This is a looooong attempt to get you to talk about what you think it is in a way that I can understand. — Kenosha Kid

And what would be the purpose of that? You claimed that neurological progress would lead to a general theory of consciousness. I asked what you mean by that. Forget me, what do you mean?

But if I were to define it it would just be defined as "awareness" or "apprehention" as you used them. I can add to that that these things (qualia) being apprehended are a result of trained pattern recognition and recall. This is a sufficient condition but I don't know if it is necessary (and you haven't clarified that bit either). I would also agree that consciousness has this "unifying effect" you speak of, as in you can be aware of multiple qualia at once (the taste of a banana as well as its color for instance).

I think the most effective way to define what I mean by it would be by comparing it to a state where it doesn't exist. Consciousness is the difference between dreaming and the other stages of sleep. You are conscious when you dream as I define it (and it doesn't have to be a lucid dream).

Another definition could be "The thing that remains constant no matter how much the qualia change". So whether I'm listening to music or screaming in agony after breaking an arm, there is always the awareness of this or that qualia (pleasant in the former case, unpleasant in the latter(the qualia that is)). That is consciousness.

Does that make it clearer what I mean?

It's not possible to answer your question because it's about something you do not describe at all. — Kenosha Kid

My question was "What do you mean by....?". Which word in that question is hard to describe?

So clearly I'm not using the term "pattern-matching" in a way consistent with your counter-example. — Kenosha Kid

Fair enough. My bad on that one.

you were asking questions about a thing that is not identical to modern, scientific descriptions of it, nor with any certainty similar to any other particular notion — Kenosha Kid

I wasn't asking questions about what consciousness is or what brings it about. I was asking what you meant by "neurological progress will lead to a general theory of consciousness". Forget me, I want to understand your point of view. Which is why I didn't mention panpsychism at all at first, you brought it into the discussion and then asked me to define what I mean by consiousness. In your own words, what I mean by consciousness has nothing to do with what you mean by it.

I'm happy to reaffirm it here and now. — Kenosha Kid

Alright then. Let me ask some of the same questions about that again. Are we talking human brains only here? What happens if a part of the brain is replaced or lost? Does it have to be organic? In other words what exactly counts as a "brain".

Your eyes might physically move to focus on a secondary stimulus but, when asked, you will report no awareness of it. In terms of accounting for the difference, neurology seems to be the *perfect* framework in which to explain it, as it deals with the transmission of information between different parts of the brain responsible for different tasks. — Kenosha Kid

It could explain why certain information, despite being within your field of view, you remain unaware of. But what does that have to do with explaining what the necessary conditions are for this awareness? All you can get out of this is sufficient conditions for consciousness/awareness, not necessary conditions for them.

For sure, and that's what we have neuroscience for. I'm not going to reproduce every paper, which is what I suspect you're suggesting my burden entails — Kenosha Kid

No nothing like that.

out Isaac's Halle Berry detector description on the Quining Qualia thread for a great example — Kenosha Kid

I'll get back to you after I've found it, I don't feel like rummaging through 40 pages right now.

We're talking about human rational inference, right? So we're talking about a human being figuring out that A > C, not some out-there truth that A > C. That's what I presumed anyway. If you meant something like the latter, it doesn't seem to be a question about human reason at all.

Maybe you should think about it a bit more.

Really? So if you lost a finger you're not you anymore? Which part of the body exactly carries this "I"? How much of a body can you lose or replace to still be the same "I"? Whatever "I" remains after all is replaced or changed, that is "the experiencer". — khaled

The last part doesn't make any sense. If all is replaced, then how can there be anything that remains?

If I lost a finger, I would still be the same I, that just lost a finger. Things change and remain the same, or else "change" wouldn't make any sense as change is what some thing does.

Are you saying that the only thing that you do is experience? You don't run, jump, laugh, talk, etc.? When your body commits an immoral act, are you at fault or is your body at fault?

Well at least we've established that there is an event. I thought you were one of those people who pretend that the scribble refers to nothing. But I still think "what is this event" is akin to asking "what is shape", It's one of those things you can't simplify further. Why don't you take a crack at it because I can't do it. — khaled

What is shape? Information.

What is this event of shapes, colors, sounds, smells and feelings? Information processing.

What are all events? Information. Process. Relationships. Take your pick. They all seem to apply. These are the terms I like to use.

It's just that when I'm talking definitions with someone I get really nitpicky about words. "experiencing eggs in the fridge" is sort of vague because it can either mean simply seeing eggs in the fridge or somehow literally "Knowing beyond all doubt that there are in fact eggs in the fridge". I just wanted to be specific that we're talking about seeing things here. — khaled

True. That is why I don't really care much for using the term, "experience". I was only using it because that is the scribble that you know to refer to the event we are talking about. I have learned that, in order to communicate, you have to use words that your audience understands, not necessarily the words you would use, because it is the thing that we are talking about that is important, not the scribbles that we use.

If all is replaced, then how can there be anything that remains? — Harry Hindu

I am implying that there is something that is not replaced no matter how much of your body gets replaced by functionally equivalent parts

Information — Harry Hindu

Not a very good definition. Not all information is shapes. For instance the color of an apple is not the shape of an apple. It's like if you asked me to define consciousness and I said it was "an event" or "a phenomena"

What are all events? Information. Process. Relationships. — Harry Hindu

Have no clue what you're trying to say here. Each of those words can mean a whole world of things.

Information processing. — Harry Hindu

So consciousness is information processing? What does information processing mean? Is a white blood cell processing infromation when deciding whether or not to attack something? And if so does that make it conscious? Is my pc processing information right now? Does that make it conscious?

I see what you mean. But that is part and parcel of the constraints-based approach here. — apokrisis

I find your "constraints-based approach" interesting and informative, but as I've explained already, I think it has a fundamental problem of a reversed representation for the roles of the foundational elements. You associate meaning with the constraints (form), I associate meaning with the thing which is constrained (content, or matter). So from your perspective, what is required to make matter meaningful (a symbol), is constraints. From my perspective, matter is inherently meaningful, because it cannot exist in a meaningless way. To exist as matter is to already have meaning. So even when matter appears to be free from constraints in an absolute way, it is still meaningful. This implies that we need to look beyond "constraints" to find the foundation of meaning.

With constraints, is the way that one might represent meaning in a systems model; having meaning is to have constraints. But there is always the fundamental elements, the parts or particles, which are modeled as being constrained. Since the existence of these parts is taken for granted by the systems model, and meaning is confined to the constraints which are applied to the fundamental parts, these elements are necessarily meaningless within that model, and therefore out of the range of intelligibility. You might, as I do, see this as a defect of the modeling system, it leaves the basic parts of the system as fundamentally unintelligible.

A proposal to rectify this situation would be to assign meaning to the fundamental elements themselves. This would allow those fundamental elements to be intelligible. But this would annihilate the validity of the widely accepted idea that meaning is produced through constraints, and is therefore proper to "constraint". This is very much a Wittgensteinian approach. We apply boundaries (define words) for specific purposes. This creates the appearance that the meaning of the word is associated with the boundary. However, such a boundary (definition) is not necessary for the word to have meaning. And, the word inherently has meaning simply by the fact of being used. We can use a word, and therefore it has meaning, without employing any boundary. So prior to all the constraints or boundaries which we create and employ to restrict the meaning of the word, there is meaning inherent within the word's capacity to be used freely, in any possible way. Now, the foundation, the base of meaning is placed within this freedom, rather than within the constraints which are applied to the freedom.

Once you allow for this possibility, that meaning is properly identified as within the freedom, rather than within the constraints, the real existence of living beings, and their vast array of apparently unconstrained or random acts, suddenly makes so much more sense, as purely intelligible, rather than as unintelligible anomalies. No longer are the free acts of living beings considered to be unintelligible, "random" acts, they are now meaningful acts. Therefore at the base of evolution for example, the cause of genetic variation, what appears to some people and is often described as "random mutation", is really meaningful expressions of freedom. Clearly the evidence which is the process called evolution, indicates that these mutations are meaningful.

Sameness (or synechism in Peircean parlance) is the global condition. All are within one. A continuity. A lack of differentation.

