• Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    In my previous thread about the web of reality, I argued that particular occasions of experience are the most fundamentally concrete parts of the world, and everything else that we postulate the existence of, including things as elementary as matter, is some abstraction that's only real inasmuch as postulating its existence helps explain the particular occasions of experience that we have.

    Some of these abstract things are so fundamental that we could scarcely conceive of any intelligent beings comprehending reality without the use of them. Immanuel Kant called these kinds of things, things we cannot exactly observe but which we cannot help but use to structure the things that we do observe, "categories".

    The ones that I will describe here are not exactly the ones that he describes, though there is significant overlap.



    The first thing we need to do to structure our experiences is to identify patterns in them. To do that, we need a pair of concepts that I call "quality" and "quantity", which allow us to think of there being several things that are nevertheless the same, without them being just one thing: they can be qualitatively the same, while being quantitatively different.

    Any two electrons, for instance, are identical inasmuch as they are indistinguishable from each other, because every electron is alike, but they are nevertheless two separate electrons, not one electron.

    In contrast, the fictional character Clark Kent is, in his fictional universe, identical to the character of Superman in a quantitative way, not just a qualitative way: though they seem vastly different to casual observers, they are in fact the same single person.

    If two people are said to drive "the same car", there are two things that that might mean: it could mean that they drive qualitatively identical cars (or as close to it as realistically possible, e.g. the same year, make, and model), or it could mean that they drive the same, single, quantitatively identical car, one car shared between both of them.

    With these concepts of quality and quantity, we can describe patterns in our experience as quantitatively different instances or tokens of qualitatively the same tropes or types. Out of this arise the notion of several different things being members of the same set of things ("qualities" as I mean them here mapping roughly to the mathematical concept of "classes", an abstraction away from sets, and "quantities" as I mean them here mapping roughly to the mathematical concept of "cardinality", an abstraction away from the measure of a set or class). And with that can be conducted all of the construction of increasingly complex abstract objects built from sets as detailed in another previous thread.



    Then to further structure those patterns, we need conceptual spaces in which to figuratively lay out those instances of those tropes, in which to cluster them together and separate them apart. The most elementary of those conceptual spaces, I hold, is what mathematicians and physicists call a phase space or configuration space, which is an entirely abstract, imaginary kind of space wherein each point represents one way the system under consideration could be, a kind of abstract space of possibilities, wherein the potential changes of our experiences can be structured.

    If we then identify patterns, trends, in the movement of our experience through that abstract space of possibilities, we have constructed the concept of time in its usual linear sense, with one direction in the configuration space being designated the past and another designated the future. I hold that time is best conceived of literally as a line through an abstract configuration space like this, with other "possible worlds", other possible configurations of the world, being literally, ontologically the same kind of thing as other times, other times being merely a special subset of other possible worlds in which the present, or the actual world, can be found.

    (My conception of possible worlds, each being an instantaneous possible configuration of the universe, is different from the usual kind promoted by supporters of modal realism — this view that other possible worlds really exist — like David Lewis, who hold that other possible worlds each contain within them a whole temporal history changing from past through present to future. Other philosophers, such as logician Saul Kripke, seem to take possible worlds to be instantaneous configurations of the universe like I do, and speaking of things being possible, necessary, etc, "from" one world or another, rather than in absolute terms; something being possible in some world if it occurs in any other world "accessible" from that world, rather than just if it occurs in any possible world at all. I would interpret that, on my model, as being equivalent to the temporal relationship between possible worlds: a world that is "accessible" from another is a possible future of that other world, and things that lie in possible futures of a given world are in a sense relatively possible from that world, but we can still speak meaningfully about things being possible in the absolute sense of occurring in any possible world at all, irrelative to any particular world from which that world is accessible).

    With a concept of time established, we can then construct a concept of space, that being the time that it takes a change to one part of our experience to affect another part of our experience. This does not depend on any particular claims of contemporary physics about the speed of light being constant or anything like that: any arbitrary speed could be picked, even if the speed of light were not constant, by which to derive distances from durations, and to construct a concept of space from a concept of time. This is actually quite commonly done in casual speech: places may be said to be hours away by foot or minutes away by car, their distances given as the time it takes to travel there at a given speed (implied by the mode of transit).



