What is that? It appears to be a metaphysical component to conscious existence, correct? — 3017amen

I definitely think that here, as well as in many other topics, there is a lot of mystery, and we know very little, and that people are justifiably puzzled or even in awe of what they don't understand.

What I deny is that philosophy has done anything interesting to address these healthy impulses. Is there a 'metaphysical component?' Again, I'm not sure what that would mean, but if it means anything like, 'would the sort of thing that Aristotle, Descartes, and Kripke have done shed any light on consciousness?' then my answer would have to be 'no.'

I really don't understand what the question is supposed to be. — Snakes Alive

The question I have raised are, in what sense do the constitutive elements of reason, such as general ideas, exist? Are the objects of mathematics real, and if so how? I say that these are metaphysical questions that can’t be adjudicated scientifically.

I am not impressed by the various experiments purporting to show that crows and other animals can exercise reason. They may indeed be able to do so in some rudimentary fashion but only in h. Sapiens does this faculty assume decisive importance.

Are the objects of mathematics real, and if so how? — Wayfarer

But what does this actually mean, is the question? I don't know what it would be for mathematical objects to be 'real' or not.

I once did read a sci-fi story in which a young man slept with a physical manifestation of the number 7 – but this is clearly not what's meant by a Platonist. But what is meant? The question 'is it real?' in isolation, when we have no idea what sort of thing we're talking about or what its 'reality' as opposed to its 'unreality' consists in, is not a fruitful question.

I am not impressed by the various experiments purporting to show that crows and other animals can exercise reason. — Wayfarer

Well fortunately our scientific models do not turn on whether you're impressed by them.

@Snakes Alive, I'm beginning to see the issue here with regards to the kind of magical thinking you're referring to. "animals don't think rationally like us because.... I really, really don't want them to"

This claim is either meaningless or amenable to empirical evidence. Is our ability to reason and navigate grounded in our ability to discern meaning? If it isn't, what would be different about the world, how would we notice? — Isaac

magical thinking [...] "animals don't think rationally like us because.... I really, really don't want them to" — Isaac

I agree it's empirical, but I think what the crows (and current AI) are able to do is less than we are able, which we might distinguish as "rational" but I would propose clarifying as semantical: the ability to discern meaning in the sense of discerning what symbols are supposed to be pointed at.

I agree that I should suggest kinds of supporting evidence if anyone were actually going to dispute my claim.

On the other hand, I might first appeal to mere armchair devices like the Chinese Room, to
ascertain what would count as evidence for my disputant.

It's an interesting line of investigation for sure, particularly the actions AI would have to demonstrate before we're prepared to label them 'rational'. But that's a very different topic and I don't want to derail the thread talking about it.

What is also interesting about this, and more related to the thread, is the way in which the criteria for the term 'rational' are being created post hoc to reflect the way we'd like things to be. We've all been using the word 'rational' (or it's equivalent) for 2000 years. What on earth is a discussion about what it means doing 2000 years later!

What I deny is that philosophy has done anything interesting to address these healthy impulses. Is there a 'metaphysical component?' Again, I'm not sure what that would mean, but if it means anything like, 'would the sort of thing that Aristotle, Descartes, and Kripke have done shed any light on consciousness?' then my answer would have to be 'no.'


Reply — Snakes Alive

From the Mind of God:

"Traditional metaphysical problems have included the origin, nature and purpose of the universe, how the world of appearances presented to our senses relates to its underlying "reality" and order, the relationship between mind and matter, and the existence of free will. Clearly science is deeply involved in such issues, but empirical science may not be able to answer them, or any "meaning of life" questions."

There is not much to disagree with in the forgoing quote from theoretical physicist Paul Davies. Nonetheless, we certainly know that we can use the physical sciences (both physics and cognitive) to provide for a deeper understanding of our existence, from an empirical/experience, or theoretical->propositional->testing view. We pose questions that we can test. We know there is much value there.

We also know in philosophy, and maybe to your point, folks like Kant saw the limitation of what human's can reason. He knew the limitations of knowledge here. For instance, he was bold enough to declare that a priori truth's (pure reason/formal logic) in themselves ( the thing in itself/nature of [its] existence) had little meaning. But ( and that's a big but) the paradox of our fixed sense of wonderment -- a priori (due to our intrinsic/innate self-awareness) compels us to ask those aforementioned metaphysical questions.

