What - exactly - do each of us classify as a "red cup" if not red cups? — creativesoul

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — creativesoul

Here you emphasize that the experience (colour-wise) produced by the red cup can be different. So let me just call the experience of a red cup you have X. And let me call the experience of a red cup Janus has Y.

When you say

the experience of red cups always includes red cups — khaled

Can mean 2 things:

"X and Y are identical" which would be an unsubstatiated claim as you yourself said.
"X and Y are both produced by looking at red cups" which no one is disagreeing with.

Which is why I replied with "experiences of red cups always include what we call red cups" which removes the ambiguity, and only refers to case 2. I am basically saying that "When creativesoul has X, he says red cup, and when Janus has Y, he said red cup, but that does not mean that X=Y"

I'd not care to guess why it's seems so important for others.

It's odd to me.

Here you emphasize that the experience (colour-wise) produced by the red cup can be different. So let me just call the experience of a red cup you have X. Now when Janus looks at a red cup he has the experience Y. — khaled

That's an equivocation.

I would be pleased if, to satisfy my curiosity, you would tell me whether you are an idealist or believe in an afterlife. — Janus

Not afterlife but I'm not sure about "idealist". I never got the split between idealism and materialism. They both just seemed to be using different words for what is practically the same thing, if not exactly the same thing.

It seems to me you are thinking that because I could hallucinate a red cup on the table when there was no red cup; and that I would be unable to tell the difference by visual appearance alone, that what I see when I hallucinate is exactly the same as what I see when I am actually seeing an object. — Janus

Yes.

But such hallucinations are rarely so stable, and also the rest of the environment would not usually be an hallucination, just the red cup. — Janus

Which is why it was a thought experiment assuming said hallucinations were stable.

Anyways I lost track of what this has to do with the overall argument so I suggest we leave talk of hallucinations on the backburner until it comes up again.

Me too! I imagine there must be some emotional attachment to the term because it is thought to support some form of idealism. I think perhaps some people feel disappointed with materialism, because they think it challenges their hopes for a life beyond this one. — Janus

Alternatively, materialism fails to properly account for conscious experience. One might turn the psychologizing around and say that materialists have a dogmatic commitment to dismissing any arguments challenging their metaphysical positions.

When you say
the experience of red cups always includes red cups
— khaled

Can mean 2 things:

"X and Y are identical" which would be an unsubstatiated claim as you yourself said.
"X and Y are both produced by looking at red cups" which no one is disagreeing with. — khaled

It means that both Janus' seeing red cups, and my seeing red cups always always always includes red cups.

materialism fails to properly account for conscious experience. — Marchesk

Indeed.

Indeed. — creativesoul

Wait, now I'm confused. Whose side are you on? Do you just not like the term qualia?

One might turn the psychologizing around and say that materialists have a dogmatic commitment to dismissing any arguments challenging their metaphysical commitments. — Marchesk

"Dogmatic" may be a bit too much, depending upon the person.

Sure, but once one side begins psychologizing the other, turn about is fair play.

I don't personally believe in an afterlife, but I do think Chalmers, Nagel, McGinn, Block, etc. present more convincing arguments than Dennett, Churchland, Frankish, etc.

Wait, now I'm confused. Whose side are you on? — Marchesk

Neither, and I said as much from the very beginning. Curious that, huh?

and my seeing red cups always always always includes red cups. — creativesoul

Let me rephrase. Here you say "includes red cups". And also you say:

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — creativesoul

Therefore what I call "red" may not be what you call "red" correct?

Therefore when you say "experiences of red cups always include red cups" do you mean red as it seems from your POV? As in "experiences of red cups produce the exact same experience in me as they do in everyone"

Neither, and I said as much from the very beginning. Curious that, huh? — creativesoul

I don't recall the beginning. I think I jumped in sometime after about 18 pages. It is a bit curious.

and my seeing red cups always always always includes red cups.
— creativesoul

Let me rephrase. Here you say "includes red cups". And also you say:

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — khaled

All conscious experience of seeing red cups includes more than just red cups, ya know?

:brow:

What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out recently? — creativesoul

Didn’t see that.

All conscious experience of seeing red cups includes more than just red cups, ya know? — creativesoul

I should hope so. Red cups in the brain doesn't sound like a healthy condition.

Conscious experience of red cups includes more than just red cups — creativesoul

Sure but I'm not sure what that has to do with anything.

Anyways I have to run now. I edited my last comment a bit hopefully that makes it clearer. Good talk.

What do you think about the three kinds of conscious experience I set out recently?
— creativesoul

Didn’t see that — Olivier5

It sets out what counts as pretheoretical conscious experience. But, since you've expressed no interest in that criterion, calling it a "strawman" built by Dennett, I suspected you may not have taken note that I'm not in complete agreement with Dennett, because I'm neither a dualist, nor a monist.

Part of the Cartesian error is to categorize unlike things together based on superficial similarities instead of making natural and functional distinctions. So visualizing, dreaming, imagining, hallucinating, etc., are considered by the Cartesian to be a kind of seeing and perception, when they are not.
— Andrew M

But they are kinds of conscious experiences. And the thing about them is you can't just dismiss dreams, hallucinations, etc. as properties in relation to the objects being perceived, since there are no objects, and thus no such relations. — Marchesk

Yes, that's just the point in distinguishing those activities from perception. You are having a dream - there's nothing being perceived, only dreamt.

