But it does seem to imply a mind or foregoing intelligence. Religion is not all gods and fairies, you know — Wayfarer

We agreed already with Janus that minds exist and are effective (i.e. causal). What is religion without a belief in the supernatural?

‘Supernatural’ is a boo word. You really ought to look at the Nagel essay I linked to, it’s in no way religious apologetics.

I asked Marchesk this earlier:

"Moore's point was that whatever an idealist claims about the illusory nature of the physical, she still jumps out of the way of on-coming tractor trailers.

Moore on phenomenal consciousness: deny it if you like, you still understand your own behavior (and that of others) in terms of it."

In the essay fdrake pointed to, Dennett mentions the necessity of the content of folk psychology. So on the one hand, he wants his readers to doubt, and on the other, be assured that belief, for instance, has some sort of liminal status as an abstract object.

Does that keep Dennettian doubt (about the phenomenal) from invading science?

Supernatural’ is a boo word. You really ought to look at the Nagel essay I linked to, it’s in no way religious apologetics. — Wayfarer

Of course it’s a boo word, so what? I am entitled to have likes and dislikes, just like everyone else. And I don’t like mythological explanations that much. So to me, minds emerge naturally from our biology.

But they cannot say much more than that. — khaled

Balls.

Of course it’s a boo word, so what? — Olivier5

Sorry. I was replying by phone, I should unpack what I'm saying here.

'Supernatural' is associated with everything that science is not, in other words, 'naturalism' is defined to be differentiated from 'the supernatural'. But in my view it's an artificial distinction, based on historical definitions and notions of the domains of religion and science. This colors many of the debates on topics of philosophy of mind, because there's a kind of tacit understanding of what is not admissable, on account of it being associated with religion. You know the Greek term 'metaphysical' is an exact translation of the Latin 'supernatural'. And many positivistic philosophies reject anything supernatural or metaphysical or transcendent, BECAUSE they concern ideas which can't be validated empirically. Dennett simply takes that to one logical conclusion.

That's why Nagel's essay Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion is important. He's not a religious apologist, in fact he professes atheism, but in this essay he analyses the role of Darwinian materialism in philosophy of mind, that you see in Daniel Dennett.

I never understood the binary choice between nature being exactly what science says it is and it being supernatural. Science is based on empiricism, and to the extent our empirical knowledge is limited, the world is more than science. It's just possible that we didn't evolve the capabilities to perfectly model the cosmos. Or that our modeling leaves something out since it's abstracting the patterns from empirical experience.

But somehow, physicalism has come to mean the same thing as naturalism.

Yep.

We agree? Damn.

Very true. But that is different to what Marchesky used to say. :-)

the Greek term 'metaphysical' is an exact translation of the Latin 'supernatural'. — Wayfarer

My understanding of the prefix "meta" is that it simply means "about", often in some reflexive way (metadata = data about the data, metacognition = cognition about cognition). Metaphysics is a discourse about physics, itself understood as a discourse about nature.

While "super" in supernatural means today something very different: "at odds with nature".

Nagel's essay — Wayfarer

I've started reading, found it a good piece. But rest assured that I am not afraid of anything here, except facile deus ex machina cop-outs. One can answer "God did it" to any philosophical question; it's just a bit too easy, which is why I stay away from theology.

My understanding of the prefix "meta" is that it simply means "about", often in some reflexive way (metadata = data about the data, metacognition = cognition about cognition). Metaphysics is a discourse about physics, itself understood as a discourse about nature. — Olivier5

Actually the title 'meta-physics' came from an editor of the Aristotelian corpus, who placed those books after the physics books, so in that case 'meta' simply meant 'after'. But it also has the connotation 'beyond' or 'transcending'. So it reasonable to say that 'meta-physic' is an equivalent of the latin 'super-natural'. (There's also a Buddhist version, 'lokuttara', meaning world-transcending. Many secular Buddhists would like the Buddha to be a 'natural person', but, alas, not.)

While "super" in supernatural means today something very different: "at odds with nature". — Olivier5

That's what I'm getting at. It has been defined in such a way as to mean almost exactly that. So ideas associated with 'religion' are placed on one side, and those with 'science' on the other. Often this demarcation is assumed or tacit.

facile deus ex machina cop-outs. — Olivier5

Care to mention an example? I didn't see anything of that kind in it, myself.

