One thing about consciousness is that it seems to be related to volition, might even be why we have it at all instead of just reflexes, however complicated. Or it could be this is the cheapest way to build up a repertoire of complex reflexes. (I spend far more time talking and writing than I do trying to remember words I want to use.) At any rate, we don't have volition here: I don't choose to see the world as colored, or to smell what I smell or feel what I feel, and so on. I have no control over what's dumped into my awareness and what's not. (Similarly, it's almost impossible not to understand speech in a language you understand, so robust is the habit.) That strikes me as interesting, but I've no idea what to do with it. — Srap Tasmaner

It speaks to the part that recollection plays.

He's talking about the word itself. The word exists. I suppose on way to put it if you want to maintain that all words we use must, by that use, have a meaning (a position I have some sympathy with), then you could say the Dennett was showing that we do not mean any single identifiable thing when using the word. — Isaac

Seems like you mean to say that the word "qualia" has no referent, rather than no meaning.

Have a read of the Farrell paper — Isaac

Thanks, I'll take a look.

Because they have backward-acting neurons which suppress signals from more primary cortices before they get processed in the models of cortices higher than them. All the while that's happening, these higher level cortices are not on idle, waiting for the results, they're still processing the previous data and this affects the backward acting signals. So basically, before a signal has even left a primary area it is out of date, it has been interpreted post hoc on the basis of a model from a few seconds ago (or a long as a few minutes ago as you go higher up the cortices). — Isaac

I take all this to mean that it takes some time for a signal (e.g. sense data) to travel (e.g. from the skin) to the brain. Without wanting to derail the discussion too much, the question becomes: when is "real time", or with what is "real time" synchronous? You seem to suggest it is (e.g.) when light hits the retina. But why then? And whose retina?

But the distinction between primary and secondary attributes is hard-baked into our worldview. There’s no easy way to unscramble this particular omelette. Heck, Dennett won’t even admit there’s a need to make the effort, or that there is an issue to solve. Modern scientific method ‘brackets out’ the subjective - that is the meaning of the ‘view from nowhere’. And then, having bracketed it out, it says it can’t find any sign of its reality. There’s a really basic sleight-of-hand behind this entire debate, but for those who can’t see it, it’s devilishly hard to explain. — Wayfarer

I think the first step to unscrambling that omelette is to reject the 'view from nowhere', and thus also the 'bracketing out' of the human perspective.

So-called "primary attributes" ultimately derive their meaning from their role in human experience. Einstein notably developed his special theory of relativity as a construction based on measuring-rods, clocks, and observers.

"Secondary attributes" similarly derive their meaning from their role in human experience. Alice observes that the red measuring-rod has black markings at one centimeter intervals. That's the view from somewhere - the perspective of Alice. So there's no good reason to dichotomize human experience in those primary/secondary terms (which is just the Lockean manifestation of subject/object duality).

In these discussions, I really am at a loss to explain how the Dennet's and Churchlands of the world actually the believe the stuff they're saying. I think it has less to do with how they experience the world and more to do with a certain mindset that views consciousness (and everything associated with it) as "woo". — RogueAI

Yes, it's a conceptual dispute. Consider whether gravity is a real force (per Newton) or a fictitious force (per GR). On any theory, walking off the edge of a cliff is a bad idea. But from the perspective of GR, gravity understood as action at a distance is "woo" (it's instead local spacetime curvature).

Similarly stubbing your toe is going to hurt, regardless of your theory. But conceptually, qualia for a non-dualist is like a real force of gravity (action at a distance) is for a modern physicist. It's a ghostly entity with no real role to play in one's theory.

I think the first step to unscrambling that omelette is to reject the 'view from nowhere', and thus also the 'bracketing out' of the human perspective. — Andrew M

But it’s there for very good reason, and it can’t easily be rejected. But it can be revealed through analysis.

It was Galileo Galilei who wrote ‘the book of nature is written in mathematics’ and whose legacy includes the astonishing leaps that science made in subsequent centuries. It is true that understanding the laws that govern just those attributes of bodies that can be made subject to precise quantification, combined with Descartes’ newly-discovered algebraic geometry, laid the ground for the ‘new science’ that is at the basis of modern scientific method, which has universal scope and application, and spectacular results, not least these amazing ‘typing machines’ we all seem to have nowadays. And you can’t let subjective preferences play a role in engineering specifications.

This is all the subject matter of another of Thomas Nagel’s books, namely, Mind and Cosmos. He says

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.

