There are variations in our biological machinery.
— creativesoul

Of course. That variation somehow produces the color difference. — Marchesk

Not all by itself.

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
— Luke

I do not. Nor need I. — creativesoul

But you claimed that you do know. You've claimed, and are continuing to claim - without any argument - that red objects must appear the same to everyone.

“Since we both learned color words by being shown public colored objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors.”
— Luke

Those entirely different subjective colors are always like the little man who wasn't there. — creativesoul

How so?

They're quite clearly not entirely different. — creativesoul

Why not? Do you have any supporting argument?

We all pick out the red ones. — creativesoul

But that's the point of inverted spectra: "our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors". We should expect to find that we would succeed in picking out "red ones" even if colours appeared to each of us differently, because we each learned to associate the colour words with however that colour appears to us (regardless of whether the colour appears the same to everyone else). Merely repeating that we succeed in picking out red cups is not an adequate response.

Yes. Generally if something cannot be described fully without experiencing it then it refers to the experience. You can describe an apple in a fruit bowl using props or a black and white drawing however that won’t help someone understand what an apple tastes like or what its color or texture is. Shapes don’t refer to experiences.

By all means, I wish someone would at least offer some sort of explanation for using these words. If it's useful for picking out or emphasizing the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience, then surely one of the proponents would utilize the tool by doing so.

Which aspects exactly? — creativesoul

How colours appear to each of us, for starters, e.g. what a colour in the chart above "looks like" to you.

You said that “we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup”. How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup? — Luke

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
— Luke

I do not. Nor need I.
— creativesoul

But you claimed that you do know... — Luke

No, I did not. Quote the entire post please.

Experience, at least insofar as we are aware of it, just is subjective, phenomenal, qualitative and felt — Janus

Then what you call “experience” we call “Qualia”

What would it mean to say that aspects of experience are illusory — Janus

That somehow you can think you’re experiencing something while actually you’re not experiencing anything. That’s what an “illusion” is, something that you think is there but isn’t.

By all means, I wish someone would at least offer some sort of explanation for using these words. If it's useful for picking out or emphasizing the subjective, phenomenal aspects of experience, then surely one of the proponents would utilize the tool by doing so.

Which aspects exactly?
— creativesoul

How colours appear to each of us, for starters, e.g. what a colour in the chart above "looks like" to you. — Luke

You first. What does the square named "rosewood" look like to you?

You said that “we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup”. — Luke

That's what I said, but taking it out of the context ignores the support that was given that you have since claimed was not.

Your other questions have been answered despite the fact that they're basically irrelevant to the position I'm arguing for/from, and the arguments given in support of that position.

Illusions and hallucinations of seeing red cups are not conscious experience of seeing red cups. — creativesoul

So what are they and how does one differentiate? If the experience is identical but in one there is a red cup in the other there is a drawing of a red cup how do we differentiate?

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
— Luke

I do not. Nor need I. — creativesoul

In that case then, the experience of red cups does not necessarily include red cups, as “red” seems like to you, that’s what I meant. They include what each person calls red cups. If we were to take a “screen shot” (somehow) of everyone’s experience seeing a red cup and put the screen shots side by side, you might call some of those green cups or purple cups. It just means that what you call “green” the first person calls “red”, which is fine as long as everything that appears red to you (by your standard) appears green to him (by your standard).

You typically don’t need to talk about this until someone says “seeing grass produces the same experience as seeing blood”. In that case is the person lying or actually having that experience (synonym of Qualia)?

Which aspects of conscious experience of seeing red cups are we picking out and emphasizing - to the exclusion of all else - when we say "qualia"? — creativesoul

Qualia are an umbrella term to include these “how things seem to us”s. Like how “mammals” includes elephants. We don’t need talk of mammals to describe elephants. However we can talk of mammals in general. Same with Qualia. We can say for example that Qualia are private, since we can’t compare them, we can’t take a screen shot of what everyone is seeing. Yet.

We all know what red cups look like. We know that each and every experience of seeing a red cup always involves seeing red cups. It only follows that we do sometimes know what others are experiencing when seeing a red cup for we know that the experience - most definitely - includes red cups. Since we know that that much is true, we also know that what you've said here above is not.

That's exactly what was said... verbatim. It was in response to the following...

I do not know what you’re experiencing when seeing a red cup. — khaled

I do not know what you’re experiencing when seeing a red cup — khaled

I meant it as you meant it here:

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?
— Luke

I do not. — creativesoul

Read the latest reply for detail.

You two seem to be imagining some sort of problem. Do you believe that I've somehow contradicted myself?

Well the problem is that you’re quining Qualia while literally using it under a different name “experience”.

What you mean by “the experience of red cups always includes red cups” needs explanation. Do you mean “the experience of red cups for me is identical to others” in which case I think we both would disagree. Otherwise do you mean “the experience of red cups includes what each of us individually classifies as a red cup” which is literally what I said? Because it seems to be the latter from your replies.

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — creativesoul

If the experience is identical but in one there is a red cup in the other there is a drawing of a red cup how do we differentiate? — khaled

Well, the experiences are not identical if in one there is a red cup and in the other there is a drawing of a red cup.

come on now. You know what I meant. Identical as in you can’t tell the difference from a first person perspective.

