@Luke, @Isaac, @Kenosha Kid

This is mostly taken from here, Dennett's summary of his Intentional Stance book.

I think the role mental entities play in Dennett's philosophy of mind is a tightrope walk. On the one hand, he does not want to deny the efficacy of explanation styles which use mental furniture, on the other he does want to deny some ontological commitments which may be taken to explain that efficacy.

So take "I enjoy spicy food", I believe Dennett would see that as quite unproblematic. I can taste things, I can have taste preferences. I have a taste preference for spicy food. But what he would see as problematic is an unrestricted commitment to the existence of tastes, spiciness feelings and so on. As if spiciness, enjoyment as we typically conceive of them are somehow instantiated in my mind and body.

But how can he see "I enjoy spicy food" as unproblematic if he also believes that there's no spiciness experience in some sense of the word? I think it is a difficult question, but he has written on it. It seems to boil down to the attribution of mental states to myself and others is effective at explaining, describing and predicting how we think, feel, sense, behave at a certain level of abstraction. That's the intentional stance idea.

The intentional stance is an explanatory style in which purposive states are attributed to systems in order to predict, explain or describe their behaviour. If I write "2+2" and hit return in the R software environment I have open, it will output "4", one way of explaining that is "my computer added the number 2 to the number 2 and outputted the number 4". That's not what the computer's internal systems did - which involved a lot of electronics and software-hardware interactions I just don't understand - but I can describe and predict its behaviour with that understanding. My computer never had the natural number "2" in it literally, but it did have some systemic pattern that behaves in a way sufficiently similar to having the natural number 2 in it that "my computer added the number 2 to the number 2 and outputted the number 4" works as a predictive explanation. You can tell it was a predictive explanation because I'm familiar with the software, think about it as if it is really adding the natural number 2 to the natural number 2, and it reliably produces the output of "4". The elements in my description correspond to functional patterns in the computer.

Another example is seeing the red light on a printer that signals it is out of paper, I've thought "oh, the printer wants fed" - "wants". Just to be super specific about it, attributing "wants" to the computer there makes a lot of sense as the procedure of printing requires paper, it currently has no paper, and in order for it to be able to print again its paper supply must be refilled. By attributing "wants" to the computer, I have summarized patterns in the printer and analogized it to having an unfulfilled desire (for paper, it is hungry).

Dennett's perspective seems to be that we take exactly the same approach in attributing mental content to people. If you took the intentional stance towards me in trying to understand why I've written this post, you might think some things like "fdrake wants to clear up an ambiguity he sees" or "fdrake wants to steer discussion in the thread" or "fdrake wants to contribute to the discussion" and so on. I'd describe my motivation as involving those and other things.

And in a similar way as I don't have to become committed to the printer having human desires and needs - hunger, wants - by reacting to its paper requirements for printing as "oh, the printer wants fed", why should I have to become committed to the literal existence of any constituent of an explanation I construct when adopting the intentional stance?

I'm not trying to say that "oh, the printer wants fed" and "fdrake wants to clear up the ambiguity he sees" use "wants" with precisely the same denotation and connotations - that is precisely the ambiguity of commitment leveraged in the intentional stance.

Even if we experience the same subjective flavours, how do I really know what you mean by "nutty"? Does it taste like a particular type of nut? Do all peanuts taste the same, for example? And what sort of bitterness are we talking about? There are many shades of difference here which language cannot easily capture. We could go on endlessly trying to refine it. I think this is what Dennett criticises (or what qualia advocates are referring to) when he speaks of the ""homogeneity" or "atomicity to analysis" or "grainlessness" that characterizes the qualia of philosophical tradition." A picture is worth a thousand words in other words, and language has difficulty doing justice to the sight before our eyes (or the taste on our tongue, etc.), especially when attempting to convey it to others in high fidelity. — Luke

I realise that what I'm about to say isn't directly about Quining Qualia's argument, but it is related to the above and the intentional stance. Adopting the intentional stance towards a system renders one relatively insensitive to fine grained distinctions between constitutive elements of the considered system for explanatory purposes. Take "fdrake enjoys spicy food", when I write that I've got a few memories associated with it, and I'm attributing an a pattern of behaviour and sensation to myself. I've made a whole type out of "spicy food", but in particular I had some memories of flavours from a vindaloo I'd had a few years ago and the burrito I'd described previously. The particulars of the flavour memories didn't really matter (I can give both more and different "supporting evidence" for the statement), as I'm summarising my engagement with an aggregate of foods, feelings and eating behaviours with discriminable characteristics (sensations, flavour profiles, event memories) etc.

