This is obviously not true, since it was you that claimed that truth is "physical" as a way of wriggling out of the conceptual difficulties involved in your position. — John

I don't know if everyone has the same amount of posts per page, but I'm set up so that I see 26 pages of posts at the moment in this thread. If you go back to page 20, say, and search for occurrences of the word "physical," the first occurrence is on page 25, when you said this:

If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) — John

So once again, I only mentioned the word "physical" because you brought it up in your post. I was responding to what you typed. My truth analysis has NOTHING to do with whether truth, facts, etc. are physical or not.

If that is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it? — John

Jesus Christ, dude--learn how to read if you're going to attempt to have a big boy discussion. I wrote this: "in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical.." You can't just bail on the sentence after you read the word "ontologically." There are six other words there that qualify the term "ontologically." (Not to mention that "meta analysis" qualifies it, too.)

All I am asking for is an explanation as to how truth can be understood to be physical; — John

Okay, but that's changing the topic. What does it have to do with whether truth is mind-dependent? I'd rather we didn't keep steering everything to talk about folks' pet topics. Let's try to have some discussions about something different every once in awhile.

You always talk about ideas like picturing something as if picturing is identical to what we're picturing. That's a simple conflation, as confused as if you were to say that a painting of a building is identical to the building. You could say, "It's an observation that you can't separate the painting and the building," but that wouldn't make it not a conflation where you simply do not understand that the painting and what it's a painting of are not the same thing. — Terrapin Station

This thread is about that very point, and nothing you have written in it demonstrates that you understand it. I notice also your non-response to the 'very well written passage' from Magee.

I wouldn't say that anything you write demonstrates that you can understand or communicate anything. In fact, every single thing you write seems to demonstrate that you have zero understanding of everything you read. You did that repeatedly in your post to me above, too, which is why I responded with sarcasm about it a number of times.

Well, as a matter of fact, I have written quite a few essays on the subject of philosophy, including a master's dissertation on Buddhist philosophy, which received high distinctions from actual academics - you know, the kind you find in those places called 'universities'. But apparently I still haven't learned the basic art of not wasting my time on those who don't understand the first thing about the subject.

You certainly write a lot--you do here as well. That in no way implies that you understand anything you read or that you can write coherently, of course. Re whether you have an educational background in philosophy, those of us who do can tell if you do independently of what you say about yourself.

Well, some people seem to think so. But, anyway, back to the point, which is the notion of 'mind-independence'. I think that the passage quoted from Magee, about 'Schopenahuer's defense of Kant', is quite relevant to the topic of 'mind-independence'. I would be interested to hear any actual arguments for or against that actual point, as distinct from invective and hyperbole.

We haven't had enough threads already focused on a general realism vs idealism debate?

Why not focus on whether truth is mind-dependent separately from that? Unless one is an ontological idealist, in which case one likely thinks that truth isn't mind-independent a fortiori because nothing is, we could make this topic a lot more interesting than yet another realism vs. idealism debate on the most general level.

We haven't had enough threads already focused on a general realism vs idealism debate? — Terrapin Station

Apparently not. The point never seems to be understood.

When someone says "It is a fact that x," they are claiming that states of affairs are such and such. Why would that be nonsense? — Terrapin Station

I presume you're familiar with A J Ayer's Language Truth and Logic, which was based around the
principle of verification, very similar in import to this point you're making here? Do you recall what about 'the principle of verification', as described by Ayer in that book, eventually caused it to fall from favour?

Yet another example of you not being able to comprehend anything you read. I'm not saying anything about verification in what you're quoting from me. You should concentrate on trying to tackle basic reading comprehension instead of concentrating on quoting and name-dropping. I don't think the latter fools anyone into believing that you're an expert on anything, especially when you continually do it so that it doesn't really have anything to do with what anyone was saying. Try understanding what you're reading, try to write coherently rather than "impressively" (advice that would go for a few others around here, too), try directly answering questions and objections about your comments instead, and try treating others with a bit more respect and maybe you'll receive some in turn.

I'm not saying anything about verification in what you're quoting from me. — Terrapin Station

Well, I think you are. I think at many points in this thread, you claim that there are the facts, X, and here our concept of them, as if facts and our concepts of them are clearly separable. But the whole point of arguments about 'mind-independence' is to analyse this very supposition. So to simply assume that separability of facts and concepts is to beg the question - to assume what it is that requires proof.

And these types of statements:

Facts are the states of affairs. — Terrapin Station

These are very similar to the ideas Ayer explores in 'Language Truth and Logic' - this is not not 'name dropping' but referring to the literature of the subject so as to situate the debate in terms of philosophy.

Well, I think you are. — Wayfarer

Yeah, no shit. Because your reading comprehension sucks.

I think at many points in this post, you claim that there are the facts, X, and here our concept of them, as if facts and our concepts of them are clearly separable. — Wayfarer

Even if the two comments were related, as if what you describe above had something to do with verification(ism).

