Then they are not truly happy, no matter what they may tell themselves. — Tzeentch

Then you don't have a moral theory. You're merely deferring a moral judgement to one about happiness, while insisting that a person is not the judge of their happiness but rather you are. You can bypass the middle man of happiness entirely and just insist on what is moral and what is not on a case-by-case basis, which is what you're doing with happiness.

Then you don't have a moral theory. You're merely deferring a moral judgement to one about happiness, while insisting that a person is not the judge of their happiness but rather you are. You can bypass the middle man of happiness entirely and just insist on what is moral and what is not on a case-by-case basis, which is what you're doing with happiness. — Kenosha Kid

Maybe.

Like I said, I haven't really gotten the chance to get into details yet.

Ultimately it is only the person themselves that can judge whether they are truly happy, and only they themselves that can validate the trueness of such a statement. I, on my part, can choose to believe them or not. If I see a truly miserable person state they are happy, I am going to doubt that statement, obviously.

What is central to my theory is that while every person desires to be happy, very few people actually know what it is that will make them truly happy. They may spend their lives chasing dreams of wealth and success (or have darker pursuits, as mentions) and end up unfulfilled and miserable. In fact, they may live their entire lives staying completely ignorant of what true happiness means for them!

What then becomes a central question is, why do people have such a hard time recognizing what it is that truly makes them happy?

And the answer seems to lie in the many layers of mud that are cast upon the individual's psyche from birth. Opinions of others (parents, society, school system, politicians, etc.) that have become internalized, and have formed the bedrock of our worldview, even though they may directly counteract our attempts at finding happiness.

Acting in a way that works against one's true happiness is immoral.
Acting in a way that works towards one's true happiness is moral.
Acting in a way that works neither towards nor against one's true happiness is not a matter of morality. — Tzeentch

This actually seems like the no true Scotsman fallacy: If one acts in a way that is sadistic in order to achieve happiness, you say they never were actually pursuing true happiness. Your objective rule that one acts immorally in working against their own happiness then becomes relevant. But how is it known if doing sadistic things works against one's true happiness? Couldn't it be behavior unrelated to their happiness and thus not be immoral according to your third claim?

Ultimately it is only the person themselves that can judge whether they are truly happy, and only they themselves that can validate the trueness of such a statement. I, on my part, can choose to believe them or not. If I see a truly miserable person state they are happy, I am going to doubt that statement, obviously. — Tzeentch

For sure, but in a moral theory that depends entirely on personal happiness, if you assume everyone to be lying about their happiness if the wrong moral fact is derived, you don't have a workable theory: it is circular. It is not a question of completeness: you have precisely demonstrated that you have not answered anything, merely deferred the question.

Human beings have both selfish and social drives, and satisfying either can be a source of happiness. A less extreme example might be a guy running off with a woman he's infatuated with, leaving his wife and five young children unsupported and none the wiser. This is unconstrained hedonism: the man is doing exactly what he wants undeterred by considerations of responsibility and consequences for others. The harm he causes far outstrips the benefit he enjoys; nonetheless I'm sure he's having a wonderful time.

Opinions of others (parents, society, school system, politicians, etc.) that have become internalized, and have formed the bedrock of our worldview, even though they may directly counteract our attempts at finding happiness. — Tzeentch

I completely agree that bad institutions, such as bad laws (or lack thereof), bad leaders, and religion can make people unhappy and/or immoral. But I've seen people ecstatic at the idea of an atheist being tortured for eternity and I've seen them do charity work because of their beliefs. It's not a straightforward mapping from one to the other.

Not to try to get the thread back on track, but what do you think of the consensus morality I describe? MSC keeps telling me it is fallacious, but I don't think it is.

This actually seems like the no true Scotsman fallacy: If one acts in a way that is sadistic in order to achieve happiness, you say they never were actually pursuing true happiness. — Aleph Numbers

More accurately, they would be pursuing true happiness (as do we all), but not achieving it.

