"If, on the other hand, one takes Traski's truth definitions to say something about the relations of specific languages to the world, one cannot at the same time claim that he has told us all there is to know about the concept of truth, since he has not told us what the concept is that his truth definitions for particular languages have in common." Donald Davidson, The Folly of Trying to Define Truth, The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 93, Issue 6 (Jun., 1996), 263-278

Where Davidson critiques Tarski for failing to provide completeness, here a definition of truth is already presumed. This proves that one is playing a game of semantics against themselves, even more so than against others, one is essentially ignorant or lying to oneself about one's commitments. Perhaps it can even be said that one is in denial? The real question is why one should proceed into the abyss of such a game when it contradicts itself from the outset?

As per the rigor of analytical standards why is one using words? Perhaps one should stop? As mentioned above, isn't the conclusion that one is merely lying to themselves? What is one attempting to achieve? (This question strikes at the hidden motive, one must be able to follow the rabbit down the psychological hole).

"I think that Tarski was not trying to define the concept of truth -- so much is obvious -- but that he was employing that concept to characterize the semantic structures of specific languages." Ibid.

Not at all. Here the attempt was made. Let us not recast the action. If the semantic structure is used to evade the game in which it confesses to be engaged, here we find a back and forth equivocation between semantics and truth premises. When one comes under attack the technique is to pivot to the other. Like religion, denial is what drives this psychological sphere.

'Here is my hand.'

'You are born with a hand, may it not be a deformed hand.'

How shall we proceed against these premises? Should we proceed at all? Should we fall into the web of their semantics? If that is the case then Tarski was trying to "employ" something in the service of rhetoric, but this will be both denied and surely not understood. How can we know what Tarski was not trying to do?

If one was after a characterization then what can we say one was after? An invention that suits their fancy? Will you deny it? If so, one must explain the correspondence between the thing and its characterizations. If one cannot do this, if one fails to do it, then one cannot say they were characterizing the thing, one is then slammed back against the wall of their fancy.

Are there then, "semantic structures," or just those architectures that we create through characterization? If there are semantic structures, can we even speak about them, are they the kind of things that can be disclosed through words, or do we merely create impressions of things we imagine? What if words carry us farther away from these structures, what if they shower us in lies? God forbid, what if there are no structures as we so imagine!  

Surely there can be no such thing as a specific language, that is, not if we deem to be analytical about the concept. How many words does a specific language contain? How many symbols? Is there one less, does one add one more, then how is this specific? Did Davidson mean to say, semantic characterizations of arbitrary language structures?

"Lees, Horwich, Williams, and others who have contended that all Tarski did was reveal the usefulness of an otherwise dispensable concept are wrong. They are right that we need a truth predicate for the purposes they, along with Tarski, mention; but they fail to note the obvious fact that at the same time Tarski solved one problem he emphasized another: that he had not, and could not, given the constraints he accepted, define or fully characterize truth." Ibid.

Shall we say it louder? That he could not define or fully characterize truth! Fully? Did we hear this correctly? Where then can Davidson run to find relief from his own radical skepticism? Let the reader not complain, for the standard has been set by Davidson himself.

What does it mean to characterize truth? Can characterization ever amount to the fullness of a thing? Who is confused here, the analyzer of these words or the one who is speaking them? What kind of complaint is this: characterization does not amount to fullness? 

How can Lees, Horwich and Williams say what Tarski did? How, we ask, does this not fall prey to the fullness criteria?

How can Davidson say that Lees, Horwich and Williams are wrong? We assume by this he does not simply mean the fancy of his characterization? In which sense then, were Lees, Horwich and Williams wrong? Can Davidson fully know it?

Of course, one wants to claim that this is a preposterous game, and I admit it is, but I am not the one who invented it, I am not even the one who demanded it, but the presumption is that I must play it in order to do something that is important or relevant in terms of philosophy. The presumption is that we are really getting somewhere. So let us return to the linguistic structure to see what else it contains.

In one instance Lees, Horwich and Williams are wrong and in the next instance they are right. So we can only conclude that it must be fully true that we need "a truth predicate for the purposes they, along with Tarski, mention." How to get around this dilemma? Where Lees, Horwich, Williams and Tarski are wrong and right, Davidson must be fully right or else he can no longer play this game. Or perhaps that is not it, perhaps he must be wrong in order to continue to play this game? Which one is, can anyone tell us whether Davidson must be fully wrong or right in order to play this game? At which point can he no longer play it? We would think if he was right? But then again, how can he play the game if he is wrong? 

"...but they fail to note the obvious fact..." Here we must have a fully formed truth? I want to hear more about "obvious facts," is Davidson the only one who gets to make use of them? This question is too straight-forward, the real analytical question is, what makes a fact obvious, what makes a fact a fact? Did they, Lees, Horwich and Williams, in fact fail to note something that was obvious, or perhaps it is not so obvious? Perhaps this obviousness is itself a characterization of Davidson's fancy? If that is the case then they had not "failed," for how could they fail to note Davidson's characterization, which is neither obvious nor a fact? Is it obvious in the sense that Davidson has spoken it as a characterization, or is it obvious in the sense that it's a fact?

Did Tarski even solve problems or did he create them? Further, if Davidson talks about solving and emphasizing problems, then he is speaking of that to which his speech is said to correspond, unless Tarski is simply creating problems? Is Tarski merely characterizing problems, and if so is this a full characterization? It looks very much like Tarski may be creating problems? But if that is the case then what is Davidson doing?


More to come,
Davidson's conclusion here is most interesting...