What does this even mean? — Aleph Numbers

We are all genetically similar.

I would suggest that meta-ethical relativism (moral relativism) should not be considered necessarily frivolous. You do not need objective morality to advocate for the death penalty of people doing something you can consider abhorrent and you do not need to acquiesce your viewpoint merely because you see morality has no "true" answer. You can be the fiercest, unrelenting thinker on moral issues if you want to be.

There are serious and unforgivable things that other cultures consider okay, you can label them as horrible degenerates, no problem. Personally, I think morality is 100% subjective and has no truth value but I do not accept this as a licence for all actions and views, I don't care what your culture is. I don't think morality functions much different whether you think it's objective or subjective.

I just think we need to be honest and upfront with why morality exists as a force in society and you can explain that without relying on "it's objectively true". Firstly, there's logic/validity/reason/reasonableness.
Secondly, there's fairness, compassion, empathy, love and so on. Anger about these kinds of things is infectious and easy to justify and has an emotive aspect not necessarily present in just saying "God said so" or something.

Well, there is the example of health care: nobody wants to be denied care or bankrupted by a visit to the hospital. The majority of people, in the US at least, want universal health care to be instituted, but because of garbage neo-liberal politicians this policy has not been passed. The morality I propose would give strong ground upon which to criticize corrupt politicians. Thus, consensus, and the morality I propose, could potentially help overcome a flawed democracy, and, ultimately, result in considerable happiness. Furthermore, certain despicable and backwards practices could be condemned and eliminated, such as fgm. I'll try to think of more ways that consensus has utility. — Aleph Numbers

Right, but Im asking about the utility of your consensus morality over and above other moral metrics. The examples you list here are not unique to a consensus view, in fact I would say that those things are better accomplished by other metrics that do not have the problems that your consensus morality does.

Utility meaning pleasure or happiness? Or utility meaning how functional something is?

In the sense of functionality.

Well, it is functional in the sense that most people's intuitive senses of what is right and wrong would often win out, while also making room for the potential for change in moral axioms over time. A moral axiom that would apply now could later be thrown out if the consensus changes, and thus more potential for rational discourse to change people's beliefs. I say rational discourse because it is not concerned with making moral statements, which would by definition be wrong if they were made by the minority, but rather with eliminating beliefs that are not reasonable given certain axioms. These axioms could actually be moral and be arrived at through the process outlined in the OP. Thus, there is the potential for progress and the establishment of new consensuses that lead to more flourishing and happiness.

I understand consensus morality can accomplish what other moral metrics do, but I think your metric has to win by comparison. Thats the point im trying to make.
What is it about your consensus morality that makes it better than other metrics we already use that do not share the same flaw as consensus morality? To me it seems you must demonstrate not only how consensus morality is better than conventional moral metrics but also how it compensates for the serious drawback of morality essentially being a popularity contest that will inevitably rob minority moral views of validity.
Other moral metrics accomplish the same things your suggesting moral consensus does but without leaving out potentially vast swaths of people/moral views. If the majority (say 51%) are deciding right and wrong then 49% of the spectrum is being excluded. Thats problematic, not the society or moral system id choose to live in.

Could you giver me some examples of other moral metrics that can accomplish the same things better? I don't doubt they exist.

Well a utilitarian calculation accomplishes the same thing as far as I can tell, for example. Pretty much every moral system I can think of are attempting to address the things you referenced. Some of those are flawed and some are not, but you would have to demonstrate to what degree your moral consensus view is better than the ones im supposed to be rejecting.

I guess one might say that certain moral axioms come from consensus and then are amalgamated via rational discourse to create ever more complex or broad rational meta-axioms which could become more morally objective standards by which to measure behavior. Thus, one could justify not repressing gay people as a result of the moral axiom, which is accepted by most, that discrimination is bad. The most important thing is that rational discourse is concerned with rooting out irrationality, and not with making moral statements, so even if you are in the minority, if all you are doing is applying the consensus axioms in novel ways, you are not absolutely wrong. Thus, even if most people are homophobes, you are not wrong to work against discrimination.

