I can't see what the authority would be in (1),nor how we'd assign it, (2) seems to leave us with no means of judging which is the correct sense, so that leaves us with (3),which make either John or Mary wrong, depending on the language game they're playing. — Isaac

3) would seem to suggest that meta-ethics is a wasted endeavour. There is no one correct answer to what it means to be moral as we don't all mean the same thing when we talk about what is or isn't moral.

I can only tell you what I mean by it (as best as I understand what it is I'm trying to say when I make moral claims, which admittedly I don't really).

would seem to suggest that meta-ethics is a wasted endeavour. There is no one correct answer to what it means to be moral as we don't all mean the same thing when we talk about what is or isn't moral. — Michael

Not wasted necessarily, but at times misguided, like much of philosophy. I think there's a lot valuable met-ethical discussion about the kinds of things we mean by 'good' and 'evil', accepting a variety is not the same thing as throwing our hands up and saying "well it could mean anything!"... It could, but it doesn't, so there's still some value in the study.

Not wasted necessarily, but at times misguided, like much of philosophy. I think there's a lot valuable met-ethical discussion about the kinds of things we mean by 'goid' and 'evil', accepting a variety is not the same thing as throwing our hands up and saying "well it could mean anything!"... It could, but it doesn't, so there's still some value in the study. — Isaac

How would we approach it then? We look at what John says about morality and we look at what Mary says about morality, recognise that they're incompatible, and then what? Is there some meaning shared by both the divine command theorist and the "God-is-evil" proponent? Maybe the "one ought do this and not do this" notion that I brought up earlier?

How would we approach it then? We look at what John says about morality and we look at what Mary says about morality, recognise that they're incompatible, and then what? — Michael

Well, for one we could do exactly the same work within those incompatible approaches as we were going to do inclusively. Divine command theorists, I presume, still have some job of work to do regarding exactly what God did or did not command.

Is there some meaning shared by both the divine command theorist and the "God-is-evil" proponent? Maybe the "one ought do this and not do this" notion that I brought up earlier? — Michael

Shared meaning, maybe, but I'm not so sure myself about "one ought do this and not do this". If 'evil' universally means "one ought do this and not do this", then how would one answer the question "why ought I not to do that?". One is now prevente, oon pain of circularity, from answering "because it's evil".

Shared meaning, maybe, but I'm not so sure myself about "one ought do this and not do this". If 'evil' universally means "one ought do this and not do this", then how would one answer the question "why ought I not to do that?". One is now prevente, oon pain of circularity, from answering "because it's evil". — Isaac

I think this is the fundamental problem of morality. One of these must be true:

1. That something is evil just is that one ought not do it, in which case we need to explain why we ought not do something (and we can't refer back to it being evil as that would be circular)
2. That something is evil entails that we ought not do it, in which case we need to explain why we ought not do evil (and we can't claim that we ought not do evil by definition; see 1.)
3. That something is evil and that we ought not do something are unconnected issues (or at least not necessarily connected), in which case we need to explain the practical significance of right and wrong and dismiss our usual claim that we ought not do something because it's evil.

Can they not all be true? Does 'evil' have to pick out the same one thing each time it's used?

Notwithstanding, each one clearly still has questions, as your analysis shows. In each case I think both societal norms and personal feelings need to be invoked.

In (1), why ought we do/avoid certain actions without reference to evil, is best answered by some kind of 'prosperity of the group' metric. But where groups are aberrant to what we individually feel, we want to reserve the ability to cry foul, so it's a kind of negotiation between the individual and the culture they belong to. Very analogous to the way law works. We accept the judgement of past generations, but reserve the right to alter it.

In (2), we need a religion of sort (which I see as the same thing as culture, being an atheist). I can only see some form of disinterested punishment playing the role of the reason not to do evil. Anything more internal would count as a reason under (1). I can see a role for psychology here, if we still fear the punishment of our parents for our misdemeanours, we might have a reason not to do evil (even if there's no 'real' punishment looming).

(3) I see as only understandable as a kind of combination of (1) and (2),but maybe I've not quite understood what you're getting at.

So it seems morality is inextricably tied up with psychology and culture.

