Epicureanism is so utterly ridiculous that it's probably one of the few, maybe perhaps the only, "mainstream" philosophy that Plotinus simply ignores outright in his writings.

He devotes time to attacking gnosticism.

He spends a LOT of time attacking Stoicism.

He completely ignores Epicureanism.

That tells us more about Plotinus than Epicurus.

"Epicurean in peace, Stoic at war".

Anyone else love Epicurus? — R-13

Well, I don't dislike him. I've read his extant fragments but never really bothered reading beyond that.

I don't think it right even to consider Epicureanism a serious philosophical sect. The real philosophers (including the Stoics) were all basing themselves, more or less loosely, on Plato and Aristotle.

Epicurus came straight out of left field with some pre-Socratic philosophy that Aristotle had long put to bed.

And need I even mention the "swerve"?

How utterly ridiculous.

So your point is... what? That serious philosophy comes from Aristotle and Plato, hence all else is wind? Were Aristotle and Plato the only true Scotsmen?

Stoicism is great, too. Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus seem as valuable along the same lines as Epicurus.

Yes; hence: Stoic at war.

I haven't looked at Plotinus closely, but I like this quote:

Once the man is a Sage, the means of happiness, the way to good, are within, for nothing is good that lies outside him. Anything he desires further than this he seeks as a necessity, and not for himself but for a subordinate, for the body bound to him, to which since it has life he must minister the needs of life, not needs, however, to the true man of this degree. He knows himself to stand above all such things, and what he gives to the lower he so gives as to leave his true life undiminished.

Adverse fortune does not shake his felicity: the life so founded is stable ever. Suppose death strikes at his household or at his friends; he knows what death is, as the victims, if they are among the wise, know too. And if death taking from him his familiars and intimates does bring grief, it is not to him, not to the true man, but to that in him which stands apart from the Supreme, to that lower man in whose distress he takes no part. — Plotinus

We have in this passage at least the same rough image of the wise man. I personally don't think the metaphysics or physics in either case are as important as this self-conscious goal --becoming more like this image of the wise man.

Could you explain the war and peace issue? If it's a quote, I don't recognize it. But it sounds promising...

Once the man is a Sage, the means of happiness, the way to good, are within, for nothing is good that lies outside him. — Plotinus

What do you reckon Epicurus would make of that? See, here Plotinus is being a 'classical sage' - heaven lies within, etc - which is is why Plotinus' ideas were so easily assimilated into Christian theology. Whereas Epicurus was more of a hedonist, albeit a prudent one. He eschews pursuit of worldly pleasure, he says, but only so as to enjoy a state of worldly tranquility, whereas for Plotinus, all such pursuits belong to the 'lower man'.

This is noteworthy.

A life free of mental anxiety and open to the enjoyment of other pleasures was deemed equal to that of the gods. Indeed, it is from the gods themselves, via the simulacra that reach us from their abode, that we derive our image of blessed happiness, and prayer for the Epicureans consisted not in petitioning favors but rather in a receptivity to this vision. (Epicurus encouraged the practice of the conventional cults.) Although they held the gods to be immortal and indestructible (how this might work in a materialist universe remains unclear), human pleasure might nevertheless equal divine, since pleasure, Epicurus maintained (KD 19), is not augmented by duration (compare the idea of perfect health, which is not more perfect for lasting longer); the catastematic pleasure experienced by a human being completely free of mental distress and with no bodily pain to disturb him is at the absolute top of the scale. Nor is such pleasure difficult to achieve: it is a mark precisely of those desires that are neither natural nor necessary that they are hard to satisfy. — Epicurus

I was just looking at the Enneads. There's plenty of logic chopping metaphysics therein, just as there is plenty of antiquated physical speculation in Epicurus. For me this "heaven lies within" is something like the indestructible core of the wisdom traditions. Maybe Plotinus has more of a mystical flavor, but I wonder how differently these men really lived. I can, of course, only guess at their subjective experiences in terms of my own.

I'll add a skeptic to the mix, to drive home the theme of tranquility:

According to Sextus, one does not start out as a skeptic, but rather stumbles on to it. Initially, one becomes troubled by the kinds of disagreements focused on in Aenesidemus' modes and seeks to determine which appearances accurately represent the world and which explanations accurately reveal the causal histories of events. The motivation for figuring things out, Sextus asserts, is to become tranquil, i.e. to remove the disturbance that results from confronting incompatible views of the world. As the proto-skeptic attempts to sort out the evidence and discover the privileged perspectiveor the correct theory, he finds that for each account that purports to establish something true about the world there is another, equally convincing account, that purports to establish an opposed and incompatible view of the same thing. Being faced with this equipollence, he is unable to assent to either of the opposed accounts and thereby suspends judgment. This, of course, is not what he set out to do. But by virtue of his intellectual integrity, he is simply not able to arrive at a conclusion and so he finds himself without any definite view. What he also finds is that the tranquility that he originally thought would come only by arriving at the truth, follows upon his suspended judgment as a shadow follows a body.

