:up:

Science can explain consciousness, if science discovers empirical principles under which an iteration of consciousness manifests empirically. The only way for science to be necessarily unable to explain consciousness is for consciousness to be proven with apodeitic certainty NOT to be an empirical condition, which, to date, has not been accomplished, at least with peer review. — Mww

I think this illuminates the misunderstanding. I am not of the opinion that science cannot explain consciousness: the exact opposite. The idea that science has not yet fully explained consciousness is far from justification that science cannot explain it. (Indeed, I'd say the ability to make progress puts the odds well in favour of, if not complete explanation, sufficient explanation.) I was essentially parodying metaphysical discussions in which precisely that fallacy is evident. I think you may have taken me to endorse viewpoints I was in fact deriding. My fault, of course: insufficient winkyfaces.

Consciousness is a good example. Lumping materialists and physicalists together for the sake of argument, the conflict is between consciousness being a physical state or process and it being unphysical, i.e. undetectable and not a "thing" existing in space. The justification for the latter is typically the above fallacy: science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical. This is true even if, in fact usually when, the actual position is ab initio.

I wasn't strictly saying that Kant fell foul of this fallacy (although I think he did), rather that people employ it to establish false knowable/unknowable dichotomies for the sake of metaphysical land-grabs.

There is no dualist science, dualist empiricism, dualist phenomenology. Any progress that is made within dualism is a) within metaphysics alone and b) utterly indistinguishable from a lack of progress. On the physicalist side of the metaphysics-of-consciousness coin, while it is in itself, as 180 Proof said, a metaphysical position, it isn't a metaphysical problem, i.e. the progress is made in cognitive psychology, psychobiology, neuroscience, etc. Hence: any useful metaphysics always becomes something else.

My fault, of course — Kenosha Kid

Nahhh....perhaps I’m too much the literalist, not being too much for subtleties. Or, perhaps the more one searches for them, the more likely he is to overlook their meaning.

We are in accord with respect to the science vs consciousness dilemma and the fallacy associated with it.

I wasn't strictly saying that Kant fell foul of this fallacy (although I think he did), — Kenosha Kid

When the site went dark I lost my comment on this fallacy thing, which I’ve since quite forgotten. Perhaps if you’re so inclined, you’d elaborate on how you think he did.

typically the above [woo-woo] fallacy: science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical. — Kenosha Kid

:100:

Perhaps if you’re so inclined, you’d elaborate on how you think he did. — Mww

By denying that knowledge can justify morality. I think the extent to which a moral claim can be justified at all, it can be justified by knowledge. The extent to which it can't, it is not justifiable. I should start a thread on this at some point, as I appear to keep derailing other threads with this view. :o

Wha....we went from the conflict of consciousness being explainable by materialists or unexplainable by idealists, the fallacy in support of the latter being “science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical”, to.......(gasp).....morality?? Can I get a great big fat.....HUH?!?!?

Truth be told, I don’t understand what you mean by fell foul, unless it is that The Good Professor neglected his own premises in forming a conclusion which required them. If so, in context, he fell foul by giving the aforementioned fallacy daylight. But he never correlated consciousness to science one way or the other, because he didn’t think it within the purview of science to examine. No transcendental object is susceptible to phenomenal predicates, so claiming science can explain it, or not explain it, are illegitimate propositions.

So....why would Kant run afoul of something by not allowing knowledge to justify morality? Under what conditions does knowledge justify morality? What if Kant never considered that morality needed any justification at all? All of which is necessarily predicated on what Kant thought morality actually is. Without that, all the above is utterly moot.
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I think the extent to which a moral claim can be justified at all, it can be justified by knowledge. — Kenosha Kid

Justifying morality is not the same as justifying moral claims. Moral claims are justified by their projection into the world by the subject in possession of them. Morality itself, being considered as nothing but a fundamental human condition, is justified by our very nature. Knowledge has nothing to do with either one.