We seem to be working with a hypothetical person who is both extremely malicious and truly happy. I don't necessarily believe such a person exists, but if you know any I'd love to hear about them.

But how is it known if doing sadistic things works against one's true happiness? Couldn't it be behavior unrelated to their happiness and thus not be immoral according to your third claim? — Aleph Numbers

Ok, if I'm correct your question here, "Can one be sadistic without it affecting their efforts of achieving true happiness?", and I would answer no.

To carry out sadistic acts one either has to act in complete disregard of well-being, or be completely ignorant of well-being. If one, at some later point in life, gains insight into well-being, then they must see the pain they inflicted upon others and they will atone through guilt. This is karmic, in a way.

Ok, if I'm correct your question here, "Can one be sadistic without it affecting their efforts of achieving true happiness?", and I would answer no. — Tzeentch

I looked up the definition of sadistic, it is defined as: "deriving pleasure from inflicting pain, suffering, or humiliation on others". So yes, by definition sadism is related to deriving pleasure and is thus related to your proposed morality. But also you have to admit that if someone does something sadistic they are also, by definition, actually deriving pleasure from "inflicting pain, suffering, or humiliation on others". The word you seem to be looking for would mean: "seeking pleasure from inflicting pain, suffering, or humiliation on others".

For sure, but in a moral theory that depends entirely on personal happiness, if you assume everyone to be lying about their happiness if the wrong moral fact is derived, you don't have a workable theory: it is circular. It is not a question of completeness: you have precisely demonstrated that you have not answered anything, merely deferred the question. — Kenosha Kid

I disagree. I think there's a workable theory, however there is no simple 1+1=2 type of proof. But I've no desire to impose this system upon others. I use it to make sense of my own experiences and what I see in others.

Human beings have both selfish and social drives, and satisfying either can be a source of happiness. A less extreme example might be a guy running off with a woman he's infatuated with, leaving his wife and five young children unsupported and none the wiser. This is unconstrained hedonism: the man is doing exactly what he wants undeterred by considerations of responsibility and consequences for others. The harm he causes far outstrips the benefit he enjoys; nonetheless I'm sure he's having a wonderful time. — Kenosha Kid

In this situation there are a few options:

1. The man carries out this act without regret, thus must be ignorant of matters such as love, compassion and the harm he inflicts upon others. One so ignorant, cannot be truly happy.

2. The man caries out this act and regrets it in the end, meaning the act did not contribute to his happiness.

Deriving pleasure from something is not necessarily related to true happiness or inner peace.

So one can derive pleasure from something whilst at the same time not moving any closer to becoming truly happy. In fact, it may even move them away from such happiness.

So what is inner peace or true happiness? Sorry if you already defined these terms, but I can't continue this discussion without knowing. Perhaps true happiness is achieving a happiness that is free of the constraints of one's maladaptive tendencies, experiences, and base desires? But what makes tendencies and experiences maladaptive? What are base desires? Drinking beer could be the height of sophistication for one person and be absolutely base for another.

Perhaps someone is autistic, for example. Their greater attention to detail could be considered a boon, yet most people wouldn't consider being autistic a good thing because of their lack of social intelligence. So is it maladaptive to be autistic? Furthermore, should an autistic person pressure themselves to fit in better with neurotypical people (or whatever you want to call them)? Maybe that would help them overcome some disadvantages they were born with, but that doesn't mean that they will be happier for it.

Not to try to get the thread back on track, but what do you think of the consensus morality I describe? MSC keeps telling me it is fallacious, but I don't think it is. — Aleph Numbers

I don't think it is fallacious. But it doesn't seem useful. Just as in morality-maximises-happiness all moral questions become questions about whether people are happy, populist morality just becomes questions about statistics. It becomes descriptive, with the only possible moral imperative: conform! The other obvious thing to point out is that morality is inevitably time-dependent if views can change over time. In addition, new moral questions, such as environmental action questions, become undefined until a majority view is formed.