And so what we have is a physical world, and yet within it metaphysical properties such as our own consciousness. It seems consistent that we can't help but to wonder and ask questions like 'all events must have a cause'. Through metaphysical self-awareness, we wonder about our own conscious existence.

Those things are natural. A normal way of Being. To your point, there may be more scientific value to asking metaphysical questions than there are philosophical for the reasons you alluded to because such questions lead to discoveries in physics and psychology, to name a few. But the paradox remains. We know we won't be able to have philosophical answers to those innate impulses that wonder about such existence, yet in the right context, it provides for clues to same.

For those reasons, we can use both science and philosophy (instead of dichotomizing them) and use those tools where its appropriate to use them. In the end, I agree that metaphysical, as well as existential questions, have their limitations. But those are the tools we have in seeking the truth to our reality. And the journey itself is worth the asking, yes?

So to come full circle, perhaps one could argue that metaphorically speaking you have to walk the path so G*d can cross it. How else do we provide for the human condition? Is there a better way? Does the existential angst of ignorance preclude all knowledge? If so, how shall we proceed?

I submit, rejoice or embrace your (self-awareness) sense of wonderment. Your metaphysical sense of wonderment :snicker: (What is wonderment?)

It's an interesting line of investigation for sure, — Isaac

Hey thanks.

particularly the actions AI would have to demonstrate before we're prepared to label them 'rational'. — Isaac

Ah well that's more of a Turing Test approach, which I was aiming to avoid. I'm less concerned about our common judgements about people's reasoning and more about the reasoning itself. Hence my proposed clarification of rational as semantical, in a sense further clarified. But then this is a good example of how an armchair method (the Chinese Room) could conceivably be of help.

But that's a very different topic — Isaac

So I agree :wink:

and I don't want to derail the thread talking about it. — Isaac

The OP will be grateful.

What is also interesting about this, and more related to the thread, — Isaac

More relevant than my posts, then, which are about whether non-metaphysical philosophy has plenty to contribute to investigations into the human condition? :wink:

, is the way in which the criteria for the term 'rational' are being created post hoc to reflect the way we'd like things to be. — Isaac

Yes, just like reading a post the way we'd like it to be. :wink:

We've all been using the word 'rational' (or it's equivalent) for 2000 years. What on earth is a discussion about what it means doing 2000 years later! — Isaac

Helping to understand the human condition. E.g. the sense of consciousness. :meh:

This article you linked is a great example of metaphysics (or philosophy in general) done right. What that author is arguing is essentially that “species” is not a useful or coherent concept, it is a concept that gives rise to unnecessary confusion and unanswerable questions, so that concept and the framework that surrounds it are best abandoned and replaced with alternative ways of thinking about things that serve the same purpose without leading into those same problems.

Whether species exist or not isn’t an empirical question. People arguing that species do exist will do so on the basis of the same empirical facts as people arguing that they don’t exist. The argument isn’t about those facts, but about how to think about those facts. Likewise for arguments about whether universals are real, etc. It boils down to “is this a clear and useful way of thinking about the world”?, not “is this how the world is?”

This article you linked is a great example of metaphysics (or philosophy in general) done right. — Pfhorrest

But it's not a work of philosophy. It's key claim is that

There is abundant empirical evidence presented since Darwin’s time that shows he had the right view

If there were not abundant empirical evidence showing species to be arbitrary, then it would probably not be "a concept that gives rise to unnecessary confusion and unanswerable questions". It would be probably one which accurately and usefully described the world.

Humans use theories and humans are part of the world so the question of whether some concept is "a clear and useful way of thinking about the world", is still a question about "is this how the world is?". If it is a useful concept then the world is such that humans believing it act more efficiently (or whatever your measure of usefulness is). One still cannot simply deduce its usefulness from the armchair, not unless one has the monumental hubris to claim to speak on behalf of the entire human race without even asking them.

universal terms are real, but that their reality is of a different order, to the reality of individual particulars. — Wayfarer

Lots of cool stuff in there, which I can appreciate. I wonder what terminology you’d use to classify the different orders of reality; I know what I’d use, being the next metaphysical generation removed from a Scholastic realist.
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Animals don’t reason, no. — Wayfarer

Agreed, under certain paradigmatic conditions. Human reason is cognition by means of conceptions a posteriori or cognition by the construction of conceptions a priori. As such, lacking the cognitive system required for those paradigms, it is impossible that animals intellectually lesser than the human variety, reason. At the same time, it is impossible for the human animal to know with any certainty whatsoever, what kind of rationality is possible other than his own. The very best we can say, is that lesser animals associate instinctively, which reduces to nothing more consequential than simple stimuli/reaction, even if derived from mere accidental occassion.

