the assertion's truth maker is something else. — Michael

I'm not sure I'm following your comment. Something else other than what caused you to make the claim you mean?

M: My dog exists.

D: Dogs have two ears.

P: My dog has two ears.

My dog is a truthmaker for P. The representation M entails P. Right?

I'd say that your dog having two ears is a truthmaker for P. Your dog alone isn't enough to entail that P. After all, your dog might only have one ear.

Sorry @Mongrel for the divergence. If you think it's not quite applicable, we could move this to another thread. My thought was that "meanings" could actually serve as one half to the correspondence theory -- meanings could correspond to facts, whether those facts be about English or otherwise.


"associating" differs in meaning from "defining". And, yes, we certainly disagree on word meaning.

Were you to define "tomato" as "used for emphasis", and by "define" I mean "descriptive definition", then that definition would be false. This is because the meaning of a word does not belong "in the head", as you say. We may take a sign and stipulate a meaning with that sign. But "tomato" still means "a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc." -- I can imagine other ways of phrasing this too that would be true -- regardless of your stipulation.

Now, if everyone began to use "tomato" as "used for emphasis", then the meaning of the word has changed. But that, in and of itself, is no reason to think that meanings on "in the head".


Consider, for instance, the following:

Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad

I can tell you what I mean by this, but clearly it doesn't mean anything in English -- because there is a fact to the matter of English(just because we are "in L" does not mean there is no fact to the matter). Also, the word "mean" here has two different meanings -- my first usage means "intend" and my latter use means "extension of a word".

Hence why I'd say there is more to definitions than stipulations. There are stipulative definitions, but there's a reason one must stipulate -- because the meanings of words are often more diffuse than some given speaker might wish to express.

Now, intentions are mental and we can intend this or that meaning with a word. But meanings differ from intent.


All that being said, you are of course free to postulate and even stick to a strictly stipulative theory of meaning. But it is at the very least idiosyncratic. What reason would you have for believing it, given that we have to learn a language, after all, and that there are at least purported facts about language. How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning? The mathematical average of the contents of a culture's mind?

What would motivate such a belief?

As in, the whole process of definition relies on truth, so trying to define truth will necessarily result in circularity? Or just a general skepticism, given the results so far?

When someone says, "I will define 'tomato' as 'to move with rapid, jerky motions,'" do you simply say that the person is making no sense, or can you understand that when that person says "tomato" from that point (at least in the context at hand), he's going to be referring to "moving with rapid, jerky motions"?

The latter.

Okay, but if you can understand that, how would it make sense to say that "definition" necessarily amounts to a report of what most people (at least of a given population) are doing? That's not what our hypothetical person is doing above when he defines "tomato" as "to move with rapid, jerky motions."

It seems to follow from your theory of stipulation -- at least, that's the best interpretation I can come up with, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective. When a class learns the meaning of the word, and the meanings of words are mental/private/subjective, then it would seem that the meanings we learn are some conglomeration of mental meanings.

Obviously the hypothetical person is stipulating another definition. But not many people are using said definition, no?

But you seem to be saying I have it wrong. So, what would you say we learn when we learn the meanings to English words, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective?

As in, the whole process of definition relies on truth, so trying to define truth will necessarily result in circularity? Or just a general skepticism, given the results so far? — Moliere

In Frege's argument an infinite regress appears with any attempt to define truth. It's not just Correspondence. It's any definition. I wrote out Frege's argument on the old forum and went through it. I guess that's all in the bit bucket, huh?

Sorry Mongrel for the divergence. If you think it's not quite applicable, we could move this to another thread. My thought was that "meanings" could actually serve as one half to the correspondence theory -- meanings could correspond to facts, whether those facts be about English or otherwise. — Moliere

You mean use meaning as truth-bearers? How would that differ from using propositions? And it's cool if you want to continue the conversation here. I recently discovered that I'm not too clear on what entailment is. I think I'll start a thread on that shortly. :)

Yeah, as truth-bearers. And it would differ, at least from my understanding of Propositions, because the meaning is attached to utterances -- the extension of usage. Propositions, from what I understand, are semi-Platonic entities.