When can one define metaphysics? Is it possible to define metaphysics when possible?
I am interested in how one can even begin the process of legitimate metaphysics? — Shawn

Aristotle called Metaphysics "first philosophy". And it was a legitimate field of inquiry in Philosophy, and most religions, especially the Catholic Church, until the advent of empirical Science in the Enlightenment era. Since then, it has been rejected as unscientific reasoning by hard-nosed Materialists, and left to Theologians and Philosophers to argue endlessly about. Today, the term is usually applied to anything spooky & poorly understood. But the concept of something "beyond physical" refuses to go away, and has had a resurgence since Quantum Physics revealed the mushy foundation of materialist Science.

So, I have developed my own personal theory & definition of Metaphysics, as summarized in the link below. If you find it of interest, we can delve deeper in the notion of Meta-Physics for the 21st century. Briefly, the term can apply to anything immaterial or incorporeal, such as Mind, Soul, Spirit, Numbers, Whole Systems, and Universals. :smile:


Meta-physics :
The branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality, including the relationship between mind and matter, substance and attribute, fact and value.
1. Often dismissed by materialists as idle speculation on topics not amenable to empirical proof.
2. Aristotle divided his treatise on science into two parts. The world as-known-via-the-senses was labeled “physics” - what we call "Science" today. And the world as-known-by-the-mind, by reason, was labeled “metaphysics” - what we now call "Philosophy" .
3. Plato called the unseen world that hides behind the physical façade: “Ideal” as opposed to Real. For him, Ideal “forms” (concepts) were prior-to the Real “substance” (matter).
4. Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
5. I use a hyphen in the spelling to indicate that I am not talking about Ghosts and Magic, but about Ontology (science of being).
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

Aristotle's Metaphysics : https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/

No transcendental object is susceptible to phenomenal predicates — Mww

Are you saying human consciousness is not dependent on the brain?

I don't think one can categorize or pin down a succinct definition of metaphysics. I see metaphysics in parts of mathematics.

Wha....we went from the conflict of consciousness being explainable by materialists or unexplainable by idealists, the fallacy in support of the latter being “science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical”, to.......(gasp).....morality?? Can I get a great big fat.....HUH?!?!? — Mww

Oh yeah. I will go there!

So....why would Kant run afoul of something by not allowing knowledge to justify morality? — Mww

Can you justify the distinction between a fallacious a priori position on consciousness and a valid a priori position on morality, without committing the same fallacy? The justification for Kant's insistence that moral issues must be treated a priori comes down to God, not an absence of experience. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it:

Kant’s insistence on an a priori method to seek out and establish fundamental moral principles, however, does not always appear to be matched by his own practice. The Metaphysics of Morals, for instance, is meant to be based on a priori rational principles, but many of the specific duties that Kant describes, along with some of the arguments he gives in support of them, rely on general facts about human beings and our circumstances that are known from experience.

Even for Kant, who insists on a moral universe hidden from experience to give God his due, actually cannot avoid experience in his philosophy of morality. And rightly so, because any useful metaphysics... etc.

Are you saying human consciousness is not dependent on the brain? — jgill

Nope, not saying that. You and I and Kant knew everything from a human perspective has to do with the brain. Nevertheless, if nobody knows exactly the how of a thing, he is allowed to speculate on it as long and as deep as he likes. And we acknowledge that as physical science supplies facts, speculative philosophy looses power. The question remains, nonetheless, will science ever supply enough facts to negate all speculation. Even if it does, will Everydayman accept them? I rather doubt it, myself. The “I”, the Kantian representation for the transcendental object of pure reason called consciousness, is not going away merely because science says there is no such thing.

“...Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account....”

Here he tacitly admits that pure speculative philosophy has no possibility of empirical proofs. But we don’t care, all we want to do is satisfy ourselves with some rational, logically consistent method sufficient to explain what we want to know about those of which Nature, and by association, experience, has nothing to tell us.
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I see metaphysics in parts of mathematics. — jgill

As well you should, although I would go even further, and say metaphysics is in, or the ground for, all mathematics. Mathematics proofs are empirical, of course, but mathematical constructions to be proven, are not empirical at all. If not empirical, then rational, and if rational then given from reason, and if given from reason, in this case not purely speculative but purely theoretical, then metaphysical.

Eazy-peasy.

Mathematics proofs are empirical, of course, but mathematical constructions to be proven, are not empirical at all. — Mww

empirical: "based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic."

