The idea is more that if you want to claim that there is a context-independent (per this specific context) truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x," then you should specify what the truthmaker is. — Terrapin Station

I'd hazard that the truthmaker is no different in this context than any other context for which truthmaker is applicable -- it's just the facts.

Facts are never context independent. But I don't think context-independence is necessary for truth.

I'd hazard that the truthmaker is no different in this context than any other context for which truthmaker is applicable -- it's just the facts. — Moliere

Haha--yeah, but what facts. Be a little more specific. (Sarcastic understatement again.)

Again, this has nothing to do with general context-independence. It has to do with a very specific context-independence.

No sarcasm on my part. The point is too rarified for me to be able to lodge sarcasm very effectively -- it's kind of one of those things where it's so simple that you already sound dumb for even talking about it, so sarcasm isn't going to exactly work.

In this case, where I say "tomato" means X, we're talking about truth and meaning in a somewhat general way, and I'm trying to make use of an example to give something more concrete to talk about. So, to give an "in the flesh" example:

https://www.planetnatural.com/tomato-gardening-guru/

There is a language which we share, English, and within that language there is a sign "tomato" which means X. The author of that page knows English just as I know English, and they know the sign "tomato" just as I know the sign "tomato". The fact of the matter, in the flesh, is that the author is using the sign "tomato". (interesting to note that the usage of the sign, in this case, doesn't occur within a sentence, but still has meaning) There is a shared Background, and shared meanings, which we were both born into which allows us to discuss how to garden.

If that's the conclusion I should draw from what I said, I don't see it as of yet. Meanings aren't related to our capacities, so just because we have different capacities -- are able to do different things with words -- that does not then mean that words have two different senses of meaning. We can use "apple" and we can mention "apple", but that's just us using the same word in a different way. — Moliere

Well you've totally lost me. If meaning is what a word means, and I can know what "apple" means, and knowing is a capacity, then how can you say "meanings aren't related to our capacities"? Isn't it clear to you that if we can know the meaning of something, and knowing is a capacity then necessarily meaning is related to our capacities. Is knowing not a capacity of human beings?

Now, you're not paying attention to the example. The example does not demonstrate that we can do different things with words. it demonstrates that we can know the meaning of a word in two very distinct ways. I am not talking about doing anything with a word, you keep interpreting in this way, and now I have to keep on correcting you. I am talking about interpreting, and that is doing something with the mind, not the word. In the example, we are doing something with our minds, knowing the meaning of a word. And, we do this in two distinct ways, by either relating the word to an object, or by relating the word to a definition.

One person knows the word "apple" as meaning that particular object on the table, and another person knows the word "apple" as meaning "a round red fruit", and both are correct. Do you not recognize a fundamental difference between relating the word to a particular object, and relating the word to a bunch of other words?

The sarcasm was on my part. I was indicating that asking for more specificity than "the truthmaker is the facts" was sarcastic understatement from me.

In the rest of your post, you're saying that the truthmaker for "The definition of 'tomato'," in a context-independent way (re that specific context) is how people use the word "tomato."

The problem with this is that that IS the specific context I was referring to. So that's not a context-dependent "true definition" (re that specific context).

The problem is this.

(A) You're agreeing that definition doesn't refer to anything like consensus or conventional usage unless we qualify that that's what we're referring to. (And the reason you agreed to this, as you should have, was that you can comprehend the usage of "definition" in a case like "I will define 'tomato' as 'a lint ball.'")

(B) You're claiming that "The definition of 'tomato' is x," unqualified, can be true or false. (And you've also made claims that this is true regardless of usage, although it's fine if we don't bother with that part here. That you claimed the definition, unqualified, can be true or false is enough.)

(C) When pressed on how the definition, unqualified, and independent of the specific context of usage, which isn't implied by the word "definition," can be true or false, you explain that it's true or false by virtue of how the term has been used. Well, this contradicts both (A) and (B).

Well you've totally lost me. If meaning is what a word means, and I can know what "apple" means, and knowing is a capacity, then how can you say "meanings aren't related to our capacities"? Isn't it clear to you that if we can know the meaning of something, and knowing is a capacity then necessarily meaning is related to our capacities. Is knowing not a capacity of human beings? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's fair. I should be more specific. What I mean is that what a meaning is is not related to our capacities. Yes, we can see some kind of relation between our abilities and our words (and the relationship may just be one of knowing or believing), but I just meant to indicate that our capacities do not create meanings.