So sameness is about wholeness and the single general large scale state. It maps to the bounding constraints in other words. A constraint is an ultimate measure of sameness. It constitutes "the same". — apokrisis

So, to support my way of looking at this, which is the reversal of yours, I will point to the problems with yours. To begin with, we cannot ever have this perfection in sameness which you propose as "the global condition". "Similar" can never obtain the absolute perfection of same. "Same" is merely an ideal, produced as a modeling condition, like an artificial scale. In reality there is no such thing as perfect continuity with a lack of differentiation. I would say that this is so highly improbable that we can rule it out as physically impossible. So if this is proposed as a starting point for the existence of real constraints, it cannot be accepted, because it's just an ideal, an artificial perfection, which has a purpose as the basis for a scale in helping us make judgements, but it doesn't represent any reality.

But differences still then divide into differences that make a difference and differences that don't. — apokrisis

This I see as a mistake of contradiction. To say that it is a difference, implies already that it has made a difference by allowing you to say that it is a difference. It is only by ignoring the reality that in relation to absolute sameness, this is contradiction, can we get to the reality of your proposed ideal, absolute sameness. If you stipulate that the most minute, infinitesimal differences do not make a difference, you might propose that this form of similarity is the reality of absolute sameness. It is not, it is contradiction.

And then difference is the local exception to the general rule. In hierarchical terms, it is down there at the ground level as the grain of atomistic action. It is the many within the one. It is something plural rather than singular simply because that is how our hierarchical model of any system works. — apokrisis

Now, since this ultimate "same", "the global condition", has been ruled out as an unsound starting point, being simply an ideal, and not actually representing anything real, we can move to the opposite, "difference". We cannot describe difference as "the local exception", because the global, "general rule" has been ruled out as impossible. Therefore we now have a multiplicity of grains of atomistic action, free and different, and we cannot say that they are "within the one", because the real existence of that perfection, that Ideal, the One, has not been validated. The multitude of free and different grains of atomistic action is verified by empirical evidence, but the global condition of perfect continuity and absolute lack of differentiation, remains an unsubstantiated ideal, judged on principles of probability as impossible.

So, the question is, where do the constraints come from. Since the global Ideal has been ruled out as extremely improbable, we need to look at what inheres within the individual grains of free and different atomistic action.

states of consciousness are just brain states — Kenosha Kid

The hard problem is asking why are there both conscious states and brain states.

People seem to be forgetting that we only know of brain states via conscious states - meaning that our knowledge of brain states takes the form of conscious visual sensory data, like "shivering brains" and such.

From where you stand, you experience brain states when looking at my conscious states. From where I stand, I only experience conscious states, not brain states. I don't experience my conscious states like you experience my conscious states. If this is the case, then how do we know that we are talking about the same thing. If we are talking about the same thing, then why does it appear so different from where we stand? We don't seem to have this sort of problem when talking about apples, tables and chairs. The differences that are there are the result of our our different positions in space-time relative to what it is that we are perceiving. Does the same hold true for consciousness - that the difference is just in our different locations relative to what it is that we are talking about?

What is relevant to this thread is the point I have already tied to make. Yes, there is a dualism at the heart of everything in some strong sense. — apokrisis

What does this really mean? It seems to me that you can always simplify dualism into monism. Dualism is just another way of saying that everything is a relationship. The problem is that there are many relationships between more than two things. Not to mention that dualism seems to be a false dichotomy derived from the idea that the singular "I" itself possesses qualities that are on a level between everything else. The world is only hot or cold relative to your own body temperature, large or small relative to your own size, etc. In other words, these sensations are relationships between the state of your body and the state of the environment. I think this is more or less something that you might agree with and maybe any disagreement we might have will be semantics, but then that just means that the real difference between dualism and monism is just semantics.

A holistic or triadic paradigm now explains life. And it is easy to see that it also explains mind, as semiosis already grants life an intentionality and "awareness" at the cellular level ... the subject of the cited paper here. — apokrisis

But the boundary between life and non-life gets blurry. After all, life is just a more complex relationship than non-life, so it stands to reason that non-life would have very rudimentary, the most basic, the most fundamental relationships that life has, not that it doesn't have it at all. What that thing is is information. Effects are informative of their causes and vice versa. A relationship is informative of its constituents and vice versa. Information is the relationship between cause and effect and it exists in everything that is a causal relation, like scribbles on a screen and the intent that caused them to be on the screen and the information molecules have about their atoms.

I think I see the issue.

My question was "What do you mean by....?". Which word in that question is hard to describe? — khaled

If you're saying that you meant "Does a computer have consciousness according to *my* understanding of consciousness," then we've been speaking at cross purposes.

But that would be akin to saying "When I press A on my keyboard the letter A is typed on the screen". This would work for explaining how a PC works eventually by testing countless hypothesis and sometimes breaking open the PC (neurology) but it does not answer whether or not the PC is conscious, or why it would or wouldn't be. — khaled

This presumes a definition of consciousness in which a conscious PC would be what-it-is + what-it-does (3rd person) + something else that is undiscoverable from the outside. This something else is what I've been asking you about. it's a property of *your* understanding of consciousness, not mine.

But I think I now get what you maybe really meant. Let's say neuroscience has provided a complete and universally accepted description of human consciousness. Armed with that, is a sophisticated computer conscious? Or a chimp, or a rat, or a crow? Knowing how human consciousness works does not decide for us the essential properties such that we can say something else is also conscious.

A human is a specific system. Is a blind person conscious? I'm sure you'd agree that they are. So one of the most important set of phenomenal consciousnesses that is available for access consciousness is not an essential for a thing to be called conscious.

So at the other extreme, let's consider a speed camera. It could be said to have a phenomenal consciousnesses: it processes raw sensory data according to its training, detects car objects, license plate objects, numbers and letters, and estimates velocities. This is close enough to some things that humans do with visual data. It also makes decisions and reports this derived data (it's nearest equivalent to qualia) to external entities. Given that every qualia it has goes through this decision-making process and is available for reporting, is it conscious?

I would say it is not. It has many of the properties of human consciousness, but it's decisions are reactive, not proactive. It never muses on the prevalence of white over red cars, or gets excited when it sees a licence plate from its home town. These specific things are not what it means to be conscious, rather are indicative of what it means to be human. But the underlying capacity strikes me as being what access consciousness is *for*. So this proactive capacity is what I would include as an essential feature of consciousness.

That is true or false or arbitrary with or without a complete neurological description of human consciousness, which merely limits consciousness to a subset of what brains do, and is reasonably extended to non-brains that do what brains do, or analogues of what brains do, or merely simulate what brains to.

This leads us to the intermediate example of an advanced computer capable of doing everything a human being does, replete with memory, imagination, the ability to form new associations, identify causes (important), etc. The question of whether that machine is conscious is not contained within the neurological description of human consciousness, or animal consciousness should we classify any non-human animals as conscious. Ultimately, you have to make a choice about what your language means: does your definition of consciousness admit non-living things or not? This is a separable question from the completeness of a neurological description of consciousness.

Let's say neuroscience has provided a complete and universally accepted description of human consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

Which is exactly what I think won’t happen but I’ll suspend disbelief for now.

So this proactive capacity is what I would include as an essential feature of consciousness. — Kenosha Kid

Interesting but I wouldn’t go so far. I’d put it in the same box as sight.

something else that is undiscoverable from the outside — Kenosha Kid

I’m more interested though in whether you understand what this undiscoverable thing from the outside that I’m referring to is. Note though: I haven’t said anything about consciousness that makes it undiscoverable from the outside by definition, though it is true that I have no clue how you would discover it from the outside.

Did the dream analogy work at all at clarifying what I mean?

Ultimately, you have to make a choice about what your language means: does your definition of consciousness admit non-living things or not? — Kenosha Kid

Well mine doesn’t require something to be living or inanimate.

You associate meaning with the constraints (form), I associate meaning with the thing which is constrained (content, or matter). — Metaphysician Undercover

Why can’t it be the Holism of the relation that is meaningful? The form represents the intent. The resulting materiality is the degree to which an intent is being manifested.

From my perspective, matter is inherently meaningful, because it cannot exist in a meaningless way. To exist as matter is to already have meaning. So even when matter appears to be free from constraints in an absolute way, it is still meaningful. This implies that we need to look beyond "constraints" to find the foundation of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Matter is always found as part of a process and so is in-formed by some set of constraints. Even an electron is a product of cosmic cooling and the constraints of the electroweak symmetry breaking being able to kick in.

The cosmos is then generally indifferent to the particular position and momentum of those electrons. The distribution is essentially free or random. Unconstrained as material properties. And you might also call that randomness meaningful from the whole system viewpoint.

