You apparently can't outline any way that inter-subjective corroboration of the objective truth of any interpretation of what is yielded by religious or peak experiences could be possible. — Janus

You've made it plain that as far as your concerned, there can't be any. But in Ch'an Buddhism there has always been a way of validating both the lineages and the progress and realisation of the aspirants. Standing outside that tradition, though, you're obviously not going to get 'peer-reviewed scientific journal articles' which validate 'the realisation of satori'. If that's the standard you're demanding, then you're correct, you're not going to get it, but that standard is incommensurable with the subject, as it is exogenous to the tradition in which such practices are meaningful.

they all say different things... — Janus

The world is a global village nowadays. There's masses of information available allowing you to contrast and compare all of these traditions. If you don't feel the 'pull' of spirituality, then it's true, it seems they all conflict. But if there's a will, there are ways can be found of harmonising them. I've always been interested in the Zen Christian movement, which really originated with Thomas Merton, but has many distinguished exemplars. Certainly on the 'doxastic' level there are massive differences between Christianity and Buddhism, but in this movement they are harmonised. Likewise there are many inter-faith communities and movements all over the world. Some differences will remain insurmountable, it's simply a fact of existence. Sometimes you have to decide.

The issues with religious cosmology and modern science is large and vexed. There's a scholar by the name of Donald Lopez who's written a lot of interesting work on that. But to say that you can practice the principles of Buddhism without dealing with cosmology! It's like, you can be dedicated Christian without believing in the literal creation myth.

But, again, if your main aim is to say that all of them are simply subjective or social myths, then sure, their differences can easily be exploited for that argument.

can you honestly say that the idea of the Guru is not the idea of an authority? — Janus

In liberal cultures, the implicit belief is 'nihil ultra ego', nothing beyond ego. In liberalism, the ego, buttressed by its belief in science, is the arbiter of reality. If you ever have the good fortune to meet with a genuine guru, you will find they can tell you many things about yourself that you don't know. Of course, unscrupulous hoodoo gurus have found millions of ways to exploit that. But 'if there were no gold, there would be no fools gold'.

Krishnamurti, you may recall, always rejected any idea of 'spiritual authority'. Yet it was always him on the podium, speaking. I suppose you could say, he had no authority beyond that of 'pointing out', but he was always pointing out something that most of us don't see, otherwise there would have been nothing to say. Where religious authority becomes corrosive, is when it is allied to governmental or executive power, and when religious dogma is enforced using those means, which is writ large in the history of religion in Europe, and one of the things that moulds our understanding of it to this day.

you completely lost me with your reference to 'genocide'.

you completely lost me with your reference to 'genocide'. — Wayfarer

It was a good attempt at a bad joke

I'm just enjoying a nice conversation between the best two philosophers on T P F. There is much to be gained from this debate.

Yes, interesting isn't it?

I don't disagree with what you've said in this post, but all it indicates is that within traditions, there are means of obtaining what the people who adhere to that tradition count, on the basis of their shared assumptions and beliefs, as corroboration. The same can happen in poetry interpretation or arts criticism. As I have said the case with science, logic and the empirical is different, because the corroboration can be achieved with an unbiased observer.

I agree there is much to be gained from this debate. It should lead to clarification of the differences between the aesthetics, ethics and religion on the one hand and logic, mathematics and empirical investigation on the other.

And I should repeat, contrary to Wayfarer's accusations, I am not against religion (apart from some religions' genocidal and oppressive tendencies), and nor am I a positivist (if anything I am a skeptic!). I don't have any problem with people having faiths of various kinds, provided they see, and admit, that it is faith. The inability to see faith as faith leads to fundamentalism; and that is a big problem (on both sides of the argument).

Thanks for the compliment too, but I really don't think I deserve it. :smile:

I actually used to think as you do — Janus

I used to think like you. I in all honesty don't believe that thinking (regarding direct knowing) is rationally supportable, and I think I have good reasons for thinking that. — Janus

First of all, no one uses repetition in philosophy these days, excellent work. :up:

Secondly, I disagree. Direct knowing is easily supported by rationality. By objective evidence, not so much. Your "good reasons for thinking that" should be evidence enough. Lol

As I have said the case with science, logic and the empirical is different, because the corroboration can be achieved with an unbiased observer. — Janus

What these have, which art and religion lack, are methodology, but digging deeper than methodology, the latter lack a purpose: that is to yield objective truth, which is qualitatively opposed to subjective truth.