    Within these spaces, we can then separate bundles of experiences from each other into different objects, giving rise to concepts such as substance, which is not directly observable and cannot really be said to exist unto itself, but is a useful concept for structuring bundles of experiences in space. Patterns in our experience bundled together in time likewise give rise to the concept of causation, which David Hume famously argued also cannot be directly observed, only patterns of "constant conjunction".

    I agree with Hume about that as much as I agree with the likes of George Berkeley about substance, in that neither can really be directly known or said to really exist in any independent way, but they are nevertheless indispensable concepts in structuring the patterns of our experiences in space and time. (These notions of substance and causation also map neatly onto the notions of mass and energy, inasmuch as mass can be thought of as the amount of substance in an object, and energy thought of as the capacity to cause changes).

    Lastly, the concept of a kind of modal identity is useful for structuring ideas about counterfactual scenarios, bundling things together across possible worlds in a way broader than mere temporal causation. For instance we might want to say that had I made different choices in the past I would find myself in different circumstances in the present, and yet that counterfactual me in some other possible present is still nevertheless me in some sense, just as much as the past version of me that we both have in common is also me in some sense, connected to this present me by a chain of causation. I am presently what that past me became, in this timeline; and some other possible me is what that past me could have become, had things unfolded differently.



    Two other useful concepts for structuring our experiences are what we might call mind and will, in very particular senses of those words, but I will explore those concepts in much greater detail in later threads. In short for now, the concept of "mind" as I mean it for these purposes is just that of whatever it is that is the subject of experiences, as opposed to the objects of those experiences: minds in this sense are whatever it is that are having the experiences, in contrast with whatever it is that the experiences are of. As discussed in the previous thread (same link at the top of this post), I hold that these are not ontologically different kinds of things, but rather, different roles that the same things can take on, and that all things do take on simultaneously.

    Note that by "experience" here I don't necessarily mean anything so robust as the kind of experience humans have, though that is a subset of what I do mean, which is something much more simple, shared by all objects; similar to, and I think identifiable with, what is meant by "observation" in quantum mechanics, which does not require a thinking person, but just any other physical system capable of interacting with the thing being "observed". (I will detail my thoughts on "mind" in a more robust and useful sense than this in my later thread on that topic).

    And the concept of "will" as I mean it for these purposes is likewise a very simple subjective role that I hold anything can and everything does take on (with my thoughts on "will" in a more robust and useful sense than that are likewise to be detailed in my later thread on that topic). But rather than being the subject of experience, "will" as I mean it here is the subject of behavior, which is to say it is essentially agency in a very broad sense, the capacity to behave, to do things, in the same way that I mean "mind" here as the capacity to experience.

    And experience and behavior, as I elaborate in the thread linked at the start of this post, I hold to be but two different perspectives on the same singular thing: interaction.
  • Possibility
    2.8k
    Just wanted to let you know that I am reading along with great interest here. There is something about your theory that always captures my interest, but I cannot quite place it. I find that on first reading I find much to disagree with, but nothing to find fault with. On a second or third read-through, the ideas start to fall into place, and although your approach is vastly different to mine, I am intrigued by the sense that we may be approaching the same understanding from very different perspectives. I don’t think I’ve read nearly deeply or widely enough of the academic material to participate notably at this level, and I still have to re-read everything a couple of times before it starts to make sense, but I think I can follow just enough to relate to where you’re headed. :up:
  • Philosophim
    2.6k
    I've always summed the approach as entities having the ability to discretely experience.

    Imagine a camera taking a picture of a sheep in a field. It does not know that there is a "sheep", or a "field". Its just the experience. But thinking things can look at that blob of white and see that its different from that blob of green. They can observe the "discrete" within experience.

    I can observe a field of grass. A blade of grass. A portion of the grass. I can ignore the grass entirely. I can part and parcel my experience however I desire. This, to me, is the basis for all other thoughts and determinations about reality.
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    Thanks, that’s very encouraging to hear!
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    Like vectorizing a raster image. I have very similar thoughts about that that I plan to write more about for an upcoming thread about epistemology.
  • charles ferraro
    369


    Pfhorrest, you stated: "The first thing we need to do to structure our experiences is to identify patterns in them."