But actually it would seem to count as part of the back-grounding meaninglessness that could now give particle momentum some meaning if you - as a sub-system of the cosmos - now found some reason to track the whereabouts of some selected electron.

You might want to have the kind of relationship where it is constrained to some flow in a mechanical circuit or something.

Reality is a hierarchical web of constraints given localised form to materiality. This is the opposite of the merological metaphysics you are trying to argue.

This is very much a Wittgensteinian approach. We apply boundaries (define words) for specific purposes. This creates the appearance that the meaning of the word is associated with the boundary. However, such a boundary (definition) is not necessary for the word to have meaning. And, the word inherently has meaning simply by the fact of being used. We can use a word, and therefore it has meaning, without employing any boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not sure quite what you are thinking. But it is obvious that we don’t construct the entirety of reality through words. A lump of rock has already formed by some natural process before I decide to call it a stone, a boulder or pebble.

Yet if I ask you to bring me a stone and you bring me a pebble, then something has gone wrong. My attempt to constrain your material behaviour in some meaningful way does not yet fit the bill.

You in turn could reply a small rock is as good as a large rock surely? Your belief is that the size difference is pretty immaterial - a matter of vagueness or indifference.

So your argument simply confuses levels of semiosis.

To begin with, we cannot ever have this perfection in sameness which you propose as "the global condition". "Similar" can never obtain the absolute perfection of same. "Same" is merely an ideal, produced as a modeling condition, like an artificial scale. In reality there is no such thing as perfect continuity with a lack of differentiation. — Metaphysician Undercover

But that was my point. So you are confirming my position again.

A constraint imposes conditions. It defines the differences that make a difference. In that, it is imposing a generalised sameness.

Yet by the same token, that act of constraint is also ruling on what are the differences that don’t make a difference. It is also defining what can be left free as material accidents.

You might come along and declare those differences are differences that count for you and thus mar the “absolute perfection” in your eyes. if a black dog has a single white hair, it fails your test.

But that is not the same as showing reality ought to have that same Platonic-strength concern. My position is all about avoiding the mistakes of that kind of formal cause idealism.

The Peircean view is founded on tychism or chance. Nature becomes organised by developing continuity or a hierarchy of limitations on its spontaneity. Forms rule because they have evolved to the degree needed to produce a lawful and regulated cosmos.

The world is only hot or cold relative to your own body temperature, large or small relative to your own size, etc. In other words, these sensations are relationships between the state of your body and the state of the environment. — Harry Hindu

I am saying that this dualism is always actually a dichotomy, and thus something intrinsically relational.

Hotter is only ever relative to colder. And vice versa. But then a world constructed within that contrast makes possible the new thing of having some particular position on that spectrum of possibilities. You can be a body in an environment where you have this Goldilocks three choices about the temperature you prefer.

But the boundary between life and non-life gets blurry. After all, life is just a more complex relationship than non-life, so it stands to reason that non-life would have very rudimentary, the most basic, the most fundamental relationships that life has, not that it doesn't have it at all. — Harry Hindu

The division - the epistemic cut - lies in the fact that life and mind are how we describe systems organised by symbols. They have a coding machinery like genes, neurons or word that can store memories and so impose a self-centred structure of habits on their environments.

It is pretty easy to recognise that difference between an organism and its backdrop inorganic environment surely?

But there just is no fact of the matter whether a word or picture is pointed at one thing or another. No physical bolt of energy flows from pointer to pointee(s). So the whole social game is one of pretence. Albeit of course a hugely powerful one.
— bongo fury

Can it both be a pretence (in physical terms) and yet also a hugely powerful one? — apokrisis

Why ever not? We're talking about the power of social conventions here. Please explain the difficulty?

But of course, as I said, the power of any code is that it is not tied to the physics of its world. — apokrisis

But of course, it could be said that some codes do and some don't derive their power from being tied to physics. Those that do we can usefully class as syntax, and implement as automation. For example, nature implements a DNA/protein correlation automatically. The rest is semantics, and requires a degree of social agreement as to what symbols are (to be pretended are) pointed at what objects.

It is powerful because it could refer to anything. — apokrisis

Yes, if we either use physics to automate it or we agree to pretend.

That means when it is not used that [just any] way, but instead pointed rather precisely, that is what makes it meaningful - signal rather than noise. — apokrisis

Yes, meaning is agreement to pretend this pointing rather than that.

One can’t be definitely pretending anything unless that is a clear contrast to the “other” of now making clear and meaningful reference to something understood to have a genuine social reality. Something that is of material consequence. — apokrisis

Oh dang, I thought you had got my drift. My bad. I'm arguing that human reference is quite generally a matter of pretence, no less when asserting unpretended truths than otherwise.

Why ever not? We're talking about the power of social conventions here. Please explain the difficulty? — bongo fury

I'm saying there is no difficulty. But then to call it a "pretence" is thus unnecessarilly loaded.

But of course, it could be said that some codes do and some don't derive their power from being tied to physics. — bongo fury

The codes that could evolve to survive in the physical world would have to be tied to their own material means of existence.

For example, nature implements a DNA/protein correlation automatically. The rest is semantics, and requires a degree of social agreement as to what symbols are (to be pretended are) pointed at what objects. — bongo fury

You are just skipping from one level of semiosis - genes - to another - words - and pretending that says something meaningful here.

It doesn't.

I'm arguing that human reference is quite generally a matter of pretence, no less when asserting unpretended truths than otherwise. — bongo fury

So to the degree that you are only concerned with linguistic semiosis, you are not engaging with my biosemiosis. And this conversation will remain at cross-purposes.

Remember that I have already specified the four key evolutionary steps in the ascent of biosemiosis - genes, neurons, words, numbers.

These levels equate to biology, neuroscience, culture and technology. And each of them are like a new sphere of life.

The modern educated human mind partakes in all four at the same time, in a moderately well integrated way. But we are dealing with a complex story here.

Why can’t it be the Holism of the relation that is meaningful? The form represents the intent. The resulting materiality is the degree to which an intent is being manifested. — apokrisis

The form "represents" the intent, but this implies that the intent is prior to the form. The intent might be the cause of existence of the form, but the intent is not itself a form. This is what we see in human relations, society, community, the intent is prior to, and cause of existence of the formal constraints. And, we see that intent resides within the individual who is a willing member of the community. So the individuals, who are the parts, are constrained by the form, but these constraints are derived from the will or intent of the parts, the individuals. Therefore prior to the existence of any constraints, there are the individual entities with the will, or intent to be constrained. The form, which is the constraint itself, is a manifestation of this intent. Meaning, as what is meant, is by definition found in the intent, not in the manifestation of the intent, the form. We might abstract the form, from the material act, but we must look beyond the form, to the intent behind it, to apprehend its meaning.

Matter is always found as part of a process and so is in-formed by some set of constraints. — apokrisis

OK, but intent, if we are to call it a constraint, is a different sort of constraint than form is. Form is an actual physical constraint, but intent is more of a desire, a motivation to act. As human beings, we have the will power to resist the desire, or motivation to act, so intent does not have the same force of constraint as form has. This is why the will is said to be free, intent (which is rooted in desire and want) does not have the capacity to force us into action. Therefore we must separate form, as actual physical constraint, from intent, which I would prefer not to call a constraint at all. Free will allows that we are not constrained in this way. Aristotle put intent in a different category from formal cause, as final cause. So in relation to your proposition above, it is possible that matter might be free from all formal constraints, yet still be "in-formed" by intent, but "in-formed" implies something other than "formed".

Reality is a hierarchical web of constraints given localised form to materiality. This is the opposite of the merological metaphysics you are trying to argue. — apokrisis

Yes, that is what I said, it is the opposite of what you propose. But I am only forced into this opposing position because you propose idealistic constraints which are completely unsubstantiated, and not grounded in reality. You are incapable of giving an account of how these constraints come into existence, where they come from, and why. From observations of human experience, I can say that constraints come from intent. But now I have to account for the existence of intent, and this pushes me in the opposite direction from you. You seem to think that intent is somehow inherent within constraint, but this defies observation, as we see that intent creates constraints, but it does not leave itself within the constraints it has created. Therefore we know that there is a separation between formal constraints and intent.

I’m not sure quite what you are thinking. But it is obvious that we don’t construct the entirety of reality through words. A lump of rock has already formed by some natural process before I decide to call it a stone, a boulder or pebble.