Secondly, I disagree. Direct knowing is easily supported by rationality. — Merkwurdichliebe

Please explain how direct knowing that yields inter-subjectively corroborable beliefs is possible. (Just to be sure it is clear empirical data, although they may be directly known by observation don't count as direct knowing in the sense I mean; I am talking about "inner direct knowing" in the sense promoted by Zen Buddhism for example).

Not sure what you mean here.

Please explain how direct knowing that yields inter-subjectively corroborable beliefs is possible. — Janus

I didn't say it was possible. I don't see how it is, other than through tyranny and oppression. I said it can be rationalized, and yield the highest degree of rationality to those ready to receive it. Remember that rationality can actually be the most illogical shit ever invented, but it is still rational - meaning that it coheres within its own system.

let me add, belief in a particular system is not the same as faith. The difference: the former holds credibility in that it is subscribed to a priori- it is speculative; whereas the latter as it were, requires spontaneous renewal - it is the Latin word for "the fact is now".

Just to be sure it is clear empirical data, although they may be directly known by observation don't count as direct knowing in the sense I mean; I am talking about "inner direct knowing" in the sense promoted by Zen Buddhism for example). — Janus

Empirical data, not that which is collected and quantified into objective knowledge that we can all agree upon , like the acceleration of gravity, but in the philosophical sense of direct experience, immediacy, existence in and for itself...that is what I assume you are referring to, more or less.

But, again, if your main aim is to say that all of them are simply subjective or social myths, then sure, their differences can easily be exploited for that argument. — Wayfarer

I believe you are putting too much negative weight on subjective or social myths. Even if we regard them (authority/doctrine) as art, they are no less significant to the believer. And it is the believer, and the believer's belief that is of concern - not what the believer believes in, but that he believes.

It should lead to clarification of the differences between the aesthetics, ethics and religion on the one hand and logic, mathematics and empirical investigation on the other. — Janus

The former is definitely philosophical territory - fun, as it were; the latter causes philosophers to shove their heads up their own stanky asses.

within traditions, there are means of obtaining what the people who adhere to that tradition count, on the basis of their shared assumptions and beliefs, as corroboration. The same can happen in poetry interpretation or arts criticism. As I have said the case with science, logic and the empirical is different, because the corroboration can be achieved with an unbiased observer. — Janus

That's an implicit criticism of such beliefs on the basis of 'shared assumptions' - again, belief and tradition don't count, or rather, they only count because of their beneficial consequences. But, you say, science and empiricism can show 'what is really the case'. And yet you deny that this criticism is positivist - look again at the definition of positivism:

'a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism.'

This not an ad hominem - positivism as a general tenet is a defensible point of view, and I don't say you shouldn't hold it or that there is anything the matter with you holding it. But you can't then turn around and claim not to hold it, when what you're saying is in line with it.

Secondly, as for 'unbiased observation' - a perfectly detached point of view - then again, in Buddhism that is also well understood. An ability of the Buddha is yathābhūtaṃ - 'seeing things as they truly are'. The ground for this claim is that the Buddha is completely lacking in self-interest and is therefore perfectly detached. There's an echo of that in scientific method itself, with its emphasis on detached objectivity, with the caveat that, since Hume (the 'is/ought' dichotomy) and the ascendancy of philosophical naturalism the Universe is believed to be devoid of inherent meaning or purpose - even though that itself is a value judgement! (although one which most people will say has been validated by science.)

'In the Indian context it would have been axiomatic that liberation (Nirvāṇa) comes from discerning how things actually are, the true nature of things. That seeing things how they are has soteriological benefits would have been expected, and is just another way of articulating the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ dimension of Indian Dharma. The ‘ought’ (pragmatic benefit) is never cut adrift from the ‘is’ (cognitive factual truth)' ~ Paul Williams.