...“the experience of red cups always includes red cups” needs explanation. — khaled

Oh, brother...

You know what I meant. I — khaled

Say what you mean.

do you have a habit of reading the first line in a comment and not reading the rest? Go back and check yourself. You’ll find I said what I mean. You literally quoted the first letter of the line where I explain on accident.

You're all over the place...

Say what you mean. What’s confusing?

Go back and read.

Well considering I wrote it that won’t accomplish much. If you’re confused about something quote it, ask about it, do something specific.

Illusions and hallucinations of seeing red cups are not conscious experience of seeing red cups.
— creativesoul

So what are they... — khaled

They are illusions and hallucinations of red cups seen in past. They are illusions and hallucinations, in part, because of the fact that there are no red cups involved at the time of the event. Such illusions and hallucinations are made possible, in part, because of prior conscious experience of seeing red cups.

What you mean by “the experience of red cups always includes red cups” needs explanation. Do you mean “the experience of red cups for me is identical to others” in which case I think we both would disagree. Otherwise do you mean “the experience of red cups includes what each of us individually classifies as a red cup” which is literally what I said? Because it seems to be the latter from your replies. — khaled

I meant exactly what I said.

What - exactly - do each of us classify as a "red cup" if not red cups?

I've no idea what seems so difficult about this for you to understand.

Then what you call “experience” we call “Qualia” — khaled

The two terms are not synonymous, though. 'Perception' and 'experience' are more synonymous. So it makes sense to say 'I experienced the taste of the apple' or 'I perceived the taste of the apple' (even there it would be better to simply say 'I tasted the apple') but how would you use 'qualia' in that sentence? I'm puzzled as to why some seem to be so attached to a term, which is unclear, ambiguous and unnecessary, not to mention potentially confusing.

That somehow you can think you’re experiencing something while actually you’re not experiencing anything. That’s what an “illusion” is, something that you think is there but isn’t. — khaled

No one here (I think) is denying that colours are being experienced or perceived when we look at coloured objects. But to say qualia are illusory is to say that what we are seeing is not qualia, but coloured objects; in other words the illusion consists in thinking that what we are seeing is something other than what it is.

I find it rather telling that it's never used when making things clear.

Me too! I imagine there must be some emotional attachment to the term because it is thought to support some form of idealism. I think perhaps some people feel disappointed with materialism, because they think it challenges their hopes for a life beyond this one.

I'm puzzled as to why some seem to be so attached to a term, which is unclear, ambiguous and unnecessary, not to mention potentially confusing. — Janus

Because it has a certain meaning. When people argue "qualia doesn't exist" it makes it seem as though they are saying experience doesn't exist. As I said to creativesoul, Qualia is an umbrella term for experiences such as "pain", "bitter", "red", etc in the same way that mammals are an umbrella term including elephants. You do not need to talk about mammals to describe elephants however you can talk about mammals in general. So this is an unfair comparison:

'I experienced the taste of the apple' or 'I perceived the taste of the apple' (even there it would be better to simply say 'I tasted the apple') but how would you use 'qualia' in that sentence? — Janus

Is like asking "An elephant has 4 legs. How would you use "mammals" in that sentence?" See the problem?

Talking of Qualia in general you can say that they are private as:

How do you know that what I experience (colour-wise) when I see a red cup is the same as what you experience (colour-wise) when you see a red cup?

I do not. — creativesoul

for instance shows "privacy" is a property of these experiences or:

Sure, someone who has never seen a red cup before is going to be surprised by first doing so — creativesoul

Despite any amount of description of what "red" is like. Which shows ineffability (there is something new discovered when experiencing the thing that cannot be encapsulated in words).

etc...

Me too! I imagine there must be some emotional attachment to the term because it is thought to support some form of idealism. — Janus

It's more like being baffled at how hard people are trying to undermine a perfectly reasonable concept based on unsubstantiated claims that it is "confusing" when no one else is confused by it. I'd rather we stop psychoanalysing the other side though as it is usually a hidden ad hom that does nothing to further discussion.

You know what I meant. Identical as in you can’t tell the difference from a first person perspective. — khaled

It seems to me you are thinking that because I could hallucinate a red cup on the table when there was no red cup; and that I would be unable to tell the difference by visual appearance alone, that what I see when I hallucinate is exactly the same as what I see when I am actually seeing an object. But such hallucinations are rarely so stable, and also the rest of the environment would not usually be an hallucination, just the red cup.

I could easily dispel the illusion by trying to pick the cup up. While it's reportedly true that in extreme cases whole scenes and activities may be hallucinated, it's hard to tell how detailed such hallucinations can be, because when we are in such trance-like states our critical faculties are not usually functioning at capacity and memories of such 'events' are notoriously unreliable.

It's more like being baffled at how hard people are trying to undermine a perfectly reasonable concept based on unsubstantiated claims that it is "confusing" when no one else is confused by it. I'd rather we stop psychoanalysing the other side though as it is usually a hidden ad hom that does nothing to further discussion. — khaled

I'm not psychoanalyzing anyone. I said "perhaps"; I was surmising. What does 'qualia' give us that 'perception' or 'experience' doesn't? I would be pleased if, to satisfy my curiosity, you would tell me whether you are an idealist or believe in an afterlife.