In (1), why ought we do/avoid certain actions without reference to evil, is best answered by some kind of 'prosperity of the group' metric. But where groups are aberrant to what we individually feel, we want to reserve the ability to cry foul, so it's a kind of negotiation between the individual and the culture they belong to. Very analogous to the way law works. We accept the judgement of past generations, but reserve the right to alter it. — Isaac

So when we talk about morality/being obligated to do/not do something, we're just talking about hypothetical imperatives with a goal to better the group?

In (2), we need a religion of sort (which I see as the same thing as culture, being an atheist). I can only see some form of disinterested punishment playing the role of the reason not to do evil. Anything more internal would count as a reason under (1). I can see a role for psychology here, if we still fear the punishment of our parents for our misdemeanours, we might have a reason not to do evil (even if there's no 'real' punishment looming).

By "why ought we not do evil?" I wasn't asking for a motivation to not do evil but asking how we get from "X is evil" to "therefore we ought not do X".

3) I see as only understandable as a kind of combination of (1) and (2),but maybe I've not quite understood what you're getting at. — Isaac

If we can't explain how we get from "X is evil" to "therefore we ought not do X" then we need to stop saying "X is evil therefore we ought not do X" and we need to explain why it matters if X is evil or not. If it doesn't dictate how I ought behave then what relevance does the fact that X is evil have?

So when we talk about morality/being obligated to do/not do something, we're just talking about hypothetical imperatives with a goal to better the group? — Michael

Yeah, to a large extent. I think we need this factor in the equation, we simply can't explain the astonishing correlation otherwise between most morals and group cooperation. But cultures can piggyback off this general picture to instill all sorts of off-message imperatives. Like a hammer is mainly for driving nails, but occasionally it's used to break a window. Doesn't mean it was ever designed to break windows.

By "why ought we not do evil?" I wasn't asking for a motivation to not do evil but asking how we get from "X is evil" to "therefore we ought not do X". — Michael

I'm not sure I understand the distinction you're drawing here. Some behaviour X is 'evil', but under your definition (2) our reason for labelling it thus cannot be because we ought not to do it. We cannot ignore the fact that we nonetheless ought not to do it, because that is a consistent property of things labelled 'evil'. So to make the possibility coherent, we must have some reason we ought not do X, other than simply that that's the definition of 'evil'.

Yet if we invoke something like 'it damages the welfare of your group', I think that would (in rational people) just constitue something one ought not to do anyway, regardless of the label 'evil'. So by this means we can't explain why we ought not to do evil, under (2). I can't make sense of 'ought not to do' without some negative consequence, I don't know what 'ought' would mean without some negative consequence should you do otherwise. So we're looking for a negative consequence that isn't already in your own best interests (because that would mean evil is just what one evidently ought not to do). Religious punishment is the only option I can think of. God decrees something is 'evil', but it's not something which you simply ought not to do anyway (that would make his decree pointless. Yet to answer your question there needs to be some reason why we care what God decrees. So punishment. Had God not declared it evil, X would have no negative consequences (hence 'evil' is not just that which we ought not to do anyway), but having declared it 'evil' we now, post hoc, ought not to do X because if we do we shall be punished.

All of which I think answers your last query too.

Yet if we invoke something like 'it damages the welfare of your group', I think that would (in rational people) just constitue something one ought not to do anyway, regardless of the label 'evil'. So by this means we can't explain why we ought not to do evil, under (2). I can't make sense of 'ought not to do' without some negative consequence, I don't know what 'ought' would mean without some negative consequence should you do otherwise. So we're looking for a negative consequence that isn't already in your own best interests (because that would mean evil is just what one evidently ought not to do). Religious punishment is the only option I can think of. God decrees something is 'evil', but it's not something which you simply ought not to do anyway (that would make his decree pointless. Yet to answer your question there needs to be some reason why we care what God decrees. So punishment. Had God not declared it evil, X would have no negative consequences (hence 'evil' is not just that which we ought not to do anyway), but having declared it 'evil' we now, post hoc, ought not to do X because if we do we shall be punished.

All of which I think answers your last query too. — Isaac

So are you saying that in a world without God then we can't have moral obligation?

So are you saying that in a world without God then we can't have moral obligation? — Michael

No, only under your (2) and (3). Where 'evil' just is 'that which we ought not to do', your (1), we don't need an external reason to not do it, and so no external source of punishment is required.