Instead of attributing a quality of ineffability to a particular experience, it can be seen as a result of the indifference of intentional stance explanations to the particular details of their constituents. Ineffability of experience as a feature of the descriptive strategies we adopt regarding experience, rather than of the abstract entities we are committed to when using those strategies. Analogously, the computer's exact reaction to my call command for "2+2" is also practically ineffable; there are thousands of transistors coming on and off, there are allocation patterns for memory etc; and not because it's trying to express the natural number 2 added to the natural number 2 producing the natural number 4 through the flawed media of binary representations and changes in voltage states of transistors.

Exactly. It's AP-speak where to exist is to be the subject of a sentence.

Santa Claus exists in this sense. Doesnt mean AP philosophers think Santa is a real guy.

Problem is that when it comes to myself, I'm not positing anything theoretical when I taste spicy food. It just tastes spicy, red cups look red, and nutty coffee does taste a bit bitter to me. And that's prior to any philosophizing about internal states and "what it's like". Our sensations are not linguistic constructs or self-reports to make sense of behavior. They're just part of experience.

But anyway, good of you to bring up Dennett's intentional stance. And I prefer to add "2+2" in a Python environment.

Or we could just ask a mathematician whether a color is a number, but they'd probably think we were trolling.

Numbers are abstract quantities that you can perform mathematical operations on. Sure, you could assign 0 to purple and 1 to green, or use the standard digital hex value or HSLA. But numbers can be assigned to represent anything, from unicorns to philosophers.

Colors are not abstract quantities. You don't say there's "green squares" to represent a number of squares.

↪fdrake Problem is that when it comes to myself, I'm not positing anything theoretical when I taste spicy food. It just tastes spicy, red cups look red, and nutty coffee does taste a bit bitter to me. And that's prior to any philosophizing about internal states and "what it's like". Our sensations are not linguistic constructs or self-reports to make sense of behavior. They're just part of experience. — Marchesk

I don't think that an identity between mental content and signifiers of mental content is required for the intentional stance (as I've understood it). It's more that the intentional stance is a modelling behaviour an agent can adopt towards a system; more goes into adopting the intentional stance than writing a description. If my partner's voice sounds irritated, I'm already attributing mental states to her. If I have an empty feeling in my stomach, I'm attributing desires (hunger) to myself.

Language use will play a role in that, but it's not the whole thing. It's a way for an agent to track and predict another system. That system may be another person or oneself. If I have those interoceptive states in that context, I feel hunger - you see what I mean? Being able to write out a system model in intentional language is piggybacking off some modelling behaviour I'm doing, that "whole thing" is the intentional stance, I think.

If I have those interoceptive states in that context, I feel hunger - you see what I mean? — fdrake

And you learned to identify it as hunger from your earliest interactions with your community in the form of your caregiver, as Lacan suggests.

But note that even the above sentence is again struggling to put it in words because you are also formed by vagueness meeting a model.

And "model" is doing it again.

And you learned to identify it as hunger from your earliest interactions with your community in the form of your caregiver, as Lacan suggests. — frank

Yes. Here's the thing: seeing this as a cup, feeling that as hunger - the identification/categorisation/discrimination is a process component of it, of seeing and of feeling. The formation of perceptual features (the cup I've seen, the hunger I feel) is a discriminating process.

the identification/categorisation/discrimination is a process component of it, — fdrake

A process component of what? I dont understand.

