[quote="Snakes Alive;422603"It should describe some state of affairs such that the one to whom it's meaningful can somehow tell the difference between that state of affairs obtaining or not obtaining.[/quote]

Is that not verificationism? The thing here is that there if you don't agree that meaning depends on verification, then there's no reason to dismiss metaphysics as meaningless just because it can't be verified.

Which is a metaphysical dispute of it's own.

Are you saying that all meaningful things are descriptions? — creativesoul

Meaningful statements describe the world in some way – that is the purported aim of metaphysical statements. They distinguish, if you like, between ways the world might be. If no such distinction is made, then the statement cannot 'pick out' any way the world might be, and so its being true or false could not possibly hinge on the world being some way. Hence it cannot describe anything.

It means other animals can perceive things we can't. It means X-Rays can pass through solid objects. It means a beam of photons can produce either a wave or particle pattern depending on whether you detect which slit they go through. And so on. — Marchesk

An idealist can simply accept all that is so, and say those things' truth is to be cashed out in terms of their experiential effects. Indeed, you cannot possibly find a difference, since an idealist can always in principle make this move.

Is that not verificationism? — Marchesk

It doesn't necessarily have to do with the means of verification – it does mean that one has to be able to know what it is, in some way, for the statement to be true as opposed to false. If you don't know that, then you can't tell what makes the sentence true or false, so the statement can't be cognitively meaningful to you. No verification is actually required, even in principle – you could simply describe or imagine something, or read them in a novel, showing the difference, so you could, say, tell in a trial at better than chance level which of the affairs holds in that description.

Are you saying that all meaningful things are descriptions?
— creativesoul

Meaningful statements describe the world in some way – that is the purported aim of metaphysical statements. They distinguish, if you like, between ways the world might be. If no such distinction is made, then the statement cannot 'pick out' any way the world might be, and so its being true or false could not possibly hinge on the world being some way. Hence it cannot describe anything. — Snakes Alive

Is that a "yes"?

Are the only meaningful things descriptions? Must all meaningful things describe something?

Cognitively meaningful ones, yes – ones that attempt to tell us 'how the world is.' Of course 'meaningful' can mean lots of other things, too, but we're interested here in figuring out 'how things are.' And that is what metaphysics purports to do.

In other words, there is a recognition that since one can speak however one pleases, that one can in some sense 'make true' whatever one pleases, just by talking about it. But as we saw in the second layer, this has no descriptive effect, and cannot really change the world or even what one thinks about it. Yet making a sentence like 'time is unreal' true according to one's logic, which follows from the employment of words in a certain way, one can sort of blur the eyes and almost believe he has stopped time. — Snakes Alive

I can't add much to the conversation, because I more or less agree with the OP. What he's describing - and I think he's right to characterize a large swathe of philosophy in this way- seems like a self-stilting way of preventing action (of basically tranquilizing that part of oneself that engages in the world and creates.) If you can self-hypnotize, there's nothing to do in the world, because the world is already just as it should be, just as it should be, just as it should be.

An idealist can simply accept all that is so, and say those things' truth is to be cashed out in terms of their experiential effects. Indeed, you cannot possibly find a difference, since an idealist can always in principle make this move. — Snakes Alive

And idealist can make this move for experience, but that differs significantly from the move the materialist is making. Let's take the double slit experiment. What does the idealist say? We have two different kinds of experiences depending on how the experiment is setup. What does the materialist say? Well, they come up with things like pilot waves and multiverses.

And idealist can make this move for experience, but that differs significantly from the move the materialist is making. Let's take the double slit experiment. What does the idealist say? We have two different kinds of experiences depending on how the experiment is setup. What does the materialist say? Well, they come up with things like pilot waves and multiverses. — Marchesk

But the point is that those additional posits can also be cast in either framework. You will never find a substantive difference between the two.

It doesn't necessarily have to do with the means of verification – it does mean that one has to be able to know what it is, in some way, for the statement to be true as opposed to false. If you don't know that, then you can't tell what makes the sentence true or false, so the statement can't be cognitively meaningful to you. No verification is actually required, even in principle – you could simply describe or imagine something, or read them in a novel, showing the difference, so you could, say, tell in a trial at better than chance level which of the affairs holds in that description. — Snakes Alive

Okay, well let's take universals. What Platonists are tying to do is explain why it is that our language is populated with universals, while particulars are the only things in experience. So they postulate forms which give structure to particulars, and that's why particulars have similarities, which reminds us of the forms. Or something. The point is to make sense of the dichotomy between how we think and talk, and our experiences.

What would make this false is if no theory of universals makes sense of the actual world, and if all the theories present infinite regressions or other fatal flaws. What would make it true is if there is no other way to account for similarity between particulars, and our use of universal concepts.

I should note I started a thread a while back debating the meaningfulness of universals, and there was no agreement reached as to whether they are meaningful.

What is the difference between there being universals and there not being universals?

But the point is that those additional posits can also be cast in either framework. You will never find a substantive difference between the two. — Snakes Alive

The mind-independence part is substantive enough for Berkley to declare materialism incoherent. Whether he succeeds is another matter. But we can just look at Nagel's view from nowhere, or Kant's noumena to get an idea of mind-independence taken seriously. Also Tegmark's mathematical universe and speculative realism.