A mathematical proof of a theorem is a chain of logic.

Can you justify the distinction between a fallacious a priori position on consciousness and a valid a priori position on morality, without committing the same fallacy? — Kenosha Kid

Sorry, I’m gonna need some help with that. It’s possible to reconcile a fallacy with a validity, so I’m not sure what I’m being asked.
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The justification for Kant's insistence that moral issues must be treated a priori comes down to God, not an absence of experience. — Kenosha Kid

Only because God satisfies the notion of an unconditioned cause. But God, particularly from the perspective of Enlightenment Germany, is an object outside us, whereas attention to proper moral issues require an unconditioned cause within us. The concept of freedom satisfies the internal unconditioned causality as God satisfies the external. Following the metaphysical logic, autonomy is the effect of freedom, determinations of the will are the effect of autonomy.
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With respect to the SEP article, it must be kept in mind that treatment of moral issues are examined in the Metaphysics of Morals, but the form such treatment takes, as a result of the constitution of the moral agent, is examined in the second critique on practical reason. The latter reveals the principles a priori the former employs in experience. In other words, the agent has no warrant for his imperatives without the freedom to determine what they must be. The choice and employment of imperatives are justified in the Metaphysics, the principles grounding the validity of imperatives are justified by pure practical reason.

“....For, in the present case, we shall commence with the principles and proceed to the concepts, and only then, if possible, to the senses; whereas in the case of the speculative reason we began with the senses and had to end with the principles. The reason of this lies again in this: that now we have to do with a will, and have to consider reason, not in its relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. We must, then, begin with the principles of a causality not empirically conditioned, after which the attempt can be made to establish our notions of the determining grounds of such a will, of their application to objects, and finally to the subject and its sense faculty. We necessarily begin with the law of causality from freedom, that is, with a pure practical principle, and this determines the objects to which alone it can be applied....”
(CpR, 1788, Intro)

From this it is clear....no, really, it is quite clear.....the SEP article neglects the fact the principles for moral constitution have already been established before the moral agency humans demonstrate are examined. It is the difference between morality the fundamental human condition, and determinations one invokes in order to deem himself in compliance with it.

This is why I mentioned that knowledge had nothing to do with it. We already know what we did, in response to some moral issue; what we want to know is why we did what we did. For empirical situations, objects are given to us and we have to figure out what they are; for moral situations, we give the objects in the form of our actions, and we have to figure out where those actions come from.

A mathematical proof of a theorem is a chain of logic. — jgill

Hmmmm......I suppose one could say a mathematical proof is in its form, that is, I can prove this theorem with this formula, but that still leaves a necessary proof of the formula. Otherwise, all you’ve got is symbols without relation to anything but themselves. Pythagoras’ Theorem don’t mean much, unless you build a triangle and plug some numbers from the triangle into the chain of logic of the formula.

D=rt don’t mean much unless you’ve got a really long ruler and a speedometer and a stopwatch.

Etc., etc., etc.......

Sorry, I’m gonna need some help with that. It’s possible to reconcile a fallacy with a validity, so I’m not sure what I’m being asked. — Mww

The question is how can insisting on a priori understanding of one thing be considered invalid and another thing valid. What is the distinction between consciousness and morality that makes the fallacy so evident for the former and so invisible for the latter?

attention to proper moral issues require an unconditioned cause within us — Mww

I disagree. The metaphysical land-grab requires an unconditioned cause within us. Morality can fare perfectly well without it.

This is why I mentioned that knowledge had nothing to do with it. We already know what we did, in response to some moral issue; what we want to know is why we did what we did. For empirical situations, objects are given to us and we have to figure out what they are; for moral situations, we give the objects in the form of our actions, and we have to figure out where those actions come from. — Mww

Yes, but the insistence that knowledge has nothing to do with it is precisely the fallacy. Knowledge is providing insight into where those actions come from. Conditioning, either biological or social, is very much on the table. The distaste toward this idea seems to me qualitatively no different to the distaste toward immaterial consciousness.

Metaphysics is about the conscious potential of the universe.

Physics is like creating a shape that can conduct energy, because you would need knowledge(also about potential).