(pp. 35-36)

So what you see with eliminative materialism is this dogmatic insistence that the objective view of modern science is complete in principle, if not in detail. Whatever ‘consciousness’ is, it must be something which can be accommodated inside this schema, otherwise it’s reality is either illusory or deceptive. That’s their view in a nutshell.

So what’s involved in rejecting it is retracing the steps, as it were, to how that situation arose and re-framing the whole issue. And that’s where I think what has become known as ‘embodied cognition’ has a vital piece of the solution. It points out that all knowledge, even the purportedly abstract knowledge obtained by the physical sciences, is situated, both in terms of a body, and also in terms of culture, language etc (hence neuroanthropology and such disciplines.) Hence my frequent reference to the expression ’cartesian anxiety’ which comprises a chapter heading Maturana/Varela/Thomson ‘Embodied Mind’.

If there's an alternative, then is is necessarily true that it's possible to doubt without having an experience of the thought process (presumably that's what the p-zombie does) and so you cannot then say anyone who doubts must be having an experience of doubting purely on the grounds of there being no alternative. — Isaac

I didn't. There IS an alternative. Them being a p-zombie (or, again, just a zombie since they're not a thought experiment any more). But I would sooner believe that they're just confused than believe they're a zombie

what would an answer to this question look like?. — Isaac

One possible answer is that some from of consciousness is inherent in all matter. Another would be some set of conditions that produce consciousness. Another would be whatever Dennett is doing. There are plenty of hypothesis. But without a "consciousness-o-meter" they're all untestable.

If I ask "why do we have noses" an evolutionary, or physiological account suffices as an answer, but for some reason such an account is insufficient for the 'hard problem' enthusiasts. — Isaac

It WOULD be sufficient if it was more than a mere hypothesis and there was some sort of evidence to back it up. In the case for noses what you have provided is "testable" in the sense that we can see noses evolve through time by finding different fossils. But we have yet to find a device that can test hypothesis about how consciousness comes about.

The problem is a consequence of not understanding our own thought and belief, what it consists of, how it emerges, evolves, what it gives rise to, and the role that all of this plays in our lives(conscious experience).

That's the only place to start. — creativesoul

Agreed. But that's still a terrible starting place. Considering that I have yet to detect another thought outside of my own head. How might we form a theory about what these thoughts consist of, how they emerge, evolve, etc without being able to detect the thing we are testing the hypothesis for from a third person perspective?

That's why the problem is hard.

leading one day to be able to read someone's thoughts... Science fiction? — Olivier5

Sure but that still doesn't answer why we have thoughts in the first place. Knowing that "brainwave x" corresponds to "I like apples" doesn't tell us HOW brainwave x produces the experience of thinking that one likes apples. Just like my knowing that: when I press a series of keys on my keyboard while highlighting this box a bunch of text pops up, doesn't tell me how a computer works.

Aren't you just expressing the hard problem with that question: why do we have qualia if they make no functional difference?
— Luke

No, that question assumes we have qualia. I'm saying that we don't. That nothing ontologically answers to that description — Isaac

Dennett seems to allow for qualia, insofar as they do not have the four special qualities he cites of being:

(1) intrinsic
(2) ineffable
(3) private
(4) directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness

In other words, he allows for properties of conscious experience (i.e. qualia) as long as they do not possess these four special qualities. I assume you reject qualia because you take "qualia" to refer to properties of conscious experience which do possess these four special qualities. And therefore, like Dennett, you would allow that we do e.g. see the redness of a flower or taste the bitterness of coffee.

Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia. Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special. — Dennett

Talk of qualia serves only to obscure such conversation. "You can never know what the coffee tastes like to me"...well, yes I can; I know it tastes bitter. I can surmise that another coffee, even nuttier to me, might well be more bitter to you.

I know what the coffee tastes like for you. — Banno

Just like the problem of the inverted spectrum, how do I know that what you call "nutty" is the same as what I call "nutty"? Paraphrasing Dennett: "Since we both learned [flavour] words by being [fed] public [flavour] objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective [flavours].

Even if we experience the same subjective flavours, how do I really know what you mean by "nutty"? Does it taste like a particular type of nut? Do all peanuts taste the same, for example? And what sort of bitterness are we talking about? There are many shades of difference here which language cannot easily capture. We could go on endlessly trying to refine it. I think this is what Dennett criticises (or what qualia advocates are referring to) when he speaks of the ""homogeneity" or "atomicity to analysis" or "grainlessness" that characterizes the qualia of philosophical tradition." A picture is worth a thousand words in other words, and language has difficulty doing justice to the sight before our eyes (or the taste on our tongue, etc.), especially when attempting to convey it to others in high fidelity.