These are very similar to the ideas Ayer explores in 'Language Truth and Logic' - — Wayfarer

Again, even if so, that (definition of "fact") has nothing to do with verification(ism). You're just digging a bigger hole for yourself. It's almost as if you can't simply read something and comprehend it for what it is.

It's almost as if you can't simply read something and comprehend it for what it is. — Terrapin Station

No kidding! I would hate that. That would be terrible. Anyway, thanks for the chat.

You quoted me thus and said this

:

If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) — John


So once again, I only mentioned the word "physical" because you brought it up in your post. I was responding to what you typed. My truth analysis has NOTHING to do with whether truth, facts, etc. are physical or not. — Terrapin Station

I actually said this ; "If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) and something entirely non-conceptual; the presumably purely physical 'something else'?"

Note how you left you the part where I said the "presumably physical something else", since you have long on these forums claimed to be a physicalist, and you also earlier said, as quoted:

Concepts are physical. — Terrapin Station

Apparently your "big boy" truth analysis has nothing to do with anything at all since it seems you are unable to give any account of it, other than to make vacuous assertions about what you will and won't "buy" as if anyone could be care less about that if it does not come with any accompanying explanation.

Your "position" is an absolute joke, dude if you not only cannot provide any argument for it, but cannot even give a cogent account of it. :-} :-d

Jesus Christ, dude--learn how to read if you're going to attempt to have a big boy discussion. I wrote this: "in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical.." You can't just bail on the sentence after you read the word "ontologically." There are six other words there that qualify the term "ontologically." (Not to mention that "meta analysis" qualifies it, too.) — Terrapin Station

This is in response to my earlier question:

This is obviously not true, since it was you that claimed that truth is "physical" as a way of wriggling out of the conceptual difficulties involved in your position. If that is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it? All I am asking for is an explanation as to how truth can be understood to be physical; and if you can't offer one then your assertion is as empty as can be. — John

You did claim that concepts and by extension truth are physical; it doesn't matter who mentioned the word "physical' first; that is just another of your red herrings. When you are asked for an account of how that works, you respond defensively as above, which indicates to me that it is likely there is no substance to your position.

Okay, but that's changing the topic. What does it have to do with whether truth is mind-dependent? I'd rather we didn't keep steering everything to talk about folks' pet topics. Let's try to have some discussions about something different every once in awhile. — Terrapin Station

Again this is a laughably lame evasion. It has nothing to do with pet topics and everything to do with whether truth is mind-dependent.The logic of the operation of minds is semantic, logical not physical. The very reason you can claim there is no truth absent minds is that the truth relation is understandable only as a semantic relation. You are left with two options. First: collapse the semantic into the physical; but if you are going to do that you should be able to give a better account of the truth relation than the semantic one. Or second, explain how there can be a relation between the semantic and the non-semantic. f you want to merely claim that concepts and by extension truth are really physical in order to merely feign explaining how the truth relation works in physicalist terms then I doubt anyone will take you seriously.

I agree with you that we have no really coherent notion of "physical' other than something like 'what can be sensed, measured and so on'. I don't know if Terrapin means "external'. I doubt it because he claims that everything is physical; that nothing is real except the physical. That is what it means to be a physicalist. It is a deeply incoherent, self-refuting position in my view, but people like Terrapin continue to assert it without being able to provide any cogent argument for why they hold to it. I think it really is a case of 'head-retracted turtles all the way down'.

You quoted me thus and said this — John

Because the whole point was who brought up "physical" first in our discussion in this thread. I wasn't talking about that in this thread. My view on truth, facts, etc. and whether they're mind-dependent do not have anything to do with my physicalism. I don't want to talk about the same things in every thread so that we can't even tell what the heck the topic of the thread started out as. This board has a tendency to do that, it has a tendency for people to keep getting into the same discussions over and over and over regardless of what the thread was ostensibly about.

Apparently your "big boy" truth analysis has nothing to do with anything at all — John

So then how about we don't bring up the same discussions we've already done 50 times in other threads?

our "position" is an absolute joke, dude if you not only cannot provide any argument for it, — John

Again with that stupid criticism. I might care about it if anyone were providing any arguments for anything here, where "argument" would amount to something I'm not doing; that is, if I were doing something significantly different than other folks rhetorically. But apparently, either (a) people believe that I believe that I'm providing arguments for things in some narrower sense, and so they're figuring that saying that I'm not providing an argument for something will sting as a comment, where they're also assuming that I consider their opinions as critics to hold water (which is probably not safe to assume), or (b) people believe that they're providing arguments for things in some narrower sense, and they believe that I'm doing something significantly different than they are in that regard. I don't know which option there is more amusing. But be sure to bring this up 50 more times in 50 different threads in the future.

it doesn't matter who mentioned the word "physical' first; — John

Yes, it does. The reason that matters is that my truth analysis has nothing to do with my physicalism. You were claiming that the two were importantly related, and you used the fact that I was making comments about physicalism as evidence for that. Well, the only reason I made any sort of comment about physicalism was because I was responding to you bringing up physicalism in your discussion with me.

