Moore's argument was that the skeptic could not provide more reason to doubt than he had to not. That is evidendtly not the case for qualia as both knowledge of physiology and confusion over intuitions gives ample reason to doubt. — Isaac

Moore's waving his hand about is no different than us pointing out colors and pains. They're both just as much a part of experience.

Moore's waving his hand about is no different than us pointing out colors and pains. They're both just as much a part of experience. — Marchesk

No, that's not Moore's argument at all. It had nothing to do with experience and everything to do with the alternative the skeptic had to offer in place of his naturalism. Active inference presents not only a cogent alternative, but one which is better at making predictions than the Cartesian theatre version.

Active inference presents not only a cogent alternative, but one which is better at making predictions than the Cartesian theatre version. — Isaac

Inference doesn't make colors or pains go away anymore than it does hands. Except for zombies.

Inference doesn't make colors or pains go away anymore than it does hands. Except for zombies. — Marchesk

Yes it does, that's the point. Naming colour names is part of a response to stimuli modelled at a cultural level. You do not 'experience' redness. But we've been through this to no avail, I'm not just re-doing it, I'll leave you all to it.

Under what domain? Philosophically, the subjective is private, private taken to mean inaccessible to an observer. — Mww

Yes, but the question now is, why is it inaccessible to an observer? And what does it mean to be inaccessible to an observer? Isn't it indirectly accessed via observation of behavior and neural activity? In other words, is the subjective accessible objectively?

Moore's argument was that the skeptic could not provide more reason to doubt than he had to not. That is evidendtly not the case for qualia as both knowledge of physiology and confusion over intuitions gives ample reason to doubt. — Isaac

Knowledge of physiology confirms phenomenal consciousness: Much of the activity of the CNS takes place without any associated awareness, and some of its activity is. The part that is, is phenomenal consciousness.

Confusion over intuitions only lets us doubt those particular intuitions, not phenomenal consciousness itself, the doubt of which will lead to global skepticism unless you put in a stop somewhere.

Dennett does it at the level of belief. Where's your stop?

It's clear that the arguments in the article are successful in removing from reasonable discourse qualia that are both ineffable and private. The reasonable folk who defend qualia have followed the only course open, which was to shift the definition of one or more of the concepts involved. — Banno

I don't think this is true. Dennett defines qualia according to a survey of literature, which is reasonable: unlike a lot of the current discussions on panpsychism (Pfhorrest's aside) and anti-physicalism proliferating atm, Dennett has the integrity to define what he is talking about. He cannot proceed under the broadest definition because that definition is too vague. So he looks to the lowest common denominators. But you and I and Dennett agree that the authors of this conception were wrong: qualia with these properties do not exist. So why on the one hand do we hold them as the authority on what qualia *are* and on the other dismiss their philosophy on the existential properties of qualia? In other words, if they can be *that* wrong, why do we accept their definition as accurate? Indeed, how can we accept a definition of a non-existent thing as authoratitive at all? I point this out because, as far as I can see, the keystone of the arguments for the non-existence / irrelevance of qualia is this diabolical quaternity of properties. It looks like a straw man.

If we define mind according to the misguided notions of dualists or panpsychists, we'd find that that too doesn't exist. Or if we define energy according to the hippy BS of new age insufferables, there's no energy either.

It just seems infinitely more useful to pin down what people actually mean by the word and describe that in terms of how the brain works than to forge a definition that is doomed to undermine far more interesting discussion. Yes, a wine-tasting machine is viable. Yes, there are people who will not accept that. But whatever the contents and properties of my consciousness pertaining to me taking a particular sip of a particular barolo, be it a singular sensation or a time-evolving one, be it a constant or state-dependent, be it a linear progression or an iterative one, be it pleasurable only for two years or forever, is still the thing I am referring to when I talk about that particular qualia, and that's what I would like to understand: it assuredly happens, so *how* does that happen? I am aware that most of that explanation has nothing to do with qualia and is a lot more similar to a wine-tasting machine, but how does this particular discerning, middle-class-alcoholic wine-tasting machine work?

You can't argue with a zombie.

Just want a point out that our ancestors evolved the ability to see color prior to language and public models. You can't quine color away without consulting evolution first.

why is it inaccessible to an observer? — Harry Hindu

An observer is so from his own perceptions; that which is inaccessible to an observer indicates that which is unperceivable by him. All perception is only possible from an empirical condition, the subjective, which is the rational activity of a subject, which is subjectivity, is never an empirical condition, hence subjectivity is never possibly given to perception, hence inaccessible to that which perceives as an observer.
—————

Isn't it (subjectivity) indirectly accessed via observation of behavior and neural activity? — Harry Hindu

No one, and I mean no one, has ever seen my neural activity, and if subjectivity is necessarily predicated on neural activity, it follows no one has, even indirectly, accessed my subjectivity.

Again, observation is perception, perception is empirical, no observation of other than the empirical is at all possible. If that which is observed must be empirical, and if it is behavior that is observed, behavior must be empirical. If it stands as proved that subjectivity is never empirical, it follows necessarily that observation of behavior can never be observation of subjectivity.
—————

In other words, is the subjective accessible objectively? — Harry Hindu

The subject may represent himself objectively, yes. But the observer only perceives the object of subjectivity, not the means by which the representation obtains its form.

....and language itself can be quined away from the necessities of evolution, but maybe not the accidental convenience of it.

Dunno, I’m not much of an anthropologist. Seems odd, though, that Nature mandated us with reason, by which we confuse ourselves, then mandated we should have language, by which we confuse ourselves even more.