We demand physicists who study forces and truth about universe shape and shape dynamics.

A metaphysical truth is that the elements are moving away from the center of a big bang, but it is also good because center-locked cons has occurred.

The question is how can insisting on a priori understanding of one thing be considered invalid and another thing valid. — Kenosha Kid

Understanding is the first and primary conscious activity in humans, so understanding is always evident in any judgement. There are only two kinds of things we can understand, either things we sense, or things we merely think. Things we sense require intuition, things we think do not. Intuitions from the things we sense are synthesized with conceptions to give us cognitions of objects as they appear to us; things we think are the synthesis of conceptions alone, which gives us cognitions of objects as they are thought. Synthesis of conceptions alone is always a priori, because there is no object of sense, or intuition, involve. A posteriori cognitions give us knowledge of objects and is experience, a priori cognitions give us knowledge of ourselves which is not an experience.

Insisting on a priori understanding, therefore, is determined by the source of the object being cognized. If an object of sense, intuition is required, so understanding is not a priori; if an object of thought, or, which is the same thing, an object of reason, synthesized from conceptions alone because of how we think of it, such understanding is a priori. Consciousness and morality are both objects of reason, for they absolutely cannot, in and of themselves, be objects of sense, therefore the understanding of them must always be a priori.

The real fallacy is mistaking consciousness the object of reason, with its content, and mistaking morality the human condition with the actions which represent it. From there, the mistake is thinking we must be able to explain consciousness scientifically because the contents of it are derivable from experience, and we must be able to explain morality scientifically because our actions are quite evidently objective. But the first requisite of science is observation, to which experiments must conform in the present or predict in the future, and such observation is always missing from the pure a priori conceptions of consciousness and morality.
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attention to proper moral issues require an unconditioned cause within us
— Mww

I disagree. The metaphysical land-grab requires an unconditioned cause within us. Morality can fare perfectly well without it. — Kenosha Kid

Ok, fine. How? You must realize no moral agent ever knows more than what he ought to do. As no ought can ever be predicated on law, for then the agent would know what he will do, but merely on subjective rules, and seeing as how science is necessarily predicated on law, it’s going to be mighty hard to equate morality to anything other than a metaphysical rule.

But....have at it. Make morality operate properly without a necessary causality of some kind specific to it alone.
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Knowledge is providing insight into where those actions come from. — Kenosha Kid

No, it isn’t. Reason provides insight, and it is quite absurd to suggest we require knowledge of our reason, when it is reason at work giving us knowledge. On the other hand, I suppose you could say, when I look back, I know I did the right thing. But that doesn’t tell you how you determined what the right thing to do, was. And, in fact, you don’t really know you did the right thing. All you reallyreallyreally know, is the thing you actually did.
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Conditioning, either biological or social, is very much on the table. — Kenosha Kid

Sure. After the fact. But we’re in a metaphysical domain of the individual subject, and even if conditioning is present, he still needs to think for himself to be a rational or moral agent. Otherwise, he is nothing but a member of a set and not an individual in himself.

Ain’t this fun???? Almost as much fun as watching you argue with noaxioms, but I know better than to participate in that existential free-for-all.

Ain’t this fun???? Almost as much fun as watching you argue with noaxioms, but I know better than to participate in that existential free-for-all. — Mww

Lots, natch! After a couple of false starts, we have found an area for disagreement finally! I haven't forgotten you, but as per my previous post, I'd like to split this off into it's own thread. Was noaxioms the Rindler horizon guy? That wasn't fun, that was like smacking my head against a wall. :o

A few quick rebuttals to tide us over.

Understanding is the first and primary conscious activity in humans, so understanding is always evident in any judgement. — Mww

This is assuredly not true. Pavlovian learning tides us over for quite a while. That does not require comprehension.

Consciousness and morality are both objects of reason, for they absolutely cannot, in and of themselves, be objects of sense, therefore the understanding of them must always be a priori. — Mww

I dispute it wholeheartedly. Metaphysics casts them as objects of reason, because metaphysics casts everything this way. That's the metaphysical land-grab again. Both arise from millenia of biological process and manifest as biological processes stimulated by other phenomena. As such, they are causes, effects, and objects of study.

From there, the mistake is thinking we must be able to explain consciousness scientifically because the contents of it are derivable from experience, and we must be able to explain morality scientifically because our actions are quite evidently objective. — Mww

But science goes way beyond describing contents. Natural selection is not 'the characteristics content of studied animals': it explains the mechanisms of the origins of those characteristics. It is a foundational theory of biodiversity, not mere zoology.

You must realize no moral agent ever knows more than what he ought to do. — Mww

I reject the assumption the question is based on. In the pretend-moralities of metaphysics, sure, humans know how they ought to behave in most circumstances, and those that don't fail rationally or are immoral. In the real world, morality is complex and you don't always get a grade at the end or know if the path you chose was right.

Reason provides insight, and it is quite absurd to suggest we require knowledge of our reason, — Mww

It is more absurd to attempt to reason without it. "A train is speeding toward... Hang on, what's a train? I am speeding toward a group of people tied... Hang on, what's speed? What are people? What does it mean to be tied? Let me just derive these rationally from things I believe in irrationally, then I can finish my question." :P

But we’re in a metaphysical domain of the individual subject, and even if conditioning is present, he still needs to think for himself to be a rational or moral agent. — Mww

I dispute that it's a metaphysical domain too. I dispute a lot, don't I, sorry. This is metaphysical land-grab yet again. It insists upon itself, then justifies itself by once again insisting upon itself, ad infinitum. My individual subject is 100% physical, I assure you, and my biology precedes my moral agency not just since my birth, but by many tens of thousands of years.

That'll have to do for now. I will offer more than denials in due course. I owe a solid affirmation of something so you PAH! me away in kind.

There is a certain tense in a lot of thoughts it would literally split all thought into physcial and non physical. Where physics discusses what, physically, we can do, metaphysics, I think, is what the universe(s) can do. It is this sort of creators POV(which, again, splits all thought into two).

I would define metaphysics as follows: anything left over that won't be explained by more rigorous fields. To the extent that it has value, the field of being and content has been removed from metaphysics by physics, phenomonology, etc. To the extent that it has value, the field of causation and origins has been stolen by science generally and cosmology and evolutionary biology in particular. To the extent that they have value, the constants of nature have been annexed by physics. If any idea in metaphysics is found to have any value, it ceases to be metaphysics and becomes something else. Metaphysics is then all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value. — Kenosha Kid

If some fields of knoweldge were previously "removed", "stolen" or "annexed" from metaphysics by "more rigorous fields", then some ideas that were previously a part of metaphysics have been found to have some value. Therefore, metaphysics cannot be "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value". I think you would need to qualify your definition of metaphysics as: "anything left over that [has not yet been] explained by more rigorous fields".

Therefore, metaphysics cannot be "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value". — Luke

Of course it can, if the moment it had value it ceases to be metaphysics. You can certainly trace origins of valuable ideas back to valueless metaphysical treatments. I'll grant it that much.

Therefore, metaphysics cannot be "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value". — Luke

Of course it can, if the moment it had value it ceases to be metaphysics. — Kenosha Kid

If something that was once part of metaphysics is later found to have value, then you cannot say that metaphysics is "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value".

"Later found to have value" != "will never be found to have any value".

Per your own examples, you state that they were once part of metaphysics and then later found to have value.

If something that was once part of metaphysics is later found to have value, then you cannot say that metaphysics is "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value". — Luke

... later found to have value outside of metaphysics, though. I'm open to counter-examples. It is not a principle, just an overwhelming impression.

... later found to have value outside of metaphysics, though. — Kenosha Kid

Yes, but the ideas were previously inside of metaphysics, according to your examples. Your assertion was that any ideas inside of metaphysics "will never be found to have any value". If that were the case, then it would be impossible for the ideas to later be found to have value outside of metaphysics.

It is therefore incorrect to assert that metaphysics is "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value".

If that were the case, then it would be impossible for the ideas to later be found to have value outside of metaphysics. — Luke

I'm not sure that follows, or that it matters much. If on my 18th birthday I am an adult, and that adult grew out of a child, does it follow a child is an adult?

When Democritus formulated the atom theory, he was starting the ball rolling on science. I'm happy to agree that his was a metaphysical theory that had potential value, and that value underlies parts of physics and chemistry where it was put to good use. However the field of questions that Democritus was answering as broadly met by metaphysics do not inherit the value that scientists later found in atom theory, nor is it obvious that, had Democritus not formulated atom theory back then, science would be unaware of it, i.e. that Democritus' idea was even relevant. My point was simply that, because atom theory has value, its natural home is in the sciences: that's where it is valuable. As a purely metaphysical idea, it is not obviously more valuable than cosmic mind theory.

My individual subject is 100% physical, I assure you, — Kenosha Kid

Assure away, but you can’t prove it. The very best you can say is that your individual subject is necessarily grounded in physical conditions, which nobody should ever seriously doubt anyway. But grounded in, does not give you 100% absolutely certainly for, and such deterministic domains are self-refuted by the very undeniable “seemings” intrinsic to the human animal.
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This is metaphysical land-grab yet again. It insists upon itself, then justifies itself by once again insisting upon itself, ad infinitum. — Kenosha Kid

This is the age-old acceptance of the inherent circularity of human reason: we cannot explain things without thinking about them, and we can only think about them by inventing a method that explains how we explain the things we think about. So what, it’s all Mother Nature’s fault. Best we can do is create a system that does the least damage.
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Reason provides insight, and it is quite absurd to suggest we require knowledge of our reason,
— Mww

It is more absurd to attempt to reason without it. — Kenosha Kid

And this is the equally age-old chicken-egg deal: do we know things and use that to reason to other things, or we use reason to give us knowledge. Both those proposition beg their own questions, so it’s a wash. Pick one, work with it til it doesn’t work anymore, switch to the other one til it doesn’t work anymore. Doesn’t matter, really, humans always come up with answers either way. Parsimony suggests, and experience supports, the idea that we come naturally equipped to reason, on the one hand, and come naturally equipped with some kind of knowledge, on the other.

That being said, if it is absurd to attempt to reason without knowledge......how do we learn? Just because I am in possession of, e.g., knowledge of biology, how do I get to knowledge of chemistry without reason specific to that particular discipline? Your proposition may be true in general, but lacks allowance for particular instances: it is not always absurd to attempt to reason without knowledge.
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morality is complex and you don't always get a grade at the end or know if the path you chose was right. — Kenosha Kid

Yes it’s complex, no you don’t always know if you chose the right path, but yes, you most certainly do always get a grade.

Nevertheless, with respect to the chosen path, there is a standing theory that the true moral agent chooses the right path simply because he is a free moral agent. That is to say, he cannot will a wrong path and still consider himself moral. This exemplifies the common error that attributes freedom of will in the wrong place, which permits the pseudo-refutation of its self-legislative determinism, making irreconcilable quackery of the whole concept.

And regarding a grade, the validity of the “moral feeling” must be taken into account, for the moral feeling is the grade the moral agent gives himself. Without the moral feeling, or something equivalent to it, a guy can neither judge himself in congratulation nor chastisement, for any chosen volition. This must be the case, for even if one is obliged to do nothing at all with the trolley switch, because of a standing imperative of his own choosing, he is not thereby prohibited from altering his obligation henceforth, perhaps because of subsequent information or merely a “change of heart”. All following from grading himself as failing by his volition to not act in the first place. He is quite free to change his obligation because the dispositions from which they arise are entirely subjective, and his subjectivity herein is predicated on the grade he gave himself, which reduces to nothing but how he feels.

So I wonder.....where does all that stand in juxtaposition to a individual subject’s 100% physicalism? And no fair exclaiming “PURE HOGWASH!!!” for all that, cuz that just ain’t gonna cut it.

If that were the case, then it would be impossible for the ideas to later be found to have value outside of metaphysics.
— Luke

I'm not sure that follows. — Kenosha Kid

Why not?

If on my 18th birthday I am an adult, and that adult grew out of a child, does it follow a child is an adult? — Kenosha Kid

The child will later be (later become) an adult, just as some metaphysical ideas will later be (later become) valuable, as per your own examples. By analogy, your assertion is that the child will never be (never become) an adult, just as metaphysics is "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value" (never become valuable).