It has been defined in such a way as to mean almost exactly that. So ideas associated with 'religion' are placed on one side, and those with 'science' on the other. Often this demarcation is assumed or tacit. — Wayfarer

This demarcation is useful, though.

facile deus ex machina cop-outs.
— Olivier5

Care to mention an example? I didn't see anything of that kind in it, myself. — Wayfarer

In what? Nagel's essay? No, of course not. I am just saying that I personally go by some rules while philosophizing, rules which exclude the facile recourse to mythology and theology. It's not an ontic statement about the existence or absence of the gods, just a methodological statement.

In what? Nagel's essay? No, of course not. — Olivier5

Oh good. Sorry, I misinterpreted your remark.

I've read it before. Is the summary in Wikipedia incorrect? — Daemon


No, but with respect, I don't think you're conveying an appreciation of it. — Wayfarer

Well explain where I'm going wrong then, please.

That’s looks like I felt, after analyzing entries on page 72.

Social bonding clearly is not innate,
— creativesoul

Nonsense, bonding is found in all sorts of animal species. From parents to mates to social groups — Marchesk

And... social bonding is not innate. These are not mutually exclusive.

It's just possible that we didn't evolve the capabilities to perfectly model the cosmos. Or that our modeling leaves something out since it's abstracting the patterns from empirical experience. — Marchesk

What would a perfect model of the cosmos look like compared to imperfect models? It seems to me that it is the nature of models to leave things out - things that are not useful to what your goal is in modeling some aspect of the cosmos. Why do we model?

Anyway, either way, no Cartesian issues there! — Andrew M

:up:

I loathe the idea that certain very useful apt terms must be tied to certain philosophical positions and the problems that those positions lead to or have.

Physical means mind independent stuff...
— Marchesk

Hmmm... and if the mind is in part, physical? — creativesoul

Checkmate, Qualiasts? — Marchesk

More than that...

:smile:

Hmmm... and if the mind is in part, physical? — creativesoul

Some of your mind is in your cell phone.

Abstract objects are things like sets: they aren't physical, but they aren't mental objects either. Allowing abstract objects requires a little ontological flexibility.

Cats can even have a conscious experience of drinking Maxwell House coffee from a red cup without ever experiencing it as such. If she drinks the coffee from the cup, the coffee triggers an involuntary physical response in the biological machinery of the cat. Language less creatures are perfectly capable of direct perception. The cat will respond accordingly. What it's like(for my cat) to drink Maxwell House coffee from a red cup consists of each and every time my cat drinks Maxwell House coffee from a red cup.

The red cup full of Maxwell House coffee. The ability to draw correlations between the coffee, the sipping behaviours, and the autonomous involuntary physiological response(s) of the sensory apparatus. These are the things required for any and all meaningful conscious experience involving tasting Maxwell House coffee from red cups. In the case of the cat's discontent, she draws correlations between her own discontentment and coffee drinking. That's the part of the overall experience that can stand alone as a conscious experience of coffee drinking/tasting. The cat becomes aware of causality, by attributing the results of her drinking coffee(the response of her physiological sensory apparatus) to her own actions of drinking coffee, and in doing so learns that she does not like drinking coffee.

It only takes once.

Clearly she'd had a conscious experience of drinking Maxwell House coffee from a red cup. It's private, in the sense that it happened... to her. It's ineffable... to and from her limited point of view. It's immediately or directly apprehensible to her. It's meaningful to her. She has no language. Clearly meaningful conscious experience is prior to language. That which is prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon it. My cat's conscious experience of coffee drinking is prior to language. Some conscious experience of coffee drinking exists in it's entirety prior to language. That's pretheoretical.

The problem...

There's no red quale as a property of her experience. There's also no reason to deny the same limitations apply to human conscious experience of drinking Maxwell House coffee from a red cup prior to language acquisition. The cat drinks from a red cup without ever perceiving the red cup as such. That's because there has been no correlations drawn between the cup's color and something else. Some conscious experience involving red cups do not have the property/quale of red, despite the fact that a red cup is an irrevocable necessary elemental constituent thereof.

Abstract objects... — frank

Are linguistic constructs based upon subject/object ontology. That ontology, that dichotomy, that linguistic framework is garbage.

Are linguistic constructs based upon subject/object ontology. That ontology, that dichotomy, that linguistic framework is garbage. — creativesoul

A set isn't a linguistic object. A set is an abstract object: neither mental nor physical.

Hmmm... and if the mind is in part, physical?
— creativesoul

Some of your mind is in your cell phone. — frank

If you say so.

A set isn't a linguistic object. A set is an abstract object: neither mental not physical. — frank

According to???

he says nothing precise — Olivier5

Coming from someone who advocates for the use of "qualia"...

...that's a tad bit ironic if it's meant to be a critique.

Philosophy of math. Frege is one of the roots of the idea.