The problem is the implicit dualism in the claim. There are no 'first-person' versus 'third-person' perspectives. There is just your perspective, my perspective, and Alice's perspective. Each is a distinctive perspective of the world, but it is a world that we all participate in, and use common language to describe. — Andrew M

The problem with this is that the world is more than individual perspectives. Science describes a world independent of that. We can't sense most of what science tells us, and what we do sense is based on our particular biology, which science has to work to abstract from to arrive at mathematical models that are predictive and explain the world as it appears to us.

Another problem is that people do have private thoughts, dreams, feelings. We can't always know that Alice's tooth is aching, or whether she's faking. But she knows, because she's the one feeling or faking the pain. We also don't know what it's like if her brain works in an idiosyncratic way from our own. Thus people who have no inner dialog, people who think in images, people with odd neurological conditions and so on.

More explicitly, the contents of consciousness correlate immediately to mental processes, not to physical, objective referents. — Kenosha Kid

Right. But that isn’t that a problem for physicalism, which says that conscious acts are reducible to objective referents? Isn’t that the nub of the issue? It you’re claiming that the mind is ‘a product of’ neurological processes, then you have to show how a physical process is the same in principle as a conscious act, such a counting or reasoning.

Incidentally, there are many ‘products’ of the brain - all of the millions of enzymes and neurotransmitters and other families of neurochemicals. I don’t doubt that at all. What I’m trying to argue is that concepts can’t be treated the same way as substances because they belong in a different explanatory framework, namely, that of language, logic, maths and so on. Philosophim, for instances, simply assumes that there’s no difference between enzymes and concepts - that ‘he brain secretes thought like the liver secrets bile’, as said by one of the French philosophes, which is reductive materialism in a nutshell.

Philosophim, for instances, simply assumes that there’s no difference between enzymes and concepts — Wayfarer

You might be misunderstanding my view. Reality is what occurs. Concepts match to reality. If a concept cannot match to reality, it is worthless. Concepts like thoughts and consciousness are fantastic, as long as at their core they represent reality. I am not a "physicalist", I am a "realist". So far, the only thing we have discovered in the universe is matter and energy. If a concept draws on "something else" without providing some reality of it, its just not any good.

Concepts match to reality. — Philosophim

What does it mean for an idea to 'match' or 'correspond' with reality? How can you stand outside of your conceptions and see if they correspond?

The word 'correspondence' suggests that, when we make a true judgment, we have a sort of picture of the real in our minds and that our judgment is true because this picture is like the reality it represents.

But our judgments are not like the physical things to which they refer. The images we use in judging may indeed in certain respects copy or resemble physical things, but we can make a judgment without using any imagery except words, and words are not in the least similar to the things which they represent. [Note: many theories in mathematical physics are like this.]

We must not understand 'correspondence' as meaning 'copying' or even 'resemblance'...the correspondence theory . . . does not give us much information unless we can succeed in defining correspondence, and unfortunately nobody has been able yet to give a satisfactory definition.

Ewing, A.C.; The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, pp54-55.

. So far, the only thing we have discovered in the universe is matter and energy. — Philosophim

Thereby 'affirming the consequent.' You frame the question in a certain way, and it means there's only a certain type of answer that will be accepted. The argument of 'facing up the hard problem' is that the objective sciences can't in principle provide complete description of the first-person point-of-view, as it is excluded from what third-person will consider in the first place. And it is true, there's no way of overturning this that is satisfactory to the third-person perspective, for the reason that it has already declared the argument out-of-bounds.

What does it mean for an idea to 'match' or 'correspond' with reality? — Wayfarer

A claim about reality that is applied without contradiction.

For example, lets say I proposed that all sentience was non-physical, but consisted of a substance called sentisia. I could write a complex paper that details exactly how it works, and it would be incredibly logical and work within the framework. But if I can't find sentisia in reality, if I can't demonstrate its existence and use, all I made was a fantasy world framework.

. So far, the only thing we have discovered in the universe is matter and energy.
— Philosophim

Thereby 'affirming the consequent.' You frame the question in a certain way, and it means there's only a certain type of answer that will be accepted. — Wayfarer

That's not affirming the consequent at all. "All tigers are cats, therefore all cats must be tigers" is an example of affirming the consequent. I am stating that the only thing we have discovered in the universe is matter and energy, so those are the only things we can realistically analyze. Is it possible something else exists besides these? Sure, why not? What we know today could be contradicted tomorrow. But we can't talk realistically, and rationally, about things which we have no knowledge of being real.

