Most wretched existence is ours. Stuck in our conscious containers with our dreadful colors displaying on the mind's wall. Unable to appreciate the pure material forms.

We shiver about unable to know the truth that would set us free of that awful model.

Stuck in our conscious containers with our dreadful colors displaying on the mind's wall. Unable to appreciate the pure material forms. — Marchesk

Ah ah... you really want to perceive Beethoven’s 5th as ‘a variation of air pressure’?

Because brains are just lumps of biological matter with electrical and chemical activity. Just looking at it isn't going to tell us what any of it's doing any more than looking at a microprocessor is going to tell us what software is on it. — Isaac

But we do know quite a lot about what it's doing, by looking at the activity and what is causing it.

Here's a thought, something to kick around.

What if Dennett is right that qualia are incoherent, but wrong about reductionism?

The amount of resistance that some eliminative materialists put up to the rather obvious idea that they themselves exist as 'minds', and their their incapacity to understand the contradiction in their stance indicate that something more sinister than a mere blind spot is at play: eliminative materialism is a self-denying and life-demeaning ideology. What started as a blind spot has evolved into denial. — Olivier5

This is simply not true, or at least is true only given that you adhere to the assumptions about materialism and just what it consists in of those who condemn it, which obviously begs the question.

Just why and account of just what is materialism "self-denying and life-demeaning"? And then what's the alternative exactly? Those are the two questions that critics of materialism never seem to be able to answer.

(And just to be clear I am not referring to so-called materialistic values as opposed to so-called spiritual values. The question is why is it not possible for a materialist to hold spiritual, ethical and aesthetical values)?

Look, everyone, get this: you can't explain consciousness, because consciousness is the source of any and all explanation. Get over it, and find something else to discuss. — Wayfarer

Hi Wayfarer,

I've seen this said before, but I don't see the force of it. We can explain many aspects of consciousness, using our consciousnesses to examine and experiment. We can't yet say what the mechanism is that triggers it all, but I can't see why there's an insurmountable barrier to that.

Maybe we're already looking at the explanation. It seems very plausible that conscious experience is a development of unconscious reflexes, and we can explain the processes involved in those. So maybe the explanation of consciousness is, when you put all those processes together in a certain way, you get consciousness. I realise this is simplistic and I'm not actually explaining consciousness here, I'm just interested in your reasons for thinking that we can't explain consciousness.

Just why and account of just what is materialism "self-denying and life-demeaning"? And then what's the alternative exactly? — Janus

Olivier was commenting on a Michel Bitbol article I had linked to. Of course he can answer for himself, but when he made this remark to me, the answer I gave regarding the motivation of eliminativism, is 'fear'. It is literally fear of the fact that the mind itself is terra incognita in some basic way. That's why they wave their arms and yell 'woo': the mind, consciousness, whatever, is not amenable to objective reduction. Therefore, it has to be eliminated! I mentioned to Olivier the Nagel essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion - which is not a defense of religion, but an analysis of how the 'fear of religion' drives so much of the 'materialism and reductionism' of this day. 'Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world. Instead they become epiphenomena, generated incidentally by a process that can be entirely explained by the operation of the non-teleological laws of physics on the material of which we and our environments are all composed.'

Those are the two questions that critics of materialism never seem to be able to answer. — Janus

As for why materialism is self denying and life demeaning, it's because it sees no difference between beings and things. Beings are simply the types of things that seem to act intentionally. Dennett says this, it's not a straw man argument. Dennett also recognises that this is a highly demoralising perspective on the human condition but insists that it's true nevertheless, we have to adapt to it. The idea that we're free agents is one of the things that's been dissolved in the 'acid of Darwin's dangerous idea'. (This is a critical essay on Dennett I think outlines the issues.)

We can explain many aspects of consciousness, using our consciousnesses to examine and experiment. — Daemon

Consider, at a very high level, what 'an explanation' comprises. You have the explanation, hypothesis, prediction on one side - that heat will melt ice, uranium will emit radiation, or whatever - and on the 'right hand side' you have the experiment, observation and result. I can't think of any empirical hypothesis that doesn't conform to that basic outline.

But when it comes to consciousness - or 'mind', as I prefer to put it - we're never apart from that, or outside it, so we don't actually have the same basic parameters within which to operate. We are that which we seek to know. (Actually the essay I mentioned above by Michel Bitbol It is never known but it is the knower is a useful reference for this.)

It seems very plausible that conscious experience is a development of unconscious reflexes, and we can explain the processes involved in those. So maybe the explanation of consciousness is, when you put all those processes together in a certain way, you get consciousness. — Daemon

Sure. But what are the implications? I mean, as humans we have to deal with this all the time. I don't know about you, but I find unconscious impulses and tendencies are often a source of discord in my own existence. Anyone who finds habits hard to control has to deal with that. I'm also aware of the fact that there are things about myself that I don't know - and I know this principally because of 'aha!' experiences I've had in the past, when something about myself suddenly became clear. That, I think, is the precise meaning of 'catharsis'.

But I digress. The point is, here, 'consciousness' is not some abstract whatever about which specialists in white coats have privileged and exclusive access. It is also what we are, our fundamental nature. It is not a 'that' to us. It is a 'that' to cognitive science and also to psychology, to some extent, but this is also why many questions remain about the extent to which psychology is truly a science.