One person knows the word "apple" as meaning that particular object on the table, and another person knows the word "apple" as meaning "a round red fruit", and both are correct. Do you not recognize a fundamental difference between relating the word to a particular object, and relating the word to a bunch of other words? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't. Objects and words, insofar that either exists, are existential equals.

In the rest of your post, you're saying that the truthmaker for "The definition of 'tomato'," in a context-independent way (re that specific context) is how people use the word "tomato."

The problem with this is that that IS the specific context I was referring to. So that's not a context-dependent "true definition" (re that specific context). — Terrapin Station

Context-independence is your term. Insofar that you're using that qualifier I am too, but it was not I who introduced this notion. Hence why I asked what would count for the qualifier in any case at all, since the way I would put things would be to say there is no such case with regards to anything.

You're agreeing that definition doesn't refer to anything like consensus or conventional usage unless we qualify that that's what we're referring to. — Terrapin Station

"Meaning", but yeah. Definitions describe meanings, by my reasoning. I understand that you don't agree with the distinction, but I'm just making it explicit that this is what I'm saying.

You're claiming that "The definition of 'tomato' is x," unqualified, can be true or false. (And you've also made claims that this is true regardless of usage, although it's fine if we don't bother with that part here. That you claimed the definition, unqualified, can be true or false is enough.) — Terrapin Station

I'm claiming that a definition can be true or false. I'm not sure where I said "unqualified".

When pressed on how the definition, unqualified, and independent of the specific context of usage, which isn't implied by the word "definition," can be true or false, you explain that it's true or false by virtue of how the term has been used. Well, this contradicts both (A) and (B). — Terrapin Station

To me this just seems like a strange set-up. Perhaps it derives from your notions on truth, actually -- since many people seem to believe that truth is somehow a property which pertains outside of context. But that's just a guess on my part, I don't know.

What I can say without reservation is that definitions can be true or false, and they are true or false by virtue of usage. That isn't to say that usage is the same as meaning, but that usage is how we determine meaning. But since I've been relying on usage as my methodology, it would certainly be shooting myself in the foot to then say that meanings exist in an unqualified and independent of specific context way. But, this is an idea I think you introduced which I'm willing to engage, but it's not what I've been saying I believe.

I just don't think you need an unqualified and independent of context way for meanings to be in order for them to serve as facts. Since all facts are neither unqualified nor independent of context it strikes me that this is just an odd criteria, too, since even with non-controversial facts (such as "the capital of the United States in the year of our Lord 2016 is Washington DC") neither quality applies.

No. you are simply conflating mathematical and semantic meanings. Whether X represents the number of times you went to the shop, cleaned your teeth, fed your dog or whatever (your so-called "defined object") is absolutely irrelevant to the mathematical meaning of 'X', which is a variable; and a variable is just a symbol for a number we don't yet know. — John

I am not conflating, I am separating. You have been attempting to deny the existence of the semantic meaning of X, claiming that it only has a mathematical meaning. Now that you've found this to be untenable, you claim that the semantic meaning is irrelevant. That too is untenable. If someone is doing algebra to solve for "the number of times that I went to the store last week", then "the number of times that I went to the store last week" is of the utmost importance. Your claim that it is "absolutely irrelevant" whether X represents this, or something else, is absolutely nonsense.

That's fair. I should be more specific. What I mean is that what a meaning is is not related to our capacities. Yes, we can see some kind of relation between our abilities and our words (and the relationship may just be one of knowing or believing), but I just meant to indicate that our capacities do not create meanings. — Moliere

I'm not sure I agree with "our capacities do not create meanings", but consider this. Suppose that instead of "the meaning" of something, we are talking about "the colour" of something. If I demonstrated to you, that we could determine the colour of something by seeing it, and we could determine the colour of something by hearing it, wouldn't you agree with me that we were using "the colour" in two distinct ways? "The colour" refers to two distinct things, the visual impression, and the aural impression. Common usage is such that "the colour" refers to the visual impression and also to the aural impression. Wouldn't you agree that we should separate these two distinct things, such that when we talk about "colour" we can distinguish whether we are talking about the visual impression of the thing, or an aural impression.

This is what I am doing with "meaning". We have two distinct ways of determining "the meaning", one, by relating the word directly to an object, as we commonly do in day to day communication, and a second, by relating the word to other words (defining the word) as we do in more sophisticated situations. Do you not agree that we should identify and separate these two, so that when we talk about "the meaning", we can avoid ambiguity, and have a better understanding of what we are talking about.

'm claiming that a definition can be true or false. I'm not sure where I said "unqualified". — Moliere

Where you say "unqualified" is by saying "Definitions are true or false." "Definitions" there is unqualified.

Again, what's true or false is that so and so(s) is (are) using a term a particular way.

But that's not what "definition" (necessarily) refers to. You agreed to this.

I am not conflating, I am separating. You have been attempting to deny the existence of the semantic meaning of X, claiming that it only has a mathematical meaning. Now that you've found this to be untenable, you claim that the semantic meaning is irrelevant. That too is untenable. If someone is doing algebra to solve for "the number of times that I went to the store last week", then "the number of times that I went to the store last week" is of the utmost importance. Your claim that it is "absolutely irrelevant" whether X represents this, or something else, is absolutely nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a wicked distortion. I have never denied, but on the contrary have explicitly acknowledged, that arbitrary semantic meanings can be assigned to X. What I have denied is that, in the context of algebraic equations, the semantic meaning one may have assigned to X (the number of times you went to the shop, the number of hairs on your head, the number of times you farted in a twenty four hour period, and so on) has any mathematical relevance whatsoever. You are not "separating" these irrelevant semantic meaning from mathematical meaning (in this case the meanings of the algebraic operations involving variables) you are conflating them; it is I who have been doing the separating.

The other point you have conveniently glossed over is that I have been arguing that the fact that such arbitrarily assigned semantic meanings are possible doesn't tell us anything significant about language, because such assignations are only possible at all within, and are thus dependent upon, the non-arbitrary context of conventionally established semantic meanings.

I say that definitions can be true or false. Obviously a stipulative definition is neither true or false. A descriptive definition, on the other hand, is true or false. It is true in the case where the description describes the meaning of a term, and false when it fails to do so.

I think our disagreement follows more from my assertion that there are more definitions than stipulative definitions. I don't deny stipulation, only that there's more to definition than stipulation.

Suppose that instead of "the meaning" of something, we are talking about "the colour" of something. If I demonstrated to you, that we could determine the colour of something by seeing it, and we could determine the colour of something by hearing it, wouldn't you agree with me that we were using "the colour" in two distinct ways? — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose it depends, actually. If you could reliably hear green, then I'd just say you're using a different method that I'm not actually familiar with, but that there's no difference in the green property. If you're using "green", on the other hand, to describe something which is not green then you'd be using "green" differently.

Common usage is such that "the colour" refers to the visual impression and also to the aural impression. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd say that common usage refers to the color green, and not an impression of the color green.

Wouldn't you agree that we should separate these two distinct things, such that when we talk about "colour" we can distinguish whether we are talking about the visual impression of the thing, or an aural impression.

I'd say it just depends on if that's important or not. Consider a submarine. A submarine can detect, at a distance, objects by way of echo-location. But there's no need to constantly specify that the submarine is using echolocation when we, as humans, would typically use sight in determining spatial distrubtion of objects. We could just say "There is an object so many meters away from us", regardless. We might even say "I see an object so many meters away from us", even if what I see is a radar.

This is what I am doing with "meaning". We have two distinct ways of determining "the meaning", one, by relating the word directly to an object, as we commonly do in day to day communication, and a second, by relating the word to other words (defining the word) as we do in more sophisticated situations. Do you not agree that we should identify and separate these two, so that when we talk about "the meaning", we can avoid ambiguity, and have a better understanding of what we are talking about.

I think the use/mention distinction handles this well enough, personally, and that there's no need to divide meaning up because we can use a word or we can mention a word.

I think this is right. And it follows that definitions, may be considered to be kinds of assertions. Although stipulations cannot be true or false, and they are thus not assertions in that sense, I think they are assertions of a kind wherever they are proposed non-arbitrarily. The implicit assertion is that the stipulation will be useful or relevant in some way.

It is true in the case where the description describes the meaning of a term, — Moliere

It's true in your view if it describes the meaning of the term per what?