Everything that we know points to consciousness forming from the brain. So that is the only thing we can rationally discuss. You can propose that consciousness is some magical entity, but unless you can show some evidence of this magical entity being real, it is a fantasy, and not a rational argument.

the objective sciences can't in principle provide complete description of the first-person point-of-view — Wayfarer

As of yet, no. And they may never be able to. But that just tells us there are either A. Things outside of our knowledge, or B. That we must work logically within these limitations.

Neither A nor B lead to the idea that all of the evidence that points to consciousness coming from the brain is somehow null or void. In the future if we find evidence in reality of consciousness existing apart from the brain, then we have something new that we can rationally consider. Until then, its just a fantasy, a "what if". "What ifs" that do not end ultimately leading back to some application in reality are just fun fantasy, not rational arguments.

It fixes the conceptual problem at issue. Hacker makes a concrete proposal that doesn't assume dualism.
— Andrew M

However, Christian doctrine must allow for the immortality of the soul, must it not? — Wayfarer

It's actually orthodox Christian doctrine that believers undergo bodily resurrection. So dualism isn't required even there.

Here's Hacker's proposal again: that sentience emerges from the evolution of living organisms.

Do you think that's a valid problem for science to investigate?

Orthodox Christians do believe God is spirit, so their worldview is still dualistic.

I am stating that the only thing we have discovered in the universe is matter and energy, so those are the only things we can realistically analyze. Is it possible something else exists besides these? Sure, why not? What we know today could be contradicted tomorrow. But we can't talk realistically, and rationally, about things which we have no knowledge of being real. — Philosophim

Are you by this claiming that we do not know whether consciousness - via which we discover things such as matter and energy - is real? If not, please explain why we don't. If, however, you agree that we know consciousness is real, then we at minimum can claim to have discovered three things being real: matter, energy, and the consciousness via which these are known.

Everything that we know points to consciousness forming from the brain. So that is the only thing we can rationally discuss. You can propose that consciousness is some magical entity, but unless you can show some evidence of this magical entity being real, it is a fantasy, and not a rational argument. — Philosophim

Excuse the limitations of the English language via which this is expressed, but not everything will be a thing, i.e. an entity. Processes are for example known to occur, and a process - though being something - is not a thing/entity. The issue of whether processes are primary to existence or, else, entities are primary to existence - though open-ended - does not bode well for the primacy of entities.

By what logical argument would one pigeonhole consciousness into being an entity? This sounds very much like the type of reification that perspectives such as those of Buddhism oppose - and, needless to add, these perspectives are not physicalist.

As of yet, no. And they may never be able to. — Philosophim

Is this not the hard problem in a nutshell?

@Wayfarer, hope you don't mind me contributing for a little while.

The problem is the implicit dualism in the claim. There are no 'first-person' versus 'third-person' perspectives. There is just your perspective, my perspective, and Alice's perspective. Each is a distinctive perspective of the world, but it is a world that we all participate in, and use common language to describe.
— Andrew M

The problem with this is that the world is more than individual perspectives. — Marchesk

It is. But note that describing that world requires a perspective whether in day-to-day life, or as a scientist performing specialized experiments. The latter is just a natural extension of the former, it's not "a view from nowhere".

Science describes a world independent of that. We can't sense most of what science tells us, and what we do sense is based on our particular biology, which science has to work to abstract from to arrive at mathematical models that are predictive and explain the world as it appears to us. — Marchesk

Yes, however those abstractions are not Platonic, they are a function of our perspective on the world.

Another problem is that people do have private thoughts, dreams, feelings. We can't always know that Alice's tooth is aching, or whether she's faking. But she knows, because she's the one feeling or faking the pain. — Marchesk

Yes. But what I'm arguing against is the idea that one's thoughts, dreams and feelings are radically, or intrinsically, private. That is, there is always a physical (and so, in principle, detectable) difference between a person in pain and a person faking pain, or between a person thinking about an apple and a person not thinking about an apple.

We also don't know what it's like if her brain works in an idiosyncratic way from our own. Thus people who have no inner dialog, people who think in images, people with odd neurological conditions and so on. — Marchesk

Yes. But that again is a manifestation of some physical difference. In principle, it is possible is to modify a person's physical state such that they experience things in different ways. Maybe Mary in her room discovers how to modify her own brain or eyes to perceive color.