Obviously the hypothetical person is stipulating another definition. But not many people are using said definition, no? — Moliere

I'll get to the other stuff, but I want to just sort this one little thing out first. If "definition" on your account refers to some consensus usage, then one can't stipulate a definition that only one is using. That you can understand that one can stipulate a definition that only one is using implies that definition, unqualified, does not denote consensus usage. You'd need to qualify it as a "descriptive (of the consensus usage) definition" rather than a "stipulated, idiosyncratic definition," for example. A "stipulated, idiosyncratic definition" would make no sense if "definition" refers to consensus usage, because then we're saying that it's a "stipulated, idiosyncratic consensus usage," and in this case, used by only one person. That would be incoherent.

Yeah, as truth-bearers. And it would differ, at least from my understanding of Propositions, because the meaning is attached to utterances -- the extension of usage. Propositions, from what I understand, are semi-Platonic entities. — Moliere

What do you mean by "attached" there?

The conventional definition of propositions in contemporary analytic philosophy is that they are the meanings of declarative sentences.

This is not my account, but my understanding of your account. Just to be clear.

Well, I don't want to boil semantics down to pragmatics, more than anything. So "attached" just means it's not merely the usage of an utterance which is the meaning, but that the meaning of some utterance can be determined by the extension of usage.

I'm not sure what this is directed at.

Wait, so "definition" on your account doesn't refer to consensus usage, and/or you're now saying that ("on your account") you can't make sense of someone saying "I will define 'tomato' as 'to move with rapid, jerky motions'"?

"Definition" does not refer to consensus usage. The latter I've already assented to.

I imagine what's throwing us off is this:

Now, if everyone began to use "tomato" as "used for emphasis", then the meaning of the word has changed. — Moliere

But there is a difference between saying that we can tell what "tomato" means by what everyone uses "tomato" as, and that a descriptive definition refers to consensus usage. A descriptive definition describes the meaning of a term. We can tell what the meaning of that term is by the extension of usage of said term. There's not exactly a Committee for Consensus on the Sign which holds conventions to ensure consensus is reached, at least with most natural languages.

A stipulative definition is understood because I know what "to stipulate" means. "Tomato" has meaning regardless of what a person might stipulate it as because "stipulate" means. So, no, just because someone can use a sign idiosyncratically that doesn't sink the notion that "tomato" means something regardless of said stipulation.


Also, I think you're focusing on my former part -- admittedly larger -- of the post in this dialogue, whereas I'm focusing on my questions, such as:

How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning? The mathematical average of the contents of a culture's mind? — Moliere

Which seems to me to be the results of your theory -- that what you learn in English class, when you learn word meaning, is the average of mental contents -- which sounds a lot like consensus to me, but maybe not to you.

But if I could just have one question answered, because you seem to be indicating that I have it wrong, this would be the one:

what would you say we learn when we learn the meanings to English words, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective? — Moliere

But there is a difference between saying that we can tell what "tomato" means by what everyone uses "tomato" as, and that a descriptive definition refers to consensus usage. A descriptive definition describes the meaning of a term. We can tell what the meaning of that term is by the extension of usage of said term. There's not exactly a Committee for Consensus on the Sign which holds conventions to ensure consensus is reached, at least with most natural languages. — Moliere

This paragraph isn't at all clear to me, unless for some reason--though Lord knows what reason--you'd be reading "consensus" as necessarily referring to some sort of formal agreement a la your comment about a committee.

A stipulative definition is understood because I know what "to stipulate" means. — Moliere

Right, but if you took "definition" to necessarily refer to a consensus or conventional usage, then an idiosyncratic stipulative definition shouldn't make sense to you. That it makes sense to you would suggest that you're not using "definition" to refer to consensus/conventional usage (which you've already agreed to, so no need to go over this again).

"Tomato" has meaning regardless of what a person might stipulate it as because "stipulate" means. — Moliere

That sentence doesn't make sense to me, either (including grammatically).