Yet if I ask you to bring me a stone and you bring me a pebble, then something has gone wrong. My attempt to constrain your material behaviour in some meaningful way does not yet fit the bill.

You in turn could reply a small rock is as good as a large rock surely? Your belief is that the size difference is pretty immaterial - a matter of vagueness or indifference.

So your argument simply confuses levels of semiosis. — apokrisis

I think you misunderstood the argument. The argument, as I've argued in this thread, is that it is incorrect to associate meaning with constraints, because meaning as Wittgenstein demonstrates, is prior to constraints. Take your example. You ask me to bring a stone. I misunderstand, so you've failed in your attempt at constraining my behaviour. You created no constraints. Would you not agree that your words still had meaning even though no constraint was created? And we do not need to assume other previously existing constraints amongst other people to justify the assumption that the words have meaning. All we need to do is consider the fact that you wanted something, and asked me to get it. This is all that's required for those words to have meaning and it doesn't matter if anyone else is capable of being constrained by your symbols (understanding them), the fact that you spoke them says that you meant something with them.

But that was my point. So you are confirming my position again.

A constraint imposes conditions. It defines the differences that make a difference. In that, it is imposing a generalised sameness.

Yet by the same token, that act of constraint is also ruling on what are the differences that don’t make a difference. It is also defining what can be left free as material accidents.

You might come along and declare those differences are differences that count for you and thus mar the “absolute perfection” in your eyes. if a black dog has a single white hair, it fails your test. — apokrisis

This is all gibberish to me, like you're try to change the subject again, trying to wiggle away. You clearly talked about sameness as "the global condition", and difference as "the local exception to the general rule". So you are positing this Ideal, "same" as the real global condition. What I pointed out is that this Ideal cannot be a real global condition, because the perfection required for that Ideal, "same" cannot be obtained in the physical reality. You seem to be still trying to justify your assumption of the physical reality of this Ideal, "same" by positing "differences that don't make a difference". All you seem to be saying is that if we overlook certain differences, assume that they make no difference, then we can have a true physical reality of this Ideal, "same". But that's illogical, because by allowing some differences you no longer have the Ideal "same". A diluted Ideal is not an Ideal.

Forms rule because they have evolved to the degree needed to produce a lawful and regulated cosmos. — apokrisis

Do you not see that "same" is itself a form? It is the supreme, highest form in the hierarchy. It's often called "One". If you posit this form as the real global condition, then you already assume the highest form as the background. There is no sense in talking about the evolution of forms, when you already assume the physical existence of the highest possible form as the background for your model.

The form "represents" the intent, but this implies that the intent is prior to the form. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or it self-organises and so intent and concrete possibility co-arise. The form is simply finality finding its fullest expression. The usual Peircean reply.

This is what we see in human relations, society, community, the intent is prior to, and cause of existence of the formal constraints. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or instead, there is always already some vague or informal understanding in play. And development of that gives it formal expression as some system of laws and rights or freedoms.

OK, but intent, if we are to call it a constraint, is a different sort of constraint than form is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Formal and final cause are the diachronic and synchronic view of the same essential thing. In the moment, you can see that there is some structure. In the long run, you can see that was expressing some reason.

You are incapable of giving an account of how these constraints come into existence, where they come from, and why. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you listen.

Where does a river get its snaking curves from? From the constraints of a least action principle. It must arrange itself so as to balance the amount of water feeding it and the slope of the land which it must cross. If a straight line is too short to shift enough water in enough time, then it must throw out snaking loops and house the water that way.

So the constraints are all the physical boundary conditions - the volume of water, the slope of the land, the hardness or softness of the terrain. The finality lies in the imperative of least action. The form is found in some degree of sinuosity. The river is the result - constrained within its suitably designed banks. It now seems a stable thing - an object of some kind we can honour with a name.

You ask me to bring a stone. I misunderstand, so you've failed in your attempt at constraining my behaviour. You created no constraints. Would you not agree that your words still had meaning even though no constraint was created? — Metaphysician Undercover

If you brought me a pebble, that is a small misunderstanding. If you bring me wombat, at least I can credit you with understanding the notion of "bring me".

It is all a matter of degree as to how obtuse I may judge you to be.

the fact that you spoke them says that you meant something with them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, even if you gibbered back to me in some weird lingo, I would still have reason to think you were trying to say something in another language.

So you are failing to demonstrate that language could have private meaning. Any meaning I could decode from the situation is relying on some familiarity with a communal habit.

This is all gibberish to me, like you're try to change the subject again, trying to wiggle away. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seems a simple point. If I draw a line in the sand, there are now two sides to the matter.

To be constrained is to be the one thing, and thus not any other thing. The usual negative space story.

And talking of wiggling out of trouble, you've skirted the key issue - that sameness seems singular and difference plural for good systems reason. That was a poor choice of target on your part.

All you seem to be saying is that if we overlook certain differences, assume that they make no difference, then we can have a true physical reality of this Ideal, "same". — Metaphysician Undercover

If you stick your big toe over the line I've drawn in the sand, I might just over-look it. If it's your whole foot, I would start to get peeved.

Between black and white, we can leave as much grey as we like - if we are actually indifferent.

As far as I'm concerned, I can decide you haven't yet done enough to cross my line.

Do you not see that "same" is itself a form? It is the supreme, highest form in the hierarchy. It's often called "One". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. A form represents singularity for the reasons I set out. If it is a universal, it applies every all at once.

That is how hierarchy theory works.

There is no sense in talking about the evolution of forms, when you already assume the physical existence of the highest possible form as the background for your model. — Metaphysician Undercover

But science shows that forms are emergent and so themselves form a developmental hierarchy. There are the most truly general constraints - we call them the laws of physics, or even the principles (like the least action principle). And then there are all the local rules and regulations, such as the strength of gravity on a planet the size of earth.

So if you only ever travel on the surface of the earth, that would seem like the general backdrop constraining all your movements. It just happens to be the highest scale of physical law you pragmatically encounter.

I am saying that this dualism is always actually a dichotomy, and thus something intrinsically relational.

Hotter is only ever relative to colder. And vice versa. But then a world constructed within that contrast makes possible the new thing of having some particular position on that spectrum of possibilities. You can be a body in an environment where you have this Goldilocks three choices about the temperature you prefer — apokrisis

There is no decision being made as we always goes with "just right". Hot and cold are merely informing you that you are no longer in a state of homeostasis, or a state of "just right".

Hot and cold are not relative to each other. They are temperatures relative to the temperature of another body that is neither hot nor cold. A body that has a different temperature will associate different things as hot and cold. If the sun could experience temperature, it would consider lava cold. Is lava hot or cold, or is it simply neither and everything just has a certain amount of kinetic energy?

The question is why is there both types of descriptors for temperature - subjectivity of hot and cold, and the objectivity of kinetic energy?

The division - the epistemic cut - lies in the fact that life and mind are how we describe systems organised by symbols. They have a coding machinery like genes, neurons or word that can store memories and so impose a self-centred structure of habits on their environments.

It is pretty easy to recognise that difference between an organism and its backdrop inorganic environment surely? — apokrisis

Effects are about their causes independent of any mind. A mind is not needed to establish that relationship. It is already there. A mind is just another effect of causes, and a cause for many effects. Minds simply focus on the causal relationships that are useful and ignore the rest. That doesn't mean that causal relationships don't exist except when accessed by some mind. Cause and effect is part of everything, including life and non-life. Again, we're merely talking about degrees of complexity of some causal system.

The relationship between tree rings and the age of a tree isn't in some mind. It is in the causal process of how the tree grows throughout the year, and that relationship exists independent of some mind attending to it.

Or it self-organises and so intent and concrete possibility co-arise. The form is simply finality finding its fullest expression. The usual Peircean reply. — apokrisis

This self-organization, what you call "the usual Peircian reply", is the illogical part of your perspective which I indicated when I first engaged you in this thread. With this type of holism it is required that the parts already communicate with symbols before the whole, as a system, is created. You insist that there is a "co-arising", but clearly the description of the system necessitates the logical conclusion that the individual parts are in communication with each other prior to the existence of the overall whole. Since the constraints are property of the whole, it is impossible that the global constraints co-arise with the local freedoms. The local freedom is necessarily prior to the global constraint.