I think the use/mention distinction handles this well enough, personally, and that there's no need to divide meaning up because we can use a word or we can mention a word. — Moliere

So if you don't recognize these two distinct types of meaning, then how do you account for the difference between truth by correspondence and truth by coherence?

I'm afraid I'm not following what you're asking after here. What is "per what"? Like, by what authority? Or, by what feature of the world? or. . what?


A description of, say, the watch is true if it describes the watch. Likewise, a description of "watch" is true if it describes "watch". In the case of a descriptive definition we're asking after the meaning of "watch". So, a descriptive definition is true if it describes the meaning of "watch".

So what makes a descriptive definition true, as with any assertion, is the facts. The facts in this case is the meaning. The meaning is determined by usage.

The only answer I can think of is to state a basic version of both theories of truth, thereby making it clear how they differ. Or to say that we can account for differences by pointing out or describing differences -- by contrasting different ideas. But that all just seems kind of flippant on my part, and so doesn't seem to answer the question.

What are you asking for?

So what makes a descriptive definition true, as with any assertion, is the facts. The facts in this case is the meaning. The meaning is determined by usage. — Moliere

You're not claiming that what "definition" (or "meaning" in your usage) refers to, though, is "report of usage" are you?

No, I am not.

A descriptive definition is true if it accurately describes the meaning of a term.

We know the meaning of a term by its usage -- more specifically, as I stated earlier, the extension of usage.

The first states under what conditions a descriptive definition is true, and the latter states how one might go about evaluating whether a descriptive definition is true.


EDIT: At least if by "report of usage" you mean statements like --

"Robert said, "Please pass the salt""

Or --

"It has been observed that "salt", by and large, is often used to refer to salt"


The latter is closer to what I am on about, but I am claiming that meaning exists too, and that a definition is true as long as it accurately describes the meaning of a term. (or perhaps even "a" meaning -- a definition does not need to be exhaustive in order for it to be true).

"It has been observed that "salt", by and large, is often used to refer to salt" — Moliere

That's a report of usage.

At any rate, the reason I asked for clarification on this is that if you're NOT saying that definitions (or meanings) necessarily refer to reports of usage, then saying that meaning is determined by usage doesn't answer the question about what facts make a meaning true.

Saying that a definition is true if it describes the meaning of the term is just putting what you're claiming in different words, and it's not answering the question I'm asking. I'm asking what makes it true that something is a meaning of a word. Usage can't be the answer if you're agreeing that definitions do not necessarily report usage.

What are you asking for? — Moliere

Well, consider "the apple is red". This phrase might be referring to a particular object on the table which appears to be red, and we might therefore say it is a true statement, by means of correspondence. On the other hand, it might be a defining statement, referring to a type of object titled "the apple", and describing this type of object as red. What I've argued, is that these are two very distinct types of meaning which that phrase could have (you haven't yet seen the need for discerning these two distinct types of meaning). The need for two distinct types of meaning comes about from the two very distinct ways that truth or falsity is judged of the phrase.

The example phrase is very simple with respect to correspondence, as I described. "The apple" is agreed to refer to a particular object, and "red" is agreed as the term for the way it appears to the human eye. But when we take "the apple" to refer to a class of objects, rather than a particular, we are making a generalization. "The apple is red" is a defining phrase, saying that all tings in this class, called "apple", are necessarily red. Then, in order that there is truth here, it must be the case that all objects which will be called "apple" are necessarily red. Otherwise, our defining phrase, "the apple is red" is false.

Now here's the difficult part, and this appears to be the substance of your discussion with Terrapin. What allows either of these meanings of the phrase to be judged as true? In the case of the correspondence, there is an agreement that the particular object is called "apple", then we agree on a judgement of truth, regardless of what anyone might say an apple "really" is. That is the apple, we've designated it as such, and therefore the phrase is true regardless of whether that object is really an apple or not. So let's move to the defining statement. Now we cannot go on a simple arbitrary designation, (that object we will call apple), we need structure, consistency. And we cannot say that all things we call apple are necessarily red, because we define "apple" by other criteria. And we must maintain consistency within this conceptual structure of criteria. No longer are we looking at a thing called "apple", but we are looking at all the things called "apple", and deriving our truth from that. Here, the agreement is not between you and I, that this object on the table will be called "apple", which makes the truth. The correspondence, or agreement, if there is any, is between all the objects called "apple", and the definition of "apple".

My question is, do you see this fundamental difference? In one case, truth is dependent on a agreement between individual human beings, we agree that the object is called "the apple", therefore it is true that this object is the apple. In the other case, there are things which we are calling apples, and truth is dependent on an agreement between the properties of these things, and our definition of "apple".

Saying that a definition is true if it describes the meaning of the term is just putting what you're claiming in different words, and it's not answering the question I'm asking. I'm asking what makes it true that something is a meaning of a word. Usage can't be the answer if you're agreeing that definitions do not necessarily report usage. — Terrapin Station

Usage is the method. If you want to know the meaning, then you look to usage -- or reports, sure. That is what one would look at. But whether a report is true is still different from whether or not a definition is true, since a report is describing events and a descriptive definition is describing word (sentences, phrases, etc.) meaning.

A meaning is different from a description. For you this is a restatement because you're saying definitions are meanings. But I would say that the meaning of some term isn't the same as its description.

"What makes it true that something is. . . "

"What makes it true that something is a chair?"

This question is clearer to me than the previous one. But I don't have an answer for you, which is bound to disappoint. But I also don't have an answer for the latter -- at least not one that I believe is true. You're asking after, from what I'm able to parse, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can pick out, out of all the entities, which entities are meanings.

I'd put it to you that to ask the question "What makes it true that something is a chair?" is to at least have a notion of "chair" and chairs. It is possible for us to know that this is a chair without knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can definitively state what, of all entities, which entities are chairs.

Likewise, we can know whether something is or is not true without also knowing what it is that makes this true. (I know true statements, but I may not know what truth is)

But I do know what a chair is, in spite of not knowing "what makes it true that something is a chair" (or, perhaps more clearly stated, I'm able to pick chairs out of the entities I am familiar with). I could even offer a definition of "chair", though that's different from what you're asking.



I'm not offering a theory of meaning, as you have. So that may be a source of some miscommunication on our parts. But I also don't need one for my assertion that descriptive definitions are true, insofar that you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions as my argument didn't rely upon a theory of meaning but rather just on whether or not language is meaningful, or that meaning exists. This, I believe, is mostly the crux of our disagreement. You believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions. My strategy has been to demonstrate, by way of example, words which have meaning in spite of stipulation to show that there are meanings aside from stipulation. I understand that the perils of such a strategy is that any counter-example can be re-interpreted under a new theory, hence why I noted I know you can sustain belief in a stipulative theory of definition and meaning. My recourse from there was to note that beliefs in meaning account for more about how language is, whereas your account doesn't account for the factual and historical element of language -- that it, taken to extremes, would lead to a bunch of people barking but never communicating. Meaning really must be shared, at least, in order for us to communicate (insofar that we believe there is such a thing as 1st person experience, at least -- as I do, and I suspect, given your comments about meaning, that you do to).

There are very good reasons to believe that language has meaning. Aside from communication, which is only one part of what language does, we can read a letter, a play, a poem, a book, an article and they all are rich in meaning. This is something of a brute fact, from my perspective -- just as objects are. There is not an existential or ontological difference between objects and words. It's possible that neither exist, but I don't think you can deny one without also denying the other. (perception, after all, doesn't individuate on its own -- objects are named, and names are a part of language) So in some sense I'd say to deny language meaning is very similar to denying objects -- I understand that it can be done, but I don't have a good reason to do so.

My understanding of our disagreement isn't as much about the existence of meaning, however, as much as whether or not meaning is purely a stipulative, and thereby private/mental/subjective, affair.

So onto that:

I found Wittgenstein's treatment in P.I. fairly convincing in arguing that language is public. That we are able to communicate on a regular basis with one another, just as we are able to sit in the same chairs and share food, indicates we share meaning, and that notion of private language are only expressable because of this shared meaning -- since, if language were strictly private, then it would not express. It wouldn't mean anything, at least not to me. And you would say that I can look to your behavior when saying some private word and infer from behavior what you have in your head. But I would say that said inference is impossible without a language. Inference is built on our ability to use language. "if", "then", "possibly", are all words taught to us -- not discovered or invented by us.