So, no, just because someone can use a sign idiosyncratically that doesn't sink the notion that "tomato" means something regardless of said stipulation. — Moliere

The only idea was to separate "definition" from "consensus (or conventional) usage." "Definition" doesn't necessarily refer to consensus (or conventional) usage. Other than that, definitions only obtain via stipulation (per usage at least). But then it's just a matter of whether other people will agree with that stipulation or not. If lots of folks agree and follow suit, then it becomes a conventional usage, and dictionary authors note it when they're doing their work.

How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning? — Moliere

Nowhere am I denying that there is conventional or consensus usage of a language. What I've said is that (a) conventions or consensuses do not make something true or false (beyond it being true or false that such and such is a convention), (b) "Definition" does not conventionally refer to conventional or consensus definitions, and (c) Definitions are stipulations, not truth claims. That's not to say that what dictionary authors are doing is stipulating whatever definitions they'd like. But that doesn't imply that what "definition" conventionally refers to is a conventional or consensus usage. (c) is saying that definitions arise, historically, via stipulation.

Anyway, so you mostly learn the conventions of the language in English class. You could separate prescriptions from that, but really, prescriptions are the conventions of a particular population (such as English professors and other people considered language experts).

that what you learn in English class, when you learn word meaning, — Moliere

On my view, one can not learn, or share, etc., meaning. Meanings are mental-only, and can't be made non-mental. You learn definitions and observe (behavioral) usage. Meanings are something that happen inside an individual's head, from a first-person perspective. (This is a response to your final question as well.)

Well, I don't want to boil semantics down to pragmatics, more than anything. So "attached" just means it's not merely the usage of an utterance which is the meaning, but that the meaning of some utterance can be determined by the extension of usage. — Moliere

I'm having trouble following this... sorry. Consider agreement. Two people are willing to assert the same truth-bearer. It can't be that they're willing to make the same utterance. I can't make your utterance and vice versa.

I'll get to the other stuff, but I want to just sort this one little thing out first. If "definition" on your account refers to some consensus usage, then one can't stipulate a definition that only one is using. — Terrapin Station

You can stipulate any arbitrary eccentric meaning you like for any word you want to, as in your example; but your stipulation, if it is to be understood, will always rely on conventional shared meanings for the terms your stipulation employs. It will necessarily be reliant, in other words, on other meanings which you have not stipulated, meanings which have been established by usage.

So, the fact that arbitrary meanings can be stipulated of words and phrases really shows nothing of any significance about meaning or definition.

So, the fact that arbitrary meanings can be stipulated of words and phrases really shows nothing of any significance about meaning or definition. — John

This isn't entirely true. A person can stipulate a definition as a premise, for the purpose of deductive argument. The logical argument, and others which follow, using conclusions as further premises, will produce a structure of meaning built upon that stipulated meaning. So we can have significant meaning which is built upon stipulated definition. This is fundamental to scientific theory.

The issue which we have to be very wary of, is when a stipulated definition is close to but varying slightly from the meaning of conventional usage. Then, if in the process of logical argument, one slips from the stipulated definition to the conventional meaning, we have a case of equivocation. These are generally sloppily produced arguments found in places like tpf, and pop philosophy, they are not the arguments of good philosophy or good scientific theory.

Yes, but the stipulated meanings in those kinds of cases are not arbitrary.

Yes, they can be arbitrary. That's the point, we can build a structure of meaning on an arbitrary definition. Whether or not the stipulated meaning is arbitrary is irrelevant. There is a relationship between symbol and what is symbolized, and this could very well be arbitrary, but that doesn't affect the fact that there is meaning there. That's algebra "let X represent ...".

This paragraph isn't at all clear to me, unless for some reason--though Lord knows what reason--you'd be reading "consensus" as necessarily referring to some sort of formal agreement a la your comment about a committee. — Terrapin Station

More just that language isn't something which is institutional, as "consensus" seems to imply to me -- though there are other ways to institute, of course, than by consensus. I do not hold that meanings are made by consensus. There are even uses of similar phonemes which are unrelated to one another, and there are more or less popular uses of certain words, as well as archaic usage too.