(Although it should be noted that Buddhism doesn't regard the natural Universe as inherently good on the grounds of it having been created by a benevolent creator. )

Even if we regard them (authority/doctrine) as art, they are no less significant to the believer. — Merkwurdichliebe

Again, it subjectivises the matter. I think the adherents of those faiths would say that it's not simply a matter of comforting oneself through belief, but that the belief is actually efficacious.

And I should repeat, contrary to Wayfarer's accusations, I am not against religion (apart from some religions' genocidal and oppressive tendencies), and nor am I a positivist (if anything I am a skeptic!). I don't have any problem with people having faiths of various kinds, provided they see, and admit, that it is faith. — Janus

It is obvious to anyone with two shits for brains that you are not against religion. Even if anyone thought that, remember, the most religious dudes in history were thought to be infidels by their culture/peers.

The inability to see faith as faith leads to fundamentalism; and that is a big problem (on both sides of the argument).

Absolutely, the imposture of faith becomes an ethical matter rather than a matter of relating to what one believes in (by faith). "Killing in the name of" is most justified under those terms.

Again, it subjectivises the matter. I think the adherents of those faiths would say that it's not simply a matter of comforting oneself through belief, but that the belief is actually efficacious. — Wayfarer

Yes, it is specifically the believer's belief that is efficacious. No disagreement.

Now, for pretend purposes, let us qualify and quantify every believers belief in a stated system. Let us hold each and every individual believers belief up to the light and compare them. Are they equal, insofar as doctrine/authority command. I say no.

All this bullshit is to say, the believers are, so to speak, comforting themselves with "belief itself", not necessarily "belief in something". If there is a something for the believer, it is only significant insofar as it sustains his belief.

Thanks for the compliment too,: — Janus

Totally dude!

But, you say, science and empiricism can show 'what is really the case'. And yet you deny that this criticism is positivist - look again at the definition of positivism: — Wayfarer

Perhaps it is indeed positivism. But those are the definitive criterion for objective knowledge in our age, and they cannot presently demonstrate what "really is the case". By other standards we might be afforded other avenues.

'a philosophical system recognizing only that which can be scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism.' — Wayfarer

Positivism is the claim that theism and metaphysics are incoherent; I haven't claimed that. I am merely pointing out that they can't yield falsifiable or verifiable knowledge in the sense that logic, math and science can.

As to the Buddha being completely lacking in self-interest; that is certainly an article of faith, since no one today has any chance of meeting him, and even if they did it would still be a questionable claim. Similar claims have been made for Sri Aurobindo, Ramana Maharshi, Meher Baba, Da Free John, Osho and many others, but I have no doubt you would reject at least some of those as being charlatans. It's much easier to accept someone as an "The Enlightened One" when there is 2000 years of tradition backing up the belief.

I know you have accepted the Buddhist vows, which means that you accept Gautama as "The Enlightened One"; but how can this possibly be anything other than an article of faith? You don't even know for sure that Gautama actually existed.

Remember that rationality can actually be the most illogical shit ever invented, but it is still rational - meaning that it coheres within its own system. — Merkwurdichliebe

I don't think it's right to say that rational thinking can be illogical. But unsound beliefs can be supported by logically valid arguments with unsound premises.

Absolutely, the imposture of faith becomes an ethical matter rather than a matter of relating to what one believes in (by faith). "Killing in the name of" is most justified under those terms. — Merkwurdichliebe

:up:

The former is definitely philosophical territory - fun, as it were; the latter causes philosophers to shove their heads up their own stanky asses. — Merkwurdichliebe

Not sure which is the former and which the latter here.

Empirical data, not that which is collected and quantified into objective knowledge that we can all agree upon , like the acceleration of gravity, but in the philosophical sense of direct experience, immediacy, existence in and for itself...that is what I assume you are referring to, more or less. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yes, by "empirical data" I am referring to what can be observed by anyone with the requisite senses.

Positivism is the claim that theism and metaphysics are incoherent; — Janus

It's not - it's the claim that they're not the basis of valid knowledge claims. It is what you're saying.

how can this possibly be anything other than an article of faith? — Janus

Whether I believe it, is beside the point: the philosophical point, is that the tradition itself recognises the problem of bias and addresses it. Actually the idea of detachment was central to all philosophical traditions even before the development of modern science. You find it in the teachings of Eckhardt also.