Is it possible to change the moral views of one person? If yes, then presumably it is possible to change the moral views of many people (simply by changing the views of one person many times). If yes then we can build a random moral generator to define a set of putative moral truths, then convince the majority of people that those views are true. Morality is then random. Replace the generator with, say, journalism and morality becomes a dictatorship, or a competition between would-be dictators.

Where I align with your view is that, left to our own devices in simple environments (e.g. uncluttered by bad ideology, questionable social structures, and individualistic or otherwise antisocial incentives), I think how people behave is a better guide to morality than anything a philosopher has ever thought up. I'm not an anarchist by virtue of the fact that our environment is not conducive to anarchism, but I do believe that the only fundamental morality is that which our biology has equipped us with, that any additions and corrections are either arbitrary or a consequence of the environment we have made for ourselves even if those additions are necessary for decision-making within that environment, and that any moral claim that cannot be evaluated purely in terms of our biological drives can only be evaluated relativistically. I have had a thread on this and plan a follow-up soon.

The man carries out this act without regret, thus must be ignorant of matters such as love, compassion and the harm he inflicts upon others. One so ignorant, cannot be truly happy. — Tzeentch

There is again a circularity. His awareness of the harm he causes others now apparently overrides even the feeling of happiness. But this is precisely a utilitarian view of morality. Irrespective of how we get there, we have a single, fixed path from 'causes harm to others' to 'is immoral' that is impervious to the variable 'happiness', whether because it is unimportant or because you keep redefining happiness to get the answer you want.

m = m(h)
h = h(o)
-> m = m[h(o)] = m(o)

Morality is a function of happiness. Happiness depends on outcomes. Therefore morality is a function of outcomes. No considerations of happiness required.

Btw 'I feel happier' is an outcome, so one can even derive moral answers along the lines of 'yes, because it increases my personal happiness' on utilitarian grounds without redefining happiness to mean 'knowledge of the suffering of others', so long as no one suffers. E.g. I want a banana. Should I eat a banana? Yes. I want to stab babies. Should I stab babies? No.

On the other hand, you cannot get moral answers to even simple moral questions in your 'personal happiness'--based formalism without redefining personal happiness ad hoc to get the right outcome, which is what you've done in both of your replies to me. You may as well bite the bullet and embrace utilitarianism.

The other obvious thing to point out is that morality is inevitably time-dependent if views can change over time. — Kenosha Kid

Like I said earlier in the thread, the people would need to be polled often enough that we would have time to implement the axioms that result from the process I outlined in the OP. This is also totally within the purview of the system I propose; through rational discourse one could persuade people to act in new ways via application of axioms that are established by consensus. Thus, the reformer is not always wrong and people can consider views that are not yet established via consensus. If the people are swayed by the discourse it will manifest itself in the polls.

So what is inner peace or true happiness? Sorry if you already defined these terms, but I can't continue this discussion without knowing. — Aleph Numbers

Understandable.

I think the concept is too intricate to describe in a forum post. I'll give you a few terms that I relate to inner peace and I hope you can fill in some of the blanks yourself: Inner deconfliction, freedom of fear, openness to love and compassion, guided by reason.

Perhaps true happiness is achieving a happiness that is free of the constraints of one's maladaptive tendencies, experiences, and base desires? But what makes tendencies and experiences maladaptive? — Aleph Numbers

When properly examined, much problematic behavior stems from fear.

What are base desires? — Aleph Numbers

When fears are properly examined, much of them are related to our desire to continue our physical existence. Fear of soical isolation, fear of poverty, fear of not procreating, etc. Perhaps that is a good definition of base desires.

Hold up. Both my replies to you have been about the nature of true happiness and not yet about morality.

The assertion that my theory amounts to "it causes harm to others, thus it is immoral" is way too hasty.

Like I said earlier in the thread, the people would need to be polled often enough that we would have time to implement the axioms that result from the process I outlined in the OP. — Aleph Numbers

I understand. My point is that this isn't useful. The axioms are just statistics. One can do away with them and just tell people the statistics and have a single moral imperative: conform!

through rational discourse one could persuade people to act in new ways via application of axioms that are established by consensus — Aleph Numbers

But wouldn't those persuaders and persuadees be acting against morality by arguing against moral truths? If majority opinion is moral fact, then contrary opinion is also contrary to morality.