    Is structure (patterns or patterning) something that is imbedded in, or native to, experiences which consciousness uncovers and identifies, or is structure (patterns or patterning) something extraneous to, or not native to, experiences which consciousness brings to, or contributes to, experiences?

    Which is your meaning?

    For example, does my consciousness create, or encounter, the pattern of the object I name "elm tree"?

    Also, how can the truth of either alternative be verified empirically?
  • Jack Cummins
    5.3k

    I like your thread discussion but do agree with the last response, being unsure about the way in which the subject matter of our consciousness can be verified on an empirical basis.

    I do have experiences of tuning into other dimensions and patterns which seem to be pointing towards unknown dimensions, but how can I know if the thoughts are real or my own fantasies, even if it is abstract thought rather than images?

    We have Kant with his picture of transcendent truths which can be perceived by the law of reason. Alternative we have Bohm's idea of an implicate order beyond the explicate order. Similarly, we have Jung's idea of the collective unconscious or the adventures of travellers on the astral plane. Are they completely different matters or are they the same exploration using different terminology?

    Generally, it seems that the idea of reason is seen as more objective and supreme as opposed to images by the philosophers. But surely this comes down to the way in which words are the main tool of the philosophers whereas images are more the subject of the arts. However, I am not sure images and symbols are not important too , especially if they can be translated into words.

    However, the main issue is that we can access other worlds and dimension containing patterns and abstraction but it is hard to know if these are real. Of course there have been writers who spoke of hidden, alternate realities, such as Emmanuel Swedenborg and Rudolf Steiner, who I doubt would not be given much credibility on this site, but as with their writings are we not journeying towards the esoteric. However, I would not be against the esoteric but from my experience of this site so far it seems to verge into a taboo territory.
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    Good question! I don't think either discovery or creation, in the senses that we normally use them of concrete objects, properly applies to abstract ideas, or patterns. Rather, something that is in some ways discovery-like and in some ways creation-like is what we do when identifying patterns. I had another thread that was all about that a little while back, but the short version of my view there would be:

    On the one hand, if we supposed that ideas were simply invented in the way that concrete objects are, that would imply that each idea did not exist at one point in the past, and then came into existence when instantiated. So, for example, the idea that 2+2=4 would not have existed, and so could not have been true, until someone thought of it, and then only after someone did think of it, would it have existed, and been true.

    On the other hand, if we supposed that ideas were simply discovered in the way that concrete objects are, that would imply that ideas already existed in some accessible way completely unrelated to the possibility of them being instantiated. So, for example, for it to be discovered that 2+2=4, there must have already existed the ideas of "two", "four", "addition", and "equality", and the relationships between them, somewhere "out there" in some kind of strange realm of abstract objects.

    It seems that we are prone to call it "invention" when it is the first known instance of someone having an idea, or if it’s a relatively non-obvious idea; and we are prone to call it "discovery" when it is a later known instance of someone having an idea, or if it’s a relatively obvious idea. But I think there really is no difference between them when it comes to abstract ideas; the distinction between creation and discovery applies only to concrete objects.

    I'm not really sure how this stuff about alternate "dimensions" etc is related to this thread, but I'm generally opposed to anything supernatural (which it sounds like you mean), as described in more detail in the thread preceding this one that was linked in the OP.
  • charles ferraro
    369


    So then, is it more appropriate to say Einstein "invented"/"created" or Einstein "discovered" that monumental interplay of abstract ideas (mathematical and physical) that constitutes the Special Theory of Relativity? Or, should we say he did both, simultaneously?

    Also, I think concrete objects (entities), not being abstract ideas, are encountered, neither discovered, nor invented.
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    Or, should we say he did both, simultaneously?charles ferraro

    Sort of both and neither. With abstract objects it's not really possible to differentiate.