I think the question which most people will ask, is How could the Buddha understand the 'nature of reality' when in his day, there weren't even scientific instruments?

You mentioned Buddhist cosmology. There are some aspects of it that have been plainly shown to be mistaken by science. This is one of the reasons the Dalai Lama said in his philosophy of science book that, should science show any dogma of Buddhism to be mistaken, then it ought to be abandoned. (Chief amongst them is the mythology of Mount Meru, which is the Buddhist 'axis mundi'). But on the other hand, Mahāyāna Buddhist mythology has long accepted that the Universe is vast in extent and populated by countless 'life-bearing orbs', and that the Universe goes through aeons-long cycles of creation and destruction. Bishop Usher, it ain't. ;-)

But, as I understand it, the Buddha(s) must see something about 'the nature of reality' which rest of us don't. I suppose you can call that an article of faith, if you like, but again, it's not the Nicene Creed.

It's not - it's the claim that they're not the basis of valid knowledge claims. It is what you're saying. — Wayfarer

No, you're misunderstanding both me and the definition of positivism. A valid claim is a coherent and consistent claim; it doesn't have to be true to count as valid. Positivism says that claims like "God exists" are not even wrong, because they are incoherent. Such claims are seen as senseless, which means "without sense", or without any means of verification. They are not, properly speaking, propositions because there is no determinable referent there.

The early Wittgenstein has a similar but subtly different view; if someone makes a metaphysical claim we should show that some of their terms have no reference, not sense; we are then literally speaking nonsense. Unlike the positivists he allowed for the mystical and for its great importance, but warned that we cannot, and should not try to, say anything about it. Kant made a very similar point re metaphysics and theology.

The later Wittgenstein saw metaphysics and theology as "language games" which we play and within which we can find internal coherence and consistency. But again he warns that we should not imagine that such games can tell us anything about the nature of reality. In a way the same goes for math, logic and science but those games are different than metaphysics and theology because of the stricter rules that govern math and logic, and in the case of science because of falsifiability and verifiabilty, neither of which are, however, absolute in any sense we might imagine them to be. But at least in those investigations there are, relatively speaking, determinably correct and incorrect answers.

Unlike the positivists he allowed for the mystical and for its great importance, but warned that we cannot, and should not try to, say anything about it. Kant made a very similar point re metaphysics and theology. — Janus

There have been comparisons between W. and his 'ladder' - something 'discarded after climbing it' - and Buddhism, which compares it's own teachings to a raft which are to be discarded after crossing over.

(Of course, in practice, Ch'an or Zen has nothing to say about any of that, it is not philosophy and is not concerned with philosophizing, although some scholars and academics like to make these comparisons.)

The whole point about 'the transcendent' is that one of the things it transcends is discursive reason. But as we're in the predicament of being human, stuck between being apes and angels, we can't help but try to seek it.

Anyway, I have always been struck by some of Wittgenstein's aphorisms towards the end of TLP.

6.371 At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.... So people stop short at natural laws as something unassailable, as did the ancients at God and Fate.

6.372 And they are both right and wrong. but the ancients were clearer, in so far as they recognized one clear terminus, whereas the modern system makes it appear as though everything were explained.

6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value—and if there were, it would be of no value.

If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
6.42 Hence also there can be no ethical propositions.
Propositions cannot express anything higher.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and æsthetics are one.)
...6.52 We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer.

I feel that he is still 'pointing towards' or 'pointing out' something of vast importance. He's not saying 'there's nothing to be understood there' but that what must be understood transcends discursive reason (which again is where his approach is rather like Zen.)

I think the Vienna Circle misinterpreted Wittgenstein - see Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Folly of Logical Positivism Philosophy Now.

Likewise there have been comparisons between Kant's 'antinomies of reason' and the Buddha's ten 'unanswered questions'. T R V Murti's book 'Central Philosophy of Buddhism', although out of favour with more recent scholarship, compared Madhymaka (Nāgārjuna) with Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy, and on similar grounds; the Buddha's reticence to indulge in 'metaphysical speculation' (whether the Buddha exists after death or not, whether the world is eternal or not) are very much in the spirit of Kant's antinomies. These questions, when asked of the Buddha, would always be met with a 'noble silence' ('that of which we cannot speak...').