It's actually orthodox Christian doctrine that believers undergo bodily resurrection. So dualism isn't required even there. — Andrew M

'At death the soul is separated from the body and exists in a conscious or unconscious disembodied state. But on the future Day of Judgment souls will be re-embodied (whether in their former but now transfigured earthly bodies or in new resurrection bodies) and will live eternally in the heavenly kingdom.' ~ Encyc. Brittanica

Not saying I believe it, but it's clearly incompatible with Dennett's neo-darwinian materialism, which is not surprising, given that he's a militant atheist.

Here's Hacker's proposal again: that sentience emerges from the evolution of living organisms.

Do you think that's a valid problem for science to investigate? — Andrew M

Yes of course - evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and so on. Does not, however, vitiate the fundamental issue.

it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. — Thomas Nagel

You can propose that consciousness is some magical entity — Philosophim

That's not what I proposed, but it's not surprising that it is how you read it. You show no sign of having actually grasped the argument that I proposed, so I'll give up.

But we can't talk realistically, and rationally, about things which we have no knowledge of being real. — Philosophim

There's a lot written about dark matter.

hope you don't mind me contributing for a little while. — javra

Not at all, your posts are generally a model of clarity.

We're in accord here. Though I'm still trying to wrap my mind around it, so to speak, do you see how all this meshes with the notion of panpsychism?. — javra

My view is that it is a category error, that it is a sophisticated example of more generic phenomena, the category error being that if A is some kind of B, then B must be some kind of A.

With that, now we're getting into metaphysical underpinnings — javra

Well, not really. That there's stuff and then what stuff can do sums up physics.

No, of course not. But it would need to give reasons for why tangible X, Y, and Z results in what it feels like to be conscious--rather than taking the latter occurrence for granted. — javra

That's a third-person/first-person crossover. Any explanation of what consciousness is is going to be third person.

But that isn’t that a problem for physicalism, which says that conscious acts are reducible to objective referents? — Wayfarer

No, because those mental processes are physical. Hence my experience of red lunar sky jellyfish must be describable as physical processes of the brain, not physical red jellyfish floating above the moon.

So a number is not an idea or a concept - but a jellyfish?

So a number is not an idea or a concept - but a jellyfish? — Wayfarer

Yeah, those were my exact words.

In three sentences you've gone from being open to the neurological phenomena being identically consciousness, to being merely the cause of consciousness, to being merely a correlate of consciousness again. All I can say is to repeat: if you are aware that, in Dennett's view, they are not merely correlates but the thing itself, it doesn't make any sense to expect him to answer a question on the separate question of the thing itself that is not meaningful in that view, or to pretend he hasn't addressed the question because he doesn't treat it as a separable problem. — Kenosha Kid

If it was panpsychist, it certainly could be the phenomena is identical with mental states. The same goes for causation. How is it the thing itself has a subjective what it's like aspect is not explained, so that is still the question at hand that is being ignored. If it's not a separable problem, he still didn't answer the question. It's okay if he doesn't want to. Stick to the easier problems. It is safe. You can say that your philosophy is more empirical therefore clearly more legitimate and all that. It looks like @javra, @Marchesk and @Wayfarer are also explaining similar ideas. But, you open yourself up if you are writing books like Consciousness Explained and you aren't even approaching that question. It should be something more like.. "Rehash of cognitive neuroscience with some thought experiments for why the term qualia is not quite right".

How is it the thing itself has a subjective what it's like aspect is not explained — schopenhauer1

What would an explanation of this be like? You've talked a lot about how Dennet's philosophy isnt one, so you must have an idea of what is one to compare it to, so what's that?

We open a philosophy journal tomorrow with the headline 'Hard problem solved - we have an explanation of why we seem to have first person experiences'. What might the abstract read? 'We seem to have first person experiences because...'

We open a philosophy journal tomorrow with the headline 'Hard problem solved - we have an explanation of why we seem to have first person experiences'. What might the abstract read? 'We seem to have first person experiences because...' — Isaac

My entry:

... because of the mise en abyme allowed by our two brains talking to one another.

What would an explanation of this be like? — Isaac

How the brain creates experiences of colors, smells, feels, etc. So far, there are only correlations, but not an actual explanation. Such and such neural activity does some sort of discrimination of incoming electrical impulses from eyes and is integrated with other brain activity to create a conscious awareness of a red cup. But it would have to show how that happens, and not just claim it does (which would be a correlation with observed brain activity).