Discrimination of perceptual stimuli into the types we perceive them as is a process component of the formation of perceptual features. The seeing of the cup. The feeling of hunger.

It sounds like you agree with Heidegger that ideas (for lack of a better word) are at the core of what we see and hear and taste.

Numbers are abstract quantities that you can perform mathematical operations on. Sure, you could assign 0 to purple and 1 to green, or use the standard digital hex value or HSLA. But numbers can be assigned to represent anything, from unicorns to philosophers.

Colors are not abstract quantities. You don't say there's "green squares" to represent a number of squares. — Marchesk

By abstract, do you mean "quantitative"?

There is the quality-quantity lens mentioned above by @javra.

We can apprehend the world through quality and quantity, hence both of these must exist, at least in our mind. They must be supported by perception systems. I noted that the taste of sugar combines a quality (sugar taste) and a quantity (too little, too much sugar in my coffee). So the idea is like this:

Functionally, a successful animal needs to be able to estimate certain things, including the energy available in its food, and incentivise certain behaviors, while minimising certain risks (including food poisoning). Its olfactive and gustatory senses help distinguish between "good" and "bad" food by:

1. Using chemical reactions in the nose and mouth to estimate a series of indicators - eg concentration in disposable sugars, various salts, some "known" ( by evolution) poisonous stuff, etc.

2. Tag each of these indicators with a qualitatively distinct mark or feel, a qualitative signal if you wish, that allows the animal to recognise the indicator. The taste of sugar is different from the taste of salt.

3. Use the intensity of the signal above to code for the quantitative aspect of perception. (too much or too little sugar)

4. Attach pleasure or displeasure to each of these qualitatively identified signals, as a way to shape behavior.

5. Make the system evolutive and adaptative throughout the animal's life, with some capacity to record or reproduce past food consumption events, to inform future ones.

Or we could just ask a mathematician whether a color is a number, but they'd probably think we were trolling.

Numbers are abstract quantities that you can perform mathematical operations on. Sure, you could assign 0 to purple and 1 to green, or use the standard digital hex value or HSLA. But numbers can be assigned to represent anything, from unicorns to philosophers. — Marchesk

I don't understand what point you're trying to make. Neither I nor Dennett are arguing that all things are the same as all other things, so you being able to find two things which aren't the same as each other doesn't prove anything relevant here. The proposition is that colours just are states of neurons in some sense. You seemed to think that a suitable counter-argument is just to say colours are one thing and neural states are another, but that argument only works if no thing we give separate names to turn out to refer to the same entity. As with Hesperus and Phosphorus, we know that's not the case. So what is your actual argument as to why colours cannot be neural states. Why are they like numbers and colours (two different things) and not like Hesperus and Phosphorus (two different names for the same thing)?

Our sensations are not linguistic constructs or self-reports to make sense of behavior. — Marchesk

Why not?

Not in this paper. But supposedly that is what he is doing. I don’t know I didn’t read much of his stuff. It’s too technical for me to understand.

It revolves around the simple question: do you understand what a p-zombie is? Dennett describes it in the article and seems to accept it as a meaningful idea.

1. If you agree that it makes sense, then you should be able to see the logical wedge this drives between qualia and function.

2. If it doesn't make sense to you, all bets are off — frank

Just because we can see what someone means by identifying something, doesn't mean it exists. I can understand the idea of an ordinary zombie animated by telekinesis, doesn't make either real.

Can you give an example of one (or more) of these properties. I assume redness is out. Bitterness? — Luke

None of those things would be properties of mental processes, they might at best be categories of mental processes, as in "this particular set neural activities is part of 'bitterness', but it would be a very fuzzy set. I think it makes more sense to think of things like bitterness as convenient fictions. The word does a job and does it quite well, doesn't mean it's referent actually exists.

Properties of consciousness would be more like the pattern of signals it has, the causes and consequences of it,...etc

Not in this paper. But supposedly that is what he is doing. — khaled

I don't think that's what he is doing. Because many around here are Dennett readers and they don't propose any alternative conceptual framework or theory to understand how come we can spot sugar from salt, or dislike cauliflower.