Sextus provides a vivid story to illustrate this process. A certain painter, Apelles, was trying to represent foam on the mouth of the horse he was painting. But each time he applied the paint he failed to get the desired effect. Growing frustrated, he flung the sponge, on which he had been wiping off the paint, at the picture, inadvertently producing the effect he had been struggling to achieve (PH 1.28-29). The analogous point in the case of seeking the truth is that the desired tranquility only comes indirectly, not by giving up the pursuit of truth, but rather by giving up the expectation that we must acquire truth to get tranquility. It is a strikingly Zen-like point: one cannot intentionally acquire a peaceful, tranquil state but must let it happen as a result of giving up the struggle. But again, giving up the struggle for the skeptic does not mean giving up the pursuit of truth. The skeptic continues to investigate in order to protect himself against the deceptions and seductions of reason that lead to our holding definite views. — IEP

For me this "heaven lies within" is something like the indestructible core of the wisdom traditions — R-13

Epicurus and Plotinus were very different indeed. The former was a materialist who didn't believe in anything beyond material existence. Plotinus, as noted, was the archetypical sage basically with a religious attitude, although on philosophical rather than fideistic grounds. I don't think he much believed in the Gods either, the One of Plotinus was not conceived as a deity.

The perfect contemplation of the One, however, must not be understood as a return to a primal source; for the One is not, strictly speaking, a source or a cause, but rather the eternally present possibility -- or active making-possible -- of all existence, of Being (V.2.1). According to Plotinus, the unmediated vision of the 'generative power' of the One, to which existents are led by the Intelligence (V.9.2), results in an ecstatic dance of inspiration, not in a satiated torpor (VI.9.8); for it is the nature of the One to impart fecundity to existents -- that is to say: the One, in its regal, indifferent capacity as undiminishable potentiality of Being, permits both rapt contemplation and ecstatic, creative extension.

Whereas catastematic pleasure (new word!) is said to be 'felt when being in a particular state, as opposed to kinetic pleasure, which is felt while performing an activity. It is the pleasure that accompanies well-being as such. Absence of pain, aponia, and lack of disturbance of mind, ataraxia, are two of the katastematic pleasures and often seen as the focal ones to Epicurus.'

Notice that ataraxia, tranquility, is mentioned also in the quote from the Sceptics. But, in any case, that state is rather more like 'eudomonia', i.e. a state of worldly well-being, happiness or joy, which is quite different from the 'unmediated vision of the One' that Plotinus praises.

I think Plotinus (and other mystics) depicts worldly existence as a kind of illusory state (cf 'maya' or samsara) analogous to a fantasy realm or game kind of like Dungeons and Dragons, but with real blood. Whereas Epicurus accepts that the game is all there is, so the best we can hope for is to attain the most satisfactory state within it - for him, that is winning. Plotinus wants to break out of the game altogether (like the scene in Mockingjay when Katniss breaks through the 'dome' and reveal the whole set-up as being a contrivance. There are many other analogies in science fiction films.)

That's a great story about the painter accidentally producing the effect he wanted. Sextus is a very interesting character. I wonder if anyone knows if his name 'Empiricus' is the etymological origin of 'empiricism'?

Granted that they are different, you do seem to be ignoring Epicurus's thoughts about the gods/God.

The Being in Plotinus sounds like God as pure possibility in Nicholas of Cusa. (Maybe Nicholas read Plotinus). On the level of concept alone I can't personally make much sense of that. What's the difference between the "active making-possible" and that which is made possible? It seems tacked on like a first cause by the arguably empty principle of sufficient reason. The PSR is tempting as a sort of axiom, but I think this is because "finite" knowledge or ordinary knowledge is pretty much the finding of causal relationships --which is to say buttons to push, levers to pull, hints about the future. On the other hand, if it's the lyrical expression of a sort of mystical-intellectual ecstasy, that's fine. But that's pretty esoteric. Heidegger obsessed over Being, and he wrote

Making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy. — Heidegger

I'm not saying that the esoteric is bad, but I do suggest that we move toward religion and away from a certain image of philosophy at least as we get more esoteric. Perhaps you, however, exactly want to preserve the esoteric in philosophy. I'm content to let music and visual art tackle the ineffable.

Anyway, Epicurus seems quite exoteric to me, at least at his ethical center. I don't think he's really describing only an animal happiness: His love of friendship suggests a recognition of intellectual delight. I read him as an "understated" sage. To manage happiness (most of the time) with just basic necessities and some serious reflection squares pretty well with my notion of wisdom. I'm not saying that this is an exhaustive vision. The "true man" is more or less going to be the "universal man" in accord with Nature or the One or Reason or The Gods. If I am abolishing important differences, this is just the cost of looking for important similarities.