It's kind of unfair to ask what the explanation would look like since nobody knows yet. Assuming neuroscience can provide one. But if it did, then the entry in the journal of philosophy could then go on to say how we could use this to understand bat sonar consciousness and create consciousness in robots.

One reason to be skeptical of this is that neuroscience is like all science in that it's an abstraction from various first person experiences to arrive at an objective understanding of the world. But that objective understanding has no sensations of color, etc.

For example, lets say I proposed that all sentience was non-physical, but consisted of a substance called sentisia. I could write a complex paper that details exactly how it works, and it would be incredibly logical and work within the framework. But if I can't find sentisia in reality, if I can't demonstrate its existence and use, all I made was a fantasy world framework.

The bolded doesn't follow. Just because you can't find something in reality doesn't mean you conclude it doesn't exist, or you conclude that everything you thought about it was a "fantasy world framework". It depends on how well you search and how competent you are at searching. That's the mistake you're making.

For example, there is no evidence that aliens exist. We haven't "found any aliens in reality". Are all the papers on exobiology a "fantasy world framework"? Are all the proposed solutions to the Fermi Paradox mental masturbation? Is SETI a big waste of time? Maybe. Maybe not. We're not justified in declaring the non-existence of X just because we can't find X in reality. String theorists would certainly agree with me on that one.

What is your justification for assuming physical non-conscious stuff exists?

My entry:

... because of the mise en abyme allowed by our two brains talking to one another. — Olivier5

...and that's an answer. Where '...because of the connectedness of many neurons' isn't, because...

How the brain creates experiences of colors, smells, feels, etc. So far, there are only correlations, but not an actual explanation. Such and such neural activity does some sort of discrimination of incoming electrical impulses from eyes and is integrated with other brain activity to create a conscious awareness of a red cup. But it would have to show how that happens, and not just claim it does (which would be a correlation with observed brain activity). — Marchesk

This just repeats the question. If, say, I explain the neuroscience of colour recognition, I'm trying to get at the sense in which that's not answering 'how?' for you. It's exactly answering 'how' for me.

If I asked 'how does a car work?' an account of its components and their effect on each other is exactly what I'm after. If I ask 'how come that cup is on the table?' an account of the events leading up to its being there suffices. If I ask 'why do humans have noses?' an account of the evolutionary or developmental process is fine. When we ask 'how does the brain create experiences?' an account of neither the mechanisms, nor the components, nor their interactions, nor their development suffices for you. Something is missing which doesn't seem required in any other question about 'how'. I'm trying to understand what that missing thing is.

It's kind of unfair to ask what the explanation would look like since nobody knows yet. — Marchesk

I don't think so. If one is going to dismiss Dennet's hard work as missing the target, I think it's fair to ask for an account of what the target is.

if it did, then the entry in the journal of philosophy could then go on to say how we could use this to understand bat sonar consciousness and create consciousness in robots. — Marchesk

But this is circular. Maybe we have created consciousness in robots "no, they're just p-zombies", how do we know what they've got isn't consciousness?

But that objective understanding has no sensations of color, etc. — Marchesk

How could an understanding of the world have sensations? If this is your target then its not the 'hard' problem its the downright ridiculous problem.

But this is circular. Maybe we have created consciousness in robots "no, they're just p-zombies", how do we know what they've got isn't consciousness? — Isaac

Isn't this admitting to the hard problem, or at least Block's harder problem? If we had a science of consciousness, we would would be able to know what was conscious.

How could an understanding of the world have sensations? If this is your target then its not the 'hard' problem its the downright ridiculous problem. — Isaac

The hard problem is aimed at the ontological conclusions derived from our understanding of the world, which would be physicalism. It's part of the ongoing mind/body debate between materialists and dualists.

I don't think so. If one is going to dismiss Dennet's hard work as missing the target, I think it's fair to ask for an account of what the target is. — Isaac

Dennett isn't a neuroscience, and his multiple drafts doesn't explain sensations. It just suggests how various activity in the brain becomes the center of attention.

This just repeats the question. If, say, I explain the neuroscience of colour recognition, I'm trying to get at the sense in which that's not answering 'how?' for you. It's exactly answering 'how' for me. — Isaac

It doesn't tell me how there is a color sensation. Instead, it explains how my brain performs certain functions related to discriminating color. But as you admitted, we don't know if the same functions in a computer would also result in a color sensation.