I mean....c’mon. If there was no stick for the crow to use, would he have built one? We wonder at the fact he uses a stick, but we neglect the fact he hasn’t figured out that sometimes a curved stick would work a whole lot better. And to say, because of that, the crow just reasons a little bit, is beneath the dignity of philosophical discourse, better left to the rationally unencumbered.

You know.....we’ve seen porpoises/dolphins using breaking ocean waves in a fashion we’ve taken the un-warranted liberty of calling “surfing”. If it was a human using such waves for some specific purpose, the concept of surfing is justified; but without those criteria, which is altogether impossible for us to ascertain, saying porpoises “surf”, or rationalize the use of breaking ocean waves for any definitive purpose at all, is a liberty not logically granted to us. And if we can’t ask a crow how he got the idea of using a stick, what right do we have, other than rampant anthropomorphism, to say he reasoned his way to it? If only they could inform us.........
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our ability to reason and navigate is grounded in our ability to discern meaning — Wayfarer

I think this is backwards, in that meaning presupposes the subjective validity of the representations already given by our innate ability to reason. We assign concepts to objects not because of what the concepts mean, but as means to know what the object is. A concept or intuition represents some x; it doesn’t tell us what x means. If we want to know the meaning of some x, which always relates to its purpose, we need a different set of judgements, but even judgements are themselves predicated on the relation of concepts.
————-

Scholastic realist. Scotus? Peirce? St. Thomas? Other than medieval?

Anyway....thanks for letting me barge in here. Like Reese’s though......not sorry! (Grin)

I'm not saying that (in this example) it's completely independent of empirical evidence, just that both sides of the debate accept the same empirical facts, so the debate is not about which set of facts obtain. Those who think there "really are" species and those who think there aren't don't argue about what organisms exist and how similar their genes are to each other. They've all got that same empirical data, and are arguing about what is the best way of organizing our thoughts about that data.

Neither side could demonstrate the difference between a world where "species exist" and "species don't exist" through Snakes' "novel test", for example. Both sides would describe the current world as a world where their personal position is true, and... probably be stumped to describe what is different about their opponents' world, or else put forward a description that their opponents would say misrepresents their view.

It's like interpretations of quantum mechanics. Copenhagen fans and MWI fans and Pilot Wave fans and so on all agree about what equations accurately describe the observable world. They disagree about what is the most useful way of understanding or interpreting those equations. That is the essence of a philosophical disagreement.

Neither side could demonstrate the difference between a world where "species exist" and "species don't exist" through Snakes' "novel test", for example. — Pfhorrest

Of course they could. You provided that yourself

it is a concept that gives rise to unnecessary confusion and unanswerable questions, so that concept and the framework that surrounds it are best abandoned and replaced with alternative ways of thinking about things that serve the same purpose without leading into those same problems. — Pfhorrest

That describes some way the world is. One in which people are confused and ask questions to which they cannot seem to find answers. The world in which the Darwinians are right is one in which adopting their way of thinking causes people to no longer be in this state. The world in which they were wrong is one in which adopting their way of thinking has no effect at all on this state of affairs. One could easily distinguish between novels written about each of these scenarios.

It's not only about the empirical facts of speciation in this case, it's about the empirical facts about how confusing/efficient different ways of thinking about them are for the humans doing the thinking. My point is that one can no more work out the latter from one's armchair than one can the former.

It's not only about the empirical facts of speciation in this case, it's about the empirical facts about how confusing/efficient different ways of thinking about them are for the humans doing the thinking. — Isaac

You do get that my entire point is about differentiating between exactly those two things? That there isn't a disagreement about the observed phenomena (the facts of speciation), but a disagreement about the observers (the humans doing the thinking about speciation).