By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. — Epicurus

Then graveyards must be the happiest places on earth...

I think Plotinus (and other mystics) depicts worldly existence as a kind of illusory state (cf 'maya' or samsara) analogous to a fantasy realm or game kind of like Dungeons and Dragons, but with real blood. — Wayfarer

:-} Then why do they keep feeding their bodies, maintain hygiene and so forth? What happens in this phantasy realm is obviously of interest to them.

The former was a materialist who didn't believe in anything beyond material existence. — Wayfarer

What's there beyond material existence?

Plotinus wants to break out of the game altogether (like the scene in Mockingjay when Katniss breaks through the 'dome' and reveal the whole set-up as being a contrivance. There are many other analogies in science fiction films.) — Wayfarer

The thing is, it's impossible to break out of the game, and even if it was, it's not worth the effort.

What do you reckon Epicurus would make of that? — Wayfarer

Simple, he'd agree with it. The pleasures of the mind are always greater and more certain than the pleasures of the body.

Epicureanism is so utterly ridiculous that it's probably one of the few, maybe perhaps the only, "mainstream" philosophy that Plotinus simply ignores outright in his writings. — ThePhilosopherFromDixie

*facepalm* :s - yeah, when you can't disprove something, you throw up your hands and say it's ridiculous! Great attitude to have, I should start adopting it!

It seems to me that some of you are aptly characterised by Benedict de Spinoza:

Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of the first importance morality, religion, and absolutely all the things we have shown to be related to tenacity and nobility. The usual conviction of the multitude seems to be different. For most people apparently believe that they are free to the extent that they are permitted to yield to their lust, and that they give up their right to the extent that they are bound to live according to the rule of the divine law. Morality, then, and religion, and absolutely everything related to strength of character, they believe to be burdens, which they hope to put down after death, when they also hope to receive a reward for their bondage, that is, for their morality and religion. They are induced to live according to the rule of the divine law (as far as their weakness and lack of character allows) not only by this hope, but also, and especially, by the fear that they may be punished horribly after death. If men did not have this hope and fear, but believed instead that minds die with the body, and that the wretched, exhausted with the burden of morality, cannot look forward to a life to come, they would return to their natural disposition, and would prefer to govern all their actions according to lust, and to obey fortune rather than themselves. These opinions seem no less absurd to me than if someone, because he does not believe he can nourish his body with good food to eternity, should prefer to fill himself with poisons and other deadly things, or because he sees that the mind is not eternal, or immortal, should prefer to be mindless, and to live without reason. These are so absurd they are hardly worth mentioning

I like Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument against the Fear of Death which was derived from Epicurus Deprivation argument.

What's there beyond material existence? — Agustino

I recommend a reading of Vladimir Lossky's The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, where these issues are discussed in detail.

it's impossible to break out of the game, and even if it was, it's not worth the effort. — Agustino

'Breaking out of the game' is an analogue for theosis, 'the beatific vision', where the 'worldly realm' or the 'domain of the senses' is analogous to being 'part of the game', but the 'awakening' or 'new birth' is seeing 'beyond the game'.

I recommend a reading of Vladimir Lossky's The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, where these issues are discussed in detail. — Wayfarer

I've read it. What's your point?

'Breaking out of the game' is an analogue for theosis, 'the beatific vision', where the 'worldly realm' or the 'domain of the senses' is analogous to being 'part of the game', but the 'awakening' or 'new birth' is seeing 'beyond the game'. — Wayfarer

"The beatific vision" is temporary in nature. There is no "breaking out of the game" because of its temporary nature. After you have the "beatific vision" you still live in this world, not another world.

What's your point? — Agustino

If you can't see the point, I won't detain you further.

So you have no response to the criticism of the implications of the beatific vision for life?

But, sir, you seem to be dismissive of the whole notion. You ask 'what's beyond material existence', in a way that seems dismissive of the question. So I refer to a book that you have already quoted from, the central concern of which is also 'that which is beyond material existence' - and you dismiss that as well. So if you really do want to argue for materialism, good luck with that, you'll find plenty of takers here but I'm not playing. X-)

No, I want to discuss it with you, not with the book. That's why I'm here, otherwise I'd be with the book. I've made a point, so I expect you to reply to my point, not say "that book". That's not philosophy, that's plagiarism and being unable to think for yourself.

you give the impression of not being interested in either the question, or the proposed solution, so I responded accordingly.

you give the impression of not being interested in either the question, or the proposed solution, so I responded accordingly. — Wayfarer

Because the proposed solution doesn't make sense. Now I may be appreciative of the mystical tradition, but I don't agree with it fundamentally. Fundamentally I'm an Aristotelian, not a Platonist. I appreciate the mystical tradition more than I appreciate New Atheism, but that doesn't mean I'm in full agreement with it or the whole way of thinking and relating to the world that it advocates. For me happiness is always found in the material world, not in some other realm. Virtue is the path to happiness in this world, not (primarily) to happiness in some other world.

