change would not even be apprehended without the comparison/contrast that only language can facilitate.

Minds do not come into existence... — Banno

At least, not literally.

This discussion is not only going on in the space between your ears
— Banno

Of course it isn’t, only. But the ground of it, the beginnings, the source, the construction of it, are, and are only. — Mww

If everything begins with what is between your ears, — Banno

Oh my. The goalposts went from the end zone clear out to the farging parking lot!!
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I don't agree that everything begins with what is between your ears. — Banno

As well you shouldn’t; not everything does. No empirical stuff, as such, has its origin between the ears. If it did, there could be no such thing as an itch, or a ‘57 DeSoto. Knowing what an itch or a car with ridiculously over-sized fins is.....begins and ends only between the ears.
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Drop the notion that the stuff between your ears has primacy. — Banno

It absolutely must.....for certain stuff.

The stuff you might describe as "out there" is just as valid. — Banno

Not only valid, but necessary.

you can't have one without the other. — Banno

No, you cannot. Hence.....wait for it......the subjective and the objective. By whichever name you wish to call it.

Oh my. The goalposts went from the end zone clear out to the farging parking lot!! — Mww

Ha! Might steal that line.

But just to be sure, the first mention of it all being between the ears, so far as I am aware, was here:

Sure, but that still asks, do you not compare the words you hear, to the words you yourself use, and is that not an analysis? And doesn’t that analysis transpire between your ears? And is not the space between your ears your own personal private space? If that is the case, and every single rational agency does the same thing, it is clear none of them are analyzing each other, but each of them are analyzing themselves. In this sense, you are correct, insofar as it is not my analysis of your private, ineffable attributes, but is really my analysis of their affect on my private, ineffable attributes. — Mww

So the goals were already in the carpark, where you put 'em.

The cat can't form an attitude towards a proposition, because it cannot form a proposition. That is, it can't believe it is hungry, but it can be hungry.

Talk of cats having beliefs is at best metaphorical.

Too obscure to be funny...?

But the philosophical challenge is to then get literal again. Lest your poetry be seized on. — bongo fury

You [too] want to settle: for different levels of description, not literally commensurable. Then, unfortunately, I have to dispute your continual claims to have risen above dualism. — bongo fury

Drop the notion that the stuff between your ears has primacy. The stuff you might describe as "out there" is just as valid. Minds do not come into existence by themselves, but by interacting with the world. — Banno

@Isaac might disagree, which would be interesting. Presumably, for example, there are neural structures in place in a new born that permit the development of vision. But that is not Kant's a priori concepts.

So, take your own advice and set it out literally.

Oh no you don’t. Check it out:.

“The words you hear....” are every bit the same empirical perception as the itch, or the huge car. The sound of words, the touch of an itch, the sight of a car, are all empirical conditions of perception. The understanding and possible knowledge about all those things.....all things so perceived.....is the analysis of them, done between the ears. The difference is, with the discussion, the object is put out in the form of sentences by me; with the empirical perceptions, the objects of the discussion, the words in the sentences, are brought in by you. (Me too, but I don’t care....I wrote ‘em)

Do you see that in order to understand each other, what goes on between our respective ears must be at least congruent, if not fully matching? If they matched exactly, one of us would have what’s call an epiphany.

What?

As in, those first two paragraphs make no sense to me. Especially that second one - is that a quote? Where from?

Ok then,

science IS NOTHING BUT representation of reality by minds.
— Olivier5

Or is it the creation of texts and pictures by organisms able to play a social game of agreeing to pretend that these symbols point at the world, according to principles of pointing that differ in interesting ways from those of art, music and literature? — bongo fury

See? No minds.

Do you see that in order to understand each other, what goes on between our respective ears must be at least congruent, if not fully matching? — Mww

No. What goes on between the ears is irrelevant. That's rather the point pushed by PI, that it's what happens that counts, not what goes on in heads. "Can I have two apples, please" is understood if I get the two apples. What happens in the head of the grocer is irrelevant.