When Democritus formulated the atom theory, he was starting the ball rolling on science. I'm happy to agree that his was a metaphysical theory that had potential value, and that value underlies parts of physics and chemistry where it was put to good use. However the field of questions that Democritus was answering as broadly met by metaphysics do not inherit the value that scientists later found in atom theory, nor is it obvious that, had Democritus not formulated atom theory back then, science would be unaware of it, i.e. that Democritus' idea was even relevant. My point was simply that, because atom theory has value, its natural home is in the sciences: that's where it is valuable. As a purely metaphysical idea, it is not obviously more valuable than cosmic mind theory. — Kenosha Kid

Either Democritus' idea was once metaphysical and later became valuable and non-metaphysical, as with your other examples, thus contradicting your assertion that metaphysics is "all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value"; or else your examples are unrelated and irrelevant to this assertion.

I am not of the opinion that science cannot explain consciousness: the exact opposite....

Consciousness is a good example. Lumping materialists and physicalists together for the sake of argument, the conflict is between consciousness being a physical state or process and it being unphysical, i.e. undetectable and not a "thing" existing in space. The justification for the latter is typically the above fallacy: science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical. — Kenosha Kid

Maybe science can explain talk about so-called consciousness. Is there a science of ghosts?

'Consciousness is not physical.'

"Consciousness is physical.'

Aren't both these statements problematic?

Is 'physical' just a synonym for the shit we can be objective about? Except that it leaves out mathematics?

Atoms, mortgages, real numbers....we can speak objectively about all of them.

The justification for the latter is typically the above fallacy: science has not explained consciousness --> science cannot explain consciousness --> consciousness is unphysical. — Kenosha Kid

The issue is that science cannot objectify consciousness. And this is for the simple reason that consciousness is not an object of enquiry, in any sense but the metaphorical. I mean, you can discuss it objectively - but that then becomes cognitive science, how the various functions of conscious organisms operate. But what consciousness is, is a different question (and a hard question.)

Rewind to early modern science. The major breakthrough was in re-defining physics in terms of mass, velocity, acceleration, force, and so on. That was associated with the division between primary qualities - just those qualities which are amenable to physical description - and secondary qualities, said to inhere in the subject.

At around the same time, Descartes introduced the proposed distinction between mind and matter. So you can where this goes. The 'bearers of primary attributes', which were conveniently describable purely in terms of physics, became also the primary focus, and res cogitans was relegated to being the ghost in the machine.

That's the philosophical sub-text, and I see no signs that you understand it.

Is 'physical' just a synonym for the shit we can be objective about? Except that it leaves out mathematics? — Yellow Horse

Hence why I bring up those embarrasing discussions about 'mathematical fictionalism' and 'the indispensability argument for mathematics'. The reality of number is an inconvenient truth for naturalism.

Hence why I bring up those embarrasing discussions about 'mathematical fictionalism' and 'the indispensability argument for mathematics'. The reality of number is an inconvenient truth for naturalism. — Wayfarer

As I currently see it, there are two sides of the same coin, and that coin is the myth of the given. Somehow the grand edifice of critical thinking is supposed to be erected on one of two versions of the ineffable, either private intellectual intuition or private sensation-emotion.

Both of these ineffable 'givens' are supposed to make sentences true somehow, and they are tempting inherited interpretations for the objectivity that we palpably have. There are constraints on any math worth talking about, and we tend to call something a fact rather than an interpretation the more it sticks to familiar, 'physical' objects.

"Surely some kind of objects are responsible for objectivity." Yet those postulated foundational objects are 'defined' so that they can't be checked --stuff that's left when no one is around to witness it, stuff that only 'I' can see, etc.

In fact, I suggest, we reason from uncontroversial propositions (facts) toward less controversial propositions ( fact candidates or interpretations). This does leave facts 'ungrounded' in a certain sense, but such groundlessness may be necessary or 'natural.'

From my perspective, the ineffably 'mental' and ineffably 'physical' are in the same leaky boat. It's not really a practical problem, though, and that's why one can be a 'bad' philosopher and good scientist or good mystic, etc.

In other words, philosophers (the kind I am being at the moment) are fussy florists.