I ought to clarify ('ought'...se what I did there!) that I'm still using the very first constraint we put in place here (since we haven't mentioned it for a while) where we're trying to understand the meaning of claims already labelled as 'moral' ones. So when I say 'that which we ought not to do' we're already within the set of behaviours considered moral. We're obviously not talking about absolutely everything I ought not to do. I hope that was clear.

what I'm saying is the moral standard you hold someone according to is completely subjective... For example Vikings used to think it was okay to rape and pillage now we say it's not... It's all a matter of opinion — Gitonga

If might was so right all would still be rules by might, but to the opposite... Today, we go to great lengths to win people's hearts and minds by being excellent in terms of democracy, human rights and general progress. If you travel to North Korea, does your head turn by the fact that you're under North Korean control? No! They are considered backwards, many challenges such as fighting starvation and keeping its people healthy. Now, what about the Vikings and gunpowder? In many ways, the Vikings were backwards too, by their barbaric ways, finally christened long after the continental others, like Germany and France.

Norway has been dominated 3 times by Sweden and Denmark combined. The Norwegians travelled to Copenhagen to get a university education, among many other things.

Why not? Is the opinion that slavery is OK not wrong? — Banno

Not necessarily. Not if the opinion is genuinely held. The merits or otherwise of slavery depend to a large degree on the social, economic and technological situation of time and place.

Your judgement that slavery is 'wrong' is your opinion.

Maybe it's not circular but what I meant to say is that power is not only created by public opinion but the ability to sway public opinion must be defined as power.

1. OP says "Power determines morality"
2. The ability to influence the hearts & minds of or mobilise the population is definitely a form of power.
3. If you can influence or mobilise public opinion to change whats moral then you must have power

The kind of power that influences morality can't be separated from how compelling the arguments are. If you take away those who follow and agree with the individual/groups who have gained power then they have lose all of their power. If their power is just "people agree with me" then it seems like that's the important thing. OP is just labelling a range of complex motivations as power and then saying "power determines morality".

I came across this quote recently, despite being written some 250 years ago it is still relevant today and to this thread.:

'Opinion rules the world, but in the long run it is the philosophers who shape this opinion' - Rousseau.

'Opinion rules the world, but in the long run it is the philosophers who shape this opinion' - — A Seagull

I find it hard to see any truth in that. How and where does opinion rule the world? And where’s the proof that philosophers shape that opinion?

Question to you: Imagine I or person like me does something horrible to you or someone like you, and yours or those like yours. I say I'm right - or have a right - to do these things. You supposedly will say I don't. But at the same time you represent these as mere matters of opinion. It seems to me that if there is a notion of right, we both cannot be right, else a thing both be and not be. That is, if you're correct, there is no such thing as a right. Please reconcile. — tim wood

I'm not very much into hypotheticals, but I will try to answer your question.

I would not say that you 'don't have a right'.

If the horrible thing a person has done is against the law of the land, and I lived in a non-corrupt democracy then I might report the incident to the appropriate authorities.

If it is not against the law of the land then I have some options:

!. I could ignore it in a stoic way.
2. Retaliate in a way that would make the 'horrible action' a net loss for the person.
3. Try to persuade the person that such horrible actions were not in their best interest.

I would not consider that arguing about somewhat abstract rights and wrongs would be a productive course of action.

Do you always agree with the views of those in power? Do you automatically change your opinions as the dominant forces in society change? Would you have been against homosexuality if you had lived a hundred years ago? If so, why don’t you think homosexuality is wrong now? (If that’s your opinion.) If you were consistent, you wouldn’t have had an opinion about anything since you claim to have seen through the insincere origin of right and wrong.

If I decided to murder someone just for fun, would you condemn me? I hope you would, but how could a murder really upset you if you knew you were just copying the attitude of the powerful? Why do you have to support them? They are certainly doing fine without you.

No, I don’t believe you. You really think murder is wrong, and if the authorities of your country were to make it legal tomorrow, you would still think it is wrong. Or are you saying that your feelings have been so thoroughly molded by the powers above you that you can’t follow your own reason? You just feel that murder is wrong, but you don’t think so?
Don’t you have your own sense of what is right and wrong?

my point is that power and influence go hand in hand, take religion for example, you could argue that power of religion dictates your moral views.