It appears like you attempt resolve this issue by positing your global condition of Ideal sameness. This Ideal sameness provides some constraint which is prior to the emergent constraints, which are necessarily posterior to the local freedoms. But this Ideal constraint is unsubstantiated by evidence, and it is just posited for the pragmatic purpose of allowing you to ignore the logical implication of your principles, that individual freedom, and intent, are prior in time to constraints, therefore the assumption of "co-arising" is unsound.

Formal and final cause are the diachronic and synchronic view of the same essential thing. In the moment, you can see that there is some structure. In the long run, you can see that was expressing some reason. — apokrisis

Formal and final cause cannot be said to be the same thing without a misrepresentation of the nature of time. Each, as a "cause" implies a necessary temporal order. The diachronic nature of formal cause, the constraints of actually existent forms in the past, which impose deterministic restrictions, cannot in any way be identified as the intent which will cause (final cause) the existence of forms in the future. Formal cause is the deterministic effect of actually existing material forms, while final cause, as intent, utilizes immaterial forms to create new material forms in a way which escapes the constraints of existing material forms. If you approach these two from a determinist world view, you will be inclined to reject the reality of final cause, as a true cause (free will), and portray it as formal cause. This is the influence which the modern concept of time holds over us. "Time" as employed in science is based in deterministic principles to enable the theories of physics, but if we accept this representation as the truth about time, we deny ourselves the possibility of understanding final cause.

I don't think you listen.

Where does a river get its snaking curves from? From the constraints of a least action principle. It must arrange itself so as to balance the amount of water feeding it and the slope of the land which it must cross. If a straight line is too short to shift enough water in enough time, then it must throw out snaking loops and house the water that way.

So the constraints are all the physical boundary conditions - the volume of water, the slope of the land, the hardness or softness of the terrain. The finality lies in the imperative of least action. The form is found in some degree of sinuosity. The river is the result - constrained within its suitably designed banks. It now seems a stable thing - an object of some kind we can honour with a name. — apokrisis

To state, and describe the multitude of physical boundary conditions which are evident in the world, is not to "give an account of how these constraints come into existence". It's not that I don't listen, it's that you don't give an acceptable answer. And to say "they emerge", is just another way of saying you do not know.

So you are failing to demonstrate that language could have private meaning. Any meaning I could decode from the situation is relying on some familiarity with a communal habit. — apokrisis

The argument is not that language has private meaning, it is that language has meaning regardless of whether it is interpreted or not. There is nothing here to imply that this meaning is necessarily private. Meaning is evident in the act of producing the physical symbols. Therefore your claim that meaning is dependent on the interpretation of the symbols is false. This is a very important aspect of meaning which you don't seem capable of grasping. Meaning is something general, so it can have existence without any specific identity. This refutes your claim that meaning is the property of the constraints which attempt to give it a specific identity. Meaning is actually within the thing that is being constrained not the constraints.

Seems a simple point. If I draw a line in the sand, there are now two sides to the matter.

To be constrained is to be the one thing, and thus not any other thing. The usual negative space story.

And talking of wiggling out of trouble, you've skirted the key issue - that sameness seems singular and difference plural for good systems reason. That was a poor choice of target on your part. — apokrisis

You're still talking gibberish and avoiding the issue. Your singularity of "sameness" is just an Ideal which has not been substantiated, or sustained by any physical evidence. I say it's a perfection which is physically impossible, for very good reasons, just like Aristotle's eternal circular motion is physically impossible, and like any sort of perpetual motion is physically impossible, for very good reasons. You assume this Ideal sameness, for "good systems reason", but that's just a pragmatic reason, to facilitate the creation of your model. And since this Ideal has in no way been substantiated by physical evidence, and it actually appears to be most likely physically impossible, your good pragmatic reason turns out to be actually a very bad ontological reason.

If you stick your big toe over the line I've drawn in the sand, I might just over-look it. If it's your whole foot, I would start to get peeved.

Between black and white, we can leave as much grey as we like - if we are actually indifferent.

As far as I'm concerned, I can decide you haven't yet done enough to cross my line. — apokrisis

In relation to your proposed Ideal "sameness", which is supposed to be "not different", any degree of difference must be respected as a difference or else you are being illogical. You cannot define "same" as "not different", and then turn around and say that there are some differences which you might accept as the same. That is fundamentally illogical.

This is so sad. You propose an Ideal sameness. Then you seem to recognize the impossibility of this perfection, so you allow that it might be diluted by some degree of difference. But of course you want to proceed as if the Ideal sameness you propose has some form of validity. How can you not apprehend the illness here?

But science shows that forms are emergent and so themselves form a developmental hierarchy. There are the most truly general constraints - we call them the laws of physics, or even the principles (like the least action principle). And then there are all the local rules and regulations, such as the strength of gravity on a planet the size of earth. — apokrisis

As I said above, to say that forms are "emergent" is simply a way of saying that where they come from, how they come into existence, and why they come into existence, is unknown. So let's be clear here, science does not show that forms are emergent. Science leaves these aspects of the understanding of forms as unknown. Then speculators such as yourself will apply some metaphysical principles, and conclude "forms are emergent". But these speculations completely ignore the well respected metaphysics based in the evidence that final cause, intention, creates forms. Therefore the claim that forms are emergent (where they come from, how they come into existence, and why they come into existence, is unknown) is completely unwarranted, because we already know very well, that intention creates forms.

So to the degree that you are only concerned with linguistic semiosis, you are not engaging with my biosemiosis. — apokrisis

No, indeed. Fair cop. I am resistant to allowing semantic notions into the analysis of automatic processes - even complex, biological ones. It seems fundamentally confused. Still, inter-faith dialogue, and all that.

I have been reading through this thread, trying to keep up (I keep running out of time and falling behind). Despite the tendency so far to ignore my questions, I’m going to make a couple points here from my perspective, because MU and @apokrisis seem to be arguing from positions that are misunderstanding their relation to each other. I don’t pretend to have a solution, mind you - only opinion. I appreciate that your discussion is informing my own understanding from both perspectives...

As I said above, to say that forms are "emergent" is simply a way of saying that where they come from, how they come into existence, and why they come into existence, is unknown. So let's be clear here, science does not show that forms are emergent. Science leaves these aspects of the understanding of forms as unknown. Then speculators such as yourself will apply some metaphysical principles, and conclude "forms are emergent". But these speculations completely ignore the well respected metaphysics based in the evidence that final cause, intention, creates forms. Therefore the claim that forms are emergent (where they come from, how they come into existence, and why they come into existence, is unknown) is completely unwarranted, because we already know very well, that intention creates forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

Forms can be either emergent (bottom-up) or intentional (top-down). An intentionally-created form is contingent upon a conscious system that perceives the potential form. An emergent form is contingent upon a conditional relation between components, such that the form’s potential is realised. The difference between these two descriptions appears to be the perception of potential. But it isn’t. The difference is the assumption of a self-conscious system that apperceives the form’s potential.

What is consistently overlooked in this discussion of consciousness is an assumption of self-consciousness inherent in top-down explanations. We can only distinguish between conscious and not-conscious, or between potential and actual, from the perspective of a self-conscious system. The properties of consciousness are considered emergent irrespective of a self-conscious system - but this doesn’t necessarily mean that where they come from, how or why they come into existence is unknown. What it means is that this information is understood as relative to the position of the self-conscious system.

Your singularity of "sameness" is just an Ideal which has not been substantiated, or sustained by any physical evidence. I say it's a perfection which is physically impossible, for very good reasons, just like Aristotle's eternal circular motion is physically impossible, and like any sort of perpetual motion is physically impossible, for very good reasons. You assume this Ideal sameness, for "good systems reason", but that's just a pragmatic reason, to facilitate the creation of your model. And since this Ideal has in no way been substantiated by physical evidence, and it actually appears to be most likely physically impossible, your good pragmatic reason turns out to be actually a very bad ontological reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

‘Sameness’ refers to absolute, not physical, possibility. It’s an ideal reference to what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective. It is from our relation to this possibility/impossibility of ‘sameness’ that any potential for difference can be perceived - a binary relation that renders ‘the self’ either non-existent or as existence itself.

But ontology is not limited to physical possibility. Ignorance, isolation or exclusion of information is neither ‘good systems reason’, nor pragmatic in the long term. That proposing an ideal ‘sameness’ is illogical doesn’t give you cause to exclude the possibility as such, in an absolute sense. Illogical or not, it is a necessary part of understanding the system.