If we had a science of consciousness, we would would be able to know what was conscious. — Marchesk

No, my point was that if I claim we do already have a science of consciousness, and as such we already do know what's conscious, you'll still claim we don't. This just seems circular to me. A thing is conscious if it can report in some way (even if only internally) on its own processing. If a robot can do that, then it's conscious. Hard problem solved? If not, why not?

Dennett isn't a neuroscience, and his multiple drafts doesn't explain sensations. It just suggests how various activity in the brain becomes the center of attention. — Marchesk

Again, how is that not an explanation? It's really unfair to keep dismissing everyone's efforts without specifying what it is you want from them.

It doesn't tell me how there is a color sensation. Instead, it explains how my brain performs certain functions related to discriminating color. — Marchesk

That is 'how'. As I showed with my examples of other 'how' questions, that's exactly the sort of thing which counts as an answer to 'how'. Even so, you're still just repeating the dismissal without specifying a reason. If "explain[ing] how my brain performs certain functions related to discriminating color" isn't an answer for you to "how there is a color sensation", then it seems entirely reasonable to ask you for an account of what's missing.

No, my point was that if I claim we do already have a science of consciousness, and as such we already do know what's conscious, you'll still claim we don't. — Isaac

Because there is no consensus in any related field for an explanation of consciousness. Of course there is much ink spilled on the topic with many different approaches, but Dennett's work is controversial and not accepted by many professional philosophers.

That is 'how'. As I showed with my examples of other 'how' questions, that's exactly the sort of thing which counts as an answer to 'how' — Isaac

No it isn't. That's just an assertion that consciousness is somehow identical to certain functions. If we knew that to be true, then there would be no mystery as to what else is conscious. If it performed those functions, whether it was a bat nervous system, a simulation, a robot or a Chinese Brain, it would all be conscious, end of story.

Even so, you're still just repeating the dismissal without specifying a reason. If "explain[ing] how my brain performs certain functions related to discriminating color" isn't an answer for you to "how there is a color sensation", then it seems entirely reasonable to ask you for an account of what's missing. — Isaac

Because it doesn't explain how it is that we're conscious. Why do functions result in an experience at all? They're just functions.

What is your justification for assuming physical non-conscious stuff exists? — RogueAI

Empiricism.

How does empiricism tell you that non-conscious stuff exists? Is there a hidden anti-panpsychist proof in empiricism?

If, however, you agree that we know consciousness is real, then we at minimum can claim to have discovered three things being real: matter, energy, and the consciousness via which these are known. — javra

I do agree that consciousness is real, but consciousness is a word that represents an identity we observe, but does not assert it is its own composed entity. We don't say, "matter, energy, and water" exist right? Water is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is not another form of existence separate from matter and energy. If someone claims this to be, they must provide evidence to counter the evidence that shows consciousness comes from the brain, which is made out of matter and energy.

Excuse the limitations of the English language via which this is expressed, but not everything will be a thing, i.e. an entity. Processes are for example known to occur, and a process - though being something - is not a thing/entity. — javra

Processes are actions, and interactions with other entities. When an electron travels across a wire, we get the process of electricity. When that electron travels to your computer, and allows a signal to alter a logic gate, that is the process of computing. Processes are not separate from the matter and energy, they are the result of their interactions. These interchanges are matter and energy.

'

As of yet, no. And they may never be able to.
— Philosophim

Is this not the hard problem in a nutshell? — javra

Yes. The hard problem states it is difficult with our current models to evaluate what it is like to "feel" red. It is not stating that consciousness is not physical, nor that consciousness cannot be evaluated in terms of the physical. The easy problem notes that tieing the laws of nature to brain states is not the issue. But will science ever be able to produce the state of being a bat, and then have us feel exactly what it is like to be a bat? Maybe not. That is not relevant to stating that consciousness is separate from the brain.

You can propose that consciousness is some magical entity
— Philosophim

That's not what I proposed, but it's not surprising that it is how you read it. You show no sign of having actually grasped the argument that I proposed, so I'll give up. — Wayfarer

No, I grasp your arguments well enough. You do not see the consequences of your argument. If you cannot show what consciousness is in reality, yet you declare t is something separate from the brain, then you are necessarily proposing a magical entity. You are saying consciousness exists as something, but you have no evidence or explanation for what that something is. That's a magical entity.

