I can't see what the authority would be in (1),nor how we'd assign it, (2) seems to leave us with no means of judging which is the correct sense, so that leaves us with (3),which make either John or Mary wrong, depending on the language game they're playing. — Isaac
would seem to suggest that meta-ethics is a wasted endeavour. There is no one correct answer to what it means to be moral as we don't all mean the same thing when we talk about what is or isn't moral. — Michael
Not wasted necessarily, but at times misguided, like much of philosophy. I think there's a lot valuable met-ethical discussion about the kinds of things we mean by 'goid' and 'evil', accepting a variety is not the same thing as throwing our hands up and saying "well it could mean anything!"... It could, but it doesn't, so there's still some value in the study. — Isaac
How would we approach it then? We look at what John says about morality and we look at what Mary says about morality, recognise that they're incompatible, and then what? — Michael
Is there some meaning shared by both the divine command theorist and the "God-is-evil" proponent? Maybe the "one ought do this and not do this" notion that I brought up earlier? — Michael
Shared meaning, maybe, but I'm not so sure myself about "one ought do this and not do this". If 'evil' universally means "one ought do this and not do this", then how would one answer the question "why ought I not to do that?". One is now prevente, oon pain of circularity, from answering "because it's evil". — Isaac
In (1), why ought we do/avoid certain actions without reference to evil, is best answered by some kind of 'prosperity of the group' metric. But where groups are aberrant to what we individually feel, we want to reserve the ability to cry foul, so it's a kind of negotiation between the individual and the culture they belong to. Very analogous to the way law works. We accept the judgement of past generations, but reserve the right to alter it. — Isaac
In (2), we need a religion of sort (which I see as the same thing as culture, being an atheist). I can only see some form of disinterested punishment playing the role of the reason not to do evil. Anything more internal would count as a reason under (1). I can see a role for psychology here, if we still fear the punishment of our parents for our misdemeanours, we might have a reason not to do evil (even if there's no 'real' punishment looming).
3) I see as only understandable as a kind of combination of (1) and (2),but maybe I've not quite understood what you're getting at. — Isaac
So when we talk about morality/being obligated to do/not do something, we're just talking about hypothetical imperatives with a goal to better the group? — Michael
By "why ought we not do evil?" I wasn't asking for a motivation to not do evil but asking how we get from "X is evil" to "therefore we ought not do X". — Michael
Yet if we invoke something like 'it damages the welfare of your group', I think that would (in rational people) just constitue something one ought not to do anyway, regardless of the label 'evil'. So by this means we can't explain why we ought not to do evil, under (2). I can't make sense of 'ought not to do' without some negative consequence, I don't know what 'ought' would mean without some negative consequence should you do otherwise. So we're looking for a negative consequence that isn't already in your own best interests (because that would mean evil is just what one evidently ought not to do). Religious punishment is the only option I can think of. God decrees something is 'evil', but it's not something which you simply ought not to do anyway (that would make his decree pointless. Yet to answer your question there needs to be some reason why we care what God decrees. So punishment. Had God not declared it evil, X would have no negative consequences (hence 'evil' is not just that which we ought not to do anyway), but having declared it 'evil' we now, post hoc, ought not to do X because if we do we shall be punished.
All of which I think answers your last query too. — Isaac
So are you saying that in a world without God then we can't have moral obligation? — Michael
what I'm saying is the moral standard you hold someone according to is completely subjective... For example Vikings used to think it was okay to rape and pillage now we say it's not... It's all a matter of opinion — Gitonga
Why not? Is the opinion that slavery is OK not wrong? — Banno
Question to you: Imagine I or person like me does something horrible to you or someone like you, and yours or those like yours. I say I'm right - or have a right - to do these things. You supposedly will say I don't. But at the same time you represent these as mere matters of opinion. It seems to me that if there is a notion of right, we both cannot be right, else a thing both be and not be. That is, if you're correct, there is no such thing as a right. Please reconcile. — tim wood
In Ethics, we seek to change the world to match what we say. — Banno
Unlike with chemistry, there is no agreed upon fact to determine what people should value. Take equality versus freedom. Which is more valuable when they come into conflict? Depends on who you ask. — Marchesk
It certainly matters to me what kind of morality a person has, but validate it? I don’t expect the laws of any country to be in full harmony with any ethical standard. Law and morality are two different things. I just hope that the laws will not be too far removed from good ethics, but most of all I hope as many people as possible will act morally whether that means following the laws and customs or breaking them.Let me ask you, does an individuals moral view matter if it's contrary to what society thinks? And if it does matter how can you validate it? — Gitonga
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