My point is that one can no more work out the latter from one's armchair than one can the former. — Isaac

One can very easily work out whether certain patterns of thought lead to confusion or not from an armchair. When the question is about our own thoughts, the only experiments we have to do are thought experiments. We're talking about the a priori implications of our concepts about the world, given some particular world the details of which are not in question (what organisms exist and how their genes compare, etc). Figuring that out is like doing math, at most you need a pencil and paper to keep track of your thoughts, but it's all in the thinking where the work is happening.

there isn't a disagreement about the observed phenomena (the facts of speciation), but a disagreement about the observers (the humans doing the thinking about speciation). — Pfhorrest

The behaviour of the observers is itself an observed fact. That's what I'm saying. The only observer whose response is not itself just another observed fact is you yourself, and it would be monstrously hubrisitc to assume your personal confusion/clarity somehow was representative of the whole of humanity.

You realize that by this account all of the other supposedly meaningless philosophical questions discussed in this thread also become meaningful empirical questions in light of the confusion or clarity they produce in people? E.g. the difference between a world where "universals exist" and a world where "universals don't exist" is that in one world (whichever of them represents the correct answer to that question), people are not needlessly confused by intractable philosophical problems, while in the other world, people are thus confused.

I don't care to engage in the argument about whether it's possible to explore the implications of concepts a priori or only by a posteriori observation of other people. My point is just that the kind of question in that article you linked is the same kind of question as supposedly "meaningless" philosophical questions: it's a question of what's a useful way of thinking about something, not a question about the thing itself.

You realize that by this account all of the other supposedly meaningless philosophical questions discussed in this thread also become meaningful empirical questions in light of the confusion or clarity they produce in people? E.g. the difference between a world where "universals exist" and a world where "universals don't exist" is that in one world (whichever of them represents the correct answer to that question), people are not needlessly confused by intractable philosophical problems, while in the other world, people are thus confused. — Pfhorrest

No, I don't think that's true. People can very well be more or less confused by competing models of empirical representation because such confusion is observed in the failure or success in the application of those models. Universals is not such a thing because one could not even in principle describe what a person 'confused' by a model including them would look like.

I'll certainly grant that a large number of supposedly philosophical problems are, in fact, of the nature of the speciation problem. Its one of the reasons I'm interested in philosophy, but most big metaphysical questions are not like that because we cannot even articulate the confusion.

Universals is not such a thing because one could not even in principle describe what a person 'confused' by a model including them would look like. — Isaac

People who argue that universals don't exist sure seem to think that the concept of them is just a philosophical confusion.

They may. They are of course free to think whatever they like. The point is merely thinking something is the case is not sufficient to make something the case. On cannot write a treatise about just how much one thinks such-and-such is the case and expect the degree to which one believes it to be the case to have any persuasive power.

If they can't demonstrate what that confusion consists in, then how are to tell if their argument that such confusion exists is sound?

It's worth pointing out that the point here is that both the claims that universals do and don't exist are equally confused – that is, 'nominalism' is as much a metaphysical thesis in this sense as 'realism.'

That it references nothing in the world is self-evident. You can't identify the thing it references. — Isaac

If it was self-evident, there wouldn't be long-standing philosophical debates over universals.

You can't identify the thing it references. — Isaac

Platonists think they can.

"We do it because..." sounds like a sociological issue — Isaac

Not if it's motivated by a philosophical puzzle.

"We do it this way..." sounds like a linguistic issue. — Isaac

Only if linquistics can show how universal concepts are constructed without appealing to other universals.

It's worth pointing out that the point here is that both the claims that universals do and don't exist are equally confused – that is, 'nominalism' is as much a metaphysical thesis in this sense as 'realism.' — Snakes Alive

That would be dissolving the issue as meaningless to debate on any side of the issue as you set out in the OP. But what does it mean to say the universal debate is meaningless? Does it become a scientific question as to why we have universal concepts? The question of using universal concepts is not meaningless. Nor are particulars.

Does it become a scientific question as to why we have universal concepts? — Marchesk

Presumably yes, but even putting it that way is probably something I wouldn't do, since it just presupposes a bunch of useless baggage.

Presumably yes, but even putting it that way is probably something I wouldn't do, since it just presupposes a bunch of useless baggage. — Snakes Alive

Do you deny the existence of universal concepts in our language?

