When I'm flying in a dream, for instance, I know that it's me flying.
— praxis

Really? You remember your dreams. That seems to contradict the well known fact that to remember dreams one has to be woken up in the middle of it. — TheMadFool

I woke up last night in the middle of a dream. I was chitchating with an attractive woman while waiting for an impromptu salsa dance competition to start. At one point in the conversation she called me a creep because of something that I said. It was unjustified, I felt, though I don’t remember what I said, and upsetting. It seems pretty clear from that that I had a sense of self while dreaming, as well as an ego to bruise.

what's the defining characteristic of mind?

Not sure.

The self is the "I" that the mind infers to from what is essentially the Cartesian I think, therefore I am. — TheMadFool

The self is a letter of the alphabet? Or are you saying that the self is but another thought? Are thoughts about stuff that aren"t thoughts?

I only asked you to provide 4 physical items that includes thoughts as one. :chin: — TheMadFool

I’ve explained why it is a poor question. But....

1) cognition
2) traffic
3) cities
4) weather
5) ecosystems

Nothing is ‘purely physical’. If there were any such object, physics would be the discipline which describes it. And yet, the search for the fundamental constituents of matter through the largest and most expensive machine in the history of the world, has resulted in conundrums, paradoxes and arguments about the nature of science.

Every experience we have is mediated by judgement, and judgement can’t be said to be a physical process, as it comprises the relationship of ideas - if this, then that, because this is so, then that must be so. That has no analogy in the physical world, it is wholly in the domain of ideas.

Schopenhauer of course saw all of this, although since his day philosophy has regressed.

I weigh around 80 Kg. So

When I'm alive: My Mind + My Body = 80 Kg

When I die: My Body = 80 Kg — TheMadFool

Actually your weight fluctuates all the time. You weigh around 80 kg when alive and when you die you weigh around 80 kg; so what does that show if you don't make the unwarranted and erroneous assumption that you weigh exactly 80 kg alive and dead?

The self is a letter of the alphabet? Or are you saying that the self is but another thought? Are thoughts about stuff that aren"t thoughts? — Harry Hindu

Can you use "I" in a sentence Harry Hindu? If you can then what that "I" refers to is Harry HIndu's self. If you can't then that'd be interesting.

I’ve explained why it is a poor question. But....

1) cognition
2) traffic
3) cities
4) weather
5) ecosystems — apokrisis

Thank you. Bear with me, I'm not the brightest bulb on the chandelier. You've listed these five items as being physical. Ergo, there must be a common thread that runs through all five of them that justifies them being listed under the same category, the physical. What is this common property that unites these five items?

Nothing is ‘purely physical’. If there were any such object, physics would be the discipline which describes it. And yet, the search for the fundamental constituents of matter through the largest and most expensive machine in the history of the world, has resulted in conundrums, paradoxes and arguments about the nature of science.

Every experience we have is mediated by judgement, and judgement can’t be said to be a physical process, as it comprises the relationship of ideas - if this, then that, because this is so, then that must be so. That has no analogy in the physical world, it is wholly in the domain of ideas.

Schopenhauer of course saw all of this, although since his day philosophy has regressed. — Wayfarer

:up:

Ergo, there must be a common thread that runs through all five of them that justifies them being listed under the same category, the physical. — TheMadFool

Do you accept them all as physical? Or even just the four listed after cognition?

Do you accept them all as physical? Or even just the four listed after cognition? — apokrisis

I have no idea but if you ask me, I can, for instance, see everything listed after 1. cognition.

Can you use "I" in a sentence Harry Hindu? If you can then what that "I" refers to is Harry HIndu's self. If you can't then that'd be interesting. — TheMadFool

Then you haven't told me what the self is, only what refers to the self. Harry Hindu and TheMadFool are just another scribble that refers to some self. So I'll ask again, what is a self?

Nothing is ‘purely physical’. If there were any such object, physics would be the discipline which describes it. And yet, the search for the fundamental constituents of matter through the largest and most expensive machine in the history of the world, has resulted in conundrums, paradoxes and arguments about the nature of science.

Every experience we have is mediated by judgement, and judgement can’t be said to be a physical process, as it comprises the relationship of ideas - if this, then that, because this is so, then that must be so. That has no analogy in the physical world, it is wholly in the domain of ideas.

Schopenhauer of course saw all of this, although since his day philosophy has regressed. — Wayfarer

What does "purely physical" even mean? Are you saying that the universe is partly physical and partly something else? How can the physical interact with something else that isn't physical? This is the problem with dualism.