Hold up. Both my replies to you have been about the nature of true happiness and not yet about morality.

The assertion that my theory amounts to "it causes harm to others, thus it is immoral" is way too hasty. — Tzeentch

Unless your definition admits the possibility that personal happiness can be consistent with the suffering of others and still be considered good, you are merely defining morality in terms of a variable that is itself defined in terms of morality. If you claim that one cannot be truly happy if one causes suffering, then your are claiming that personal happiness is a function of moral considerations. If you simultaneously claim that moral goods are those that increase personal happiness, you have a circular argument.

If you want to avoid this, stop working from the top down and build your theory from the bottom up. The answer to a moral question in your theory cannot be equivalent to 'he must be unhappy deep down because otherwise the answer comes out wrong'.

The answer to a moral question in your theory cannot be equivalent to 'he must be unhappy deep down because otherwise the answer comes out wrong'. — Kenosha Kid

It is true though. People that want others to be miserable are miserable themselves. If that has to be the basic assumption on which my theory is built, then so be it. It seems like a reasonable assumption to me, which I have seen confirmed plenty of times through experience.

It is true though. People that want others to be miserable are miserable themselves. If that has to be the basic assumption on which my theory is built, then so be it. It seems like a reasonable assumption to me, which I have seen confirmed plenty of times through experience. — Tzeentch

No, it isn't a reasonable assumption because it yields a circular argument. It's also insufficient to just make stuff up to make an argument hold. Either do it properly or don't do it.

Okay then. Show me this person that routinely makes people miserable on purpose and is happy at the same time.

Okay then. Show me this person that routinely makes people miserable on purpose and is happy at the same time. — Tzeentch

Will all caps help? WHETHER IT IS TRUE OR NOT (and it's not) YOU CAN'T DEFINE MORALITY IN TERMS OF PERSONAL HAPPINESS ON THE ONE HAND AND CONSTRAIN PERSONAL HAPPINESS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH MORALITY ON THE OTHER TO SUPPORT THAT DEFINITION. THAT IS NOT AN ARGUMENT.

And, while we're at it, this is YOUR theory you're presenting. You need to do better than present a circular argument followed by shifting the burden of proof onto others. Otherwise all philosophical debate would reduce to things like:

God doesn't exist. Prove me wrong.
Aha, but God does exist. Prove me wrong.
Except that he doesn't, so... Prove me wrong.
etc.

Is it possible that even you can see how this sort of thing is an idiotic waste of time? If you want to demonstrate that all immoral activity actually reduces personal happiness, that's your burden. You have to do the legwork. You can't assume it and then claim to derive it.

I recommend you read some of my conversation with .

I've had quite enough nonsense for today, maybe tomorrow.

7

that makes the actor feel good and truly happy. Indistinguishable from other things that make us happy, such as child birth, wedding, falling in love. Is falling in love a moral act, in and by itself? It's not even in your power when you do.
-- that which most people approve of. Most people approve of holding the fork and knife properly, of driving on the proper side of the road, of not kicking dogs. Is not kicking dogs actually a moral act, in and by itself? Is not raping children a moral act? No, raping children is immoral by consensus, but not raping them is not moral per se.
-- heroic acts: sacrificing one's own health, wealth, family, even life, for the good of the community or for loved ones. Is working overtime to make a boss's or capitalist life better, at the cost of destroying your own health a moral act?
-- acts that make most or all people feel better, or their lives better, easier, happier. This is indistinguishable from being "good" or "bad", in case of the opposite.
-- a decision has to be involved; a moral decision. You see your child drowning in a lake; you jump in, without thinking. This is a moral act; yet no decision took place. So it is indistinguishable from a good Samaritan act.
-- serving god. Well, it is not moral to kill, according to the ten commandments, but refrain from murder is indistinguishable from harm avoidance: you burn in hell if you do cross god.
-- etc.