Best post in a while on this thread.

If one accepts Dennett's arguments against qualia, is one then bound to accept the remainder of his analysis of consciousness?

That assumption seems to be behind much of the thinking expressed here. But put directly it is inept.

Cool. Yes, I'm interested. My cousin has a genetic anomaly that's known to be associated with perfect pitch. She's always had it. She started playing piano at 3 years from watching her mother play.

But it's true that jazz musicians demonstrate the ability to perceive key transitions that normal people can't. Supposedly there is a study. I could find if you need it. — frank

Great. Happy to be introduced to research. I would hope to recognise some of it from previous encounters, but nonetheless. No real excuse for launching into the project, such as it is, without a thorough review. On the other hand I hope we and any other participants aren't inhibited from forming and comparing opinions based on a mixture of science and navel-gazing.

I'll start the thread in the lounge, for that reason. Any views, anecdotes, arguments, research or idle speculation welcome. :smile:

I start from the (questionable) assumption that my brain must have quickly destroyed all growth of the global, absolute sensitivity as soon as musical play led it to start to develop the local, relative sensitivity. [...continued p 94 aka the lounge, here]

But it’s there for very good reason, and it can’t easily be rejected. — Wayfarer

Yes, it requires a conceptual shift.

But it can be revealed through analysis.

It was Galileo Galilei who wrote ‘the book of nature is written in mathematics’ and whose legacy includes the astonishing leaps that science made in subsequent centuries. It is true that understanding the laws that govern just those attributes of bodies that can be made subject to precise quantification, combined with Descartes’ newly-discovered algebraic geometry, laid the ground for the ‘new science’ that is at the basis of modern scientific method, which has universal scope and application, and spectacular results, not least these amazing ‘typing machines’ we all seem to have nowadays. And you can’t let subjective preferences play a role in engineering specifications. — Wayfarer

What you're describing are the spectacular results that can be realized by effective mathematical abstraction. But, as I note below, it isn't necessary to adopt the Cartesian ontology along with it.

This is all the subject matter of another of Thomas Nagel’s books, namely, Mind and Cosmos. He says

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.

(pp. 35-36)

So what you see with eliminative materialism is this dogmatic insistence that the objective view of modern science is complete in principle, if not in detail. Whatever ‘consciousness’ is, it must be something which can be accommodated inside this schema, otherwise it’s reality is either illusory or deceptive. That’s their view in a nutshell. — Wayfarer

The solution, as I see it, is to put qualities like color, etc., back in the world where they belong. It is the apple that is red, there is not red qualia in people's minds, or anywhere else. We see that the apple is red because it is red. Just as we see that there is one apple because there is one apple. That is nature from our perspective (the relational interaction between ourselves and the world that we are a part of).

So what’s involved in rejecting it is retracing the steps, as it were, to how that situation arose and re-framing the whole issue. — Wayfarer

:up:

The solution, as I see it, is to put qualities like color, etc., back in the world where they belong. It is the apple that is red, there is not red qualia in people's minds, or anywhere else. We see that the apple is red because it is red. Just as we see that there is one apple because there is one apple. That is nature from our perspective (the relational interaction between ourselves and the world that we are a part of). — Andrew M

Yep. Talk of qualia distracts us from the world in which we are embedded. It's vestigial idealism.

I curried some 'roo the other day. Used a cinnamon stick, whole coriander and whole cumin seed roasted, fresh green garlic pulled that morning, some curry leaves fresh from the tree, whole cardamon pods, garam masala; cooked the meat first then made a paste with the spices, returned the meat, then some spuds and a couple of cups of fresh broad beans. Slow cooked the result for a couple of hours.

Each mouthful had several distinct tastes, sometimes the garlic, sometimes the 'roo, sometimes the cinnamon, each time in a different combination.

To describe a qualia of curry would be a nonsense. An utter failure to recognise the complexity of the experience.

Again, talk of qualia detracts from the conversation.