I dont think the consensus part of your equation is needed anymore in that case. Its rational discourse that would then be your metric.

Consensus would still be relevant in order to have objective standards for morality. The meta-axioms would need to be run through the consensus finding process I outlined in order to be objective standards, and, if the majority pays attention to the discourse, maybe they will be swayed.

Essentially: if one is looking to root out irrationality then that works, but yes, the reformer that wants to make moral proclamations still presents a problem.

The objective standards are being created by rational discourse as you outlined. You are adding the extra consensus step to hang onto the consensus morality, but its not necessary for what you just described. What is necessary for what you just described is rational discourse. Unfortunately I think your idea doesnt work.

Human self delusion is so powerful it may not be possible to say much of anything meaningful about morality. Here's an example to illustrate...

The Nazis are often considered an extreme example of immorality. The Nazis sought to take over the entire European continent by force, exterminating all those they found inconvenient and enslaving the rest. We here in America were outraged, found the Nazis to be morally abhorrent and joined the fight against the Nazis, full of enthusiastic sincere conviction that we were morally superior.

And what did the Nazis want to do? The very same thing America had only recently finished doing on the North American continent, sweeping race based genocide and enslavement.

What's interesting is how thoroughly convinced Americans of that era were that there was a profound difference between American history and Nazi goals. This is fascinating given that we had completed the genocide of native peoples only a generation before the rise of Nazism, and were still lynching blacks in earnest during the Nazi era.

Point being, does the rampant self delusion which is a consistently reliable part of the human condition makes intelligent discussion of morality possible?

Are you saying that the meta-axioms wouldn't need to be run through the consensus process or that my previous post doesn't work?

The former.

Yeah, I see what you are saying. Thanks for that. I guess one would merely need to poll people about what they think on moral issues often and then discuss the resultant axioms to deal with all of the real, and sometimes intractable, moral problems we face. After all, there would be an interaction between the discourse and people's beliefs.

Yeah, I see what you are saying. Thanks for that. I guess one would merely need to poll people about what they think on moral issues often and then discuss the resultant axioms to deal with all of the real, and sometimes intractable, moral problems we face. After all, there would be an interaction between the discourse and people's beliefs. — Aleph Numbers

To me, what you are describing here would be an interesting form of democracy and an ideal situation to me. I do take issue with the word axiom being used in talk of Ethics and meta-ethics because I don't know if we have the required faculties for axiomatic thinking. We aren't computers.

In the context of this topic, it is perhaps worth asking the question whether a conglomerate of individuals can be a moral agent, or whether only individuals can be moral agents.

Well, I'm happy you find it enticing. I think it is valid to discuss axioms; they are essentially just "a statement or proposition on which an abstractly defined structure is based". Meta-ethics, and ethics in general, is full of both propositions and abstractly defined structures, so I see no problem.

Interesting question, but how is it relevant?

Indeed, I agree with that.



I think that is an interesting related question as well. It made me think of large groups or institutions that are immoral, and how and in what ways the individuals within that organisation are morally culpable.

Interesting question, but how is it relevant? — Aleph Numbers

Well its related because group consensus would be at play, but individuals might not agree with the group consensus yet none the less remain in the group.

Oooh. Okay. Yeah, that's a good point. I would say a group can be an agent if they can reach a consensus about a course of action and act on it. This would mean that if the majority of humanity decided what is moral and decided to implement policies based on what they believe to be moral, those who disagree wouldn't be considered part of the agent-group.

They could still be moral agents on an individual level, however. Additionally, they would still remain in humanity. Or maybe they wouldn't be agents at all. I need to think about this.

Would the individual more morally required to self terminate their membership in the group?

Perhaps. Let me think.

Terminating their membership might decrease the number of people who hold the immoral opinions, but it would do nothing to decrease immoral behavior provided the people with the immoral opinion accept the moral consensus and abide by it. Furthermore, making the moral axiom more popular past the majority doesn't make it more right. As long as the ratio is over 0.5 it is as right as it will get.

Phew! That was a close one :grimace: