I am talking about the process that produces snowflakes. How can it be singular if it is the same everywhere? How can "a bunch of dust particles floating around in the right atmospheric conditions" occur in more than one place and at more than one time, if this situation is always just a collection of singulars? What enables us to predict the formation of snowflakes before it happens?

Note that a strict physicalism of this kind is really saying that all we know in the end is how to make measurements that seem to work (they are reliable, they serve demonstable purpose). So it is an epistemic point, not an ontic claim. — apokrisis

No, that's instrumentalism, which is an epistemic attitude. Strict physicalism says that the only real substance is matter, which is indeed an ontological claim (and monistic, as noted; however, since Einstein's discovery of the equivalence of matter-energy, physicalists are now obliged to use the term 'matter-energy' which is rather less crisp than they would have liked.)

Weather forecasting; however nobody can predict the exact configuration of a particular snowflake.

I am talking about the process that produces snowflakes. How can it be singular if it is the same everywhere? How can "a bunch of dust particles floating around in the right atmospheric conditions" occur in more than one place and at more than one time, if this situation is always just a collection of singulars? What enables us to predict the formation of snowflakes before it happens?

I don't quite understand the perplexity here: the Earth has certain zones of climate, formed over the course of millions (billions?) of years of geogenesis, itself subject to differential processes of production, etc etc; Moreover, snowflakes are indeed all individual, their shapes differing depending on the trajectory they take as they fall through the air such that one can say that "the very structure of a snowflake ... embodies the conditions under which it was created" (Juarrero, 1999). It's singularity all the way 'up' - and all the way down. There is nothing not subject to history, to process, to becoming.

If we can predict - to some extent - the formation of snowflakes, it's because of certain climactic regularities, stabilized over time through the roughly self-regulating ecosphere that is the planet. Singularity doesn't entail pure randomness - rather, it entails that any regularities that do occur are themselves subject to processes by which they come into being. Even singularity is the product of a process. At no point do you 'bottom out' into the abstractions that are 'Forms'. The hard thought to think here is that generality - in this case climactic regularities - are themselves singularities (hard because we're we're cognitively - evolutonarily - wired to think of generality in terms of genericity*).

*Which is why I think the vocabulary of the general and the particular has a tendency to obscure more than it does clarify, bound up in a set of lexical associations which it is better to avoid. Better, I think, to speak in terms of ecologies, environments and contexts, all of which impart a flavour of the singular over and against the abstraction of the general.

Nonphysicalists are those people who reject the doctrine that everything is "physical", whatever that entails precisely. Dualists are not physicalists, nor are idealists or anyone else like that. — darthbarracuda

But on your view physicalists don't believe that everything is physical. They only believe that concrete particulars are physical. So there doesn't seem to be a difference between physicalists and nonphysicalists.

I can't say I understand what motivation you could have to hold such an extreme reductive view. — darthbarracuda

Well, because it's what the world is really like. My views are dictated by facts. I don't think things like, "Do I want an extreme reductivist view?" I don't judge whether I like the facts or not, or whether I'd rather they were something else. I see my responsibility as reporting the facts as they are.

If properties are physical particulars, then what does is mean that the property of being a physical particular is a physical particular? This seems circular. — darthbarracuda

If properties are physical particulars, then the property of being a physical particular (supposing there is such a thing) is a physical particular. That's not circular, it's obvious, because it's tautologous. The only reason something would seem off about that to you is that you are having difficulty seeing properties as physical particulars--you see them as universals a la real abstracts instead. So you'd tend to read "property" as "universal (in the sense of a real abstract)" rather than "physical particular."

At that, I wouldn't say that "being a physical particular" is a property in the first place. Properties are qualities of things such as redness, brittleness, heat-resistance, etc. "Being a physical particular" isn't a quality of anything. In other words, properties are characteristics that are exhibited (so that they produce qualia when perceived, for example, though exhibited qualities do not have to be directly perceptible by us--that's about our perceptual limitations) or characteristics with respect to how matter interacts with other matter. "Being a physical particular" isn't something that's exhibited or an interaction characteristic. It's not a property. That properties are only physical particulars is simply due to the fact that there are only physical particulars and there are no universals (Facts being states of affairs, that is, what happens to be the case re matter/relations of matter/processes (dynamic relations) of matter.)

Yes, but are these different arrangements of matter themselves made of matter? — darthbarracuda

Yes of course. Relations and processes are of matter. It's simply how matter is situated with respect to other matter and how it moves/changes with respect to other matter. That's what form is, too--matter and its relations, processes (dynamic relations) and properties.

The hard thought to think here is that generality - in this case climactic regularities - are themselves singularities ... — StreetlightX

It is hard for me to think this because it is contradictory, at least as I currently understand the two terms. That which is general - including all processes and regularities - cannot be singular, and vice-versa. If everything is truly singular, then nothing is truly general.

I think the issue is that we say that the manner in which the snow was formed here is the same manner in which the snow was formed there. So there's something that two particular singulars have in common; this thing in common not itself being a particular singular.

Else when snow forms in two different places we have three particular singulars; the snow forming here, the snow forming there, and the shared manner in which they form.

What he's getting at there, though, is that universals are singularities. The story of universals is supposed to be that they're singular entities, however it is that they obtain exactly, that are then, somehow, through whatever mysterious process, wholly instantiated in concrete particulars.

the shared manner in which they form. — Michael

The shared manner in which they form is just a way of saying that the particulars in question resemble each other in some way(s) (resemblance simply being a comparative measure of matter/structure/relations)

That is not my current understanding, although I am trying to do some reading up on this whole topic. Can you (or anyone else) suggest a good resource (preferably online) that clearly defines and distinguishes all of the relevant metaphysical terminology - universal, general, singular, particular, individual, etc.?

Why does it sound like philosophers are saying that certain ideas of objects and forms actually have an existence outside of the mind? That just sounds silly, yet I know I am missing something here...

Just to confirm, physicalism and universals are non-compatible right?

What is *real* then? Do there exist things that are not just arbitrarily chosen sets or instances of patterns that the mind recognize/identify? A stone is real? There is no stone: your mind is just arbitrarily giving a unique identity to a set of atoms. You are real? There is just an apparent sequence of perceptions and choices and an arbitrary grouping of them as it was a unique being.

It's been a while since I read it, but I remember D.M. Armstrong's Universals: An Opinionated Introduction being good. You can read parts of it for free on Google books. Do not pay a lot for it if you buy it--it's a very short book.

In a nutshell, the difference between nominalism and realism on universals is this:

Nominalists claim that properties are non-identical, particular qualities of particular objects, like this:



Realists on universals claim that properties are identical instantiations of a separately existing universal like this:



It's important to note that realists on universals are saying that the instantiations are identical, that is "one and the same," in a complete sense, of the universal at hand. Literally, they're not two separate things, but the same thing somehow multiply instantiated. Of course, the drawing doesn't reflect this exactly--but who knows how we'd even draw that? It's a mystery how the heck it's supposed to not only work, but make sense in the first place.

Realists on universals can't say that all there is to universals is what's going on in the first picture, because that's nominalism. They could say that what's going on is what's depicted in the first picture, only the properties are identical rather than just similar, but then we've got a separate, unified thing that's not identical to the objects, which are two different things. So you wind up with the second picture.

The intuitive objection a lot of folks have with nominalism is that the properties in Particular Object I and Particular Object II are not actually identical. But the problem with the realism on universals view is obviously that it makes no sense ontologically. Realism on universals is simply a reification of concepts and the normal way that language works.

Thanks, but it looks like Armstrong never uses the term "singular," and only mentions "general" and "individual" a handful of times. I am still wondering exactly what you meant when you claimed that "universals are singularities," because again, my understanding is that a universal/general cannot be a singular/particular/individual (and vice-versa). I would also like to get a better handle on what (if anything) differentiates universal vs. general and singular vs. particular vs. individual.

In that second picture, the universal is the big circle above the other two. That's one thing, not multiple things. Hence a "singularity"

As far as I can tell, you are just restating your nominalist position, which is not helpful. My understanding is that a realist would say that a universal is not a "thing" at all, and certainly not a singularity or a concrete particular. I am looking for a neutral explanation of the terminology.

The diagrams are neutral. That's what realists on universals are claiming. They say that there are universals. The circle above the particulars is the universal that there is for A-ness. By drawing that circle, I'm not saying that it's a "thing" or that it "exists." I'm not making any sort of commitment to a particular term like that (where people might take those terms to have technical ontological implications). Whatever it is, a realist on universals says that there IS a universal of A-ness (whatever property the A might be standing for). And there's only one universal of A-ness, where the whole point of universals, from the realist perspective, is that that ONE thing is instantiated in multiple particulars.

Just think about it logically. A realist on universals isn't going to say that there are not universals, right? They're going to say that there are universals (whatever it is that they believe universals are, exactly). And why would they say that there are multiple universals of the same property? Again, they can't say that each of the multiples is instantiated uniquely in a particular, because that's nominalism.

So far, I have yet to find a realist who affirms (in so many words) that universals are singularities; just William of Ockham, the arch-nominalist. I suspect that a realist would object to any diagram that does not clearly distinguish a universal from a particular as two distinct kinds of entities. That is the point, really - universals have a different mode of being from particulars. It still seems to me that someone who recognizes only one mode of being - concrete existence - is a nominalist by default.

Again, I also need some clarification on universal vs. general and singular vs. particular vs. individual. Any thoughts on that?

So far, I have yet to find a realist who affirms (in so many words) that universals are singularities; just William of Ockham, the arch-nominalist. I suspect that a realist would object to any diagram that does not clearly distinguish a universal from a particular as two distinct kinds of entities. That is the point, really - universals have a different mode of being from particulars. It still seems to me that someone who recognizes only one mode of being - concrete existence - is a nominalist by default. — aletheist

Again, I wasn't saying anything about "kinds of entities." I was just illustrating the logical relationships. I don't know how we'd illustrate different "kinds of entities" (in this sense) anyway.

Anyway, why do you think that a realist on universals would say that there is more than one universal of a specific property? Would they be saying that the multiple universals of that specific property are different from each other somehow?

Again, I wasn't saying anything about "kinds of entities." — Terrapin Station

I realize that, but I also know that you believe that there is only one kind of real entity. The whole debate is over whether there is at least one other kind of real entity.

Anyway, why do you think that a realist on universals would say that there is more than one universal of a specific property? — Terrapin Station

The problem I am having is not with saying that there is one universal of a specific property, it is with saying that a universal is a singularity (or a singular). My sense is that the latter term has a very specific technical meaning in these kinds of discussions, such that a universal cannot be a singular(ity), any more than it can be a particular or an individual. However, as I keep saying, the distinctions among singular(ity), particular, and individual are fuzzy to me, as well as those between universal and general.

Okay, but forget about those terms for a minute and whether they have technical definitions.

The only logical options, at least if we're realists on universals, is that there is one universal per property or that there are more than one universal per property, right?

Better, I think, to speak in terms of ecologies, environments and contexts, all of which impart a flavour of the singular over and against the abstraction of the general. — StreetlightX

No. This just repeats the metaphysical mistake of encountering a dichotomy and trying to turn it into a monism where one pole of being is primary or foundational, the other somehow illusory or emergent.

So sure, existence might be singular in the sense that substantial being is always the hylomorphic outcome of some developmental history. But every snowflake is still the unique outcome of a common process. The geomorphic world has a general habit of producing particular snowflakes. So the general part of the story is as fundamental as the particularity.

I would agree that the usual conception of Universals is faulty because it does express the monistic fallacy. It wants to treat the general as the foundation of being - as in Plato's ideas. But it is just as much a mistake to turn around and argue some variety of nominalism.

The only logical options, at least if we're realists on universals, is that there is one universal per property or that there are more than one universal per property, right? — Terrapin Station

Okay, but I have not been able to find anyone else who puts it that way.

The intuitive objection a lot of folks have with nominalism is that the properties in Particular Object I and Particular Object II are not actually identical. But the problem with the realism on universals view is obviously that it makes no sense ontologically. Realism on universals is simply a reification of concepts and the normal way that language works. — Terrapin Station

I thnk the objection to nominalism is much deeper than that. This is because the similarities, likenesses and common attributes shared by like things, are more than arbitrary, but are real, and are not simply real in the mind or in language.

Aquinas' says of universals that they enable the intellect, by grasping one thing, to grasp many things. And surely if you dispute that principle, then how do you make any kind of general argument for or against universals, or for or against nominalism? I mean, every form of generalisation and abstraction relies on such a principle. If what you say is true only of a particular matter, and only meaningful for the particular individual who states it, then (as Lloyd Gerson says above), thinking would be impossible, as thinking is an inherently 'universalising' process. It relies on the ability of the intellect to abstract and recognise likenesses.

As to whether 'properties of different objects are identical' - it is the mind's ability to recognise likeness and unlikeness that is the very basis of rationality in the first place. If every single instance of a particular was unique, then how would cognition even be possible? Experience would be chaotic.

That is why I said your statement 'Our mathematical thinking certain is a handy tool, but that doesn't imply that it's something other than thinking' means nothing. I wasn't trolling. Such a statement doesn't allow for the reality that mathematical reasoning discloses previously unknown facts (which is abundantly obvious from the history of science since Galileo). Maths is predictive with respect to nature in such a way that it can't simply be 'about itself' or 'internal to the act of thinking'. So the very thing you're dismissing, is the only thing by virtue of which you're able to argue your case, such as it is. (Same criticism applies to Armstrong, who happened to be the Professor of the department where I was an undergrad.)

It is hard for me to think this because it is contradictory, at least as I currently understand the two terms. That which is general - including all processes and regularities - cannot be singular, and vice-versa. If everything is truly singular, then nothing is truly general. — aletheist

Not at all - generality is opposed to particularity, and not singularity; the particular is what is replaceable, interchangeable, amenable to generalization, while the singular is not. Singularity (and it's natural 'pairing', universality, which is in turn not generality) cuts across the general-particular dichotomy, such that a general regime may itself be particular. It's all a bit abstract when put this way, but it's quite pedestrian when, if your generality is 'climate', it's possible to recognize a singular, Earthly climate, which nonetheless remains general for the particular weather patterns that form in it (hence the very distinction between climate and weather - weather may change from day to day, climate remains constant).

I think the issue is that we say that the manner in which the snow was formed here is the same manner in which the snow was formed there. So there's something that two particular singulars have in common; this thing in common not itself being a particular singular.

Else when snow forms in two different places we have three particular singulars; the snow forming here, the snow forming there, and the shared manner in which they form. — Michael

But this is just a 'issue' of granularity, and how one pitches one's analysis: if your analysis is fine grained enough, literally every single snowflake - even in the 'same' weather system - is unique (hence the phrase 'unique snowflake'!). On the other hand if you loosen your analytic criteria, it becomes possible to generalize over a set of singularities by disregarding information and treating them as particulars. Generality and particularity are, in this sense, properly epistemic categories; they help us think.

And further, one has to recall (again) that singularity does not mean 'absolutely random/unique'. It simply mens that all singulars are subject to it's own, singular process of becoming which is generalizable only at the price of 'losing' information about that particular individual.

Perhaps part of the problem here is (human) scale: if you scale out and treat the Earth as a singular system with consistent weather patterns across it's various climate zones - if you take an entire planet as your 'base' unit of analysis, 'here' and 'there' don't really begin to mean all that much at all.

No. This just repeats the metaphysical mistake of encountering a dichotomy and trying to turn it into a monism where one pole of being is primary or foundational, the other somehow illusory or emergent.

So sure, existence might be singular in the sense that substantial being is always the hylomorphic outcome of some developmental history. But every snowflake is still the unique outcome of a common process. The geomorphic world has a general habit of producing particular snowflakes. So the general part of the story is as fundamental as the particularity.

I would agree that the usual conception of Universals is faulty because it does express the monistic fallacy. It wants to treat the general as the foundation of being - as in Plato's ideas. But it is just as much a mistake to turn around and argue some variety of nominalism. — apokrisis

I'm not auguring for nominalism, and the whole appeal to process is to undermine, as I think you recognise, the rather stale debate over which 'side' to take between the nominal and the universal - both of which ignore the issue of ontogenesis. On the other hand, to give up the vocabulary of the general and the particular in favour of an ecology is precisely to short-circuit both 'poles' without, for all that, 'siding' with one or the other, as your charge holds. An ecology, environment, or even cosmos is precisely - a singular generality - a short-circuit between the poles that is precisely designed to avoid collapsing one into the other. That said, I realize that you're irrevocably wedded to your vocabulary, which in the end' works' much in the same fashion, but I'd rather avoid it all the same. It remains too musty for my liking, even when dusted off and treated anew (even 'hylomorphism' leaves a bad taste in the mouth...). But these are minor quibbles.

Okay, but I have not been able to find anyone else who puts it that way. — aletheist

Well, folks will talk about, say, the universal "spherical" (or "sphericalness") for example, right?

They don't talk about the unversals (plural) "spherical" (or "sphericalness").

There's one universal for "spherical." And the whole gist of universals is then that particular substances that are spheres exihibit the universal "spherical."

I thnk the objection to nominalism is much deeper than that. This is because the similarities, likenesses and common attributes shared by like things, are more than arbitrary, but are real, and are not simply real in the mind or in language. — Wayfarer

I'm just going to cover one thing at a time with you, because otherwise it will be ignored (because for whatever reason, that's how you interact with me)

Nominalists are not denying the reality of similarities or resemblances. They're denying the reality of multiple things having an identical (in the A=A sense) property.

... generality is opposed to particularity, and not singularity ... Singularity (and it's natural 'pairing', universality, which is in turn not generality) cuts across the general-particular dichotomy, such that a general regime may itself be particular. — StreetlightX

See, I understand universal and general on the one hand as being opposed to particular, singular, and individual on the other. That is why I keep asking for clarification of the terminology. Nothing personal, but I cannot just take your word for it; I need some references.

Nominalists are not denying the reality of similarities or resemblances. They're denying the reality of multiple things having an identical (in the A=A sense) property. — Terrapin Station

But they can't deny the 'law of identity'. Without it you wouldn't even be able to write that sentence. So surely they're saying that identity is in the mind but not in the world. The basis of identity is comparison, surely.

otherwise it will be ignored (because for whatever reason, that's how you interact with me) — Terrapin Station

Because a lot of what you write is predicated on the notion that meaning is subjective, which means that there is no way to respond to what you write, as there is no necessary connection between what you mean, and what others understand by it.

There's one universal for "spherical." And the whole gist of universals is then that particular substances that are spheres exihibit the universal "spherical." — Terrapin Station

I still hesitate at this description, because I am contemplating the alternative that a universal (or a general) is not one single "item" exhibited by multiple particular things, but rather a continuum. In Peirce's words, "Thus, the question of nominalism and realism has taken this shape: Are any continua real?"

An ecology, environment, or even cosmos is precisely - a singular generality - a short-circuit between the poles that is precisely designed to avoid collapsing one into the other. — StreetlightX

But my point is that this is to speak of the substantial actuality - following Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphic form and other such tradititional triadic resolutions of the issue.

So everything that exists is the outcome of a history of process. Yes, that is the (singular) actuality. But then that still leaves the question of how best to deal with the two aspects that are required to produce such a history. And you did seem to be collapsing them in talking about this confusing thing of a "singular generality". Your choice of jargon seems unhelpful here.

That said, I realize that you're irrevocably wedded to your vocabulary, which in the end' works' much in the same fashion, but I'd rather avoid it all the same. — StreetlightX

I'm not wedded to one particular jargon. I'm more interested in the multiple ways people have tried with varying degrees of success to get at the core metaphysical issue here.

I get what you mean when you say "singular generality". Well, I am understanding that as talk of the substantial actuality that arises as some particular history of a general developmental process. But it doesn't seem like good jargon as I don't think the singularity of some generality is the important thought here.

Instead, I prefer the constraints based approach that physics normally takes, and even better, the pansemiotic approach of infodynamics. This says that the generality is a symmetry - some state of constraint that imposes a symmetry condition on material possibility. And then particularity arises via spontaneous symmetry breaking. A history of material accidents develops via the locking in of "random" local acts.

So with a snow flake, the general symmetry in question is the charged configuration of a water molecule. The molecule satisfies its own internal tensions by having the hydrogen atoms forming a 104 degree angle. Then when the molecules are collectively cold enough to crystalise, they can minimise their energy by forming hexagonal patterns - the sixfold symmetry that accounts for snowflake branching growth patterns.

(Note that the individual molecules have to bend wider to 106 degrees, plus twist a bit, to fit the imposed "universal" geometry of a hexagon. So they deform in response to this new collective constraint in a way that increases their internal energy as part of the trade-off to achieve a collective minimisation of the crystal's energy.)

So anyway, the transition from water to ice involves a breaking of rotational symmetry. As water, H2O can spin freely and be "at any angle" in regard to its neighbours. (In fact this again is an idealisation as water has many of its unique properties because it is always fleetingly ordered in its orientation.) But anyway, :) , becoming constrained as a crystal is a breaking of symmetry. It reduces the orientation possibilities to some global hexagon form.

And this then becomes the new (more particular or singular?) symmetry to be broken - by accident. Because by now, nature doesn't care about how exactly a snowflake grows. The attachment of new molecules floating about in the air is a random and unconstrained process. It is different from a body of water freezing (and producing compact hexagonal crystal forms). The process has an extra degree of freedom in the way the snowflake grows.

The point is thus that the real world, in all its substantial actuality, seems like a really messy place. It is hard to pick apart the general and the particular, the symmetries and the symmetry-breakings, the constraints and the degrees of freedom (all ways of talking about the same thing) when dealing with any generative process or developmental habit. Remember, there is nothing much simpler than ice as a substance.

Yet once we get used to thinking hierarchically about these things - that is, used to a triadic logic - then we can see how every level of actuality is indeed a product of the interaction between the general and the particular. Complex structure grows in ways which are locally accidental and yet globally constrained.

It remains too musty for my liking, even when dusted off and treated anew (even 'hylomorphism' leaves a bad taste in the mouth...). — StreetlightX

Yeah, well, talking about musty definitions....

For Aristotle, the distinction between singular and universal is a fundamental metaphysical one, and not merely grammatical.

A singular term for Aristotle is primary substance, which can only be predicated of itself: (this) "Callias" or (this) "Socrates" are not predicable of any other thing...He contrasts universal (katholou)[4] secondary substance, genera, with primary substance, particular (kath' hekaston)[4][5] specimens.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Term_logic#Singular_terms

So the singularity is to do with the most highly individuated or constrained state of affairs. And universality is the ability to then point backwards to a developmental history of constraints - the more generic "properties", or states of broken symmetry, like the fact that Socrates is a substance of the genera "Homo sapiens". And humans are in turn a substantial state of being qua the genera of "living things". Etc, etc, all the way back to the Big Bang or laws of thermodynamics. :)

So the central thought is that the singular is the most constrained state of affairs. But then the bit that I argue Aristotle misses (and Peirce gets) is that a constraint is a state of informational symmetry - a modelling or sign relation. It is basically nature saying this much is what I've locked down for sure. All the rest is a matter of indifference. Further symmetry breaking has no effect on what is the case. It becomes differences (or individuation) that don't make a difference.

Is Socrates still Socrates - the substantial actuality, the singular generality - when he trims his beard or perhaps loses his leg in an industrial accident? There is no doubt Socrates is being further individuated by these accidents of history. And yet also no doubt that then don't matter. As events, they are failing to rewrite the informational script that is "Socrates".

Though eventually, enough accidents can overwhelm the script. Real change is possible because states of constraint, conditions of symmetry, are themselves dynamical beings subject to development. So - as with avalanches - things can grow and seem stable, dispersing their forces in even manner, until the tiniest accident, one snowflake landing on the right spot, and it all tumbles down the hill.

This is how physics now understands reality - the new jargon of criticality and dissipative structure. And beyond that, the pansemiotic models of infodynamics which recognises the symbolic aspect to physical existence.

So the thread running through all this - from ancient Greece to modern science - is the need to think of reality in an irreducibly complex and triadic fashion. You need something like the general and the particular, the process and the event, the symmetry and the symmetry-breaking, as the two sides of the dichotomy. And then it is how they recursively interact which produces the third thing of the substantial actuality - the reality that most people take to be the concrete, nominalist, world of ordinary experience.