Forms can be either emergent (bottom-up) or intentional (top-down). An intentionally-created form is contingent upon a conscious system that perceives the potential form. An emergent form is contingent upon a conditional relation between components, such that the form’s potential is realised. The difference between these two descriptions appears to be the perception of potential. But it isn’t. The difference is the assumption of a self-conscious system that apperceives the form’s potential. — Possibility

I don't accept this bottom-up, top-down distinction. I see no real principles to support it. I do see a distinction to be made, in the Aristotelian tradition, between the material forms of particular things, and immaterial forms, which are abstractions, universals, or concepts. Since abstractions are produced from individual human minds, all forms are bottom-up in creation. The universal Ideal, the One, or Same, "global condition", which apokrisis proposes, and might be used to ground top-down constraints, I find to be nothing other than a bottom-up, intention guided, human idea.

What is consistently overlooked in this discussion of consciousness is an assumption of self-consciousness inherent in top-down explanations. — Possibility

Right, so the supposed top-down forms are really, fundamentally bottom-up. So we hit the Kantian problem, the supposed top-down forms, the independent, intelligible forms, the noumena, are inaccessible to us, as independent. We assume top-down forms, we assume that they are inaccessible, and this makes these supposed top-down forms fundamentally unknowable. In reality though, this assumption is unsubstantiated and unwarranted because all forms are fundamentally bottom-up, and this is what Plato described as apprehending "the good". When all forms are apprehended as bottom-up, we dissolve the division which makes some forms appear to be fundamentally unintelligible. That any forms could be unintelligible is itself a basic contradiction.

‘Sameness’ refers to absolute, not physical, possibility. It’s an ideal reference to what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective. — Possibility

This ideal is fundamentally incoherent. To remove the self-conscious perspective from the self-conscious perspective makes no sense. If we could do such a thing, we would not be left with an "ideal", we would be left with a non-ideal. So anything presented as an absolute, as an ideal, produced from removing the self-conscious perspective, is fundamentally wrong. We can see this in your phrase "...what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective". Clearly, without that self-conscious perspective, nothing matters, therefore there cannot be an ideal here.

It is from our relation to this possibility/impossibility of ‘sameness’ that any potential for difference can be perceived - a binary relation that renders ‘the self’ either non-existent or as existence itself. — Possibility

The problem is that you come up with the opposite conclusion of what is logical. You cannot render the self-conscious mind as non-existent in a thought experiment, and then use that self-conscious mind which is supposed to not be there, to come up with an ideal which represents existence without the self-conscious mind. That is illogical, as contradictory. Therefore it is just fundamentally illogical to propose the removal of the self-conscious perspective, and we must accept the absolute reality of the self-conscious perspective. If we deny the reality of the self-conscious perspective we rob ourselves of the capacity to access reality.

That proposing an ideal ‘sameness’ is illogical doesn’t give you cause to exclude the possibility as such, in an absolute sense. — Possibility

Yes it does. That something is illogical is very good reason to reject it from the realm of possibility, as impossible. This is fundamental to epistemology, and the only means for obtaining true certainty, the process of eliminating the impossible.

Illogical or not, it is a necessary part of understanding the system. — Possibility

Understanding that if it is illogical, it is therefore impossible, is of the highest priority. This is falsification, it is how we reject falsehood. And, "understanding the system" which has been rejected as false, is what guides us away from falsity in our quest for truth.

We're talking about human rational inference, right? So we're talking about a human being figuring out that A > C, not some out-there truth that A > C. That's what I presumed anyway. If you meant something like the latter, it doesn't seem to be a question about human reason at all. — Kenosha Kid

I found a quote by the biologist J B S Haldane which makes the point I was trying to get across:

It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.

Haldane, J.B.S. (1932) [1927]. Possible Worlds, and Other Essays (reprint ed.). London, UK: Chatto and Windus.:p 286

(incidentally, Haldane, according to the encyclopaedia article on him, was a staunch atheist and humanist and had zero regard for theological arguments.)

This is because, as I said, logical necessity can’t be equated to physical necessity. And this has nothing intrinsically to do with whether it’s a ‘human being figuring it out’ or not - although, as it happens, humans are the only beings we know of who can figure it out. But were some other sentient rational beings to exist somewhere else in the universe, they too would be obligated to recognise logical necessity, and for the same reasons - even if their brains were configured completely differently to our own.

And what is it about you that provides you with different evidence of your consciousness than I have of your consciousness? — Harry Hindu

I can introspect myself, but others can't.

That is a good explanation of why Possibilitiy's proposition makes no sense.

It’s an ideal reference to what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective. — Possibility

We cannot assume in the same proposition, to remove the means by which we understand things, and also still maintain the assumption that there is the means for understanding things. Logic demonstrates itself as the means for understanding, and we have no basis to assume anything else as the means for understanding.

So there is absolutely no sense to the proposition which removes the means for understanding, because it leaves us with absolutely nothing intelligible and no possibility to proceed anywhere from that proposition. Therefore we must turn things around and start with the assumption that the capacity to understand, logic, cannot be removed from reality, thus it is fundamental. This is the assumption which enables us to understand reality, and denies emergence (which posits a reality without logic as the starting point), as an impossibility.

And what is it about you that provides you with different evidence of your consciousness than I have of your consciousness?
— Harry Hindu

I can introspect myself, but others can't. — bert1

I'm not clear on how this answers the question.

Introspection is the observation of one's own mental processes. Others can claim that they can observe our mental processes as "shivering brains". The question is trying to ask why we have two different views of our own mental processes - an introspective and extrospective view of one's own mental processes.

Doesn't this also presume a homunculus in the brain with an alternate view of mental processes? What does it mean for the mind to view itself? How is it different from viewing your whole self (your body), or is it a simulated view, or maybe even an information feedback loop - of turning the information back on itself of being about itself?

The question is trying to ask why we have two different views of our own mental processes - an introspective and extrospective view of one's own mental processes. — Harry Hindu

Because the fact that I am bert1 allows me two different perspectives to examine bert1's mental processes: introspection and extropsection. Whereas other people only have extrospection as a way of observing bert1's mental processes (to the extent that the can do so at all).

Is that question equivalent to "Why am I some particular person, rather than no one in particular?"?

Right, so the supposed top-down forms are really, fundamentally bottom-up. So we hit the Kantian problem, the supposed top-down forms, the independent, intelligible forms, the noumena, are inaccessible to us, as independent. We assume top-down forms, we assume that they are inaccessible, and this makes these supposed top-down forms fundamentally unknowable. In reality though, this assumption is unsubstantiated and unwarranted because all forms are fundamentally bottom-up, and this is what Plato described as apprehending "the good". When all forms are apprehended as bottom-up, we dissolve the division which makes some forms appear to be fundamentally unintelligible. That any forms could be unintelligible is itself a basic contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kant’s aesthetics suggest that the noumena does not consist only of independent, intelligible forms but of qualitative relations that transcend logical construction - accessible to us through the ‘free play’ of our faculties of understanding, imagination and judgement in relation to experience.

In my view, the structure of reality has an aspect duality that renders it both bottom-up apprehensible and top-down accessible - so long as we do not arbitrarily limit this accessibility by dismissing the possible existence (and information) of illogical relations. I agree that all consolidation of forms are fundamentally bottom-up, but I would add that all relations are fundamentally top-down, and that their structure prevails over form, regardless of logic. It will require both to render our existence fully intelligible.

This ideal is fundamentally incoherent. To remove the self-conscious perspective from the self-conscious perspective makes no sense. If we could do such a thing, we would not be left with an "ideal", we would be left with a non-ideal. So anything presented as an absolute, as an ideal, produced from removing the self-conscious perspective, is fundamentally wrong. We can see this in your phrase "...what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective". Clearly, without that self-conscious perspective, nothing matters, therefore there cannot be an ideal here. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet, despite all logic, it remains possible to imagine such an ideal. To clarify, I’m not saying that we should remove the self-conscious perspective itself, only the assumptions that centre it. This was Kant’s aim: to dislodge the anthropocentric perspective, in the same way that Copernicus dislodged the geocentric one. Copernicus didn’t remove our perspective, but rather the assumptions that centred it - he imagined a broader perspective in which ours is moveable, variable, one of - and from there determined a more accurate structure of the solar system. The way I see it, Kant’s own efforts were missing the shift in perspective that Darwin’s work provided - he was trying to effect two consecutive ‘Copernican Turns’ in one.