There are institutions dedicated to language, but language came prior to said institutions.

Institutions are where we get conventions from. So, therefore, language is not purely conventional. I would say that there is a fact to the matter.

That sentence doesn't make sense to me, either (including grammatically). — Terrapin Station

"Tomato" means. "means" is a verb, indicating that the word is an active participant in language, regardless of intent. In the same way one might say "The rock is", I was stating ""Tomato" means" to indicate there is a fact to the matter.

Other than that, definitions only obtain via stipulation (per usage at least). — Terrapin Station

:D -- I am trying to draw a distinction between what you are smashing together. Definitions obtain via usage, not stipulation. So, it is either by use or by stipulation, at least if we happen to be just that smart and are debating the only two theories that are possible. ;)

To highlight the difference:

But then it's just a matter of whether other people will agree with that stipulation or not. If lots of folks agree and follow suit, then it becomes a conventional usage, and dictionary authors note it when they're doing their work. — Terrapin Station

Agreement is a kind of institutional action -- a way of creating institutions. But it is not agreement which gives meanings to words. We are able to stipulate, of course, because anything can serve as a sign. But this does not then mean that agreement creates meaning -- even if we agree to use "The crow flies from coast to coast" to mean "I'm a member of the Communist Party", and even if the entire communist party began using it in this manner, that would not change the meaning of "the crow flies from coast to coast".

There is a certain history to words which agreement is unable to overcome. People don't follow suit and decide to create language. Rather, we are born into a world with language, and it already means something, regardless of my intent.

I'd say that this is what your theory is unable to explain -- it explains how it is we can take a sign to mean something, but it doesn't explain the factual side of language.

(c) Definitions are stipulations, not truth claims — Terrapin Station

I think this is our only point of contention, really.

Anyway, so you mostly learn the conventions of the language in English class. You could separate prescriptions from that, but really, prescriptions are the conventions of a particular population (such as English professors and other people considered language experts)

On my view, one can not learn, or share, etc., meaning. Meanings are mental-only, and can't be made non-mental. You learn definitions and observe (behavioral) usage. Meanings are something that happen inside an individual's head, from a first-person perspective. (This is a response to your final question as well.) — Terrapin Station

Cool.

Then I'd submit to you that I know "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.

If I know that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc., then it is true that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.

If an utterance is true, then there is a fact to the matter.

If there is a fact to the matter with respect to language, then not all language is stipulated.

An utterance is a matter of language. And so I'd conclude that there is something missing in the belief that "all English definitions are stipulated"

This is just a bit more formal way of presenting what I already stated above.

I'm having trouble following this... sorry. — Mongrel

No worries at all. Please question away -- I'm far from an expert on this subject. I probably know just enough to hurt myself, really ;).

Consider agreement. Two people are willing to assert the same truth-bearer. It can't be that they're willing to make the same utterance. I can't make your utterance and vice versa.

True. But then suppose while I was in California I were to say, "It is 5:00 PM". And my cousin, who lives on the East coast, were to also say "It is 5:00 PM" at the same time in a telephone conversation. Only one of these utterances is true, even though they express the same semantic content. (well, OK, they could both be false as well -- but they can't both be true :D)

One of the reasons I like the focus on utterances is that it seems, at least, to be a nice and neat way to accept all the messiness of context without getting lost in the mud of possible contexts.

If I know that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc., then it is true that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc. — Moliere

Here's a slight problem. When I say I know what "tomato" means, does this mean that I can ring off an acceptable definition as you have, or does this mean that I can identify a tomato? It is possible that one is capable of the latter, without being capable of the former, or even vise versa. So for instance, if a child learns the word "tomato", and is able to point to a tomato when the word is spoken, but is not able to state what the word "tomato" means, would you say that the chid knows the meaning of "tomato" or not? If not, why is being able to relate the symbol to the object not a case of knowing meaning?

How about both? I'd call the former a descriptive definition, and the latter an ostensive definition. So they are two different definitions of the meaning, but we can both fairly say we know the meaning of the word, I think.