But we can't talk realistically, and rationally, about things which we have no knowledge of being real.
— Philosophim

There's a lot written about dark matter. — Wayfarer

Dark matter is not a descriptor of known entities. It is a placeholder that describes logical conclusions within observed limitations. Here is a good read.
https://www.space.com/20930-dark-matter.html

"If scientists can't see dark matter, how do they know it exists?

Scientists calculate the mass of large objects in space by studying their motion. Astronomers examining spiral galaxies in the 1970s expected to see material in the center moving faster than on the outer edges. Instead, they found the stars in both locations traveled at the same velocity, indicating the galaxies contained more mass than could be seen. Studies of the gas within elliptical galaxies also indicated a need for more mass than found in visible objects. Clusters of galaxies would fly apart if the only mass they contained were visible to conventional astronomical measurements.

Albert Einstein showed that massive objects in the universe bend and distort light, allowing them to be used as lenses. By studying how light is distorted by galaxy clusters, astronomers have been able to create a map of dark matter in the universe.

All of these methods provide a strong indication that most of the matter in the universe is something yet unseen."

What we can rationally discuss about dark matter is based on the data we have. While speculation also happens, as to what Dark Matter could be, it does not assert that the speculation is true, or that the existence of such speculation asserts that the regular physical laws of the universe or necessarily invalid.

I have shown several examples of the brain being the source of consciousness. For a proposition that consciousness is separate from the brain, it needs some evidence that it IS separate from the brain. Saying, "It might be," without any evidence as to how or why is nothing we can rationalize about.

Positing the existence of something, and not finding it in reality are two different things. For example, there is no evidence that aliens exist. — RogueAI

Right, there is no evidence that aliens exist. So we cannot rationally discuss aliens as if they do exist.
This is different from saying, "Maybe aliens exist," and then looking for evidence that they exist. The people I've been chatting with aren't saying, "It could be that all of physics is wrong and consciousness could exist as something separate from the brain,". I would have no disagreement with that. Having an idea of what could be and looking for it are great. We would never advance our understanding of the world otherwise.

The posters that I have been discussing with are claiming that consciousness IS separate from the brain. Not a maybe, but that it just can't be from the brain. I have asked for evidence that would show this to be true, and none has been provided but speculation. Asserting the existence of one thing, and the refutation of another thing without any evidence that can be shown in the real world is a fantasy world framework.

Right, there is no evidence that aliens exist. So we cannot rationally discuss aliens as if they do exist.

This is different from saying, "Maybe aliens exist," and then looking for evidence that they exist. The people I've been chatting with aren't saying, "It could be that all of physics is wrong and consciousness could exist as something separate from the brain,". I would have no disagreement with that. Having an idea of what could be and looking for it are great. We would never advance our understanding of the world otherwise.

The posters that I have been discussing with are claiming that consciousness IS separate from the brain. Not a maybe, but that it just can't be from the brain. I have asked for evidence that would show this to be true, and none has been provided but speculation. Asserting the existence of one thing, and the refutation of another thing without any evidence that can be shown in the real world is a fantasy world framework.

Nonsense. The statement: "aliens, if they exist, aren't made of chocolate and don't have candy cane brains" is not irrational. It's true.

. If you cannot show what consciousness is in reality, yet you declare t is something separate from the brain, then you are necessarily proposing a magical entity. You are saying consciousness exists as something, but you have no evidence or explanation for what that something is. That's a magical entity. — Philosophim

No, i'm not arguing that it's a 'magical entity'. That's how you must see it, but it's not what I've said.

The main arguments I have advocated are: first, to re-state the argument from facing up to the hard problem of consciousness by David Chalmers. I don't think he proposes that consciousness is a 'magical entity' either. What he says is, the mind possesses attributes that cannot be satisfactorily accounted for from a third-person perspective. http://consc.net/papers/facing.html

And in any case, the 'explanatory gap' is well known and acknowledged in both science and philosophy as an outstanding problem. You write as though all this has been solved, all the answers are in, when it's simply not the case.

I've referred to a number of facets of what is generally known as psychosomatic medicine, which according to materialism ought not to occur.

The third argument is that semantic, logical, and mathematical order, which are fundamental to the ordering of reason and the nature of thought, can't be accounted for in physicalist terms, as they act independently of physical causality.

And I said the reason you see my arguments in terms of a 'magic entity' is 'as a consequence of Cartesian dualism which depicts the mind as the 'ghost in the machine'.