The cat can't form an attitude towards a proposition, because it cannot form a proposition. That is, it can't believe it is hungry, but it can be hungry.

Talk of cats having beliefs is at best metaphorical. — Banno

That's one way to skirt around the issue, but leaves you with being forced to admit that cats do not have belief. Otherwise it's still an equivocation fallacy, incoherence, and/or self-contradiction regarding the use of "belief". I say that that is ground for rejecting the "attitude towards a proposition" definition. It's wrong, plain and simple. The notion that all belief has propositional content is based upon conflating reports of belief with belief.

Red cups, apples, and pains in hands are not propositional content. They are most certainly always part of the correlational content of belief about them.

I would completely agree that a cat cannot believe it is hungry, but it can be hungry.

That post looks like a fumble. At best you might argue that beliefs are attitudes towards states of affairs. But then I would just show how to reduce states of affairs to true propositions.

It's Olivier's "nothing but" that is decrepit.

For you, maybe.

Then, unfortunately, I have to dispute your continual claims to have risen above dualism. — bongo fury

In your case perhaps qualism more than dualism.

Too poetic.

Obfuscation is disappointing.

Do cats have beliefs?

According to the position you're working from, in order to avoid self-contradiction, incoherence, and/or equivocating the term, you must admit that they do not.

It's not my accounting of belief that has been found wanting.

Obfuscation is disappointing. — creativesoul

Then stop obfuscating.

A belief is an attitude towards a proposition. A cat cannot have an attitude towards a proposition, and hence cannot have a belief.

In so far as we ascribed beliefs to cats, we are not treating beliefs as attitudes towards propositions. We are using the word differently.

It's not my accounting of belief that has been found wanting. — creativesoul

No, your account wants for nothing. It is incoherent, and hence not an account.

In so far as we ascribed beliefs to cats, we are not treating beliefs as attitudes towards propositions. We are using the word differently. — Banno

In the same argument, using the word differently is equivocating.

What happens in the head of the grocer is irrelevant. — Banno

Not to the grocer, it isn’t. For you, the grocer is an object and his subjectivity is irrelevant to you. For the grocer, you are the object and your subjectivity is irrelevant to him. You want two apples, the grocer must understand you want two apples, or he isn’t going to do anything, or he will do what doesn't conform to your ask.

If we have to have both, between the ears and not between the ears, as you say, this is the way. In order to have two apples in your hand, unless you get them yourself, you and the grocer must understand each other. How do you suppose it is you asked for two apples but it happens you were given two rutabagas? Asking for and getting in hand the same thing you asked for, makes explicit the happening of mutual understanding.
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Do you see that in order to understand each other, what goes on between our respective ears must be at least congruent, if not fully matching?
— Mww

No. What goes on between the ears is irrelevant. That's rather the point pushed by PI, that it's what happens that counts, not what goes on in heads. — Banno

Yes, what happens counts, as verification. But how does P.I. take account if what happens is wrong?

Red cups, apples, and pains in hands are not propositional content. — creativesoul

Can’t they be subjects or objects of propositions, hence contents of them? Or can propositions not have content?

They are most certainly always part of the correlational content of belief about them. — creativesoul

Yes, always, with the caveat that correlational content of belief is not propositional.

Too poetic — Banno

He he.

... leads to conflating pre-theoretical language less conscious experience, pre-theoretical linguistically informed conscious experience, and theoretical linguistically informed conscious experience. — creativesoul

Fair enough, but if the goal is to distinguish "conscious experience" from a non-conscious variety of something or other (experience?), and all three of your sub-categories fall on the positive side of the distinction, what exactly is the point of the proposed sub-division? Ah...

Only the first of the three consists entirely of directly perceptible things. — creativesoul

Ok, I'm curious to know in what way you aren't offering to help @frank here to,

Clean away the strawmen piled in the idea of phenomenal consciousness, — frank

?

Just interested.