In a reality filled with variable self-conscious perspectives, everything matters and nothing matters. I recognise that this transcends logic, but it is the possibility of relational structure at the level of reality in which self-conscious entities interact. I’m not suggesting that we take leave of our senses and reside there - only that we acknowledge this incoherent contradiction, the irreducible binary, as fundamental to reality. Logic is one possible relational structure, and its appeal is undeniable. But it will never enable us to understand existence fully at a relational level. Despite our best efforts, we continue to act contrary to logic when it suits us to do so. Reality is not a purely logical structure. It must be understood as inclusive of illogical relations, or we will remain ignorant of its possibilities, and continue to be blindsided by suffering.

The problem is that you come up with the opposite conclusion of what is logical. You cannot render the self-conscious mind as non-existent in a thought experiment, and then use that self-conscious mind which is supposed to not be there, to come up with an ideal which represents existence without the self-conscious mind. That is illogical, as contradictory. Therefore it is just fundamentally illogical to propose the removal of the self-conscious perspective, and we must accept the absolute reality of the self-conscious perspective. If we deny the reality of the self-conscious perspective we rob ourselves of the capacity to access reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not deny the reality of the self-conscious perspective, but deny its necessity - dislodge its central, immovable position.

Yes it does. That something is illogical is very good reason to reject it from the realm of possibility, as impossible. This is fundamental to epistemology, and the only means for obtaining true certainty, the process of eliminating the impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would have thought my continual reference to existence and understanding, rather than certainty and knowledge, made it clear that my perspective is ontological. You’re referring to logical, not absolute, possibility, here. I understand that what we can know with any true certainty will always be relative to a particular value structure - such as logic. But I also understand that this is not reality. So eliminating the impossible, while it enables us to articulate what we know, deliberately excludes accessible information about reality.

Understanding that if it is illogical, it is therefore impossible, is of the highest priority. This is falsification, it is how we reject falsehood. And, "understanding the system" which has been rejected as false, is what guides us away from falsity in our quest for truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you’re after truth in a logical structure - what you can claim to know with certainty, not what you can understand or relate to. When I talk about ‘understanding the system’, I mean access to information that enables us to improve predictions about future interactions with reality. That includes not just recognising falsehood in order to reject it, but understanding the relational conditions under which such falsehoods arise.

Kant’s aesthetics suggest that the noumena does not consist only of independent, intelligible forms but of qualitative relations that transcend logical construction - accessible to us through the ‘free play’ of our faculties of understanding, imagination and judgement in relation to experience. — Possibility

I don't see your distinction between forms and relations. Surely a relation is a form, isn't it?

I agree that all consolidation of forms are fundamentally bottom-up, but I would add that all relations are fundamentally top-down, and that their structure prevails over form, regardless of logic. It will require both to render our existence fully intelligible. — Possibility

I really can't see this distinction. A "form" is an arrangement of parts. A "relation" is the way in which one thing is connected to another. The only difference appears to be that "relation" implies distinct things, related to each other, whereas "form" implies that those things which are related to each other compose a whole, a form. So the matter of whether a relation is simply a relation, or whether it is a part of a whole, is just a matter of perspective.

Now, your top-down/bottom-up distinction is just a matter of perspective. If you apprehend the whole (form) which the related things are parts of, it appears as top-down, and if you do not, the relations appear to be bottom-up. But as I explained already, the whole is just an unsubstantiated Ideal, so all such relations are really bottom-up, as the whole which would validate any top-down relations is just an imaginary ideal which cannot actually be found.

And yet, despite all logic, it remains possible to imagine such an ideal. — Possibility

Oh yes, quite definitely. It is possible to imagine all sorts of impossible things, but that does not make them possible. But with logic we can assess imagined things, which people might claim as possible, and designate some as impossible, and this is the epistemic basis for certainty.

To clarify, I’m not saying that we should remove the self-conscious perspective itself, only the assumptions that centre it. — Possibility

What I am saying is that this is impossible. The reality is that the self-conscious perspective is central, and placing it anywhere else would be a false premise. Notice that Copernicus did not remove self-consciousness as central, but just found the means to account for the illusions created by this position. These illusions are the false Ideals, "the global position", which lead to the idea of top-down causation. Self-consciousness being at the center of reality is constrained by the forms that surround it, and this creates the illusion of top-down acting constraints, what you call relations. But in reality, all these other constraints are just bottom-up forms produced from other points which are equally the center of reality.

That is the difficult part to grasp, there is not one particular "center of reality", but each point is equally a center of reality, just like each self-conscious being is equally a center of reality. We attempt to build "relations" between these points of self-consciousness, with our intellectual powers, so we assume an overriding whole, the Ideal external world, and model the points with a spatial-temporal reference. But these top-down relations are all artificial, imaginary relations, while the real relations are internal to these points which are each equally the center of reality. This is what the study of genetics indicates, the real relations are internal, and from within these internally related points the bottom up causation is active. Now each point of self-consciousness has its own bottom-up formal structure, and to build a true model of reality requires relating them one to another, each as the center of reality. This is why the principles of physics cannot model the true reality, because it hasn't developed the principles required to relate individual points to each other, when each is the center of the universe. As the center of the universe, they are each the same, but as individual points, they are each different.

Despite our best efforts, we continue to act contrary to logic when it suits us to do so. Reality is not a purely logical structure. It must be understood as inclusive of illogical relations, or we will remain ignorant of its possibilities, and continue to be blindsided by suffering. — Possibility

There is fault in this line of thinking. Just because we act in ways which are contrary to reason doesn't mean that we ought to act in these ways. What is implied is that our ability to apply logic, and understand, surpasses our capacity to control our actions. Therefore we can figure out what we ought to do, but we cannot necessarily make ourselves do it. Our actions are very much constrained by our physical bodies, but our minds are much freer. So as living creatures, our minds can evolve much quicker than our bodies, apply logic, and determine thing such as the way that we ought to behave, while our bodies might not provide us with the will power to actually do what is logical.

Sure, you might allow that illogical relations are part of your reality, just like when you do something which you know that you ought not do. But the point is that we can, and ought to dismiss these from our epistemology. Illogical things cannot be accepted into any sort of knowledge, so we can dismiss them as bad, just like my actions are bad when I do something which I know I should not.

So "reality" being what is produced by the self-conscious being within, through its judgements (as it is illogical to try and exclude the self-conscious being from reality) must exclude what is illogical. That would not be an acceptable judgement. And when we act in ways which are contrary to reason, this is not the reality of the illogical, it is just a failure of our ability to understand why we act the way that we do. But just because it appears to the rational mind that the actions are illogical, doesn't mean that they are, in an absolute sense. It's really just a matter of not understanding why we act the way we do.

Not deny the reality of the self-conscious perspective, but deny its necessity - dislodge its central, immovable position. — Possibility

That's the point, the self-conscious perspective is necessarily the central, immovable position. It is the self-conscious being which has the perspective, so it is impossible to assign the perspective of the self-conscious being to something else. That's what gives us the false ontology, assuming that this perspective can be "dislodged". Once we realize that this is the one and only ontological perspective which we have, then we can proceed toward analyzing how the constraints of the real, physical human being, influence, and even taint, the way we understand reality, in ways which we cannot escape, but we can compensate for.

I would have thought my continual reference to existence and understanding, rather than certainty and knowledge, made it clear that my perspective is ontological. You’re referring to logical, not absolute, possibility, here. I understand that what we can know with any true certainty will always be relative to a particular value structure - such as logic. But I also understand that this is not reality. So eliminating the impossible, while it enables us to articulate what we know, deliberately excludes accessible information about reality. — Possibility

It is reality though. And once you come to realize that there is nothing further beyond this, no other elusive "more real reality" which is outside of, or beyond your own personal perspective, then you can look at every other perspective as equally "reality". Then we might all partake in the same "reality", because we are related from within, in ways we do not yet understand, but a way that gives us each a different perspective. Then there is nothing more to ask ontologically, and we can move on to epistemology.

Again, you’re after truth in a logical structure - what you can claim to know with certainty, not what you can understand or relate to. When I talk about ‘understanding the system’, I mean access to information that enables us to improve predictions about future interactions with reality. That includes not just recognising falsehood in order to reject it, but understanding the relational conditions under which such falsehoods arise. — Possibility

Once you see that reality is within, you'll see the value of honesty and truth, as fundamentally prior to understanding, and you'll stop talking about trying to relate to, and interact with, some external reality, as if this is the route to understanding.