There is only one "substance". If someone were to assert that the "substance" is mental, then that would be projecting your mental properties onto the world, as if the world was like the mind, and is anthropomorphic.

If someone were to assert that the "substance" is physical, then what exactly does that mean when our perceptions of the world are not how the world is. Perceptions and the world are not the same thing. Perceptions are only part of the world. So perceiving "physical" objects would be similar to projecting your perceptions onto the world and also be anthropomorphic.

So which is it, or is it something else? I think that it is something else. I often use the terms, "information", "process" or "relationships" to refer to the primary "substance". And I think a proper explanation of consciousness will shed the light necessary to understand our minds' relationship with the world.

Maybe that is the problem - we are arguing about which scribble to use when referring to the primary "substance" (trivial), rather than trying to explain how minds and the world interact (not trivial).

What does "purely physical" even mean? — Harry Hindu

I’m not sure I know either, but I’m pretty sure that to a physicalist, ‘the physical’ refers to the only real entities. That is what physicalism means. The most thorough physicalist I have interacted with, on another forum, said it is defined in terms of matter-energy-space-time which in his philosophy comprises everything that is real. Within that ensemble, the brain is an evolved organ and the mind an epiphenomenon of the brain. That is the view of mainstream materialists such as Daniel Dennett.

As to how perceptions can be mistaken, that is not a hard thing for a materialist to account for. It’s something like a misconfiguration or flaw in perception.

As to why I am arguing that nothing is purely physical, it is because I argue that whatever is received by the senses, is then incorporated or synthesised by the mind. The human brain is the most complex phenomenon known to science, with more neural connection than stars in the known universe (that’s not hyperbole). So the brain generates reality, or rather, the only reality that we will ever know. Although even that is wrong, because it’s not as if ‘the brain’ is one thing, and ‘reality’ is another. It is a seamless process of perception, apperception, judgement, and action. Within that matrix, ‘the physical’ has a specific meaning, but the matrix of conscious experience is not in itself physical - it is prior to any definition or judgement about what ‘the physical’ consists of.

As to how something non-physical can react with something physical - well, a dualist could say that is exactly what organisms are, this is why they are capable of spontaneous movement and have many other attributes that can’t be found in non organisms. Not that this means that ‘mind’ and ‘body’ can strictly be separated - that idea is more like a model or an idealisation. But let’s say the mind is what is capable of grasping meaning and initiating intentional action. That is compatible with Aristotelian (as distinct from Cartesian) dualism, in that it sees the mind (nous) as intellect.

In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do. (It is what sets h. Sapiens apart as the ‘rational animal’; it is, arguably, ‘sapience’ itself.) This therefore connects discussion of nous to discussion of how the human mind sets definitions in a consistent and communicable way, and whether people must be born with some innate potential to understand the same universal categories in the same logical ways. Deriving from this it was also sometimes argued, especially in classical and medieval philosophy, that the individual nous must require help of (or be an instance of) a higher intellect. By this type of account, it came to be argued that the human understanding (nous) somehow stems from this cosmic nous, which is however not just a recipient of order, but a creator of it.

Then you haven't told me what the self is, only what refers to the self. Harry Hindu and TheMadFool are just another scribble that refers to some self. So I'll ask again, what is a self? — Harry Hindu

Indeed. You're correct, if I catch your drift, about this whole self issue. The fluid nature of our persona precludes the identification of anything fixed and unchanging about us. Everything about us changes - bodies age, worldviews are discarded and new ones adopted - and the problem is that the notion of self is tied to something that remains constant throughout life.

However, and this seems critical, the self in the Cartesian sense, the "I" in "I think, therefore I am" is the "thinking thing" or "that which thinks". In this view, the self is simply the thinker - just as running requires a runner and speaking implies a speaker.

It looks like this thinker or thinking thing lacks properties that can give it a distinct identity i.e., if you don't mind me saying, the thinker in Harry Hindu is indistinugishable from, is identical to, the thinker in TheMadFool so long as we ignore mathematics. In a mathematical sense, you and I make two and ergo, we must be numerically distinguishable from each other. Right?

That Harry Hindu is not the same as TheMadFool is based not on the nature of thinking things/thinkers, which are indistinguishable, but on what is thought - the contents of our minds determines our identities as two different individuals, Harry Hindu and TheMadFool. Let's not forget to mention that the two of us are also physically distinct.

I think I went off on a tangent there but I think it's time to ask, what we mean by self?

I did accept, and I guess you believe it to be the case, that there's nothing that remains constant in our lives and if that's true it makes it impossible to find a referent for self - the same word/term can't apply to two different things and have the same meaning.