Private languages don't account for this, which brings me to:

The phenomenological consideration that I was born into a world where the meanings of language pre-existed me. Language was always-already there. So it's simply true that I didn't define the words which I use. English is older than me, and has a history. I have a Background, of which language is a part.

So, I have good reason to reject that meanings are private, at least. I suspect they are not mental, but perhaps there is some way of parsing a public mental sphere which could make sense of the matter. However, I likewise suspect that any such parsing will make objects just as mental as words -- idealism of a stripe, even if it be a more reserved transcendental idealism.

Usage is the method. If you want to know the meaning, then you look to usage -- or reports, sure. That is what one would look at. But whether a report is true is still different from whether or not a definition is true, since a report is describing events and a descriptive definition is describing word (sentences, phrases, etc.) meaning. — Moliere

This makes no sense, though. If usage is what makes meanings true, and a definition gives the meaning, then a definition isn't true independent of meaning. That's a simple contradiction.

For you this is a restatement because you're saying definitions are meanings. — Moliere

?? I'm not saying that at all. I said that they're two different things on my view.

However, the more you're writing the less sure I am of what the relationship is in your view between definitions, descriptions and meanings.

You go on to say both:

you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions — Moliere

and

you believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions — Moliere

Which is again a simple contradiction.

That last part went on to say:

you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions — Moliere

That's not at all true. I don't believe that meanings are stipulated definitions. I explained this earlier. In my view, meanings are mental associations that we make, where they're inherently mental and can't be made into or translated into something else. The words we express via speaking, writing, etc. (so, for example, definitions) are correlated with meanings, but they're not the same as meanings.

It's probably not very important to get into that, though, for a discussion where you're claiming that definitions (or meanings, or whatever you'd like to call it) can be true where that can be independent of usage.

Likewise, we can know whether something is or is not true without also knowing what it is that makes this true. — Moliere

The importance of being able to say what makes it true is when someone--that's me--comes along and challenges the claim that definitions can be true (or false). If you're going to claim that they are indeed capable of having truth values, then you'd better be able to support that claim beyond "I just know that it's the case" which is essentially all that you're saying here. To me, it just looks like a combination of not wanting to analyze this very much (because you like the view you hold) and perhaps being too lazy to analyze it very much.

Re "What makes it true that something is a chair?" my answer to that is simple (well, rephrasing it because it's not true (or false) that something is a chair--it needs to be rephrased to something like "What makes me say that that is a chair?") The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. This has the upshot that it's a chair to them, and it might not be a chair to someone else. And that's indeed the case with ALL name-bestowal. Not everyone calls the same things by the same identification names. Not everyone has the same concepts.

Re "I'd put it to you that to ask the question 'What makes it true that something is a chair?' is to at least have a notion of 'chair' and chairs." I don't at all agree with that. You could say, "Hey, that's a reetswahtter!" I haven't the faintest idea what a reetswahtter might be. So I'd ask you "What makes you say that's a reetswahtter?" and hope that your answer would give me some clues as to what the heck a reetswahtter is in your usage.

Anyway, this is all going way far afield from what I was asking you. We're going off on a bunch of tangents, which I hate doing, and that's why I hate that people type such friggin long posts, especially in response to a simple, direct question. I want to focus on one simple thing at a time.

But I also don't need one for my assertion that descriptive definitions are true, insofar that you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions as my argument didn't rely upon a theory of meaning but rather just on whether or not language is meaningful, or that meaning exists. This, I believe, is mostly the crux of our disagreement. You believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions. — Moliere

Just really quickly -- putting your contradictory quotes into context above

"insofar" means "if" in the above, not "Since".

If I believe that they're the same thing, I can't have an "insofar as I believe there can be a difference."

That's a contradiction.

If there can be differences, they're not the same thing.

(Of course, I don't believe they're the same thing. I rather believe that definitions are correlated with meanings.)

Alright, cool. Then I did (and probably do) not understand your objection.

This makes no sense, though. If usage is what makes meanings true, and a definition gives the meaning, then a definition isn't true independent of meaning. That's a simple contradiction. — Terrapin Station

Usage is not what makes meanings true. Usage is how one determines what a meaning is. Meanings themselves, I suspect, are not true or false. It would be like saying a chair is true or false to say that meanings are true or false.

A definition describes the meaning. Is that the same as gives? I don't think so.