Take the example of the wine tasting machine at intuition pump #2. Dennett describes it as:

A computer based "expert system" for quality control and classification is probably within the bounds of existing technology. We now know enough about the relevant chemistry to make the transducers that would replace taste buds and olfactory organs (delicate color vision would perhaps be more problematic), and we can imagine using the output of such transducers as the raw material--the "sense data" in effect--for elaborate evaluations, descriptions, classifications. Pour the sample in the funnel and, in a few minutes or hours, the system would type out a chemical assay, along with commentary: "a flamboyant and velvety Pinot, though lacking in stamina"--or words to such effect. Such a machine might well perform better than human wine tasters on all reasonable tests of accuracy and consistency the winemakers could devise, but surely no matter how "sensitive" and "discriminating" such a system becomes, it will never have, and enjoy, what we do when we taste a wine: the qualia of conscious experience! — Dennett

What would it take to really invent this machine? How would we go about matching the machine's verbal reports with the chemical compositions of various wines? In particular, how would we obtain the verbal reports to input into the machine? From human wine tasters who actually taste wine, of course! These would be what an expert wine taster would say, because they taste wines and say these sorts of things (give these sorts of descriptions). The wine tasting machine may be indistinguishable from a human (once it is up and running) from a behavioural or functional perspective, but I doubt anyone would say - given the current level of technological sophistication - that the machine does actually taste wine. But another problem is how many different adjectives or scripts could be programmed into the machine without it sounding like a 1980s computer game with a limited range of responses. Furthermore, tastes change and language/descriptions/expressions evolve with them. Can we really imagine such a machine being indistinguishable from humans, and if we could imagine it, could we then doubt whether it did have taste qualia?

Our theories about the world emerge from our pretheoretical observations and reason...
— Olivier5

What would such pre-linguistic reason consist of?
— creativesoul

"Pre-theoretical" means something different from "pre-linguistic". It means stuff you do in practice without thinking about it in theory. Like when you watch large packs of birds fly. You are not necessarily theorizing about yourself watching birds fly, or even about how the birds fly. You may simply watch them. You may wonder why they fly so high or turn so suddenly, all as one, but it's not a research program yet, more a wonder, a question. You may start to reason that this is peculiar and beautiful, and start filming the phenomenon with your cellphone. You are still not theorizing much. You are just recording whatever you can of the event, thinking your friends will like this.

You may theorize latter, for instance if I ask you why you looked at those damn birds for so long. — Olivier5

Ah. Thanks for clearing that up. Not sure how helpful that distinction is given the task, but at least I better understand what it means.

So you deny basic logic? Numbers and neurons aren’t colors. This is a matter of identity. You expect me to reconsider? — Marchesk

How does logic tell us what sets the things we label belong to? Are you saying that Hesperus and Phosphorus are two different things, despite both being the same star just because they have different names? Is a chair not a collection of atoms, but some other thing on top of such a collection because atoms are atoms and chairs are chairs? If this is basic logic, then you should be able to write it out in formal notation so we can see how you arrived at your conclusion.

↪Isaac

what would an answer to this question look like?. — Isaac


One possible answer is that some from of consciousness is inherent in all matter. Another would be some set of conditions that produce consciousness. Another would be whatever Dennett is doing. There are plenty of hypothesis. But without a "consciousness-o-meter" they're all untestable. — khaled

Cool. I have no objection to that. I ask because the majority view from 'hard problemers' seems to be that Dennett is somehow 'not even addressing the question', rather than that he just cannot be shown to be right about the answer. It's a position I've yet to understand so I'm trying to gather some different perspectives on it. If you're not in that camp then you're not really the target of that question. It doesn't really go anywhere from here, but thanks for answering.

The problem is a consequence of not understanding our own thought and belief, what it consists of, how it emerges, evolves, what it gives rise to, and the role that all of this plays in our lives(conscious experience).

That's the only place to start.
— creativesoul

Agreed. But that's still a terrible starting place. — khaled

Perhaps, but we've no other choice. We make due with what's available.

How might we form a theory about what these thoughts consist of, how they emerge, evolve, etc without being able to detect the thing we are testing the hypothesis for from a third person perspective? — khaled

We look to statements of thought and belief for starters. We set out what they consist of at a minimum. We assess whether or not those basic elements could possibly exist in simpler forms. Etc. That's another thread though.