    Also, I think concrete objects (entities), not being abstract ideas, are encountered, neither discovered, nor invented.charles ferraro

    Some concrete objects are invented (or created if you prefer). This computer, a concrete object, isn't something that someone just found (discovered, or encountered if you prefer). Someone made it. On the other hand another concrete object, El Capitan, the famous monolith in Yosemite valley, was discovered, not invented. Someone just found it there already like that.

    Abstract ideas, meanwhile, being nothing but possibilities until instantiated in concrete objects (including in human minds), are "made" by being "found", and "found" by being "made". To come up with an idea just is to realize something is possible; but it was already possible before you came up with it; yet there was nothing to that possibility other than the potential for someone to come up with that idea. They don't really come apart.

    But this is really more a topic for that other thread (Creativity: Random or deterministic? Invention or discovery?) than this one.
  • charles ferraro
    369


    I was referring to "natural", not manufactured, empirical entities as being encountered. Also, the ultimate constituent elements of manufactured entities are encountered. No one makes them.

    I do not subscribe to the Platonic notion of pre-existent abstract ideas being instantiated. To me they are simply actual, not possible, expressions of the variety of ways in which the human brain is structured or programmed to perceive and know the empirical entities it encounters; that is why they exhibit varying degrees of universality, necessity, and applicability.
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    I was referring to "natural", not manufactured, empirical entities as being encountered.charles ferraro

    Sure, but that's completely uncontroversial. My point is that the distinction between something being found and something being made originates in a distinction between kinds of concrete objects, "natural" vs "artificial", found-in-nature vs made-by-man. And that distinction doesn't really properly apply to abstract ideas, because there is nothing to be found but the potential for something to be made, but that potential itself was not made, it was always "there". (Not like in some Platonic realm, but as in it was always possible to make the thing, nobody created the possibility, they just found out that it was possible.)

    I do not subscribe to the Platonic notion of pre-existent abstract ideas being instantiated.charles ferraro

    Neither do I, which is why I don't just come down on the "ideas are found" side of the divide. I'm also not on the "ideas are made" side of it. I'm saying the divide doesn't apply to ideas, only to concrete objects.
  • charles ferraro
    369


    Abstract ideas are neither found, nor made; they are thought.

    Please explain with greater precision what your statement means which begins with "... because there is nothing to be found but the potential for something to be made, but that potential itself was not made, it was always "there." " What is the subject you are referring to here?
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    Abstract ideas are neither found, nor made; they are thought.charles ferraro

    Sure, that’s a fine way of putting it.

    Please explain with greater precision what your statement means which begins with "... because there is nothing to be found but the potential for something to be made, but that potential itself was not made, it was always "there." " What is the subject you are referring to here?charles ferraro

    Two different subjects:

    When people speak of discovering something abstract, the “thing” they have discovered is just the possibility of making something concrete, because abstract things are nothing more than possible forms that concrete things could take on.

    But when people speak of creating something abstract, they are not talking about creating that possibility that is the subject of the discovery above, but just of creating the first concrete instantiation of that form, since it was always already possible to create things of that form, the “creator” didn’t make it possible.
  • charles ferraro
    369


    If I may.

    Two different subjects:

    Subject 1. Einstein said he just discovered the possibility of making the abstract Special Theory of Relativity concrete because the theory was nothing more than a possible form that concrete things could take on.

    Subject 2. Einstein also said he created the first concrete instantiation (expression?) of the abstract Special Theory of Relativity, since it was always already possible to create things of that form, he "the creator" didn't make it possible.

    Am I missing something???
  • Pfhorrest
    4.6k
    No, that sounds about right, though it's phrased a little unusually for talk of a theory. But yeah, Einstein discovered that Special Relativity was a possible way of modeling the world (and also discovered that the world fit that model, but that part was was discovering something concrete about the world). And Einstein created the first model of that form. Discovering the possibility and creating the instantiation were the same act, so it's not like we can say unilaterally that he only created or only discovered, because with abstract ideas you're always kinda creating and kinda discovering them at the same time, in different senses, never just doing one or the other.
bold
italic
underline
strike
code
quote
ulist
image
url
mention
reveal
youtube
tweet
Add a Comment

Welcome to The Philosophy Forum!

Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.