Also you haven't captured the switching of power accurately in your depiction because you're not measuring the correct level of power/influence of the people involved.

Like let's say you have 33 presidents that all had one moral view, would the power of the 34th incumbent be enough to change public opinion if it was contrary? Nope but if the subsequent 34 presidents supported this new moral view then of course the view would change

On homosexuality my point is, if you were born in a Greek society it would be seen as okay however if you were born in a 19th century Christian society it would be wrong. You see there's no objectivity here it's just boils down to what each society wants, how many people want it and if they have the power/ influence to enforce it.

Let me ask you, does an individuals moral view matter if it's contrary to what society thinks? And if it does matter how can you validate it?

For the murder I'm saying it goes much deeper than that.. There's also how we murder and who we murder. Is abortion wrong? What about euthenasia? Lethal force? Capital punishment?what about animals, do you see how all these factors have no meaning on their own but are purely determined by what the majority of people think? How can you prove something is right if you're the only one that believes it? Doesn't it boil down to mass belief which is determined by power and influence.

In Ethics, we seek to change the world to match what we say. — Banno

You do this by influencing public opinion or those in power. While it's true that we can critique the morality of public opinion or those in power, if we want the world to be more moral, then we have to change one or both.

Problem is, what makes it "more moral"? That you're able to persuade people? Because as you pointed out, morality isn't like chemistry. Chemistry forces the scientist to adjust their language to coincide with the facts. But ethics is trying to persuade people to change their moral valuation. Which can differ depending on the ethicist.

Unlike with chemistry, there is no agreed upon fact to determine what people should value. Take equality versus freedom. Which is more valuable when they come into conflict? Depends on who you ask.

Morality shifts — Gitonga

Depends dude. Depends. Think of it this way:

Some things are morally absolute and some things are morally relative...

what is morally absolute?

You do this by influencing public opinion or those in power. — Marchesk

Sometimes I do this by lending a hand to the blind. It's not all big stuff. And yes we do disagree, and without a clear method to resolve our differences. That's what makes it interesting.

Unlike with chemistry, there is no agreed upon fact to determine what people should value. Take equality versus freedom. Which is more valuable when they come into conflict? Depends on who you ask. — Marchesk

I don't think it's quit as different as you're making it out. People make a lot of hoopla about the "facts" in science, and yet we still have flat-earthers, climate change deniers, young-earthers, intelligent design theorists, alchemists, astrologists, etc. Furthermore, what was accepted as scientific "fact" 100 years ago (let alone 500 years ago) is now reckoned as falsehood. And yet these considerations don't prompt most of us to abandon science as hopelessly subjective. That's because there is tangible progress in the sciences, but I'd argue the same can be said of ethics, even taking into account the horrors of the 20th century. How many of us would prefer to live in an ancient democracy, a medieval absolute monarchy or a contemporary communist dictatorship? Are we not justified in reckoning the moral underpinnings of some societies tangibly inferior to others?

...religion dictates your moral views. — Gitonga

Then whence apostates?

Dictates is a poor choice here. One choses one's religion, even if one does so by not changing one's mind.

That is, there is a logical error in your OP that you have not addressed. See my previous posts.

It’s easy to observe that the general moral view of society is often in harmony with the view of those in power. That could be a chicken and egg observation, though. No doubt it goes both ways: the opinion of the powerful is reflected by the general social morality as well as vice versa.

But let’s suppose you are right, and it only goes in one direction. You observe that your fellow citizens mostly accept the view of the powerful and you call that right. How about yourself then? Do you always accept the ethical viewpoints of your authorities? If you answer yes even though you have seen through it all, it means that you really don’t have any morality and you can’t criticize anyone who live under other authorities. Why would it be wrong to own slaves, for instance, if the laws of one’s country accepted it? If you answer no, you acknowledge that there is a morality independent of the powerful since you yourself use another standard.

Let me ask you, does an individuals moral view matter if it's contrary to what society thinks? And if it does matter how can you validate it? — Gitonga

It certainly matters to me what kind of morality a person has, but validate it? I don’t expect the laws of any country to be in full harmony with any ethical standard. Law and morality are two different things. I just hope that the laws will not be too far removed from good ethics, but most of all I hope as many people as possible will act morally whether that means following the laws and customs or breaking them.