Our mathematical thinking certain is a handy tool, but that doesn't imply that it's something other than thinking. — Terrapin Station

This means nothing.

no matter how exotic things are, they nevertheless have properties that make them what they are. — darthbarracuda

You're re-stating the law of identity.

To elaborate the point I'm making - universal characteristics or attributes are those by virtue of which the mind, in grasping one thing, can grasp many separate things. Universals are an aspect of what has been called 'the formal domain', that is, the domain of laws, rules, conventions, logic, and so forth. There's no point in asking where this domain is, as it is not located in space and time; rather it is inherent in both the structure of reality and the nature of thought itself. In that sense, it precedes and informs what exists, but does not itself exist. Because of the 'habit of extroversion' that has been bred into us by the culture in which we live, such ideas are incomprehensible to most of us; more fool us, I say.

This means nothing. — Wayfarer

LOL

It's not physicalism if it posits there there are things in the world that aren't physical (whatever a particular species of physicalism considers "physical" to denote, exactly). — Terrapin Station

If that is what physicalism entails then I doubt anyone would actually want to call themselves a physicalist.

So you've been thinking that "physicalism" simply amounts to people who believe that some, but not all, of "what there is" is physical? Contra people who think that nothing is physical, maybe?

So you've been thinking that "physicalism" simply amounts to people who believe that some, but not all, of "what there is" is physical? Contra people who think that nothing is physical, maybe? — Terrapin Station

I consider physicalism to be the doctrine that whatever exists "on the stage" so to speak is "physical", whatever that entails. "Physical" itself cannot be "physical" without being empty of meaning. It has to mean something, and it can only mean something if there are alternatives.

'Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical. ' ~ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

'In philosophy, physicalism is the ontological thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical,[1] or that everything supervenes on the physical.[2] Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality as opposed to a "two-substance" (dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) view.' ~ Wikipedia

'Physicalism (also known as Materialistic Monism - see the sections on Materialism and Monism) is the philosophical position that everything which exists is no more extensive than its physical properties, and that the only existing substance is physical.' - Basics of Philosophy

whatever exists "on the stage" so to speak — darthbarracuda

I'm not really familiar with that phrase, so I don't have an intuitive grasp for what it includes versus excludes.

"Physical" itself — darthbarracuda

What are you referring to there--the word? The concept (or meaning as you suggest in the next sentence)? Are you positing a necessary, real universal?

I'm not really familiar with that phrase, so I don't have an intuitive grasp for what it includes versus excludes. — Terrapin Station

Concrete particular objects, the subjects of predicate statements. If we predicate the mind as physicalists, then the mind is a physical object. There are no concrete subjects that are not-physical.

What are you referring to there--the word? The concept (or meaning as you suggest in the next sentence)? Are you positing a necessary, real universal? — Terrapin Station

Yes, I am positing the necessary existence of a property, physicality, for the doctrine of physicalism. If everything is physical, then it needs to be explained what makes everything physical. Doing so, in my view, can only be accomplished by positing the existence of some"thing" that is not a concrete, physical object but nevertheless is necessary for concrete objects to even exist.

Concrete particular objects, the subjects of predicate statements. If we predicate the mind as physicalists, then the mind is a physical object. There are no concrete subjects that are not-physical. — darthbarracuda

In your view, what's the difference for nonphysicalists, then?

Yes, I am positing the necessary existence of a property, physicality, for the doctrine of physicalism. — darthbarracuda

I'm a physicalist who doesn't at all deny that there are properties. It's just that properties are physical particulars. Re this: "It's not physicalism if it posits there there are things in the world that aren't physical (whatever a particular species of physicalism considers 'physical' to denote, exactly)," to which you responded, "If that is what physicalism entails then I doubt anyone would actually want to call themselves a physicalist," I call myself a physicalist in the sense that you're saying no one would want to call themselves.

If everything is physical, then it needs to be explained what makes everything physical. — darthbarracuda

On my account, it simply refers to the fact that what there is is exhausted by matter, relations of matter and processes of matter.

I'm not saying that any of that is some "thing" that is not a concrete, physical object but nevertheless is necessary for concrete objects to even exist.

At any rate, I didn't mean to sidetrack this to a discussion of "what is physicalism" or a discussion of my general views as a physicalist. I was just trying to make sense of your view that realism on universals isn't incompatible with physicalism. After the exchanges we have on that, I'd say that you have a quite unconventional view of what physicalism is.

In your view, what's the difference for nonphysicalists, then? — Terrapin Station

Nonphysicalists are those people who reject the doctrine that everything is "physical", whatever that entails precisely. Dualists are not physicalists, nor are idealists or anyone else like that.

I'm a physicalists who doesn't at all deny that there are properties. It's just that properties are physical particulars. Re this: "It's not physicalism if it posits there there are things in the world that aren't physical (whatever a particular species of physicalism considers 'physical' to denote, exactly)," to which you responded, "If that is what physicalism entails then I doubt anyone would actually want to call themselves a physicalist," I call myself a physicalist in the sense that you're saying no one would want to call themselves. — Terrapin Station

I can't say I understand what motivation you could have to hold such an extreme reductive view.

If properties are physical particulars, then what does is mean that the property of being a physical particular is a physical particular? This seems circular.

On my account, it simply refers to the fact that what there is is exhausted by matter, relations of matter and processes of matter. — Terrapin Station

Yes, but are these different arrangements of matter themselves made of matter? That's what is at issue here. Matter can only be part of the explanation, there has to be a Form as well. Neither can exist without the other.

Matter can only be part of the explanation, there has to be a Form as well. Neither can exist without the other. — darthbarracuda

This is precisely what a (conventional) physicalist denies. You are imposing either Platonism or Aristotelian hylomorphism, and then trying to shoehorn physicalism into it. But a physicalist maintains that matter is the entire explanation, and that there are no (non-material) forms; the shoe does not fit.

This is simply not true.

A physicalist maintains that matter/energy as well as time and space are real.

Sorry, I meant matter in the broad modern sense that includes energy and space-time. The point is that the physicalist denies the reality of non-material forms.

Sorry, I meant matter in the broad modern sense that includes energy and space-time. The point is that the physicalist denies the reality of non-material forms. — aletheist

But this is exactly what I am disputing, how can physicalism have a coherent definition of what "physical" entails or what "mass" or "energy" entail without appealing to something other than the physical, the massive, or the energetic?

As I understand it, a physicalist would say that those terms denote concepts, which are nothing more than (physical) brain states.

But then we're back at square one, still. If they are nothing but concepts, then when does it end? What concept is actually referring to something that exists?

Say the physicalist argues that whatever is physical is whatever has mass or energy or what have you. Then we simply have to ask, well, what is mass, what is energy? What could mass and energy be other than a property something has, or a kind of "stuff" that everything has? And how is this not a universal?

I am not a physicalist, so I can only continue to speculate. My guess is that mass-energy is not considered a (universal) property in the same way that existence is not considered a predicate.

I am not a physicalist, so I can only continue to speculate. My guess is that mass-energy is not considered a (universal) property in the same way that existence is not considered a predicate. — aletheist

But we use mass and energy as predicates with power. Things have different amounts of mass, different amounts of energy. We can measure how much mass or energy things have.

We can measure how much mass or energy things have. — darthbarracuda

I gather that those are considered particular properties that each individual thing has, not universal properties that multiple things have.

Units of measurements are particulars?

But then we're back at square one, still. If they are nothing but concepts, then when does it end? What concept is actually referring to something that exists? — darthbarracuda

Physics is expressed via equations that quantify mass, energy, momentum and so on. Physicalism proper says that the things that are described in those terms are the only real things, matter-energy ( or matter-energy-space-time) being the only reality. That is why physicalism is called 'monistic'.

Concepts, in this view, are configurations of neural matter in the physical brain that is itself the consequence of the physical processes of evolution.

Then we simply have to ask, well, what is mass, what is energy? — darthbarracuda

I think a physicalist would be quite entitled to argue that both mass and energy are irreducible, i.e. cannot be explained in other terms; analogous to the 'uncreated substance' of theism.

.Are the physical constants examples of universals or particulars?

,

As I understand it, everything is a particular to a physicalist, because the only mode of being is actual existence.

I don't know about physicalism, but Gilles Deleuze once remarked that the first principle of any empiricism ought to be that universals do not explain, but must themselves be explained. Whatever one's stance here, I think this at least situates the debate at the right level: its not a question of whether or not universals exist, so much as assigning to them their proper place: explanandum or explanans? After all, I think its pretty clear one can find 'universals' everywhere if one looks hard - or creatively - enough. So not existence, but function ought to be the wheel upon which the debate turns.

... universals do not explain, but must themselves be explained. — StreetlightX

Would you mind unpacking this a bit more? What does it mean for universals to explain? What does it mean for universals to be explained? On what basis would we ascertain which of these is the more appropriate pursuit? Surprising facts are what call for explanations, so we either hypothesize universals to explain certain surprising facts, or we need another hypothesis to explain the surprising fact of universals. Which do you advocate, and why?

Are the physical constants examples of universals or particulars? — m-theory

They are universal particulars in that they quantify some quality absolutely everywhere. :)

So not existence, but function ought to be the wheel upon which the debate turns. — StreetlightX

Yep. In a process philosophy view, both particulars and universals would be the product of mutual emergence. So it is the functional or telenomic level view that will get at it best. It is not about physical existence - either of abstracta, or concreta - but about the self-organised development of a stably persisent process.

. But a physicalist maintains that matter is the entire explanation, and that there are no (non-material) forms; — aletheist

Physicalism is generally understood as a naturalism that excludes supernatural or transcendent causes. So it is against treating the mental aspect of reality as further kind of causal substance, as well as divine causes.

But physicalism can still pose its own ontic duality in terms of matter and sign - the semiotic approach. And this is essential for understanding life and mind as natural phenomena. More controversially - as pan-semiosis - it can even be applied to regular physics and cosmology.

So physicalism can indeed say there is "more" than just material cause. And that is important to discussions of the reality of universals like "cat", "cup", or even the colour "red".

Physicalism proper says that the things that are described in those terms are the only real things, matter-energy ( or matter-energy-space-time) being the only reality. That is why physicalism is called 'monistic'. — Wayfarer

Note that a strict physicalism of this kind is really saying that all we know in the end is how to make measurements that seem to work (they are reliable, they serve demonstable purpose). So it is an epistemic point, not an ontic claim.

Words like energy, matter, time and space become signs of qualities that we consider universal. We know how to make those kinds of basic acts of measurement "whatever the physical situation". But in the end, we arrive at concepts so universal that they themselves lack visualisable properties. It is like trying to describe red if red were the only colour that everything is.

So in the end, we wind up talking about the ability to measure some naked difference. Energy density or spacetime is everywhere we look. And we know that there is "something" only in the sense we can scale its variation. With the three Planck constants in particular - c, G and h - we are down to primal measurements of a difference. What the difference is in, becomes hard to say, even if we give it names like the speed of light, the strength of gravity, or the quantum action.

Probably one of the best ways to think about it is in terms of morphogenesis (the genesis of form). Does a soap bubble look like a soap bubble because it instantiates a universal bubble Form? Or is does the soap bubble come about because of certain processes which individuate it accordingly? Turns outs, the latter is the case - soap bubbles look as they do because they tend toward minimizing surface tension, which is how they acquire their (roughly) spherical form (spheres are the best shape to be in to minimize ST). For something more complex like a snowflake, they all tend toward forming six-sided stars because of the particular way in which hydrogen bonds form as a particle falls through the air (which they do because gravity takes hold once the freezing process takes hold, which makes the particle heavier and heavier).

In these cases, universality does not explain why the soap bubble or the snowflake looks like it does: rather one must explain the universality of both in terms of the (singular) processes which give rise to them.

In these cases, universality does not explain why the soap bubble or the snowflake looks like it does: rather one must explain the universality of both in terms of the (singular) processes which give rise to them. — StreetlightX

But what explains the surprising fact that those (supposedly singular) processes are the same for all soap bubbles and snowflakes?

What do you mean? Snowflakes dont preexist the processes by which they come into being - if there happen to be a bunch of dust particles floating around in the right atmospheric conditions, snowflakes will be the result. What's surprising here?

That is not so.

The speed of light is universal, it applies to any particular photon.