In any of the foregoing, the act which we call moral, and its essential qualifier, can be found in acts that are not moral. Not immoral, but just not moral. And therefore I claim that humans have not found the magic formula for calling any act truly moral, whether the act is actually moral or not. — god must be atheist

Sorry for the late reply. Been in a lot of interesting discussions recently and it's been a little hectic to manage them all around home life and responsibilities. I'm sure you understand.

I agree with your claim that there is no one magic formula for claiming full epistemic justification for truly claiming any act as truly moral with 100% certainty. In order for there to at least be some objective moral truth there needs to be at least one true claim about morality to ground it in. So ultimately we can only rely on certainty by degree. It becomes a question of reasonable or unreasonable certainty.

If there is no such thing as moral knowledge or meaning then Relativism is also the wrong. Relativism cannot set itself apart from other moral claims when it is itself a moral claim, that there are no moral absolutes or objective truths. Relativism is still a moral claim, so if it is true then there must be at least on moral claim which is true, itself. Yet it can't be because it's central claim is there are no moral absolutes. Do you see the contradiction there?

Contextual Relativism, might have relativism in the name but it's first claim is this; Moral Truth and meaning are relative to clearly delineated context. If we had full awareness of the context of the universe and it's compositional parts, as well as a brain and/or Mind (whichever you prefer, not the topic) that could handle all of that complex data. Then maybe we'd be able to act with complete and full certainty on all moralistic matters.

If there is no such thing as moral truth then that means there is no cultural truth, if that is true this negates all ideas of meaning in language. Which means we couldn't have certainty on anything. However, this would provide deep contextual meaning to the concept of Chaos. But if chaos can mean something? Why would everything else be meaningless? The word "Meaningless" ultimately means "Nothing" but how can "nothing" have a meaning when the meaning we take from "Nothing" when our only frame of reference for a concept of "nothing" is reasonable certainty that this must mean an absence of a "something".

Ultimately, if language is meaningful to nature through any of the compositional parts of the universe that we might term "alive" then we can reasonably be certain that the universe must have meaning.

Otherwise everything I have said is just the nonsensical grunts and ape noises we claim have no meaning in the languages of other living entities. Which would have to be impossible for you ti understand if there is no meaning to anything.

If we can be reasonably certain about one thing, it stands to reason that we can not only be reasonably certain about other things, but that we can be reasonably certain that there are other meaningful truths up to and including moral claims.

Back to contextual relativism; it's second claim is that Language is a tool. A tool by itself is neither good or bad. It can be used by either a good or bad actor. If language is a tool, all words are tools. Made to Negate Falsehoods, Affirm truths and delineate clearly between the two with theories of meaning and the nature of meaning.

All this really implies about moral truths, as truths about language, is that moral truths can be described as objective but emergent in the same way there used to be no stars until the compositional parts of the universe previously enabled stars. It's an assumption that even meaning has to be in the universe from the beginning in order for it to be an objective reality of the universal environment, the way stars used to not be but now are. The way life used to not be but now is.

I understand. My point is that this isn't useful. The axioms are just statistics. One can do away with them and just tell people the statistics and have a single moral imperative: conform! — Kenosha Kid

If the statistics are represented as axioms they can be used to theoretically develop abstract rules via rational discourse. This would allow for growth and progress. Furthermore, these abstract rules would be able to be applied in different situations; it would be impossible to have a referendum, and thus statistic, on every possible situation. So, in some ways one would have to conform; but in a situation that doesn't correlate to a specific statistic one would have to apply multiple consensus-defined axioms to come to the right act. If there was a single moral imperative based on the statistics this would be impossible.

through rational discourse one could persuade people to act in new ways via application of axioms that are established by consensus
— Aleph Numbers

But wouldn't those persuaders and persuadees be acting against morality by arguing against moral truths? If majority opinion is moral fact, then contrary opinion is also contrary to morality. — Kenosha Kid

