This demand for (whatever) philosophy to justify itself in terms of its measurable value to society ought to be resisted. — SophistiCat

At the least, it’s reasonable to ask that philosophers try not to do too much harm, I think.

I take your point that as any pursuit that depends largely on public support, philosophy has a burden of justifying its existence. But as I think you agree, this question should not be considered transactionally, but in the wider context of the value of learning. (After all, philosophy is not much different in this respect from many of our other pursuits, and not only academic.)

But I want to stress that value here does not have to be a measurable material value. We don't support philosophy in the hopes of possibly getting Velcro or strong encryption out of it somewhere down the road. This is value in a broader axiological sense.

But as I think you agree, this question should not be considered transactionally, but in the wider context of the value of learning. — SophistiCat

There are already fields in the social sciences that do this much better than philosophy. If you are here rehashing the argument that has already been attempted, that is, Analytical Philosophy imparts the ability to think. I have already raised valid objections to this claim, critical thinking does this much more efficiently. Further, thought in and of itself doesn't contain value, just like physical strength in and of itself doesn't contain value, it is only when the strong man puts his strength to some social use that it obtains value beyond subjectivity. One can make a strong machine only to let it rot in rust. As for my argument against subjectivity I have addressed it here:

'My claim is that philosophers have to do better than mere subjectivity, otherwise their entire program turns to dust. If one is just playing an aesthetic game, and they claim that's what it is, then they have already refuted themselves. There is no valid request for a formal refutation or argument after this, one can simply dismiss it on hedonistic terms. One can even characterize it however they want, as long as it brings value to them.'

But I want to stress that value here does not have to be a measurable material value. — SophistiCat

What? How did you arrive at this rule? Who allowed you to make it?

Philosophy is negation pure and simple, the value it has to offer comes through this negation. Philosophy can do no better than to strike out against its own irrelevance and abstraction for the sake of negating itself in order to hammer itself back in the direction of being. Philosophy must regulate itself if it would ever achieve the status of intelligence.

At the least, it’s reasonable to ask that philosophers try not to do too much harm, I think. — Olivier5

Try that on Nietzsche.

Or Peter Singer.

'My claim is that philosophers have to do better than mere subjectivity, otherwise their entire program turns to dust. — JerseyFlight

So e.g. 'modal logic' and 'reflective equilibrium' and 'nonreductive physicalism' ... are instances of "mere subjectivity"?

So e.g. 'modal logic' and 'reflective equilibrium' and 'nonreductive physicalism' ... are instances of "mere subjectivity"? — 180 Proof

This is a red herring. The counter of subjectivity arises from the claim that one cannot define "importance," that the idea of value is entirely subjective, and hence the argument against the Analytical position fails. This is what I'm countering, the claim that philosophy is merely a preference and that one cannot ask the question of its value. You will not find me here discussing the objectivity of modal logic, reflective equilibrium or nonreductive physicalism. You are free to make any case you wish.

There have actually been two claims:

1. Some of us would be doing more good if we were doing something else; if you measure the effect of your actions against the most good you could do, we are doing relative harm.

2. What some of us do leads others into the (1) scenario above, so that others are now doing less good than they might; thus there is a compounded relative harm.

This is what I'm countering, the claim that philosophy is merely a preference and that one cannot ask the question of its value. — JerseyFlight

So you've not read a word of e.g. Peirce, Popper, Quine, Sellars or Wittgenstein? Or understood them. Questioning "the value of philosophy" is nearly a raison d'etre. You're "countering" a strawman, Jersey.

So you've not read a word of e.g. Peirce, Popper, Quine, Sellars or Wittgenstein? Or understood them. — 180 Proof

Not sure why you assume that only those who agree with these thinkers would have been the one's to comprehend them? I have had this fallacious argument served to me many times by theists. But further, this is just another red herring. The conversation here is not a comparison of reading lists, this thread is about the social value of Analytical Philosophy.

1. Some of us would be doing more good if we were doing something else; if you measure the effect of your actions against the most good you could do, we are doing relative harm. — Srap Tasmaner

As I said in a recent PM, it would be an extraordinary presumption on someone's part to see us here doing this, and suppose to themselves that that is all we do.

2. What some of us do leads others into the (1) scenario above, so that others are now doing less good than they might; thus there is a compounded relative harm. — Srap Tasmaner

One may show the fly the way out of the flytrap; but the fly is unfortunately not obligated to follow. One does what one can...

:wink:

presumption — Banno

The very word I reached for on page 1 of this thread.

Ha!

I'm going to make a single point and then leave you to your crusade. — Srap Tasmaner

You and I both have the failing of not being able to leave this shite alone. We ought take Street's advice:

You should not play this vapid game... — StreetlightX

I don't entirely object to the discussion. I do object to it interrupting other discussions.