I really have no idea how to answer that question.

Do you deny the existence of universal concepts in our language? — Marchesk

I really have no idea how to answer that question. — Snakes Alive

I thought this was fine...

Is the question, for example, how we can use the same word for multiple things? How it is that 'apple' can refer to multiple fruits, for example? — Snakes Alive

It's worth pointing out that the point here is that both the claims that universals do and don't exist are equally confused – that is, 'nominalism' is as much a metaphysical thesis in this sense as 'realism.' — Snakes Alive

You requested some stories about universals...

The stories all begin with Gilbert visiting Oxford and remarking that he had seen the colleges and the libraries, but was wondering where the University was.

In the Platonist story, the University resides in the realm of the Forms and the colleges and libraries are merely a dim reflection of that Ideal. Gilbert travels to the realm of the Forms and has a mind-bending experience. Eventually he comes back down to Earth to enlighten his fellow compatriots about the Ideal University.

In the Nominalist story, there is no University, only buildings in a desert landscape. Gilbert learns that the University is merely an arbitrary artifact of human language and thought. Gilbert wanders around in perpetual confusion, unable to find order or meaning in anything.

In the conventional story, it is explained to Gilbert that the University is the way the buildings are organized. Gilbert enrolls, earns a degree, and makes valuable contributions in the philosophy of language and mind.

Are the objects of mathematics real, and if so how?
— Wayfarer

But what does this actually mean, is the question? I don't know what it would be for mathematical objects to be 'real' or not. — Snakes Alive

The point about Platonic realism is that it posits that intelligible objects, such as number, are real but incorporeal. That is, they're real but not material. So why is that a problem? It's a problem because the implicit philosophy of scientific-secular culture is that everything is reducible to matter (or matter~energy), that matter is the only real. So if number is real, but not material, then it undermines that.

Mathematical platonism has considerable philosophical significance. If the view is true, it will put great pressure on the physicalist idea that reality is exhausted by the physical. For platonism entails that reality extends far beyond the physical world and includes objects which aren’t part of the causal and spatiotemporal order studied by the physical sciences. Mathematical platonism, if true, will also put great pressure on many naturalistic theories of knowledge. For there is little doubt that we possess mathematical knowledge. The truth of mathematical platonism would therefore establish that we have knowledge of abstract (and thus causally inefficacious) objects. This would be an important discovery, which many naturalistic theories of knowledge would struggle to accommodate.

Platonism in mathematics SEP

I've learned there is a whole domain of arguments defending mathematics from deflationary naturalist criticism on the grounds that maths is indispensable to the natural sciences. :

In his seminal 1973 paper, “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf presented a problem facing all accounts of mathematical truth and knowledge. Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to debar any knowledge of mathematical objects.

Why do 'our best' epistemic theories 'debar' such knowledge? It's precisely because maths seems to suggest a domain of abstract reals.

Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.

So this is the inconvenient truth about maths! That it undermines the very naturalism that has been its greatest beneficiary!

Scholastic realist. Scotus? Peirce? St. Thomas? Other than medieval? — Mww

Read the entry on Eriugena's five modes.

"animals don't think rationally like us because.... I really, really don't want them to" — Isaac

They demonstrably do not possess language, the ability to abstract, the ability to create technology, and so on and so on. If that's 'magical thinking', then guilty as charged.

I think the meta-philosophical issue behind this is that philosophical naturalism qua neo-darwinian materialism, collapses any possibility of an ontological distinction between animals and humans. So, we're basically 'a species', and the very faculty which makes science possible in the first place is really 'an adaptation'. Again, if criticizing that is 'magical thinking', then guilty as charged.

//ps// - and there's a payoff for believing that humans are simply another species. It solves many problems of self-identity, what Fromm calls 'freedom-to'. We are free to define ourselves and realise ourselves in many different ways, but this freedom is also a burden, because it creates a sense of anxiety that we don't know the best way, or that we might fail to realise ourselves. So this is a way of avoiding that fear.//

In the conventional story, it is explained to Gilbert that the University is the way the buildings are organized. — Andrew M

Except that a university is also a social organization, and organizations are more difficult to be relegate to a name for a group of individuals, land and buildings, since the social structure has an important effect on society.