Oh, and a couple of teaspoons of peanut butter - mussaman style.

The solution, as I see it, is to put qualities like color, etc., back in the world where they belong. It is the apple that is red, there is not red qualia in people's minds — Andrew M

But how come some (colorblind) people see the apple as green? And how do you confirm that the apple is in fact red? You can’t see the apple from my perspective to confirm that when you say “red” you are referring to the same experience as when I say “red”.

The problem is this: we can confirm that we all agree on some properties of the apple/experience them the same way. Properties such as shape can be confirmed by asking someone to draw an apple and you’ll find people will agree on an apple’s shape. But someone can be seeing inverted colors from me and there will be absolutely no way to confirm or deny that. In other words, we can confirm the wavelength reflected off the apple, but we cannot confirm whether or not the experience produced when that wave enters our eyes is the same.

But how come some (colorblind) people see the apple as green? — khaled

Because that is how colour blind people see a red apple.

And how do you confirm that the apple is in fact red? — khaled

And how do you confirm that it isn't in fact red?

You can’t see the apple from my perspective to confirm that when you say “red” you are referring to the same experience as when I say “red”. — khaled

But if you agree that it is red, that's an end to the discussion. Well, for everyone else but you, perhaps.

But someone can be seeing inverted colors from me and there will be absolutely no way to confirm or deny that. — khaled

And hence the argument drops out of the discussion. Either way, it is ineffable. The only issue here is you insisting on attempting to "eff" it, anyway.

And that's the problem with qualia; if they are worthy of inclusion in our musings, then they are just the colours, smells and tastes of which we already speak; and if they are more than the colours, smells and tastes of which we already speak, then they are outside our musings.

Sounds delightful!

Because that is how colour blind people see a red apple. — Banno

So then “red” must not be an inherent property in the apple right? We can agree it reflects a certain wavelength but beyond that we have no data to indicate that that wavelength produces the same experience in everyone. And with colorblind people we have clear data to show it doesn’t.

And how do you confirm that it isn't in fact red? — Banno

I don’t have to. I’m not the one proposing to attribute experiences to the objects that produce them as properties.

But if you agree that it is red — Banno

I agree that the color I’m experiencing is called red. But I don’t agree that when I say “red” and you say “red” that we’re necessarily referring to the same experience.

The only issue here is you insisting on attempting to "eff" it, anyway. — Banno

I’m not trying to eff it. When did I do that? I’m not trying to describe red to someone who has never seen it. That would be effing. I’m saying that there is no reason to believe that my experience of red is the same as your experience of red. In other words, while the experience of red is ineffable, we have no reason to believe that your ineffable experience is identical to my ineffable experience. That’s all I’m saying.

So then “red” must not be an inherent property in the apple right? — khaled

Is it? , "The red inheres in the apple" might be an odd way for you to say that the apple is red; but perhaps you want to bring in the baggage of essential properties and so on? You want to add a distinction between inherent properties and... what? Note that I am not here asking for the detail, but pointing out that it is there; and that makes for further perplexity.

We can agree it reflects a certain wavelength but beyond that we have no data to indicate that that wavelength produces the same experience in everyone. — khaled

That's because of the way you talk about experience. We have ample data that we see apples - some of them - as red. Some are green, some yellow; the conformity is more than sufficient for some of us to plant orchards, breed a huge variety of apples of different colours and sell them to green grocers. What more do you want? Ah, perhaps you want philosophy. Hence:

And how do you confirm that it isn't in fact red?
— Banno
I don’t have to. I’m not the one proposing to attribute experiences to the objects that produce them as properties. — khaled

You can choose the red apple from amongst the green ones; buy it; eat it; cook it. The only time you have a problem with it's being red is when you come to the Philosophy Forum.

I agree that the color I’m experiencing is called red. But I don’t agree that when I say “red” and you say “red” that we’re necessarily referring to the same thing. — khaled

Don't ever apprentice yourself to a green grocer, then.