The point is, here, 'consciousness' is not some abstract whatever about which specialists in white coats have privileged and exclusive access. It is also what we are, our fundamental nature. — Wayfarer

I don't think the white coated specialists have exclusive access, but aren't they likely to be the ones who do provide the answer to the so-called "hard question"? If some white coated specialist said tomorrow "I've discovered that when you connect this bit here to this bit here, it goes conscious", would that solve the hard problem? I think so.

I don't think the white coated specialists have exclusive access, but aren't they likely to be the ones who do provide the answer to the so-called "hard question"? — Daemon

I think if you think that, then you don't understand the point of the hard question!

I think if you think that, then you don't understand the point of the hard question! — Wayfarer

That seems harsh.

The problem of consciousness, Chalmers argues, is really two problems: the easy problems and the hard problem. The easy problems may include how sensory systems work, how such data is processed in the brain, how that data influences behaviour or verbal reports, the neural basis of thought and emotion, and so on. The hard problem is the problem of why and how are those processes accompanied by experience? — Wikipedia

My imaginary white coated specialist above has explained how those processes are accompanied by experience, so he's solved at least one part of the problem. The "why" part is something that's been vaguely troubling me for a while. It seems obvious to me that we can have experiences, like seeing stuff, and it's really useful to be able to see stuff. So that's the "why" question answered. No?

ere's a thought, something to kick around.

What if Dennett is right that qualia are incoherent, but wrong about reductionism? — Banno

That would be interesting. How would we characterize consciousness in that case?

Rather than the Wikipedia article, why not read the original. It's not very long. The second half of the article does propose what would be required to address the hard problem, including a theory that has information at its basis. Chalmers goes on to develop these ideas in subsequent books and essays.

How's about an honest "I don't know"?

What's problematic here is accepting or rejecting the Dennett article (Remember the Dennett article? This is a thread about the Dennett article) on the basis of pre-judgements (prejudices) that are to do with what consciousness is or isn't and not so much to do with the article. Hence the argument here that has little to do with qualia.

Folk can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable.

And folk cannot show them to us, because they are private.

But rejecting qualia does not lead directly and inevitably to materialism.

Let the neuroscientists do their neuroscience and see how far they can get. It keeps them off the streets and will be fun to watch.

Fair enough, but what we'll do in the meantime?

Well, lunch is next on my agenda.

I'm a little worried for your gustary enjoyment while we wait on the neuroscientists.

That would be interesting. How would we characterize consciousness in that case? — Marchesk

:lol:

Errr... ummm... ahhh... maybe something like what I've been doing?

Errr... ummm... ahhh... maybe something like what I've been doing? — creativesoul

I honestly can't remember at this point. Brief summary?

Here's a thought, something to kick around.

What if Dennett is right that qualia are incoherent, but wrong about reductionism? — Banno

Then the notion of "qualia" is incoherent, and conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes.

That's the position I'm arguing for/from. I'll keep on kicking...

:wink:

Nah. I'm more than willing to set things out for those willing to listen. Given the last few exchanges, including the refutation of "what it's like" that you neglected only to mischaracterize in summary, I'll wait for a clear sign that I'm not talking to myself.

If there's any sincerity in the query of yours, it's vey easy to click on my avatar, then click on my comments, then browse through quickly stopping at the ones relevant to this thread. Most of late are.

That's too much effort for a long thread with so many wordy posts.

I'm not sure how I mischaracterized it. I just don't agree that there's nothing it's like to see color or hear sound. Maybe I misunderstood.

Ok. Explain it then. What's it like to see red?

Ok. Explain it then. What's it like to see red? — creativesoul

I obviously can't explain that other than to say it's one of the three primary shades of objects in visual experience, which differs from other sensory modalities. Maybe "What it's like" is a misleading phrase. All it means is that a bat may have sonar sensations like we have color sensations, but we can't know what those are.

Maybe "What it's like" is a misleading phrase. — Marchesk

Ya think? Too bad the paper hinges upon it. Go back a few pages and re-read my critique.

I obviously can't explain that — Marchesk

You cannot explain it because there is no it...

Plain and simple.

You cannot explain it because there is no it... — creativesoul

There is a conscious visual experience with red in it.

Too bad the paper hinges upon it. — creativesoul

The paper hinges on the possibility that bats have kinds of conscious experiences we don't. If not bats, then almost certainly dolphins.

Plain and simple. — creativesoul

I don't undestand what you mean by "consciousness" then. Color is an aspect or property of visual experience. We could substitute "What it's like" with what are the properties of sonar experience?

There is a conscious visual experience with red in it. — Marchesk

There's a conscious visual experience with a dog in it.

And???

And??? — creativesoul

Only 32 more pages to 100.

The paper hinges on the possibility that bats have kinds of conscious experiences we don't. If not bats, then almost certainly dolphins. — Marchesk

Of course bats have conscious experiences. Of course dolphins have conscious experience as well.

The "we don't" part is irrelevant. When we're reporting upon another's conscious experience, in order to know what we're talking about, we must be able to take that conscious experience into proper account.

Agree?

I agree that dolphins have conscious experiences. But I disagree in that we can say some of their experiences might be fundamentally different from our own, because they have a form of perception we don't. What that is, we cannot say.

It's just noting a hard limit to our understanding, at least as things stand now.