When you are asked for an account of how that works, — John

An account of how what works? The relation between propositions and facts that we judge as truth-value? I explained that--we assign meanings to words, phrases, propositions and assess how those meanings correlate with facts (if correspondence theory), other propositions we've assigned "T" to (if coherence theory), what's commonly assigned "T" by relevant populations (if consensus theory), etc. If you still see something mysterious there, you'd need to better explain why you see it as mysterious.

And I said all of the above already.

If you were talking about something else instead (re an account of how "that" works--I'm not entirely sure what "that" is referring to), then please specify what "that" is.

It has nothing to do with pet topics and everything to do with whether truth is mind-dependent in their view. — John

Again, MY truth analysis, MY view on whether it's mind-dependent has nothing to do with my physicalism. Assume mind is nonphysical. Well, that doesn't at all change my truth analysis or my view on whether truth is mind dependent. That would be the case whether we assume that mind is nonphysical, whether we assume that the world is nonphysical, too, whether we assume that the world is nonphysical and the mind is physical--whatever we assume in that regard. It just has nothing to do with my truth analysis.

The very reason you can claim there is no truth absent minds is that the truth relation is understandable only as a semantic relation. — John

I don't agree with that. I don't agree that that's the only reason that someone could claim that there is no truth if there are no minds, but in any event, as I explained above, yes, the relation is a semantic one on my view.

First: collapse the semantic into the physical; but if you are going to do that you should be able to give a better account of the truth relation than the semantic one. Or second, explain how there can be a relation between the semantic and the non-semantic. — John

Not that I agree that those are the only two options, but the first option is irrelevant on my view, as I'm not saying anything that hinges on whether anything is physical or not, and re the second option, I did that already.

Although note in the first place that it's not necessarily the case that the relation is between the semantic and the nonsemantic. That's not the case with coherence theory for example. The relation there is purely in terms of the relation between the proposition in question and the other propositions the person assigns "T" to. It's also not the case with consensus theory, because again, the relation is purely to other propositions to which "T" is assigned. And I'd say it's not the case with pragmatism, either, as the relation is between the proposition in question and what the person considers useful, practically valuable, etc.

It's an issue with correspondence (and for some odd reason, by the way, folks on this board seem to assume that correspondence is the only available truth theory), but as I said, with correspondence, I explained this already. You're simply assessing the proposition in relation to facts of the world as you experience them. It doesn't matter for this what exactly is going on ontologically re that experience--whether physicalism is true, whether direct realism is true, whether solipsism is true, or anything in between--whatever is the case. It doesn't matter. In all of those cases, the answer is the same. You're assessing propositions with facts of the world as you experience them.

[Of course, for the question posed in this thread, we don't have to bother too much with (at least ontological) idealism, because an (ontological) idealist is going to think that the answer to the topic question is obviously "Yes," since a fortiori everything is mind-dependent in their view]

And for it not mattering, it would be a crappy functional analysis of truth if it were to only work on an assumption that physicalism is true. To be a worthwhile analysis of truth it needs to work for not only whatever general ontological assumptions someone makes, but whatever truth relation they employ--hence why it's not just a correspondence theory. It works just as well with the other truth theories. That's not to say that it's simply a reporting of how people think about truth, their beliefs about it, etc. It's a functional analysis of what they're doing in their truth (talk) behavior.

By the way, the relation isn't mysterious to you because you're thinking that all of the properties have to match or something to be a relation, are you? That is, you're not thinking something like "There can't be a relation between something with property p and something without property p. In order for there to be a relation, both things have to have the same properties", are you?

f you want to merely claim that concepts and by extension truth are really physical — John

For the umpteenth time, I only mentioned that I believe that concepts, truth, etc. are physical because you brought up that issue and I didn't want to ignore things that you'd said in my response to you. I definitely believe that concepts, truth--EVERYTHING--is physical, and I'm a direct realist and yada yada yada. None of that has anything to do with my truth analysis however.

I doubt anyone will take you seriously. — John

You're obviously under a mistaken impression of my assessment of fellow posters who might not "take me seriously."

For example, maybe you're under a mistaken impression that I consider you a qualified judge of anything?

Fine, have it your own way as always, but I won't bother to respond to a giant load of evasive, non-committal bullshit. What a joke! :-}

We agree on one thing:

:-}

Is Truth Mind-Dependent?

I'm hardly the first or the last to do it, but I think we have to question the question. If we take the question seriously, it seems to throw us into the ancient mud of stating our linguistic preferences as if we were doing something like science. I'm just one voice, of course, but I'd say that pursuing this question in all of its ambiguity and possible uselessness is a waste of time better spent on more relevant issues. I don't want to come off here as anti-philosophical. Philosophy is at times the best genre. At other times it looks like the place where thinking goes to die alone, growling along the way of course at the "idiots" who refuse to agree with trivial preferences.