But again he warns that we should not imagine that such games can tell us anything about the nature of reality. — Janus

'The nature of empirical reality', perhaps.

I want to run something by you if it's not too much of a bother.

If memory serves, Ch'an is Zen in Japanese Buddhism, right? I remember my early encounters with Zen mainly involving Koans. Koans, again if memory serves, are generally intended to be paradoxes or, if not, extremely (allow me to exaggerate a bit) difficult puzzles constructed by those who've seen the light so to speak and aimed at the novice with the specific purpose of enlightening faer.

To my knowledge, koans, at their core, are about two aspects of life and living, well, actually thinking but humans are defined as sapient, so, viz. 1) language and 2) logic. These two qualities if you'll allow me to label them as such define us for they constitute the essence of sapience - thought, thinking, rumination, cogitation, etc.

Koans put into their service both language and logic but the resulting products, the koans themselves, defy both in the sense that their solutions, assuming koans have solutions, can't, or are supposed not to, be expressible with words in a logical manner. In different words, the "solutions" to koans can't be, or are not intended to be, found in either language or logic or both.

A penny for your thoughts...

True - in theory. But in the actual Zen tradition, koan training is given in the context of the overall 'monastic curriculum' which includes many other elements - physical training, recitation, a strict routine and unremitting discipline. It's a highly regimented discipline. In that context, the Ch'an kung-an (koan) are a traditional collection of cryptic and elliptical sayings, which the student monks 'work on' under the supervision of a roshi often for periods of months. The students expression of his/her insight into the Ko'an is assessed by the roshi. Koan is more associated with the Rinzai lineage than the Sōtō lineage (which are the two main Japanese sects.)

I'm not claiming the least expertise or experience in Zen training, my own knowledge is all second hand and gained from books, apart from a few meditation retreats. The well-known Penguin book Zen Flesh Zen Bones was floating around my house all the sixties and seventies, it contains many koans and other 'teaching stories'. That's about the extent of my knowledge of it. You can find many of them here.

There are also videos on youtube about the subject, such as this.

Do you have a favorite koan?

The only one I can remember is this:

What is the sound of one hand clapping? — Zen

Joshu's Zen

Joshu began the study of Zen when he was sixty years old and continued until he was eighty, when he realized Zen.

He taught from the age of eighty until he was one hundred and twenty.

A student once asked him: “If I haven’t anything in my mind, what shall I do?”

Joshu replied: “Throw it out.”

“But if I haven’t anything, how can I throw it out?” continued the questioner.

“Well,” said Joshu, “then carry it out.”

//ps// I don't think that is an official Ko-an. It's one of the anecdotes in Zen Flesh, Zen Bones that I particularly liked.//

This is a pointless response — Janus

Yes, it was, totally agree. My apologies. I wore myself out on the forum yesterday and by end of the day my brain had turned to toxic applesauce. Sorry, my bad!

Krishnamurti, you may recall, always rejected any idea of 'spiritual authority'. Yet it was always him on the podium, speaking. I suppose you could say, he had no authority beyond that of 'pointing out', but he was always pointing out something that most of us don't see, otherwise there would have been nothing to say. — Wayfarer

As much as I'm fond of JK, I still wonder whether having nothing to say might have been an improvement.

Example, I once attended a talk by Amrit_Desai. I was in no way a follower, but rather a college sophomore skeptic, attending in the hopes of meeting hot hippy chicks. This fellow sat on the stage saying nothing at all, and filled the whole room with a fog of peace that was undeniably tangible. Eventually he began to talk, not a word of which I remember.

The counter argument is that had no talk been promised, I very likely wouldn't have shown up.

As I have said the case with science, logic and the empirical is different, because the corroboration can be achieved with an unbiased observer. — Janus

As you have said many times. And so my question would be, having discarded religiously generated conclusions as unreliable....

What's next?

The discarding seems reasonable to me. The apparent lack of any "whats next" does not.