:zip:

Seems like you mean to say that the word "qualia" has no referent, rather than no meaning. — Luke

Yes, that might be better, but I would say that a word with no proper referent has no consistent meaning (use) and so it's involvement in technical fields like philosophy is highly questionable.

I take all this to mean that it takes some time for a signal (e.g. sense data) to travel (e.g. from the skin) to the brain. Without wanting to derail the discussion too much, the question becomes: when is "real time", or with what is "real time" synchronous? You seem to suggest it is (e.g.) when light hits the retina. But why then? And whose retina? — Luke

Not quite. It's not the route taken that's at issue (otherwise you'd be right, we simply pick a point to class as 'real time'). It's that the point we pick as 'real time' is separate from the activities of the neural circuits which are processing the data we attach to that measure. So with signals we expect to be asynchronous (like light and touch - light is much faster) the faster signal is held back before it is sent to cortices which combine the two senses. Not all cortices (including sub-conscious ones) are getting synchronous signals, which means that whatever we set as 'real time' it's impossible that all parts of the brain are working to it.

Modern scientific method ‘brackets out’ the subjective - that is the meaning of the ‘view from nowhere’. — Wayfarer

While I agree with you on the general thrust (as always), I think you (or Nagel) may be attributing too much antisubjectivity to the scientific method. Galileo imposed the concept of frame of reference, I think. Nothing in physics can be described without a frame of reference - physics are not about the view from nowhere, and do not deny subjectivity or agency. If fact authorship (who discovered what) is a key question in science, absolutely central to the project. Scientists have an ego too.

It is only the most naïve and nihilist forms of materialism that deny consciousness or agency, not science.

The other point is that the "bracketing" was an idea of Husserl if I am not mistaken, and what he recommended philosophers to "bracket" was analysis, so as to return to the acts of perception. That seems far more productive to me that bracketing out the subjectivity of the observer.

I assume you reject qualia because you take "qualia" to refer to properties of conscious experience which do possess these four special qualities. And therefore, like Dennett, you would allow that we do e.g. see the redness of a flower or taste the bitterness of coffee. — Luke

No. Whilst I agree with Dennett about rejecting the purported properties of qualia, I also reject that there is such a thing as the 'redness' of a flower. I don't think it makes sense. If there were such a thing, we'd expect some evidence of it, ie it would have some effect on the world. I don't see any evidence of the effect on the world of the 'redness' of a flower, in the sense of a quale. The photons reflected from it have an effect on our retinas, which have effects on our visual cortex, which has effects on our decisions, mental states and behaviours, but I don't see where 'redness' is in any of that.

Frames of reference are associated with the theory of relativity, not from Galileo, as I understood it.

I don’t believe that Galileo deliberately sought to omit the observer, but the idea of the role of the observer was simply not relevant to his science. It was again much later science that caused the question of the role of the observer to suddenly assume significance. I don’t think the modern philosophical implications would have occurred to him either. They really exploded into consciousness in the subsequent centuries.

The expression of ‘bracketing’ does indeed hail from phenomenology but in such terminology Husserl is merely making explicit what had hitherto been simply assumed. But what I mean by it is that there is a widespread understanding, really the commonsense view, that the universe revealed by modern science is the reference point for what is real. Science has established beyond much doubt the age and extent of the universe, which is of such an enormous scale that the phenomenon of humanity appears as a minute ephemera when compared to it. However again this overlooks the centrality of the human mind in arriving at that understanding. We say it exists independently of us, which in an obvious sense is true, but nevertheless the universe has, as it were, come to this understanding of itself through us. Which is hinted at but not much elaborated by Nagel in Mind and Cosmos.

It is only the most naïve and nihilist forms of materialism that deny consciousness or agency, not science. — Olivier5

Of course. And that is exactly what Dennett, who is not a scientist, represents.

The notion that modern science ‘de-humanises’ the modern worldview is hardly my invention, it is the topic of a vast literature.

Galileo's mechanics are relativist and makes the point that frames of reference are key to understanding what's happening. E.g. in the experience of throwing a weight from the mast of a boat while the boat is moving (the weight falls along the mast, not behind it), to explain why all seems to happen as if earth was immobile, while e pur si muove. This is why an inertial frame of reference may also be called a Galilean reference frame. Einstein generalized the finding to light.