Cruel Mistress indeed.

there were on this thread many attempts to deny a phenomenological ‘layer’, a ‘representation’ of the world constructed in (or for) our minds based on sense data
— Olivier5

The second is not just a simile for the first. There's a world of difference between merely asserting a 'phenomenological layer' and asserting that it is 'constructed in (or for)our minds based in sense data'. — Isaac

Should I take your word for it, or are you trying to make an argument? And don’t forget to mention why oh why this matters to the subject at hand, unless you’re just nitpicking...

Induction? Is that another illusion you care to prop up and to shoot down, or what?

Just want a point out that our ancestors evolved the ability to see color prior to language and public models. You can't quine color away without consulting evolution first. — Marchesk

No, our ancestors evolved to respond to wavelengths of light, prior to language. Had they not then they would not all have picked the ripe berries (which are united in the wavelength the reflect, not the experience they produce). If you want to have wavelengths of light as 'colours' I'm happy with that, but qualia aren't required here either.

You can't argue with a zombie. — Marchesk

You can. Just keep saying "Not brains!"

I'm always left wondering why so many participants around here seem to think that arguing for direct perception always and only implies naive realism - an outright denial of indirect perception...

That's the go to critique, a ridicule of sorts, and it's a charge that those making seem to think counts as a knock-down argument or some such. I suppose it could be, if only it were true. Saying something is so doesn't make it so. The move seems more like grasping at some familiar straws when faced with admitting of much better accounting practices, and/or escaping cognitive dissonance.

The underlying mistake is - once again - thinking in terms of either/or when it comes to direct/indirect perception. There's also the use of "perception" that is always extremely problematic, particularly when used as a blanket term to include both linguistically informed and non linguistically informed conscious experiences(which is also an inadequate dichotomy). Not all conscious experience is all direct perception or all indirect perception. Leaning too far either way leads to conflating pre-theoretical language less conscious experience, pre-theoretical linguistically informed conscious experience, and theoretical linguistically informed conscious experience. Notice there are three distinctions here... not two. Only the first of the three consists entirely of directly perceptible things.

That's where we all start.

I don't see progress. If we follow your argument, all we would have is "private, ineffable attributes". I can see how you dug that little hole for yourself, but I have no desire to dig my own.

This discussion is not only going on in the space between your ears.

This discussion is not only going on in the space between your ears — Banno

Of course it isn’t, only. But the ground of it, the beginnings, the source, the construction of it, are, and are only.

It’s the same hole everybody’s in; some admit it, some don’t.

All we would have is wrong, we all would have, is right.

‘Nother topic?

I just don't see the point in continuing a discussion in which the primary counter-argument is "...but it's obvious". — Isaac

Well said.

...in the end it seems to me that intuition pumps will not work on folk with the wrong intuition. — Banno

I'm hoping that my present chat with @Mww might proceed in a new direction.

"Here is one hand"; we can perhaps agree and move on. But apparently here is a much greater difference in opinion between "I have an apple in my hand" and "I have a pain in my hand", a difference hidden by the superficial grammatical similarity, and which might underpin the apparent difference in intuitions. Some folk would treat "I have a pain in my hand" as if it were "I have an apple in my hand"; others would treat "I have an apple in my hand" as if it were "I have a pain in my hand". We might be better served by mapping out the differences and similarities.

These are notdistinctions that depends on neuroscientific principles. The answer is in philosophical analysis.

But the ground of it, the beginnings, the source, the construction of it, are, and are only (in the space between your ears) — Mww

As @Isaac pointed out, there's no point in continuing a discussion in which the primary counter-argument is "...but it's obvious".

No, it is not obvious. Indeed, the evidence to the contrary is before you, in the very sentence you are reading, right now.

There is stuff that is not between your ears.

others would treat "I have an apple in my hand" as if it were "I have a pain in my hand". — Banno

If they're insane maybe.

I don't think this is true. — Kenosha Kid

Which is not true: that "(i)t's clear that the arguments in the article are successful in removing from reasonable discourse qualia that are both ineffable and private", or that "(t)he reasonable folk who defend qualia have followed the only course open, which was to shift the definition of one or more of the concepts involved."? Or both?

If they're insane maybe. — frank

Yet that is what @Mww apparently wants to do, since he thinks that both are "between your ears":

But the ground of it, the beginnings, the source, the construction of it, are, and are only. — Mww

Yes, insane.

Apples are directly perceptible external things. Pains are directly perceptible internal things.

Does Wittgenstein mesh well with realism?

There is stuff that is not between your ears. — Banno

Again.....there most obviously is stuff not between the ears. Nobody ever said all stuff was between the ears, not even ol’ Bishop Berkeley.

It is pointless to continue a discussion in which it cannot be agreed that some stuff is only between the ears.

It is pointless to continue a discussion in which it cannot be agreed that some stuff is only between the ears. — Mww

Biological machinery.

he thinks that both are "between your ears". — Banno

Nope, he doesn’t think that.

Again.....there most obviously is stuff not between the ears. — Mww

I just don't see the point in continuing a discussion in which the primary counter-argument is "...but it's obvious". — Isaac

It is pointless to continue a discussion in which it cannot be agreed that some stuff is only between the ears. — Mww

In so far as that stuff between your ears is private and ineffable, there is indeed no point in continuing the discussion.

Irreducibly, yes. But not practically.

We operate in terms of biological machinery, but we don’t think or talk in those terms.