I'm not doubting that philosophers have written books in which they deny or agree with various claims. The question is whether any of those denials or agreements have any descriptive substance.

Anyway, this is turning into a tired defense of basic positivism, rather than focusing on the Lazerowitz model, which I'm interested in. These discussions have all been had a million times before.

What is the difference between there being universals and there not being universals? — Snakes Alive

Whether there exists universal categories which material things take their form from. There are different possibilities. Nominalism says nope on one end and realism says yep on the other. A nominalist might put forward tropes or sets as an explanation for our use of universal concepts. Or they just consider them arbitrary. A realist thinks universal language is describing nature as it's carved up by the forms.

Anyway, this is turning into a tired defense of basic positivism, rather than focusing on the Lazerowitz model, which I'm interested in. These discussions have all been had a million times before. — Snakes Alive

Fair enough. But that's a fundamental problem, isn't it? We can't even agree on what makes a statement meaningful. I don't know what that means for philosophy and whether we have to nail down a theory of meaning first before having these debates.

Cognitively meaningful ones, yes – ones that attempt to tell us 'how the world is.' Of course 'meaningful' can mean lots of other things, too, but we're interested here in figuring out 'how things are.' And that is what metaphysics purports to do. — Snakes Alive

This is muddled.

How about this example of what seems clear enough to me to be a metaphysical claim.

All human thought and belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between different things.

Does this count as cognitively meaningful according to what you are advocating here?

Fair enough. But that's a fundamental problem, isn't it? We can't even agree on what makes a statement meaningful. I don't know what that means for philosophy and whether we have to nail down a theory of meaning first before having these debates. — Marchesk

I think philosophy should be studied externally as a kind of folk religion or practice, by anthropologists, and that meaning should be studied by linguistic semanticists.

It sounds like nonsense to me.

I think philosophy should be studied externally, by anthropologists, and that meaning should be studied by linguistic semanticists. — Snakes Alive

Assuming they can stay free of philosophical assumptions.

How so?

I mean... it's true and can be proven as such by using the right terminological framework.

Why would we ever think we could figure out the basic nature of the elements of the universe by talking? It's in this puzzling feature of metaphysics – that somehow the deepest truths are known without any investigation whatsoever, and just by deciding to use words in a certain way, that is the start of his account. — Snakes Alive

So basically your criticism is, metaphysics is empty because it’s not physics.

I don't know what that means for philosophy and whether we have to nail down a theory of meaning first before having these debates. — Marchesk

Definitely a necessary prerequisite. Someone is claiming that the only meaningful statements are descriptions about the way the world is. That someone had better damned well know what all meaningful things have in common.

Because I don't know what it means.

Assuming they can stay free of philosophical assumptions. — Marchesk

Decent sciences tend to converge on conclusions even starting from widely diverging prejudices. And I don't think philosophical prejudices matter much, because again, I don't think they're meaningful.

So basically your criticism is, metaphysics is empty because it’s not physics. — Wayfarer

No.

Because I don't know what it means. — Snakes Alive

So, sensible claims hinge upon your understanding?

Whether a claim is meaningful to someone depends on whether they can understand it, yes. I can't speak to your mind, but I doubt you understand it either.

Whether a claim is meaningful to someone depends on whether they can understand it, yes. I can't speak to your mind, but I doubt you understand it either. — Snakes Alive

Not all meaningful claims are understood by everyone. Thus, we know that being 'meaningful to someone' is not equivalent, is not part and parcel to being meaningful. It's not even required(being meaningful and/or understood by everyone).

Are you actually doubting that I understand my own claim?

:brow:

Do you know what the term "pretentious" means?

Whether a claim is meaningful to someone depends on whether they can understand it, yes. — Snakes Alive

Here's the rub. I've said I can understand metaphysical statements. But then others of your persuasion will come along and claim that I don't really understand, because the statements aren't meaningful. I argue that they're wrong, and indeed it is possible to understand metaphysical claims. But the oppositions persists in being skeptical

So then what?

Demonstrate you understand them using the novel-writing test.

Are you actually doubting that I understand my own claim? — creativesoul

Yes.

Demonstrate you understand them using the novel-writing test. — Snakes Alive

You want me to write two novels, one where the plot demonstrates one side of metaphysical claim, and another where it demonstrates the other? As interesting as that sounds, I'm not a writer and don't have the time.

Why isn't demonstrating that one understands an argument for or against enough?

Are you actually doubting that I understand my own claim?
— creativesoul

Yes. — Snakes Alive

Good. At least you're being clear.

I'm curious. What are you basing your claim about my cognitive ability upon... exactly?

And...

What would it take for you(or me for that matter) to understand my claim?

:brow:

Or just a paragraph, or short story, or anything. For example, can you write or imagine two scenarios, one in which there are universals, and one in which there aren't? Conversely, if someone else wrote two such scenarios, could you tell the difference between them at better than chance?

If you cannot do this. then you demonstrably cannot tell the difference between the two claims, which means you can't see how they describe or don't describe the world, which means you don't understand them in the relevant sense.

Why isn't demonstrating that one understands an argument for or against enough? — Marchesk

Because an argument is just an exchange of words, and one can use words in whatever way one pleases. It's evident that metaphysicians go back and forth forever without understanding anything, because they do nothing but shuffle words around. Shuffling words around is precisely not an index of understanding, as the history of the discipline shows.