However again this overlooks the centrality of the human mind in arriving at that understanding. .... the universe has, as it were, come to this understanding of itself through us. — Wayfarer

Through us and other species. And let's remember that our understanding of the universe remains highly imperfect. As for size, why does it matter? The stars are not as wise as you are (Omar Khayyam).

The notion that modern science ‘de-humanises’ the modern worldview is hardly my invention, it is the topic of a vast literature. — Wayfarer

That is true but in my experience, real scientists are far more humane and modest than their philosophical worshipers.

I don't see any evidence of the effect on the world of the 'redness' of a flower, — Isaac

Why do you think plants synthetize pigments for their flowers, rather than keep them chlorophyll green? What Darwinian advantage is there to have your flowers colored?

The stars are not as wise as you are (Omar Khayyam). — Olivier5

The good and the bad that are in human nature,
The joy and grief that are found in fate and destiny--
Do not attribute them to the movement of heavenly bodies
For according to the path of science
The stars are a thousand times more helpless than you

I also reject that there is such a thing as the 'redness' of a flower. — Isaac

Do you disagree with Dennett that there are properties of conscious experience?

As though it'll then be clearer what everyone is talking about. — bongo fury

We are talking about mental stuff, so there's no avoiding mental stuff, as much as some would like to...

Einstein generalized the finding to light. — Olivier5

:up: That's something I didn't know.

Through us and other species. — Olivier5

Don't agree with that. That's kind of fashionable reaction against so called 'human exceptionalism'. We have to own our abilities, not project them on other species. Reason is a soveriegn faculty.

real scientists are far more humane and modest than their philosophical worshipers. — Olivier5

On the whole I agree with you, but there are some egregious exceptions. Anyway I've made my point about Dennett so will bow out.

Ah. Thanks for clearing that up. Not sure how helpful that distinction is given the task, but at least I better understand what it means. — creativesoul

It is important to realize that theory emerges from a non-theoretical background, for instance that infants learn how to speak through observation, comparison and imitation, not from grammatical theory. When they grow up they can study grammar theoretically, and even become grammarians. But a grammarian cannot say: "There's no such thing as learning a language."

It follows that those theories -- such as naïve materialist theories -- who deny the efficacy of pre-theoretical observation and reason are shooting themselves in the foot. They can have no credible story of origin, and they cannot make any progress. Theory cannot destroy the basis for theoretical thinking.

Through us and other species.
— Olivier5

Don't agree with that. That's kind of fashionable reaction against so called 'human exceptionalism'. We have to own our abilities, not project them on other species. Reason is a soveriegn faculty. — Wayfarer

In my mind, it's more that we shouldn't go around denying other species possible abilities. W can speak for ourselves of course, but not for others.

Dennett ... is just trying to come up with better ways to talk about them because "Qualia" is not good enough for that. — khaled

If that was true, he would try and propose an alternative conceptual framework, better than the one he criticizes. But this does not appear to be the case.

Do you disagree with Dennett that there are properties of conscious experience? — Luke

I presume you're referring to

Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties.

I don't really agree or disagree here. I think the concept is too poorly defined. If by 'reality of conscious experience' we merely mean that some mental goings on can be referred to as 'conscious experience' then I'd agree that, being real, they'd have properties. I'm tempted, based on Dennett's subsequent views to think he has this in mind, but it's not clear from the text alone. If, rather, it means the same sort of ineffable, intrinsic, private and accessible entity as qualia, but just somehow aggregated to avoid the issues individuating qualia, or some sort of platonic entity, then no.

. Whilst I agree with Dennett about rejecting the purported properties of qualia, I also reject that there is such a thing as the 'redness' of a flower. I don't think it makes sense. If there were such a thing, we'd expect some evidence — Isaac

So at this point we could move on to arguments by Chalmers and others aiming to show that the concept of qualia does make sense and that we cant say that qualia necessarily reduces to function.

A famous one is Chalmers' p-zombie argument. It revolves around the simple question: do you understand what a p-zombie is? Dennett describes it in the article and seems to accept it as a meaningful idea.

1. If you agree that it makes sense, then you should be able to see the logical wedge this drives between qualia and function.

2. If it doesn't make sense to you, all bets are off. ;)

I don't really agree or disagree here. I think the concept is too poorly defined. If by 'reality of conscious experience' we merely mean that some mental goings on can be referred to as 'conscious experience' then I'd agree that, being real, they'd have properties. — Isaac

Can you give an example of one (or more) of these properties. I assume redness is out. Bitterness?