However, notice one thing - throughout our journey through life, there is something - the thinker - that's constant and unifies the sum total of a person's experience. Given that and that thinkers are mathematically distinct, I think it's not wrong to say that the thinker = the self. :chin:

My Mind is not physical. — TheMadFool

You say the mind is not physical. When you say the mind, you can only be referring to two things, either the brain or consciousness. The brain is physical and by definition has mass. You can examine a brain, weigh it, etc. Consciousness is a process, more specifically the brain's process. A process has no mass.

Put another way, a wheel has mass. The motion of spin a wheel experiences has no mass.

Nothing you've stated refutes physicalism.

You say that we are different from each other both physically and in the contents of our minds. You also say that the contents of each mind determine its identity and that that which thinks has no distinct identity. Therefore, there is a mind, there is a that which thinks and there is a body, and all these make an individual. In addition, you say that that which thinks is common to all individuals; however, that the body and the mind are unique to each individual. Thus, an individual is made of a body which is unique to the individual, a mind which is also unique to the individual, and a that which thinks which is the same for all individuals. That is, there are many minds, many bodies, and only one that which things in the known universe. Is this interpretation of what you said correct?

I have no idea — TheMadFool

So you have no idea if you would classify cities or the weather as physical phenomena?

Sounds legit.

I'm guessing this is sarcasm

Any non-physical object is, in turn, non-quanitfiable, so it's impossible to use mathematics to describe a non quantifiable object, except maybe imaginary numbers, which are imaginary.

You might think "zero" is used in mathematics all the time and it is "nothing", well, nothing is in relation to what is being quantified. If there are no attainable coins in someone's coin pouch, they have zero, but that doesn't mean there are zero coins, or that there is nothing to make the coins with, or that there isn't mass in relation to what a coin is. It just means there are zero coins from an arbitrated point of view of what is and isn't valuable.

You say the mind is not physical. When you say the mind, you can only be referring to two things, either the brain or consciousness. The brain is physical and by definition has mass. You can examine a brain, weigh it, etc. Consciousness is a process, more specifically the brain's process. A process has no mass.

Put another way, a wheel has mass. The motion of spin a wheel experiences has no mass.

Nothing you've stated refutes physicalism. — avalon

Well, I would've liked to say "exactly" but then your last statement prevents me from doing that.

The mind/consciousness/psyche, whatever you want to call it, is a complex subject. Perhaps what I've been saying in this thread makes sense if we make the assumption that there's something, call it x, that does the thinking in us.

Yes, admittedly, this x could be the brain but how does one explain sleep/death? In both these states we have an intact brain but no consciousness - in sleep it's a temporary absence but in death it's permanent.

The reasonable response to the above question is to say that consciousness is just a process that occurs in the brain. All that's going on in sleep/death is the brain shutting down the putative process and we lose consciousness.

This is the right time to consider the nature of consciousness and we come to the realization that it deals exclusively with thoughts. Consciousness is all about thoughts - ideas/concepts - and thoughts are clearly not physical like brains, and neurons are.

The human body has, at any one time, multiple physical processes in action - the heart, the kidneys, etc. but all of them remain, so to speak, within the realm of the physical - blood flow, urine, etc. all physical. Given physicalism, how do we explain the peculiar fact of the immaterial/nonphysical nature of thoughts?

So you have no idea if you would classify cities or the weather as physical phenomena?

Sounds legit. — apokrisis

:smile: You're barking up the wrong tree.

Any non-physical object is, in turn, non-quanitfiable, so it's impossible to use mathematics to describe a non quantifiable object, except maybe imaginary numbers, which are imaginary.

You might think "zero" is used in mathematics all the time and it is "nothing", well, nothing is in relation to what is being quantified. If there are no attainable coins in someone's coin pouch, they have zero, but that doesn't mean there are zero coins, or that there is nothing to make the coins with, or that there isn't mass in relation to what a coin is. It just means there are zero coins from an arbitrated point of view of what is and isn't valuable. — ep3265

Quantity is secondary to physicality. First there must exist something physical and quantity follows.

I don't believe so, it still falls within the physical realm
a conscious mind is a process, not an object for it to be disproven like so, just like a cake mixer being turned on is a process with electricity passing through it, all still falls under the physical realm.

I don't believe so, it still falls within the physical realm
a conscious mind is a process, not an object for it to be disproven like so, just like a cake mixer being turned on is a process with electricity passing through it, all still falls under the physical realm — Augustusea

Ok :up:

Well, I would've liked to say "exactly" but then your last statement prevents me from doing that.