This is only partially true. Acting counter to what is believed to be good behavior would be wrong, but to argue that the consensus is wrong could be considered not immoral. For example: if the majority of humanity believes that stealing is usually a wrong behavior for most people some of the time, a descriptive claim, is run through the process I outline in the OP, it becomes the moral axiom that stealing is sometimes justified relative to humanity. This is because the morality I propose is defined as "what is considered by the majority of humans to be good or bad behavior for most people some of the time" One can make another descriptive claim, such as that stealing is a good behavior if you are trying to feed your starving children, that isn't by definition immoral as it is merely descriptive until it is run through the consensus finding process. Nor is it by definition incorrect; but if the initial statistic were that stealing is always a wrong behavior for most people some of the time it would result in the axiom that stealing is always wrong relative to humanity, and, thus, to propose a descriptive claim that would result in a contradictory axiom would indeed be immoral. But one could still argue that a certain moral belief is more or less rational given what axioms are currently defined by the consensus.

Sorry for fucking around with my comment so much.

If the statistics are represented as axioms they can be used to theoretically develop abstract rules via rational discourse. — Aleph Numbers

If the statistics are represented as statistics, even more so. I mean, you have mathematics at your disposal to do just that.

Acting counter to what is believed to be good behavior would be wrong, but to argue that the consensus is wrong could be considered not immoral. — Aleph Numbers

Okay, so I guess what you're saying is that you can challenge majority opinion as long as you don't breach particular rules. So I could verbally challenge, say, UK deportation policy (which is popular with the racist majority in the UK) so long as I don't actually hide a Windrusher in my cubby hole.

Fair enough, although it's limiting, it seems to me. Say that the majority get fed up with protests after BLM and Antifa and decide that protesting is wrong, unpatriotic, etc. Doesn't seem unthinkable to me. We still have the right to verbalise our contrary opinion, but we would be immoral to take our placards to the streets. Debate should always be the first, second, third, fourth and fifth port of call, but the problem with majority opinion is that it is propagated the majority of the time, which is always a barrier to moral progress. Think Rosa Parks.

For example: if the majority of humanity believes that stealing is usually a wrong behavior for most people some of the time, a descriptive claim, is run through the process I outline in the OP, it becomes the moral axiom that stealing is sometimes justified relative to humanity. This is because the morality I propose is defined as "what is considered by the majority of humans to be good or bad behavior for most people some of the time" One can make another descriptive claim, such as that stealing is a good behavior if you are trying to feed your starving children, that isn't by definition immoral as it is merely descriptive until it is run through the consensus finding process. — Aleph Numbers

I think this works better for "Would you like it if X were done to you or a loved one?" type questions. I think it gets harder when dealing with questions about the most vulnerable in society, who are generally minorities embedded in majorities who at best don't care about them and at worst don't like them. You can't get a meaningful majority opinion on questions like 'Should you be deported to your grandmother's country of birth if you commit a minor fellony' when most people live in the country their grandmother was born in.

Personally my faith in the majority is low. I am a democrat, but one thing that democracy constantly highlights is that majority opinion is pretty ugly, stupid, and backward. I do not find the average person to be a good role model.

Thanks for the reply.

Personally my faith in the majority is low. — Kenosha Kid

I mean, Trump got elected, that's pretty much all that needs to be observed. Granted, Hillary sucked.

one thing that democracy constantly highlights is that majority opinion is pretty ugly, stupid, and backward. — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, well, majority opinion can be swayed. George Floyd's death was tragic, but it catalyzed protest on an incredible scale. That being said the left is leaderless and disorganized, and when the leftist opinion surges up it is usually organic. Chomsky made the good point that the left has always voted against, not in favor of their favorite, morally pure politician; that kind of dogma is for the right.

You can't get a meaningful majority opinion on questions like 'Should you be deported to your grandmother's country of birth if you commit a minor fellony' when most people live in the country their grandmother was born in. — Kenosha Kid

Good point. One could just resize the sample, however.

If there is no such thing as moral truth — MSC

Actually, I kept saying that there may exist a moral truth, but we haven't found it yet.