I would suggest a philosophical experiment to bring an end to this thread. Let us contrast this paper of Davidson with these aphorisms by Gracian. It is important to note that Gracian represents all the things Analytical Philosophers have railed against on this thread, generality and a lack of logical rigor applied to grammatical and linguistic structures. Gracian tries to impart wisdom with words, Davidson tries to criticize the structure of words. I am making a revolutionary claim, that humans are wasting their lives and energy on sophistical forms, and that these forms are not needed to obtain knowledge or achieve quality in life. In fact, these forms often serve to detract from both knowledge and quality. What I find most interesting is the objector who wants to claim that this appraoch is invalid, 'that this is not a proper way to approach the subject of knowledge or value.' And yet, here we are doing it, here we are contrasting two forms, here we are deriving imparted knowledge from Gracian's form. The question is why should one give their life over to Davidson's form, why can't one just proceed along the path of Gracian?

What I am most interested to hear from readers is what they got out of reading Davidson contrasted with Gracian? What specific value did you derive from Davidson? What specific value did you derive from Gracian? Did you think Davidson's paper was a waste of time, did you think Gracian's aphorisms were a waste of time? Would you read Davidson's paper again, would you read Gracian's aphorisms again? Do you want to read more of Davidson, do you want to read more of Gracian?

I suppose there are those who will claim that the issue of value cannot be settled this way, in one sense I admit they are correct, because value cannot always be immediately perceived, in another sense they are wrong, because life is short and it must choose between forms, and one of the ways it must do this is in terms of relevance.

For my part, I am not really paying attention to this pompous ass, but there is not reason why we can't discuss analytical philosophy or the value of philosophy.

I mostly agree, I mean I pursue philosophy for self-improvement and pleasure that can’t be reduced to those concerns.

Only I'm less hesitant to explicitly value the economic or welfare outcome (wider categories than transactional) of a pursuit. If certain pursuits have no such outcomes in a particular society, I see a potential critique how that society is badly designed to exploit full utilization of those skills rather than seeing discouragement of the value of that pursuit. And if it truly has no practical applications whatsoever, it makes me question how in tune those ideas are with reality. Maybe I’m being optimistic about the interconnectedness of the world and thinking everything of value can lead to contributions to society is wishful thinking, but I think the abstract ideas leading to contributions speculation worked out quite well in history so far.

Peter Singer — Banno

What's so wrong with this guy?

Yes of course, Nietzsche is a case in point. Derida too in my view, in the sense that his particularly terrorist (Foucault's words not mine) and toxic form of post-modernism produced a generation or two of 'post-truth' confused people. One should be careful with one's words, they can do damage.

They are simply different approaches to different subjects. There is no absolute measure of value by which they could be compared.

They are simply different approaches to different subjects. There is no absolute measure of value by which they could be compared. — Janus

Your life and its limits, this is both the criteria and the measure.

Your life and its limits, this is both the criteria and the measure. — JerseyFlight

Yes, so each individual decides what has value for their life and its limits.

Yes, so each individual decides what has value for their life and its limits. — Janus

Society, that accounts for your individual quality, plays a part in the overall calculation of value. This is how we avoid pure egoism/subjectivity, but there is a level at which this breaks down... a horizon we are fast approaching.

Society, that accounts for your individual quality, plays a part in the overall calculation of value. This is how we avoid pure egoism/subjectivity, but there is a level at which this breaks down... a horizon we are fast approaching. — JerseyFlight

Of course we value on account of how we have been socially conditioned, and how we have reacted to that and worked with it, or not. Community values, a sense of community, have indeed, and are continuing to be, broken down. Is that a good or bad thing? There is no absolute answer to that, because any answer will still be filtered somehow through the lens of the very values in question.

The whole point of this thread has been to show that it is not coherent to claim that AP (or any other branch of philosophy or intellectual pursuit) has "negative social value" unless empirical evidence can be provided showing that AP has eroded, or is eroding, specific social values.

To sustain such a claim it would also be necessary to specify just what social value is in the first place, and why it should be thought to be such.

Returning to the point raised in the post before last. Having said what is said there, I acknowledge that it must be thought to be a bad thing if social cohesion, as opposed to any specific social value, breaks down. Because we are social animals; we depend on one another, and intellectual honesty demands that that be acknowledged. We are too weak to become solitary predators.

But the question is: just what does social cohesion consist in? I would venture to say that it consists in concern for others. So concern for others is one social value that cannot be eroded without loss of social cohesion. Could it be shown that AP necessarily erodes concern for others? I'm not seeing it.In fact I think saying that AP has negative social value erodes social value more than AP ever could.

I think there are far bigger fish to fry! How about financial capitalism?