In my view, meanings are meantal associations that we make, where they're inherently mental and can't be made into or translated into something else. The words we express via speaking, writing, etc. (so, for example, definitions) are correlated with meanings, but they're not the same as meanings. — Terrapin Station

Gotcha.

Then we're not so different, I think, except insofar that I don't believe that meanings are mental. They are, however, associated with words/phrases/sentences. (do we associate the meanings? We can, but we also don't always do so

The importance of being able to say what makes it true is when someone--that's me--comes along and challenges the claim that definitions can be true (or false). If you're going to claim that they are indeed capable of having truth values, then you'd better be able to support that claim beyond "I just know that it's the case" which is essentially all that you're saying here — Terrapin Station

I certainly didn't have a proof written up. I'm just being honest about that. I'm working through ideas with you. It helps to have someone who disagrees to do exactly that. Sorry if it frustrates. After all:

To me, it just looks like a combinatino of not wanting to analyze this very much (because you like the view you hold) and perhaps being too lazy to analyze it very much — Terrapin Station

It would be an odd way of being lazy, considering the length of the discussion so far. :D

Re "What makes it true that something is a chair?" my answer to that is simple (well, rephrasing it because it's not true (or false) that something is a chair--it needs to be rephrased to something like "What makes me say that that is a chair?" The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. This has the upshot that it's a chair to them, and it might not be a chair to someone else. And that's indeed the case with ALL name-bestowal. Not everyone calls the same things by the same identification names. Not everyone has the same concepts. — Terrapin Station

The problem I have with that is we just don't operate on necessary and sufficient criteria. People don't gaze about looking at objects and evaluating them on this basis. Philosophers wonder about answers to these questions, but this does not reflect how people identify chairs.

To rephrase your question in terms of meaning, then -- "What makes me say that that is a meaning of a word?"

Again, I would say an answer to the question "What makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart?" is to ask the exact same question. It's not ideas, from my view, as per what I stated above. Notions maybe, in the sense that people have rough ideas, but not necessary and sufficient conditions. At least, from the way I believe we actually use words and think about these things.

There's an ambiguity in the word "makes", too -- I mean, I could say that what makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart is someone asked me whether or not Walmart has chairs, and reply in a jocular fashion, "That is a chair of Walmart". So someone else's question made me say exactly that.

What makes me say that words are correlated with meanings -- signifiers with signifieds -- is that there are signs in the world, and they mean things regardless of what beliefs I might hold about those signs. "tomato" refers to a tomato even if I use "tomato" to insult someone. What makes me say that this is a meaning is that meanings of words are as public as chairs of walmart. To go back to an older example:

Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad — Moliere

If you were to reply, "Now what does that mean?", and meanings are private, then I would reply:

Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad — Moliere

And "Now what does that mean?" would have about as much meaning as the above example does.

So when you state:

So I'd ask you "What makes you say that's a reetswahtter?" and hope that your answer would give me some clues as to what the heck a reetswahtter is in your usage. — Terrapin Station

I only understand you because I know the meanings of your words. Were they private, then the whole thing has about as much meaning as reetswahtter does in English.

Anyway, this is all going way far afield from what I was asking you. We're going off on a bunch of tangents, which I hate doing, and that's why I hate that people type such friggin long posts, especially in response to a simple, direct question. I want to focus on one simple thing at a time. — Terrapin Station

And I was just getting to how this all leads to World Peace. Darn.

I don't want to talk about 50 different things in each reply, so I'm just going to cover one thing at a tinme.

The problem I have with that is we just don't operate on necessary and sufficient criteria. — Moliere

You weren't reading me to say that people explicitly think, "What are my necessary and sufficient criteria for this," were you?

When I read this:

The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. — Terrapin Station

That is what I hear.

You read it as if I'm saying that they're explicitly saying "What are my necessary and sufficient criteria"??? Why in the world would you read it that way? It in no way SAYS that they explicitly say "What are my necessary and sufficient criteria"

My question is, do you see this fundamental difference? In one case, truth is dependent on a agreement between individual human beings, we agree that the object is called "the apple", therefore it is true that this object is the apple. In the other case, there are things which we are calling apples, and truth is dependent on an agreement between the properties of these things, and our definition of "apple". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that makes a good deal more sense to me now. In one case we're offering a standard by which to judge whether something fits a category, and in the other we are referring to some entity.