I really can't see this distinction. A "form" is an arrangement of parts. A "relation" is the way in which one thing is connected to another. The only difference appears to be that "relation" implies distinct things, related to each other, whereas "form" implies that those things which are related to each other compose a whole, a form. So the matter of whether a relation is simply a relation, or whether it is a part of a whole, is just a matter of perspective.

Now, your top-down/bottom-up distinction is just a matter of perspective. If you apprehend the whole (form) which the related things are parts of, it appears as top-down, and if you do not, the relations appear to be bottom-up. But as I explained already, the whole is just an unsubstantiated Ideal, so all such relations are really bottom-up, as the whole which would validate any top-down relations is just an imaginary ideal which cannot actually be found. — Metaphysician Undercover

A ‘form’ is a consolidated arrangement, whereas ‘relation’ refers to the variability in arrangement: the structural potential that informs any consolidation. It is very much a matter of perspective (that is what we’re talking about). Relation does not necessarily imply ‘distinct things’ but the existence of rules and laws that structure consolidation at each dimensional level. While I agree that a consolidation of form would validate top-down relational structure, its insubstantiality does not preclude its possible existence.

How do you think quantum mechanics began, except from mathematical arguments regarding the possible relational structure of insubstantiated ideals?

Oh yes, quite definitely. It is possible to imagine all sorts of impossible things, but that does not make them possible. But with logic we can assess imagined things, which people might claim as possible, and designate some as impossible, and this is the epistemic basis for certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

That also doesn’t make them necessarily impossible - only logically so. Don’t get me wrong - what I’m referring to is along the lines of the usefulness of imaginary numbers in mathematics. I’m not arguing for the necessary validation of imaginary, illogical possibilities - only their possible existence and therefore usefulness to us in informing a more accurate understanding of reality.

The reality is that the self-conscious perspective is central, and placing it anywhere else would be a false premise. Notice that Copernicus did not remove self-consciousness as central, but just found the means to account for the illusions created by this position. These illusions are the false Ideals, "the global position", which lead to the idea of top-down causation. Self-consciousness being at the center of reality is constrained by the forms that surround it, and this creates the illusion of top-down acting constraints, what you call relations. But in reality, all these other constraints are just bottom-up forms produced from other points which are equally the center of reality.

That is the difficult part to grasp, there is not one particular "center of reality", but each point is equally a center of reality, just like each self-conscious being is equally a center of reality. We attempt to build "relations" between these points of self-consciousness, with our intellectual powers, so we assume an overriding whole, the Ideal external world, and model the points with a spatial-temporal reference. But these top-down relations are all artificial, imaginary relations, while the real relations are internal to these points which are each equally the center of reality. This is what the study of genetics indicates, the real relations are internal, and from within these internally related points the bottom up causation is active. Now each point of self-consciousness has its own bottom-up formal structure, and to build a true model of reality requires relating them one to another, each as the center of reality. This is why the principles of physics cannot model the true reality, because it hasn't developed the principles required to relate individual points to each other, when each is the center of the universe. As the center of the universe, they are each the same, but as individual points, they are each different. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your approach is different to mine, but I have no real argument with what you’re saying here. To clarify, by relations, I don’t mean top-down causation or acting constraints. I’m talking about all possible relations existing both between all ‘forms’ and within them, informing their respective consolidation (ie. their bottom-up formal structure) as well as that of any being that consolidates them as such.

My approach is developed partly from Carlo Rovelli’s deconstruction of time, and his resulting description of physical reality not as objects in time, but as ‘correlated events’. As individual points they are each different (and ‘move’ in relation to each other), but when each is the centre of an unfolding universe of spacetime, they are the same.

The main problem that physics has, in my view, is the purely quantitative structure of its relations. It is a self-conscious process that excludes illogical, qualitative relations from what is effectively a five-dimensional model. Even consciousness as the centre of the universe has an unconsolidated, qualitative relation to it.

A ‘form’ is a consolidated arrangement, whereas ‘relation’ refers to the variability in arrangement: the structural potential that informs any consolidation. It is very much a matter of perspective (that is what we’re talking about). Relation does not necessarily imply ‘distinct things’ but the existence of rules and laws that structure consolidation at each dimensional level. While I agree that a consolidation of form would validate top-down relational structure, its insubstantiality does not preclude its possible existence. — Possibility

The problem I see here, is that if "relation" refers to something variable, then a "relation" is inherently indefinite, as a "variabilitiy in arrangement", rather than a definite arrangement. A "form", as "a consolidated arrangement", requires true definability, and therefore cannot be composed of "relations" as you have defined it.

Relation does not necessarily imply ‘distinct things’ but the existence of rules and laws that structure consolidation at each dimensional level. While I agree that a consolidation of form would validate top-down relational structure, its insubstantiality does not preclude its possible existence. — Possibility

So we need a third thing here, to validate "consolidation". A form cannot consist of relations because relations are variable, and the consolidated structure of a form is invariable. To change, for example, is not to continue existing as the same form, but to have a new form, so invariability is essential to the form. So you propose "the existence of rules and laws". Clearly these rules and laws cannot be derived from the form itself, because they are necessary to create the prerequisite invariability, from the relations which are observed, and described as variable, in order for a form to be created. This is the point I've made numerous times to apokrisis. The form itself cannot be the source of the rules and laws, as these are necessarily prior to the existence of the form, as cause of its existence.

This is where we have to be careful to differentiate the two distinct ways that "form" is used, one referring to our description of the thing, which is posterior to the thing, and the other referring to the creation of the thing, which is prior to the thing. So we have a "formula" or blueprint, by which we create a thing, and a "form" which is a description of a thing, and each is a distinct sense of "form".

Now, our subject of inquiry is the rules or laws which apply to forms being responsible for invariability. In describing a form, the rules are descriptive, in creating a form, the rules are prescriptive. Notice that both refer to what "ought" to be done, therefore the two types are reducible to a single type rule, as prescriptive rules. So the rules and laws, which are responsible for the creation of forms, of both types, are of the prescriptive type, rules of how things ought to be done. "Ought" implies the activity of intention, final cause.

We can apply this back against the dilemma of variable (indefinite) relations, and consolidated (definite) forms. We see that a "relation" implies members, elements, particles, or some form of a multitude, distinct differences which are related in that condition of variability. And, there is some form of "ought" which is applied to these relations which converts the existence from variable to invariable, creating a form. The existence of human beings provides our example of individual members, with intention, acting with final cause. We see that the final cause and intention inheres within the particulars, who produce principles from within their own minds, as rules to act by, each person attempting to constrain one's own acts with personal principles which they adhere to. Therefore from this example, we can see that the invariance required to produce a form comes from within the individual members, as final cause, so that all forms are bottom-up.

That also doesn’t make them necessarily impossible - only logically so. — Possibility

You don't seem to understand, logic is necessity. What is logically so is necessarily so. What is logically impossible is necessarily impossible. How can you introduce a form of necessity which is outside of logic? You could appeal to a "need" in the sense of pragmatism, and final cause, as the means to an end, what you call "usefulness", but then your proposed end needs to be justified. This justification is a process of logic. So you say, mathematics is "useful" for understanding, but to use mathematics which produces conclusions which are unintelligible is misunderstanding. That is the position we're in with quantum mechanics. Imaginary numbers, infinities, and such, are used for the sake of prediction, so they are useful, but the result can in no way be described as understanding. If we apply good principles of logic, and rid ourselves pragmatic necessity in favour of logical necessity, we have a true course toward understanding. When your pragmatic end must be justified, on what would you pretend to base any other form of true necessity on, other than logic?

My approach is developed partly from Carlo Rovelli’s deconstruction of time, and his resulting description of physical reality not as objects in time, but as ‘correlated events’. As individual points they are each different (and ‘move’ in relation to each other), but when each is the centre of an unfolding universe of spacetime, they are the same. — Possibility

The problem with process philosophy and assuming "events" as fundamental, is that traditionally relations would be inherent within the classical description of an event. An event in the classical sense is a changing of relations between things. Now, as the fundamental element, the "event" is the thing. So we have two new problems. How do we describe what is internal to the fundamental "event", so as to make it consistent with the traditional "event"? What is changing inside that fundamental event to justify calling it an event? And the second problem is on what principles do we relate one event to another, to represent the passing of time. At this point, since we do not have any real understanding of the passing of time, and science turns it into something subjective, the trend is to appeal to panpsychism to justify the apparent continuity of the passing of time.