It's becoming quite obvious that you don't wish to discuss this matter with me honestly and openly though, and prefer instead to be pushing an agenda. Fine.

Because the proposed solution doesn't make sense. — Agustino

Which is why I employed the analogy of 'breaking out of the game'. The 'beatific vision' is not 'a temporary state', but a transition to an entirely new way of being - 'new heaven, new earth', as it is written. So Plotinus was one of the well-springs of that kind of visionary state (albeit distinct from the later Christian interpretations of that state).

In relation to Epicurus, and other materialists, they also, obviously, dismiss such ideas, but the question I have is, have they even begun to understand them? That is where materialism, overall, is trying to make a virtue out of a deficiency. Not having understood the game they're in, or that they're in a game, it's like 'let's make the best of it'. But from the viewpoint of a Plotinus, whatever good Epicurus makes of it, is temporary, transient, subject to decay, unsatisfactory. They're actually in a situation of grave peril, which they don't understand.

It is noteworthy that Epicurus employs the traditional terminology of philosophy - ataraxia, eudomonia, etc - but that they have a different referent, i.e. maximising well-being in the context of worldly existence. Epicurus is far more likely to be acceptable to the modern secular intelligentsia, for that very reason. But I'm not amongst them.

Which is why I employed the analogy of 'breaking out of the game'. The 'beatific vision', which you referred to, is not 'a temporary state', but a transition to an entirely new way of being - 'new heaven, new earth', as it is said somewhere. So Plotinus was one of the well-springs of that kind of visionary state. — Wayfarer

But thinking that some "beatific vision" is what will change your life, or how you will find meaning in life is nothing short of deluded. No experience, no matter how great, can provide a meaning to life in this world that has nothing to do with this world. Think about it - when you experience a great piece of music, or when in love you stare in your beloved's eyes and the whole world stands still - the experience ends. Human beings are fallen to the point there is no escaping this world. We can get glimpses - beatific visions - of another state, but they all end, and then we're thrown back into this world. We are creatures of the earth, born to live and die as creatures of the earth.

In relation to Epicurus, and other materialists, they also, obviously, dismiss such ideas, but the question I have is, have they even begun to understand them? — Wayfarer

No I don't think they dismiss them, only that they realise the limited significance such events have to living.

But from the viewpoint of a Plotinus, whatever good Epicurus makes of it, is temporary, transient, subject to decay, unsatisfactory. — Wayfarer

But whatever good Plotinus found is especially subject to decay. Are you enlightened 100% of the time? Of course not. Why not? Because reality is fallen - regardless of what you do, you will never be in that state 100% of the time or anywhere near it.

It is noteworthy that Epicurus employs the traditional terminology of philosophy - ataraxia, eudomonia, etc - but that they have a different referent, i.e. maximising well-being in the context of worldly existence. — Wayfarer

But all well-being is in the context of worldly existence. Even the beatific vision. And Epicurus isn't the best comparison, Aristotle is. The mystical isn't other-worldly, but decidedly this worldly.

Epicurus is far more likely to be acceptable to the modern secular intelligentsia, for that very reason. But I'm not amongst them. — Wayfarer

The only thing they like in Epicurus is his denial of gods, not his ethics.

But thinking that some "beatific vision" is what will change your life, or how you will find meaning in life is nothing short of deluded. — Agustino

Well, I really have to differ with you on that. It's not a matter of 'having an experience' - I'm referring to the meta-cognitive change that is called 'metanoia' in Platonistic philosophy. I thought, as you had referred from time to time to Orthodox philosophy that you might understand these things, but apparently not, sorry for the bother.

Well, I really have to differ with you on that. It's not a matter of 'having an experience' - I'm referring to the meta-cognitive change that is called 'metanoia' in Platonistic philosophy. I thought, as you had referred from time to time to Orthodox philosophy that you might understand these things, but apparently not, sorry for the bother. — Wayfarer

And what does a meta-cognitive change have to do with anything? Really now... I still have to provide for my kids and so forth. What has changed? Have I become better able to provide for them? Has my relationship with my wife improved? Am I more loving, not in an abstract kind of way, but in a practical kind of way?

That's why I see this all as useless. The essence is virtue, not some meta-cognitive change. Virtue alone is sufficient. All you're doing Wayfarer, is that you're imagining yourself as you are today, then you're imaging yourself as you will be after the beatific vision. But that's exactly a delusion! To think that any experience will produce a sudden change in your character - really? Why would you think that?