But there are still experiences.

I dream of a red apple, and that red apple is a visual experience. — Marchesk

Metaphorically perhaps, but nothing is being seen, only dreamt. Paraphrasing:

Spoon boy: Do not try and bend the inner spoon. That's impossible. Instead... only try to realize the truth.
Neo: What truth?
Spoon boy: There is no inner spoon.
Neo: There is no inner spoon?
Spoon boy: Then you'll see, that it is not the inner spoon that bends, it is only yourself.

So .... the mind is a Matrix? We need to take the red pill of philosophy to get to the desert of the real? Then we can go back inside the mind and kick some ass?

We understand the entire process of swimming towards the attractant at this level of detail. We know that the attractant chemicals react with chemicals in the cell, setting off a chain of reactions which eventually cause the flagella to rotate in such a way that the bacterium swims in the direction where the concentration of attractant is increasing. — Daemon

We can’t synthetise the mechanism from scratch yet, which means we are still guessing how it might work. Note that all the flagella have to paddle in the same direction, so the process involves some uniform sense of spatial direction, which ain’t easy to do with mere chemistry.

But this is just nitpicking. More importantly, how would you propose that we differentiate « real codes » from « unreal codes »? Is the genetic code not real, and why?

Conscious experience of red cups includes more than just red cups
— creativesoul

Sure but I'm not sure what that has to do with anything. — khaled

That's why it's not a problem for someone(like me) to make both claims you're asking about.

We can know something about what another is experiencing when seeing red cups, and I need not know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup. I know that both experiences include red cups and people seeing red cups in whatever way they appear to them, each and every time.

It's been interesting.

It sets out what counts as pretheoretical conscious experience. But, since you've expressed no interest in that criterion, calling it a "strawman" built by Dennett, I suspected you may not have taken note that I'm not in complete agreement with Dennett, because I'm neither a dualist, nor a monist. — creativesoul

I am quite interested in pretheoretical conscious experience. In fact, I taught you how to use this word, remember? https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/469904

So .... the mind is a Matrix? We need to take the red pill of philosophy to get to the desert of the real? Then we can go back inside the mind and kick some ass? — Marchesk

Sure, once we've made up our minds to.

I know that both experiences include red cups and people seeing red cups in whatever way they appear to them, each and every time. — creativesoul

Fantastic. Thanks for clarifying. That's exactly what I meant when I said "The experience of red cups includes what people call red cups" but I can see why that would have been confusing.

That's why it's not a problem for someone(like me) to make both claims you're asking about. — creativesoul

Isaac or Banno would say that both claims are identical. That's why I needed to differentiate. Isaac would go further to say that X and Y don't exist so both claims are non-sensical from what I gather.

So far of the "Qualia Quiners" I've talked to Banno did it on the basis that it is useless to talk about. Isaac insisted we don't have experiences, which seems crazy to me. You seem to just think the term is redundant at best - as there are other ways to encapsulate what it is supposed to be referring to - and confusing at worst and based on that say it doesn't exist. I don't really have a problem with that.

Odd, isn't it.

We can’t synthesise the mechanism from scratch yet, which means we are still guessing how it might work. Note that all the flagella have to paddle in the same direction, so the process involves some uniform sense of spatial direction, which ain’t easy to do with mere chemistry. — Olivier5

Well I'm afraid you haven't quite understood the description of what the bacterium is doing. The (to me) astonishing truth is that the bacterium does swim in the direction of the higher concentration of attractant chemical, it does achieve this entirely by means of biochemistry and biophysics, and we're not guessing how it works, we know precisely how it works, it's set out in those papers.

But this is just nitpicking. More importantly, how would you propose that we differentiate « real codes » from « unreal codes »? Is the genetic code not real, and why? — Olivier5

The genetic code is not "actual coding", coding here is again a metaphor, the whole amazing thing happens by what you call "mere chemistry". "Actual coding" takes place in the way you describe for the colour coding of a map, it's an activity which requires the involvement of conscious agents with the cognitive capacity to make use of symbols.

The genetic code is not "actual coding", coding here is again a metaphor, the whole amazing thing happens by what you call "mere chemistry". "Actual coding" takes place in the way you describe for the colour coding of a map, it's an activity which requires the involvement of conscious agents with the cognitive capacity to make use of symbols. — Daemon

So if the genetic code was written by God (or some alien race), then it is actual coding, but if it is the result of random variations, then it is not actual coding. By this reasoning, you cannot know if the genetic code is an ‘actual code’ or not, because you don’t know who wrote it.

To me, only the result counts. The origin doesn’t matter. If it behaves as a code, quacks as a code, and looks like a code, then it’s a code.

So if the genetic code was written by God (or some alien race), then it is actual coding, but if it is the result of random variations, then it is not actual coding. By this reasoning, you cannot know if the genetic code is an ‘actual code’ or not, because you don’t know who wrote it. — Olivier5

How do you think it developed Olivier, really? How do you think the bacterium's ability to swim up a chemical gradient developed, really?

I’m talking of the genetic code, not of some specific ability of a specific bacteria. You are saying that it’s not a real code because it has not been designed by someone, it just emerged haphazardly. I’m saying that we don’t know this origin of the genetic code for a fact. Abiogenesis is an hypothesis. So the most one can say is: assuming abiogenesis, then the genetic code was not designed by someone but emerged spontaneously from some physico-chemical process.