The mind/consciousness/psyche, whatever you want to call it, is a complex subject. Perhaps what I've been saying in this thread makes sense if we make the assumption that there's something, call it x, that does the thinking in us.

Yes, admittedly, this x could be the brain but how does one explain sleep/death? In both these states we have an intact brain but no consciousness - in sleep it's a temporary absence but in death it's permanent. — TheMadFool

It’s complex, I agree. Your last paragraph here is interesting. Let’s separate sleep and death. In my eyes, during sleep you still possess consciousness, you’re just unaware of it. We say you’re “unconscious”. Death on the other hand is a matter of physical decay. You don’t possess consciousness nor the potentiality of consciousness because the physical brain decays. Science has not yet clearly identified what level of decay results in consciousness being unsustainable.

Using my previous wheel example, in sleep the wheel is still intact and CAN spin. In death, the wheel itself is no more, the ability for it to spin is no more. The physical state (brain / wheel) results in the process (consciousness / spin) being possible or not.

This is the right time to consider the nature of consciousness and we come to the realization that it deals exclusively with thoughts. Consciousness is all about thoughts - ideas/concepts - and thoughts are clearly not physical like brains, and neurons are.

The human body has, at any one time, multiple physical processes in action - the heart, the kidneys, etc. but all of them remain, so to speak, within the realm of the physical - blood flow, urine, etc. all physical. Given physicalism, how do we explain the peculiar fact of the immaterial/nonphysical nature of thoughts? — TheMadFool

I disagree with your premise here. We don’t actually know whether or not consciousness is physical. To say “thoughts are clearly not physical” seems like a stretch. It certainly appears non-physical but we may simply lack the understanding to describe it in physical terms (currently). As a species, we have overcome our lack of understanding regarding all sorts of topics (for example how one becomes sick through bacterial and viral infections). Given our (mostly recent) successful history of explaining previously misunderstood topics in physical terms, I see no compelling reason why consciousness could also not be explained in such terms.

To say “thoughts are clearly not physical” seems like a stretch. It certainly appears non-physical but we may simply lack the understanding to describe it in physical terms (currently). — avalon

Here's where the meat of the issue is: "it certainly appears non-physical".

Here's where the meat of the issue is: "it certainly appears non-physical". — TheMadFool

What appears to us as physical or non-physical has no bearing on rational discourse. There are plenty of things that we interpret or wish to be that are wrong. Neuroscience has shown very clearly that the mind is tied to the brain, and is a result of its chemical processes. This isn't really a debate anymore. It doesn't matter what anything appears to be, when we have the facts and studies to show what it is.

Its like looking at the sun across the sky and saying, "Huh, the Sun goes around the Earth." By appearance, that's the only conclusion one can make. But we've studied it, gone into space, and realized that WE go around the Sun. Its an absolute shock to our common sense conclusion, but that is reality, not our personal perception of it.

What appears to us as physical or non-physical has no bearing on rational discourse. There are plenty of things that we interpret or wish to be that are wrong. Neuroscience has shown very clearly that the mind is tied to the brain, and is a result of its chemical processes. This isn't really a debate anymore. It doesn't matter what anything appears to be, when we have the facts and studies to show what it is.

Its like looking at the sun across the sky and saying, "Huh, the Sun goes around the Earth." By appearance, that's the only conclusion one can make. But we've studied it, gone into space, and realized that WE go around the Sun. Its an absolute shock to our common sense conclusion, but that is reality, not our personal perception of it. — Philosophim

It certainly appears non-physical — avalon

History of the philosophy of mind in a nutshell:

We moved from Identity type theory to identity token theory. From identity token theory to functionalism. From functionalism to emergentism. We seem to be moving closer towards the mind not being material

I would argue at this time Alex that philosophy of mind has now been merged with neuroscience. The days of postulating on what a mind are without reference to science are now over. This is the natural course of philosophy. Philosophy asks questions about things we have no defined concept of until it can become a science. Mind is now science. Mind is a physical reality we can study and learn about in a lab. To say the mind is not physical, is to say it cannot be tested. I have cited a few articles that show very much, that thoughts can be read, memories can altered, and tested on.

The mind is functionality and information. So in one sense, it is not physical.

But that could be misleading. How do you record information without something physical? How does functionality arise without a physical system of circuits? The mind itself may not be physical, but it always needs something physical to host it.

The mind can also be suspended. If you have a complete image of a consciousness, you could stop the functioning of the mind and then resume the functioning later. During that dormant period, did the mind cease to exist? Or was it still there?

yes, that's the point of my comment. You must first decide if something is able to be quantified before quantifying it, which you did not do