I’m not trying to eff it. When did I do that? I’m not trying to describe red to someone who has never seen it. That would be effing. I’m saying that there is no reason to believe that my experience of red is the same as your experience of red. In other words, while the experience of red is ineffable, we have no reason to believe that your ineffable experience is identical to my ineffable experience. That’s all I’m saying. — khaled

And I'm saying that there is no reason to believe that my experience of red is not the same as your experience of red. Because of the overwhelming agreement as to what is red and what ain't, what you'r saying is irrelevant; more than that, it is senseless; nonsense; meaningless; it has no referent; it makes no difference; it drops out of the discussion, unnoticed by anyone but those few, such as yourself, who misunderstood what was going on.

And that's the problem with qualia; if they are worthy of inclusion in our musings, then they are just the colours, smells and tastes of which we already speak; and if they are more than the colours, smells and tastes of which we already speak, then they are outside our musings. — Banno

It was pretty good. Still fathoming the issue of using 'roo in place of beef, or my own preference, lamb. It is very lean, with a texture similar to skirt steak; although much more tender.

Ah, perhaps you want philosophy — Banno

Some are green, some yellow — Banno

Not quite. Some we all call green, some we all call yellow. Again, my red could be your purple and no physical or chemical theory would be violated. And we would both refer to a given apple by the same name because we've been taught to associate "Red" with a particular experience. However that particular experience may not be the same for both of us. My "word to associated experience" table may be a homomorphism of yours, not necessarily identical.

That is what I mean when I say that "red" is not the property of the apple. If by "this apple is red" you mean "this apple produces the experience 'red' refers to" then yes that apple is red. If by it you mean "this apple produces the experience 'red' refers to for me, equally for everyone" then no not necessarily. You don't know that. The light wave coming from the apple only specifies which "pointer" to use, it doesn't necessitate the the experience pointed to must be the same.

Don't ever apprentice yourself to a green grocer, then. — Banno

If my expereience of color was the exact inverse of what he experiences, we could still work together just fine. We would both look at an apple and call it "red" or "green" or whatever the case may be but if we somehow peered into the others' first person perspective, maybe their "red" is my "purple". And even if that were the case, we would still be able to perfectly understand each other, as long us neither of us tries to "eff" our experience to the other (because they won't succeed).

And I'm saying that there is no reason to believe that my experience of red is not the same as your experience of red. — Banno

I didn't say there was. I'm not advocating for a position on this. I'm saying that we have no reason to believe OR deny that our experiences are identical. And neither position leads to any differences in real world interactions or breaks any sort of physical laws.

what you'r saying is irrelevant — Banno

Practically irrelevant. Agreed.

it has no referent; it makes no difference; — Banno

But these two things are not the same though you seem to use them interchangeably. "It makes no difference". Fine. "It has no referent". No. It refers to the contents of your experience. Think of "red" as a pointer if you're familiar with programming. "Red" is a word that points to a certain experience (qualia). We do not use the the thing being pointed to when we talk (because that are ineffable) BUT we do use the pointer.

So when I say "the apple is red" I'm saying "I am having the experience 'red' points to, and you'll probably have that one too (unless one of us is colorblind)". I am NOT saying that the experience "red" points to has to be the same for us, and I do not need to make such a claim for us to undertand each other. It could be the case that the experience 'red' points to for me is the experience 'purple' points to for you, and we would still have no issue in understanding.

And that's the problem with qualia; if they are worthy of inclusion in our musings, then they are just the colours, smells and tastes of which we already speak; and if they are more than the colours, smells and tastes of which we already speak, then they are outside our musings. — Banno

I didn't disagree with this. Doesn't make the concept meaningless, just useless.

Each mouthful had several distinct tastes, sometimes the garlic, sometimes the 'roo, sometimes the cinnamon, each time in a different combination.

To describe a qualia of curry would be a nonsense. An utter failure to recognise the complexity of the experience. — Banno

So you have a way to distinguish garlic from cinnamon through "distinct tastes". Amazing!

You are not saying that these tastes are qualitatively distinct from one another, right? That is ruled out by Dennett, the naked emperor of your soul.